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JONATHAN GLOVER BIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN GLOVER
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JONATHAN GLOVERBIOGRAPHY OF JONATHAN GLOVERJonathan Glover was born in England in 1941. As a young man, Glover attend the elite Tonbridge boarding school for boys in southern Britain. Following his education there, Glover continued his studies in philosophy at Corpus Christi College at Oxford throughout the 1960’s. During his time at Oxford, Glover began to establish himself as a leading student of ethics and philosophy. As a result, Glover served as a Fellow in philosophy at the prestigious university’s New College. During this time, he earned a reputation as an excellent lecture and tutor. Later, Glover also served as Editor of Philosophy of Mind (1979) while continuing to make similar contributions to other publications in the field. Jonathan Glover is currently a Professor of Ethics at King’s College, University of London, and the director of the Centre for Medical Law and Ethics at the college. Currently, he is examining the philosophy of mental illness, in particular the nature of psychopathology. He resides in England with his wife, Vivette, a neuroscientist and two children. Beyond his academic life, Glover has also taken an active role in the political community. In addition to much of his work analyzing political events from a philosophical or ethical perspective, he has also been active within the forming European Community. In 1989, he chaired a European Commission Working Party on Assisted Reproduction. One of the final products of this commission, The Glover Report: The Ethics of New Reproductive Technologies (1989), is a major treatise on what continues to be an important political issue both in the EU and around the world. Likewise, Glover’s interest in applied ethics and philosophy contributed to his focus on questions raised by the Human Genome Project. Glover has written several books as well as presented dozens of articles at various conferences on philosophy, ethics, bioethics, science/medicine and other topics. Many of his writings are of social significance, as well as useful for Lincoln-Douglas and other types of debate. Among these works are: Humanity: A Moral History of The 20th Century (1999), Utilitarianism and Its Critics, editor (1990), I: The Philosophy and Psychology of Personal Identity (1988), What Sort of People Should There Be? (1984), Causing Death and Saving Lives (1977), Responsibility (1970). GLOVER ON ETHICSGLOVER’S CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL ETHICAL THEORIES In his most expansive work, Humanity, Glover attempts to develop an ethical theory by offering a historical account of the moral lapses and victories of the twentieth century. Through a series of case studies he attempts to articulate the reasons for the waning authority or influence of moral law as understood at the beginning of the twentieth century and attempts to “shape it consciously to serve people’s needs and interests” while “avoiding repetition of man-made disasters of the kind” witnessed during the Holocaust, My Lai, Apartheid and other events that reflect severe moral lapses. To explain these atrocities, Glover begins with a treatment of the flaws in traditional ethical theories such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and social contracts. Glover argues, conceding many arguments made Friedrich Nietzsche (For more see entry on Nietzsche) that “the idea of a moral law external to us is in deep trouble”. However, rather than arriving at the same conclusions as Nietzsche, Glover suggests that the erosion of an external authority doesn’t prevent the possibility of identifying a basis of morality that can still provide an ethical system that avoids the ends which Nietzsche describes. As he notes, “he [Nietzsche] believed in unrestrained self-creation, perhaps thinking only an external authority could provide a basis for restraint.” However, Glover argues, “the Nietzschean nightmare does not follow from Nietzschean premises.” Glover believes that despite the absence of an external basis for morality, i.e. g/God, there is still the ability to identify values, as well as resources from which to establish a moral, or ethical, system. Glover suggests that history and psychology reveal resources that may guide individuals and societies toward ethical action. Similarly, he suggests that, as a basis for morality, these hold the potential to avoid the shortcomings of an external system of morality founded in religion, as well as the brittle foundations on which Kantian ethics, utilitarianism, and others moral frameworks reside. As Glover notes, many of these frameworks motivated by calculated self-interests do not always support cooperation or ethical action when the relevant social penalties or rewards are modified. For example, social contracts often fail to restrain those who participate in them when the stakes are raised for one side or another. GLOVER’S ETHICAL THEORY: THE MORAL RESOURCES Glover optimistically suggests that, “fortunately, there are also the ‘moral resources’, certain human needs and psychological tendencies which work against narrowly selfish behavior. These tendencies make it natural for people to display self-restraint and to respect and care for others. They make it unlikely that “morality” in a broad sense will perish, despite the fading of belief in [external] moral law.” These moral resources on which Glover couches his ethical theory are three-fold. The first two he refers to as the ‘human responses’ which, under most circumstances, act as restraints on individual’s treatment of other human beings. Specifically, he describes these two resources as respect and sympathy. The third element Glover labels one’s moral identity. He explains, “we have different psychological responses to different things people do: acts of cruelty may arouse our revulsion...courage or generosity may win our respect...these responses are linked to our sense of our own moral identity...we have a conception of what we are like, and of the kind of person we want to be, which may limit what we are prepared to do to others.” Before examining how this forms the basis for moral action by which we may choose future, or judge past, actions, examining how Glover operationalizes each of these concepts is useful. Glover argues that there is a