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MUST REJECT CURRENT PHILOSOPHY Part 2
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MUST REJECT CURRENT PHILOSOPHY Part 21. WE ARE AT THE END OF PHILOSOPHY Calvin 0. Schrag, Professor of Philosophy-Purdue, THE RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY: A RESPONSE TO THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, 1992, p.5. Rorty responds to the discourse of modernity not via a Habermasian critical reconstruction of its philosophical platform, geared to a discourse of modernity and proclaims that we are now at the “end of philosophy.” The accepted “givens” and paradigmatic constructs of modernity are brought under indictment. 2. CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO SAVE PHILOSOPHY ARE NOT WORKING Calvin 0. Schrag, Professor of Philosophy-Purdue, THE RESOURCES OF RATIONALITY: A RESPONSE TO THE POSTMODERN CONDITION, 1992, p.5. Rorty’s central point is that things got off rather badly when Kant differentiated and congealed the three culture-sphere under the aegis of the telos of a unifying rationality. Hegel simply continued to make purchases on the received problematic of cultural differentiation and the requirement for unification. But to continue a preoccupation with this problematic in search of the correct solution is for Rorty to continue to scratch where it doesn’t itch. Efforts to respond to this problematic via an epistemological reconstruction have outworn their usefulness. Such efforts are simply vestiges of an inclination to do philosophy, i.e., foundationalist and epistemological reflection that yearns for a reconstruction of knowledge. Philosophy thusly conceived, according to Rorty, has mercifully come to its end.
--Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity Introduction Richard Rorty burst on the American philosophical scene in the 1970s with a message that combined the best of American analytic philosophy with the strong tendency of American philosophers to comment on social issues. Always a little bit left of center, Rorty’s message was nevertheless balanced. He has argued that things like imperialism, racism, and capitalism are undesirable, but he has also been cautious about rhetoric like “overthrow” and “revolution.” The key to Rorty’s appeal is this balance, this self-proclaimed revival of the pragmatism of American philosophers such as Charles Saunders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. Rorty, in fact, fancies himself the true heir of Dewey, although many of his critics take issue with that. The balance that is the key to pragmatism is similar in some ways to the philosophy labeled “nihilism” in Europe. Rorty believes that we are living not simply in a “postmodern” age, but in an age where all philosophical systems have been proven, to the greatest degree, unsatisfactory. In place of systemic metaphysics, though, Rorty does not recommend that we believe in nothing. Instead, he suggests that we can take “what works” from any particular system and use it precisely because it works. Moreover, Rorty believes that philosophers cannot change the world. He rejects Karl Marx’s imperative that it is the job of philosophers to do just that. Instead, he argues, activists, writers of fiction, and business owners change the world. Philosophers, at best, are reporters, trying to chronicle these changes in a sensible way. In an age when philosophy seems to have run into its own limits, Richard Rorty’s philosophy of pragmatism seems refreshing, healthy, and humble. This essay argues that those conclusions are premature. I believe that, rather than helping progressive change along, Rorty’s philosophy is an invitation to the kinds of values and policies that end up in futility: reforms which, as humane as they might seem, only serve to perpetuate the very systems responsible for the kinds of evils Rorty hates. After explaining a little more about Rorty’s pragmatism, I will argue the following: First, Rorty’s political philosophy, which calls for an abandonment of public revolutionary criticism, actually perpetuates an undesirable dichotomy between the public and private spheres of life; a dichotomy which has been responsible for much misery throughout history. Second, Rorty’s philosophy actually reduces the possibility of change by stifling the creative, critical, utopian thinking that has been the cornerstone of most progressive changes in history. Finally, I argue that in entrusting social justice to elites (which he blatantly does), Rorty becomes a weak apologist for inequality. In essence, he must bow to elitism as a precondition for fighting against “bad” elitism, and this renders his social philosophy either incoherent or undesirable. I have met Richard Rorty, heard him lecture, and even shared my frustrations about injustice with him. During one of our conversations, I remarked that in the presence of hardcore Marxists I often become an apologist for Rorty’s kind of liberalism, but when listening to capitalists and radical individualists, I often feel like a true red revolutionary. Professor Rorty indicated that he agreed with and understood this dilemma. As the years have passed, however, I have seen Rorty’s writings turn more towards apology for capitalism, even as he claims to be concerned about issues of social justice. I wonder if he still understands the dilemma. His writings do not indicate that he understands anything about the hatred of capitalism, and the necessity of systemic and unrelenting criticism. Rorty’s PragmatismBorn October 4, 1931 in New York City, Rorty grew up among leftists, served in the army, got his PhD in philosophy, and went on to win several awards, accolades, and academic posts while writing a corpus of work that would eventually be labeled “new” pragmatism. His philosophy rests on several methods and assumptions. He rejects absolutism and relativism equally, saying they are two sides of the same representationalist coin. In other words, absolutism assumes that human thinking is capable of representing absolute truth, which is impossible. Relativism, on the other hand, assumes that human thinking is utterly incapable of representing truth, which assumes the same kind of “truth” as absolutism does: “Rorty is able to back up his rejection of any philosophical position or project which attempts to draw a general line between what is made and what is found, what is subjective and what is objective, what is mere appearance and what is real. Rorty’s position is not that these conceptual contrasts never have application, but that such application is always context and interest bound and that there is, as in the case of the related notion of truth, nothing to be said about them in general. Rorty’s commitment to the conversationalist view of knowledge must therefore be distinguished from subjectivism or relativism, which, Rorty argues, presuppose the very distinctions he seeks to reject” (http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/rorty/). This rejection of systemic and absolutist thought in epistemology and metaphysics makes it easy for Rorty to be a “self-proclaimed bourgeois liberal,” who distrusts radicalism and eschews the possibility of “revolutionary” change. Obviously, to criticize something systemically is to be an absolutist, to be able to tie all relevant social phenomena into a particular system, like “capitalism” or “patriarchy.” Rorty believes that preoccupation with systems only makes activists into social theorists, when instead, they ought to work within the system to achieve those localized changes which are really possible, which do not hurt others (there are no bloodless revolutions), and which are not co-opted by Stalinist absolutists. “Liberal ironists” are the heroes of Rorty’s universe. Liberal ironists are those who are committed to change, but are also aware of the non-absolute nature of their moral sentiments. In other words, if I believe that capitalism causes poverty, I should act to ameliorate that poverty, but remain “ironic” and philosophically non-committal about whether this entity called “capitalism” actually “causes” poverty. In summary, Richard Rorty believes that we ought to reject any attempt to make our social projects systemic, because all attempts to systematically represent or understand the universe fail. We ought to oppose suffering simply because we find suffering undesirable. We ought to cure symptoms, which we can see, rather than addressing systemic causes, which we cannot see. Change will be slow and often frustrating, but liberal ironists will tolerate that frustration, just as we ought to tolerate our inability to truly “understand” or represent the universe in some “truthful” way. 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