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| EUobserver, July 21, 2015. Government Accountability Office, U.S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, at 62 (May 2017). Nina Jankowicz, Assessing the Western Response to Russian Disinformation in Europe How Can We Do Better, at 11 (2016-2017). disinformation. It also provides regular monitoring reports and policy recommendations, publishes case studies, conducts trainings, and convenes practitioners and policymakers in both open and closed forums. 806 A similar effort, the Information Warfare Initiative, is run by the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), an American think tank with offices in Europe. The program monitors the content and techniques of Russian disinformation in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. In addition to monitoring, the initiative works to help policymakers develop strategies to counter disinformation. 807 European countries have also begun to develop multilateral efforts to produce and support accurate, independent Russian-lan- guage media that can serve as an alternative to Kremlin propaganda for Russian-speaking audiences. In response to a 2015 report by the European Endowment for Democracy, European governments are working to develop a Russian-language regional news hub and a multimedia distribution platform, as well as other initia- tives. 808 For example, the Netherlands and Poland are supporting the development of an independent Russian-language regional news agency. 809 In addition, the British Broadcasting Corporation BBC) is developing a blueprint fora content factory to help Central and Eastern European countries create Russian-language entertainment programs. 810 European governments joint efforts to promote investigative journalism have already proven effective. One positive example is the Russian Language News Exchange Program, launched in 2016 with support from the government of the Netherlands and other European governments and institutions. The program supports and trains journalists in the EU Eastern Partnership countries on Russia s periphery. In 2016, the program’s participants produced and exchanged more than 500 stories, and each story produced by the exchange garnered at least one million views across multiple platforms. Analysts attribute the program’s strong success to its focus on unique local reporting rather than covering the international stories that dominate Russian disinformation. 811 The program, currently funded through 2019, should be continued and expanded in future years. Finally, efforts to improve media literacy on Russia’s periphery have also shown a large return on investment. For example, the Learn to Discern Program, funded by the Canadian government, operated in Ukraine from July 2015 to March 2016. The program trained 15,000 Ukrainians in safe, informed media consumption techniques including avoiding emotional manipulation, verifying sources, identifying hate speech, verifying expert credentials, de- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 144 812 IREX, Learn to Discern https://www.irex.org/project/learn-discern (visited Dec. 15, 2017). See European Commission, Energy Strategy and Energy Union, https://ec.europa.eu/en- ergy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union (visited Dec. 31, 2017); Michael Ratner et al., Europe’s Energy Security Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification, Con- gressional Research Service, at 7 (Nov. 2015). Andrew Rettman, Eastern EU Leaders to Warn Juncker on Nord Stream II EUobserver, Mar. 17, 2016. Erik Matzen & Stine Jacobsen, Denmark Passes Law That Could Ban Russian Pipeline from Going Through its Waters Reuters, Nov. 30, 2017; Henry Roy et al., ‘‘Gazprom to Receive Funding for Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Financial Times, Apr. 24, 2017. tecting censorship, and debunking news, photos, and videos. Ina survey, 89 percent of participants reported using their new skills and 91 percent reported sharing their new skills with an average of six people each, reaching 90,000 Ukrainians in total. Furthermore percent of the 2.3 million Ukrainians who viewed the programs information campaign in its first two weeks reported a need for greater skills in discerning disinformation. 812 EUROPEAN ENERGY DIVERSIFICATION AND INTEGRATION While Europe has been slow to recognize and respond to the Kremlin’s weaponization of energy, some countries have begun taking steps to mitigate their dependence on Russian energy supplies and therefore reduce the Kremlin’s influence. The EU has traditionally had little, if any, influence over the energy policies of its member states. Since energy policy in European countries is set by national governments, with each EU member state making its own decisions regarding energy mix, suppliers, and contracts, the Kremlin has been able to pursue and implement its divide and conquer strategy by dealing with states on a bilateral basis. Over the past decade, however, EU member states, concerned about reliance on Russian energy and facing pressure to combat climate change, have begun to gradually increase cooperation and work toward developing a unified EU energy policy. In March 2015, the EU’s member state governments endorsed a European Commission proposal fora European Energy Union Among other things, the proposal focuses on energy security and solidarity, and an integrated European energy market. 