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CRITICISM OF NIETZSCHEThese new perspectives on Nietzsche were greeted with contempt both by traditional critics of Nietzsche, who saw the perspectives as old Nietzsche in new clothes; and by traditional defenders of Nietzsche, who believed his thoughts were being diluted and sanitized by postmodern thinkers who wanted to appropriate his reputation by twisting his philosophies. The traditionalists remind us that Nietzsche is still arguing that women are subordinate, regardless of his seeming “respect” for gender differences. They argue that he is still an elitist, regardless of his seeming concern for the excesses of democracy. And they point to his confrontational style as evidence not or irony, but of the arrogance that he thought was justified by the greatness of his ideas. To begin with, Nietzsche is still anti-woman. The best way to prove this is simply to acknowledge that Nietzsche never intends to allow women participation in public life. Why is this important? Because in privileging the classic Greek and Roman values, Nietzsche sees participation in the shaping of history as being more important than personal vanity. Nietzsche assigned women into this realm of vanity. He argues that they are little more than ornaments and cooks. It may be argued, as Froese attempts above, that one can derive a feminist respect for difference from Nietzsche’s conceptual separation of the masculine and feminine. But one must ask at what price one can afford such extraction. The “feminine,” for Nietzsche, is not simply a mysterious power. It is fundamentally an other-worldly power, not merely an “other” demanding respect. Because it is other-worldly, this implies that it has no place in “our world.” Our world, of course, is the world of public discourse and participation, in Nietzschean terms power and leadership. By excluding women from that realm, even due to their “special” or privileged nature, a Nietzschean philosophy silences women. Second, regardless of the new attention Nietzsche has been receiving by philosophers of democracy, he is still anti-democratic. His philosophical project is fundamentally devoted to promoting elitism. He believes the weak should know their place and the strong should rule. Now it is true that this hierarchy is found in nature, and it is equally true that 20th Century regimes’ attempts to enforce an order of equality have failed and have often made things worse for common people. But Nietzsche would not stop at criticizing the social experiments of enforced egalitarianism. He fundamentally believes that people are not created equal; that they are not endowed with natural rights, and that neither governments nor collectives of any kind can or should protect those rights. It is difficult to see what contribution Nietzsche could make to a philosophy of democratic empowerment. He is simply uninterested in providing any kind of “fair” access to political power. Finally, Nietzsche’s style may open itself up to misinterpretation because of its disconcerting emphasis on confrontation and power. As Michael Pantazakos writes, Nietzsche shamelessly admires brutal heroes. This may rub us, or influence us, the wrong way: Nonetheless, perhaps the apparent "danger" of Nietzsche's vocative locutions, for these misinterpreters and even for his sympathetic readers, lies not so much in his content as in his style. Perhaps it is his over-wrought manner, his Teutonic bluntness, his unabashedly naked contempt that is troubling. Or perhaps the fault is ours. Perhaps it is the heroic mode of the clarion itself that we are no longer turned to hear as a clear and noble invitation to action but as a muddled ominous clamor… Nietzsche's dynamic call to arms is so essentially disconcerting. (Michael Pantazakos, "The Form of Ambiguity: Law, Literature, and the Meaning of Meaning," CARDOZO STUDIES IN LAW AND LITERATURE, Winter 1998, pp. 203-204.) IMPLICATIONS FOR DEBATEFirst, by emphasizing Nietzsche’s claim that we do not and cannot live the values we purport to possess, value debaters can dismiss claims of deontology or utilitarianism. Nietzsche’s writings are almost universally rejoinders to the existence of moral codes. The idea of deontology, that we must be motivated by a selfless sense of duty, strikes the Nietzschean as extremely inauthentic. People couldn’t and shouldn’t be expected to adhere to such a duty if they have any sense of self-worth. Instead, we can enter into mutually beneficial arrangements and stop obsessing with whether our actions are “true in their intentions.” Utilitarianism receives equal criticism from Nietzsche. The philosopher doesn’t necessarily mean that there is a rigorous or unchangeable hierarchy among human beings, but he certainly implies that there are differences which ought not be suppressed by legalistic equality. And even if some collective organization should act in the best interest of all of its members, or as many as possible, it doesn’t follow that I am bound to take the needs of the majority into account when I make personal moral decisions. Second, the current interest in feminist philosophies can receive a vital dose of Nietzschean exposition, as debaters raise questions about what, exactly, constitutes the “feminine other.” Finally, Nietzsche’s critique of democracy deserves attention, even if it seems unpopular or “politically incorrect” to question the notion of popular self-rule. Democracy is great if you genuinely trust all citizens to make informed decisions, participate sincerely and selflessly in the political process, and learn from their mistakes. Nietzsche points out that people do none of these things. Our obsession with the correctness of democracy masks our ignorance of its fundamental impossibility. The more we cry out that humans have rights, the more blind we become to the powers we have to enact such rights. Debaters can question whether it is always good to have more democracy. If Nietzsche is correct, we may have some democracy, but may also want to avoid “too much of a good thing.” CONCLUSION Friedrich Nietzsche used to be synonymous with the black-clad nihilist across the hall in the dorms. He read Nietzsche, listened to gothic music, and may have been found saying depressing things about life, politics, and art. In more dangerous instances, Nietzsche’s BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL sounded responsible for violence and “amoral” behavior. He was a convenient philosophical scapegoat for the breakdown in traditional values. But here at the turn of the century, we have discovered that discarding values is not enough. In discovering this, we have re-read Nietzsche and have discovered that transcending values requires the positive affirmation of life, of difference, and of vitality. Whether we choose to be strong or weak democrats, fight wars or wage peace, and whatever the status of women’s rights, concepts such as nobility, hierarchy and difference are an important part of what is happening around us. These new perspectives on Nietzsche retain the original radical break with tradition, and are no less subversive or even “dangerous” if read in a certain way. But they do not end in the mindless violence of Columbine or the systemic evil of Nazism. Instead, they represent a voice in the wilderness, crying out to urge us not to lie to ourselves or one another about who we are. Debaters employing Nietzsche’s critique of values have a powerful weapon at their disposal. It is bound to generate controversy, and every debater will be find themselves wondering if judges and opponents will be morally offended if Nietzsche’s name is even invoked. But imagine debates about whether utilitarianism is really an attempt to cover up inequalities that cannot be eradicated. Imagine debates about how people may subjugate themselves instead of being victimized by others. Such debates can only take us to a higher level of moral analysis. Debate has become obsolete in many of its treatments of value questions. Every round becomes a new war between old enemies: freedom/order, deontology/utilitarianism, or justice/mercy. Transcend all of this, Nietzsche seems to say: figure out who we are, and where we are, before we start telling other people how to live. 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