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BibliographyGavin W.R. Ardley. AQUINAS AND KANT: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN SCIENCES. New York: Longmans, Green, 1950.
Cambridge, MS: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969. Lewis White Beck. ESSAYS ON KANT AND HUME. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978. Edward Caird. THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT. Glasgow: J. Maclehose & sons, 1889. Andrew Cutrofello. DISCIPLINE AND CRITIQUE: KANT, POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF RESISTANCE. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994. Herman Jean DeVleeschauwer. THE DEVELOPMENT OF KANTIAN THOUGHT: THE HISTORY OF A DOCTRINE. A.R.C. Duncan, trans. New York: T. Nelson, 1962. Paul Guyer. THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Piotr Hoffman. THE ANATOMY OF IDEALISM: PASSIVITY AND ACTIVITY IN KANT, HEGEL, AND MARX. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1982. Immanuel Kant. CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956. Immanuel Kant. CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968. Immanuel Kant. THE DOCTRINE OF VIRTUE. PART II OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Immanuel Kant. LECTURES ON LOGIC. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Immanuel Kant. LOGIK. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974. Immanuel Kant. ON HISTORY. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963. Immanuel Kant. PROLEGOMENA. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953. Michael Morton. THE CRITICAL TURN: STUDIES IN KANT, HERDER, WITTGENSTEIN AND CONTEMPORARY THEORY. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993. Ben Lazare Mijuskovic. THE ACHILLES OF RATIONALIST ARGUMENTS: THE SIMPLICITY, UNITY AND IDENTITY OF THOUGHT AND SOUL FROM THE CAMBRIDGE PLATONISTS TO KANT: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF ARGUMENT. The Hague: Mannus Nijhoff, 1974. Herbert James Paton. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: A STUDY IN KANT'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY. New York: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1947. Irving I. Polonoff. FORCE, COSMOS, MONADS AND OTHER THEMES OF KANT’S EARLY THOUGHT. Bonn: Vouvier, 1973. Nathan Rostenstreich. EXPERIENCE AND ITS SYSTEMATIZATION: STUDIES IN KANT. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1965. Robin May Schott. COGNITION AND EROS: A CRITIQUE OF THE KANTIAN PARADIGM. Boston: Beacon Press, 1988. MORALITY IS EMBEDDED IN TILE HUMAN MIND1. MORALITY IS EMBEDDED IN HUMAN CAPACITY Robert Johnaesen, Communication Professor-Northern Illinois University, ETHICS IN HUMAN COMMUNICATION, 3rd ed., 1990, p. 47. An eighteenth century German philosopher, Kant believed that the uniquely human capacity was a sense of conscience (moral will, moral reason). To varying degrees, in Kant’s view, all humans possess a sense of right and wrong; universal moral law as apprehended by conscience must be obeyed by all rational beings. Moral imperatives inherent in human nature are categorical.
Immanuel Kant, Former Professor-Konigsberg, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, 1929, p. 639. Hence also everyone regards the moral laws as commands; and this the moral laws could not be if they did not connect a priori suitable consequences with their rules, and thus carry with them promises and threats. But this again they could not do, if they did not reside in a necessary being, as the supreme good, which alone can make such a purposive unity possible.
Immanuel Kant, Former Professor-Konigsberg, LECTURES ON ETHICS, 1963, p. 36-7. The supreme principle of all moral judgment lies in the understanding: that of the moral incentive to action lies in the heart. This motive is moral feeling. We must guard against confusing the principle of the judgment with the principle of the motive. The first is the norm; the second the incentive. The motive cannot take the place of the rule. Where the motive is wanting, the error is practical; but when the judgment fails the error is theoretical.
1. RULES OF CONDUCT ARE DETERMINED BY REASON Immanuel Kant, Former Professor-Konigsberg, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, 1929, p. 634. Whether reason is not in the actions through which it prescribes laws, itself again determined by other influences and whether that which, in relation to sensuous impulses, is entitled freedom may not, in relation to higher and more remote operating causes, be nature again, is a question which in the practical field does not concern us, since we are demanding of reason nothing but the rule of conduct; it is a merely speculative question, which we can leave aside so long as we are considering what ought or ought not be done. 2. REASONING LEAD TO LAWS AND REGULATIONS Immanuel Kant, Former Professor-Konigsberg, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, 1929, p. 633-4. But these considerations, as to what is desirable in respect of our whole state, that is, as to what is good and useful, are based on reason. Reason therefore provides laws which are imperatives, that is, objective laws of freedom, which tell us what ought to happen--although perhaps it never does happen--therein differing from laws of nature, which relate only to that which happens. These laws are therefore to be entitled practical laws.
Immanuel Kant, Former Professor-Konigsberg, LECTURES ON ETHICS, 1963, p. 1. Philosophy is either theoretical or practical. The one concerns itself with knowledge, the other with the conduct of beings possessed of a free will. The one has Theory, the other Practice for its object--and it is the object that differentiates them. There is another distinction of philosophy into speculative and practical. In general, we call sciences theoretical and practical, without reference to their objects. They are theoretical if they are the ground of the conception of the object; practical, if they are the ground of the exercise of our knowledge of the object.
Immanuel Kant, Former Professor-Konigsberg, LECTURES ON ETHICS, 1963, p. 1-2. The object of practical philosophy is conduct; that of theoretical philosophy cognition. Practical philosophy, being the philosophy of action, is thus the philosophy which provides rules for the proper use of our freedom, irrespective of particular applications of it. Just as logic deals with the use of understanding in general and not in particular conditions, so does practical philosophy deal with the use of the free will not in specific circumstances, but independently of the particular. Logic provides rules concerning the use of the will.
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