813 Several European countries have also come out in strong opposition to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which could make Europe more dependent on Russian energy supplies and would significantly diminish Ukrainian government revenues collected from pipeline transit fees in its territory. In the summer of 2016, the leaders of Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania wrote to the European Commission president about their concerns that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline NS) could create destabilizing geopolitical consequences and pose certain risks for energy security especially by increasing Central and Eastern European countries reliance on Russian gas supplies. 814 And in late November 2017, the Danish government passed a law that would allow it to block NS for security or foreign policy reasons (the pipeline requires approval from Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, as it would traverse their territories). 815 The EU has also supported several projects to improve energy integration and reduce reliance on Russian energy supplies. These infrastructure projects, especially cross-border ones, are known as Projects of Common Interest and are supported by an EU fund VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 145 European Commission, Funding for Projects of Common Interest https://ec.europa.eu/en- ergy/en/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest/funding-projects-common-interest (visited Dec. 15, 2017). European Commission, EU Invests in Energy Security and Diversification in Central and South Eastern Europe https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/eu-invests-energy-security-and-diversifica- tion-central-and-south-eastern-europe-2017-dec-18—en (visited Jan. 4, 2018). Robbie Gramer, First US. Natural Gas Shipped to Poland Foreign Policy, June 8, 2017. 819 Agnia Grigas, US. Natural Gas Arrives in Lithuania Foreign Affairs, Sep. 12, 2017. South Stream Bilateral Deals Breach EU Law, Commission Says EURACTIV.com, Dec. 4, 2013. US. Department of State, Information Provided to Committee Staff. that aims to boost energy, transport, and digital infrastructure. 816 One project, the development of a liquid natural gas (LNG) terminal in Croatia, would provide new opportunities for energy supply diversification throughout the Balkans. 817 Similar LNG terminals in Lithuania and Poland have had transformational effects in reducing dependence on Russian pipelines for natural gas sup- plies. 818 LNG terminals allow for the development of spot markets for natural gas, ensuring that market forces keep prices in check, and reduce the Kremlin’s bargaining power by increasing supplier options. After it built an LNG import terminal, Lithuania was able to leverage a fair market price for its natural gas imports from Russia, ending years of paying the highest rates for gas in Europe. Lithuania’s president summarized the benefits of new sources of LNG upon the first delivery of US. LNG to her country in 2017: US. gas imports to Lithuania and other European countries is a game changer in the European gas market. This is an opportunity for Europe to end its addiction to Russian gas and ensure a secure, competitive and diversified supply.’’ 819 The EU has also made market liberalization and integration a key part of its energy strategy, launching the Third Energy Package into work towards a single EU gas and electricity market. The Package included key provisions on ‘‘unbundling,’’ or separating the activities of energy transmission from production and supply interests. Subsequently, the EU concluded that Gazprom had to unbundle its plans for the South Stream pipeline, leading Gazprom to effectively cancel the project. 820 A smart grid development between Slovenia and Croatia, as well as the development of improved Romania-Bulgaria electricity interconnections will also have positive effects. In northern Europe, several ongoing developments will also reduce dependence on Gazprom, including a gas pipeline from Norway to Poland, via Denmark (Baltic Pipe a Po- land-Lithuania gas interconnector project the construction of a Finland-Estonia gas pipeline upgrades to make the Estonia-Latvia gas interconnector bidirectional Baltic state participation in the ‘‘Nordpool’’ wholesale market for electricity and plans for all Baltic states to desynchronize from the Russia-Belarus electricity grid and integrate into the European energy grid. All of these developments show the importance of improving intra-EU connectivity and moving away from monopoly suppliers and companies, especially state-driven monopoly suppliers, which bring along with them entrenched oligarchies and other bad actors. 821 EU AND U S EFFORTS TO SANCTION MALICIOUS ACTORS The Russian government’s malign influence and hybrid warfare operations have led to a strong sanctions regime jointly imple- VerDate Mar 15 2010 04:06 Jan 09, 2018 Jkt PO 00000 Frm 00151 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\COMMITTEE PRINT 2018\HENRY\JAN. 9 REPORT FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER 146 Kristin Archick et al., EU Sanctions on Russia Related to the Ukraine Conflict, Congres- sional Research Service, at 1 (Sept. 2017). 823 Download 0.63 Mb. Share with your friends:
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