widespread disposition to (under normal circumstances) show people respect. He explains this as an “egalitarian kind of respects, which is shown to all members of a community, and which is sometimes thought of as respect for people’s dignity.” He continues noting that, “behavior showing respect for someone’s dignity symbolizes that person’s moral standing.” Often this disposition is backed by social convention, such as laws that attempt to protect individuals from physical or psychological harm. In other instances, psychological responses provide backing to this human disposition that Glover cites. For example, harming a helpless person may not carry social sanction, but nonetheless most people are restrained from doing so. However, Glover also suggests that this resource can be eroded. For example, in Argentina soldiers under the junta called the machine they used to deliver massive electric shocks ‘Susan’, and interrogation utilizing such means was referred to as a “chat with Susan”. By utilizing these cold jokes, the disposition towards respect can be eroded by effacing the mutual dignity of victims. Glover explains, “the cold joke mocks the victims. It is an added cruelty and it is also a display of power...it adds emphasis to the difference between ‘us’ and ‘them’.” He believes this difference is central in limiting the potential restraints offered by the resource. The second resource, sympathy, operates similarly to respect in Glover’s analysis of ethical successes and failures of the twentieth century. He explains, “our entanglements with people close to us erode simple self-interest...there is a constant pull towards new kinds of sympathy and commitment. Narrow self-interest is destabilized.” Likewise, sympathy can also be felt for people we don’t know. Those we identify with also often earn our sympathy, e.g. the refugees we learn about in news reports or the compassion we feel for those who have lost loved one’s in public tragedies. Thus, this recognition of a commonality, or identification, with other human beings Glover argues can provide a powerful restrain on immoral action. However, again like respect, this moral resource can also be effaced. For example, public humiliation and other strategies used during various episodes of the twentieth century ensured that torturers didn’t identify with victims and could rest easy believing those who suffered their acts “did not belong.” Among many examples Glovers cites were both the practices utilized during the Holocaust and the treatment of Indians during the British Occupation. As both these discussions reveal, the first two moral resources may provide restraints, but may also be eroded by particular situations or long-term strategies. Likewise, one may feign respect and sympathy for fellow humans while only acting in accord with those principles when it is necessary. However, the third moral resource Glover posits narrows the possibility for these restraints to be overcome. He notes that, “narrow self-interests [and immoral action are] . . . limited by the way we care about being one sort of person rather than another.” This concept of moral identity can take many forms. For example, you may think to yourself before an exam, I am not the type of person who cheats. Likewise, you may consider yourself not the type of person that would commit an act of violence (even in self-defense). Each of these considerations reflects a series of moral commitments through which you shape your identity. Glover explains, “this sense of identity has a moral charge when it is not a matter of style or personality but is of deeper character.” He believes that the decisions and acts in which individuals engage contribute to their character. As we repeat them, they sediment as part of our personal character. Likewise, we may develop ways that we respond to other people that shape our character. For example, you may detest gossip and value sincerity when you witness it in others. As Glover summarizes, “few people could easily give a list of what their own commitments are. We may only recognize them when they are challenged. But these, commitments, even if hardly conscious, are the core of moral identity.” Given the centrality of these commitments to one’s identity, Glover believes that they provide an additional significant restraint on immoral, or unethical actions. As he observes, “the question of the sort of person you want to be is central to the argument given by Socrates against the view that is in our interest to seem moral but not be moral. . . [because] inner conflict is a threat to happiness . . . and to be at peace with yourself depends on your anarchic and conflicting desires being subjected to the discipline of morality.” Glover explains how this in conjunction with the first two human resources creates a powerful restraint against unethical action. He notes, “on its own the Socratic argument seems weak. But it does make more sense if we presuppose the moral resources. Most of us have to some degree the human responses of respect and sympathy. Most of us do care, at least a little, about what sort of person we are. These dispositions all conflict with ruthless selfishness, greatly raising its psychological costs,” thus, restraining unethical acts. From this ethical theory, two implications emerge which are important as a starting point for understanding criticism of Glover’s theory and for highlighting its implications for debate (for the latter, see discussion below). First, Glover suggests that rather than offering prescriptive ethical principles for judging actions or evaluating ideas, the moral resources offer a way by which to judge alternatives and evaluate dispositions towards events. He notes, “the international machinery needs to be developed much further, but it is only part of what is needed. A change in the climate of opinion is also important. International intervention could be stronger if the attitude that war and persecutions are utterly intolerable was more deeply rooted.” Evaluating contemporary wars and persecutions, like the Summer 2006 conflict in Lebanon, through the lens of Glover’s theory provides that opportunity. Once evaluated, this lens further helps provide a mechanism by which to choose between action and inaction, as well as evaluating what actions individuals or nations take. The second implication articulates most clearly how Glover’s “moral resources” avoid the pitfalls of both