NYE’S NOTION OF SOFT POWER IS WRONG

NYE’S NOTION OF SOFT POWER IS WRONG

1. NYE’S VIEW OF SOFT POWER IGNORES HISTORY

Wayne Hunt, Mount Allison University, JANUS HEAD Vol. 2, No. 2., Fall 1999, p. np, http://www.janushead.org/2-2/whunt.cfm, accessed May 1, 2002.

In the study of transnational relations, the strategic balance between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power has been much commented upon. The terms originate with Joseph S. Nye, Jr. According to Nye, the state-sanctioned application of force comes under the definition of ‘hard’ power, as do the requisite material conditions necessary to sustain this force. ‘Soft’ power, by contrast, relies on the force of ideas rather than the force of arms. Included in this first definition are the ethical values which have been injected into the international arena by a number of mediating institutions. Mainstream Hollywood movies as well as sophisticated advertising techniques came into this category, as did advances in communications technology. In this context, ‘hard’ power was about ends and the bottom-line criteria necessary to achieve those ends while ‘soft’ power was about process and the means to an end. ‘Hard’ power was objective, quantifiable and direct while ‘soft’ power was subjective, unquantifiable and indirect. The first was readily understandable because it spoke to the traditional role of the state which was to provide for security of the person as well as the security of property. The second seemed to indicate a larger transformation, a ‘paradigm shift’ as some enthusiasts would have it. But on closer inspection these categories seemed to take on an older dimension. On the one hand there were those who engaged with the world as it is, and on the other there were those who looked to what ought to be. This was observed in the tension between realpolitik and idealism which analysts have long detected in America’s relations with other powers. Involved as well were competing conceptions of political community. Allied to this was a bifurcated view of the nature of public action, with coercive measures on one side of the divide and co-operative ones on the other. More ancient still, and at a greater philosophic remove, was the contrast between authority and liberty. In Nye’s writings this longer scholarly tradition goes unremarked upon.

His concern is with the present and the way in which the future can be brought to the present. In his view of the world there is a subtle but implicit business orientation in which the notion of ‘soft’ power takes on entrepreneurial boldness. The comparative dimension was critically important. ‘Soft’ power was associated with the relative strength of the American economy in relation to its competitors. Entrepreneurial dynamism, it was further assumed, was tied to the ability to innovate. Nye clearly sees ‘soft’ power as the way of the future. He implies that it is superior to ‘hard’ power because it relies on uncommanded loyalties. As such it allows for the free play of creative instincts. In short, it approximates an anglo-American form of capitalism, or to be more precise, an idealized version of what this form of capitalism represents.

Nye and Owens (1996) examine this from a geopolitical perspective, insisting that it can be a force for good throughout the world. Thus ‘soft’ power can work in tandem with ‘hard’ power, as, in his phrase, "a force multiplier in American diplomacy." Space-based surveillance, direct broadcasting and a high speed ‘system of systems,’ he argued, had given the United States a "dominant battlespace knowledge"-- as Operation Desert Storm and Operation Desert Fox presumably demonstrated. This assertion rested on the strategic argument that America’s capacity for accurate, real-time, situational awareness of military field operations exceeds that of all other nations combined. (Operation Allied Force, by contrast, put many of the beliefs about ‘surgical’ intervention, in areas where there is not an obvious national interest at stake, to the test.) Assumed here was a technologically-driven view of American intervention.

NYE’S FOREIGN POLICY THINKING IS FLAWED

1. NYE’S EFFORTS AT EXPLAINING THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 WORLD ARE FEEBLE

Joseph Losos, investment adviser, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 27, 2002, p. B1.
That may not have been how it seemed at the time, but commentators are notorious hindsight experts. Today, so they say, matters are much harder to figure out, and this is especially so now that we have entered the Age of Terror and anti-terror. Confusing situations produce squadrons of deconfusers, of course, and professors Joseph Nye and Walter Mead have come forward to explicate our condition and prescribe programs of policy. In some respects, these books are similar. Both make the same basic assumption: The United States is the world's only superpower, perhaps even a superduper power, but despite the immense might that that implies, our freedom to do just what we want is limited. Moreover, in a world with such diverse developments -- Muslim hostility, increased Chinese potency, uncertain economic trends and many other crosscurrents -- there are more options for our country to follow and more spokespeople to advocate them. Yet we must choose, for failing to make up our mind, or simply drifting from one crisis to the next, is in itself a choice, and a rather bad one. Both authors argue that we cannot retreat from most or all of our present involvements, so that this should be taken as the basis for decision. But in working out our strategy, these books definitely differ. The chief difference, to put the matter bluntly, is that Mead has written a valuable book while Nye's effort is feeble. The latter's little treatise is long on cliches and short on substance. Thus, he argues that it is not just hard power (guns, planes, money) but also soft power (what anybody else calls influence) that counts. So we get nuggets such as "countries that are well-placed in terms of soft power do better." Throughout the book there are tables that propose desirable projects, aspirations that would not surprise any reasonably studious 15-year-old.
2. NYE IS WRONG ABOUT COMMON INTERESTS BETWEEN U.S. AND JAPAN

Japan Policy Research Institute, JPRI CRITIQUE, Volume V, Number 1, January 1998, http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/crit5.1.html, accessed May 5, 2002.

Last November 30, the Yomiuri published the results of an opinion poll it had commissioned from the Gallup organization concerning Japanese and American attitudes toward the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In Japan, 1,952 people were interviewed; in the U.S., 982 responded. In an accompanying article, Joseph Nye, one of the principal architects of last year's revised Security Treaty, tried to put a positive spin on the poll's results. While he acknowledged "some perception gaps between the two countries on military cooperation, mainly over details for implementing new defense cooperation guidelines," he professed to believe that the poll reveals "Japan and the United States share common interests in the Asia-Pacific region." JPRI's reading of the same statistics is far less sanguine. When respondents were asked which nations or regions they believed might pose a military threat to their own country, 69% of the Japanese named the Korean Peninsula, whereas 58% of U.S. respondents gave the Middle East top billing. Only 26% of the U.S. respondents believed that the Korean Peninsula posed a military threat. So much for some of those shared common interests.
3. NYE SEVERELY MISANALYZES THE DATA – U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP IS FLAWED
Japan Policy Research Institute, JPRI CRITIQUE, Volume V, Number 1, January 1998, http://www.jpri.org/jpri/public/crit5.1.html, accessed May 5, 2002.

There is a further statistic that should give both sides pause. While approximately half of both Japanese and U.S. respondents think that the U.S. military presence in Asia should be maintained-which Joseph Nye cites as evidence of "the broad public support in both countries for the reaffirmation of the Japan-U.S. Security relationship"-40.9% of the Japanese and 20.4% of the Americans want the U.S. military presence reduced. These are sizeable percentages, and the fact that the 'hosts,' the Japanese, outvote their 'guests' by two to one in calling for a reduction of troops must tell us something. Most likely, it should tell us that we have become an unwelcome army of occupation rather than of liberation, and that if security is the air we breathe (to use Professor Nye's tired analogy), the air surrounding Japan's American bases is decidedly unhealthy.

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