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RELIGION IS NECESSARY FOR A STRONG SOCIETY
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- IT IS BETTER TO TEMPORIZE AN EVIL FORCE THAN TO OPPOSE IT
- Alasdair Maclntyre
RELIGION IS NECESSARY FOR A STRONG SOCIETY1. UNCORRUPTED COUNTRIES VALUE ROLE OF RELIGION Niccolô Machiavelli, Political Philosopher, THE PRINCE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1981, p. 174.
If a principality or a republic is to be kept uncorrupted, it is important above all else to prevent corruption of its religious ceremonies, which must be held in the highest veneration. For there can be no clearer sign of the ruin of a country than to see divine worship despised. This can easily be demonstrated by examining the foundation upon which the religion of any country is built. 2. GOOD RULERS MAINTAIN PRINCIPLES OF RELIGION Niccolö Machiavelli, Political Philosopher, THE PRINCE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1981, p. 175. All rulers of kingdoms or republics, therefore, ought to maintain the principles of the religion of their country. For if they do this, they can easily maintain devotion, and consequently good order and unity, among their subjects. and they must give their support to all accounts of events which tend to strengthen religious faith, even if they do not believe in them themselves.
Niccolö Machiavelli, Political Philosopher, THE PRINCE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1981, p. 176. Many people indeed hold that the Church of Rome is the only source of well-being for the cities of Italy; but I shall now bring forward the available evidence against that opinion, and especially two very powerful arguments, which I consider unanswerable. In the first place, the corrupt example of the Roman court has extinguished all sense of religion and piety in Italy; which has been the cause of countless evils and disorders. For just as everything may be expected to go well where religion is strong, everything may be expected to go badly where it is lacking.
1. GOVERNMENTS SHOULD TRY TO TEMPORIZE AN EVIL FORCE Niccolo Machiavelli, Political Philosopher, THE PRINCE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1981, p. 187. From this story it should first of all be noted that when some evil or inconvenience threatens the state, either at home or from abroad, and the danger grows to the point where everyone begins to be alarmed, it is much safer to temporize and come to terms with it, than try to extinguish it by force. For those who attempt the latter policy nearly always increase the strength of their enemy and hasten the disasters they fear. 2. IT IS BE1TER TO TEMPORIZE AN EVIL FORCE THAN TO OPPOSE IT Niccolö Machiavelli, Political Philosopher, THE PRINCE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1981, p. 187. These evils are difficult to recognize when they first arise, since the beginnings of things are often deceitful at a later stage, when the dangers become clearly visible, it is better to temporize, rather than actually oppose them. For if we temporize, they may die a natural death; or at least the damage that results may be postponed.
Niccolo Machiavelli, Political Philosopher, THE PRINCE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1981, p. 187-8. And when a ruler decides to oppose the advance of some such development or to undo its effects, he should be very careful not to reinforce what he is trying to weaken. He should carefully consider the nature of the malady, and if he finds himself able to effect a cure, he should set about it without any hesitation; otherwise be should leave it alone and not try any form of treatment. For otherwise the same thing will happen to him as we have already seen happening to the neighbours of Rome; who would have done better once the Roman had acquired so much power, to try to placate them and restrain them by peaceful means, rather than to make war upon them and so compel them to invent new institutions and new means of defence.
Moral PhilosopherAlasdair Maclntyre has taught philosophy at the University College, Oxford University. He has also been a visiting professor of philosophy at Princeton University. He has written extensively in the area of ethics, moral theory and justice. In 1981, he published the first edition of After Virtue. In that book, he concluded that we still, in spite of the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one of sociology, lack any coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point of view. Moreover, Maclntyre argues that the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a way that restores rationality and intelligibility to our own moral and social attitudes and commitments. This essay will examine: (1) notions of rationality, (2) the link between values and society, (3) role of philosopher, (4) modern political theory, and (5) application to debate. Maclntyre challenges the assumption that values can be evaluated by a priori assumptions. Although he suggests that we seek to “rationally” discuss morality, that rationality is essentially subjective. That is when we make claims to support our values, we are left with an inherently local and subjective interpretation of our value criteria. Maclntyre’s work is complete with a more holistic view of our values. In 1982, Maclntyre delivered the Carlyle Lectures in the University of Oxford on “Some Transformations of Justice.” In preparing the material from those lectures for publication, he came to recognize that different and incompatible conceptions of justice are linked to different and incompatible conceptions of practical rationality. Maclntyre supports the interrelationship between justice and practical rationality by examining the views of justice taken by Aristotle, Gregory VII, and Hume. Maclntyre posits that their views of justice turned out to be inseparable from that of explaining the beliefs about practical rationality presupposed by or expressed in those views of justice. What had been originally conceived of as two distinct tasks [understanding justice or rationality] had become one. This is important for our understanding of Maclntyre’s notions of values and ethics. Indeed, Maclntyre sees a clear link between history, society, and values. To evaluate one requires an examination of the others. Maclntyre argued that a philosopher should attempt to write for academe and the everyday audience. There is indeed in philosophy a large and legitimate place for technicality, he argues, but only insofar as it serves the ends of a type of inquiry in which what is at stake is of crucial importance to everyone and not only to academic philosophers. The attempted professionalization of serious and systematic thinking has had a disastrous effect upon our culture. Obviously, it is extremely difficult to write for both audiences when dealing with complex issues such as values, rationality and knowledge. What Maclntyre wants philosophy to accomplish is to write a history of philosophy that is essentially practical. That is, the theories and postulates of philosophy are able to be applied and understood by everyday individuals participating in everyday events. To accomplish this task, Maclntyre argues, requires the philosopher to reconceptualize his/her audience. This new audience is one that is composed of scholars and “lay” people. Maclntyre further contends that modern academic philosophy turns out to provide means for a more accurate and informed definition of disagreement rather than for progress toward resolution of conflict. Professors of philosophy who concern themselves with question of justice and of practical rationality turn out to disagree with each other as sharply, as variously, and so it seems, as irremediably upon how such questions are to be answered as anyone else. They do indeed succeed in articulating the rival standpoints with greater clarity, greater fluency, and a wider range of arguments than do most others, but apparently little more than this. In the end we are left with a diverse, contradictory view of values such as justice. The diversity of claims requires philosophy to begin to develop some conclusions about how we conceptualize moral theory. Maclntyre posits that one of the most striking facts about modern political orders is that they lack institutionalized forums within which these fundamental value disagreements can be systematically explored. The facts of disagreement themselves frequently go unacknowledged, disguised by a rhetoric of consensus. Furthermore, in a discussion of both simple and complex issues, there is an illusion of consensus, even thought there is widespread disagreement. Moreover, the political institutions express disagreement is such a way as to avoid extending the debate to the fundamental principles which inform those beliefs. The debater interested in Maclntyre will find much to support a broad range view of values. Especially useful would be Maclntyre’s discussion of value relativity, and the inability to debate values as a priori assumptions. In addition, the debater can use Maclntyre to justify the inclusion of more “pragmatic” discussions, such as the effects of values and the social action that is supported by embracing certain value hierarchies. 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