religious, or otherwise externals moral codes, and brittle abstract notions of Kantian ethics and social contracts. Glover believes that the moral resources provide an ethical system that is part of human psychology. That is, one need not consult an external source of morality, e.g. a religion, or attempt to apply an evaluative tool kit, i.e. utilitarianism, but rather provides system that both fits the pitfalls of current ethical systems and provides a mechanism by which to avoid tragedies wrought by that system. As Glover explains, “at the core of humanized ethics are the human responses [of sympathy, respect, and consistency with one’s moral identity].” CRITICISM OF THE MORAL RESOURCES The first criticism of Glover can be found in the concessions he offers while making his argument. While he believes the moral resources offer a criterion through which to evaluate events and actions, he also concedes that its application across societies or cultures may be limited. As suggested, in the discussion of the sympathy and respect, the moral resources can be eroded by situational factors. He notes that often sympathy and respect provide fewer restraints when a potential victim lacks standing within the perpetrators social group, or another that is valued by the perpetrator. For example, consider the choices made by governments as to which “genocides” receive attention and which are ignored as atrocities occur. In the mid to late 1990’s the international response in the Bosnian conflicts stand in stark comparison to the inaction in Rwanda and underscore how sympathy and respect as a resource can vary based on who is competing for those responses. Most problematically, Glover concedes that in a hostile climate or war, social pressures often support group hostility to the demise of moral restraint. He defends this shortcoming and suggests that by adopting a lens that views events through the moral resources, the rest of the international community more decisively intervene in such failures of morality. Others suggest that Glover offers an incomplete account of a “moral history of the 20th century” he attempts to provide. William Schweiker, professor of theological ethics at the University of Chicago Divinity School, suggests that Glover’s theory offers an incomplete account. He notes, “The moral history Glover presents is disturbing not only for what it relates but also for what it fails to relate. Even as he seeks grounds for reviving the moral imagination and provoking moral sensibilities, Glover pictures humanity in its most depraved forms. No mention is made of the past century's great movements of liberation, or the worldwide women's movement, or struggles for freedom and human rights. Are these not also part of the moral history of the past century? This point is especially consequential for Glover's argument, since many of the resistance and liberation movements of the past century were inspired and championed by people with deep religious convictions.” As a result, they suggest that Glover both unfairly attempts to dismiss alternative ethical systems and fails to account for how they may fit into that ethical system. Critics suggest that this both limits the ability for Glover’s moral resources to arbitrate morals, but more importantly misinforms efforts to create authentic accounts of morality’s successes and failures. Schweiker explains that if an ethical history is attempting to offer guidance for avoiding past atrocities, then “insofar as any history is a complex act of remembering, how and what is remembered is of utmost importance.” APPLICATION TO DEBATE The “moral resources” theory of ethics that Glover offers provides extensive application in Lincoln-Douglas Debate. In particular, for resolutions in which you are asked to deduce what types of actions are morally justified, the theory provides multiple ways to examine the topic. For example, a recent topic asked debaters to determine whether or not the ends of military intelligence gathering justified the ends. In this instance, Glover’s theory provides an excellent criterion through which to evaluate those means to determine if their ends could morally justify them. By applying the human responses of sympathy and respect and our sense of moral identity, Glover’s theory provides a way to determine if and by what means such actions are justifiable. Likewise, the moral resources provide an excellent criterion by which to choose between alternatives offered by many resolutions. For example, a resolution asking you to decide whether a democratic society should value equality of opportunity or equality of condition provides another situation for an application of the moral resources. By considering the implications of a society acting in one of those two ways, you may evaluate the outcomes for individuals. Judging those effects in accord with Glovers conceptualization of sympathy, respect and moral identity provides a basis on which to make such a determination. Additionally, many value resolutions ask you to consider empirical questions. For example, a recent topic asked whether the death penalty is justified. In much the same way that Glover interrogates the horrors of the 20th century to determine if, how, and why the moral resources failed, they provide a criteria to determine whether a policy articulated by the resolution is a moral or ethical policy. For instance, comparing the psychological and physical horror of life on death row to the commitments of our human responses and moral identity as articulated by Glover provides a basis for rejecting it as a justified act. Countless other policies from parental consent for abortion to restrictions on immigration provide policies whose empirical effects may be evaluated utilizing Glover’s theory. Last, as you may have considered Glover makes several arguments that could facilitate a critique or indictment of the moral framework adopted by your opponents. Glover offers extensive reasons to be skeptical of authority-based morality, whether the state or g/God be the authority. Similarly, Glover suggests that other systems provide brittle foundations for a workable ethical theory. From Kantian ethics abstract basis to the highly contingent cost-benefit analysis implicit in many utilitarian theories, Glover provides extensive warrants interrogating the appropriateness of alternative ethical systems and criteria. 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