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Richard Rorty Linguistic-Epistemological Philosopher
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Richard RortyLinguistic-Epistemological PhilosopherRichard Rorty suggests that Western philosophy is and has been motivated by the assumption that the mind mirrors the world. This notion has inspired the view that philosophers, as those who investigate the structure of mind or the conditions of knowledge, stand in a privileged position. Philosophers are able to assess the accuracy of our mental representations. In addition, Rorty argues that philosophers need to be aware of the way in which individual differences are impacted by their respective cultural and social importance. This biography will examine Rorty’s assumptions of: (1) The role of the philosopher, (2) pragmatism and discourse, (3) criteria, (4) critics, and (5) application to debate. The task of the philosopher is not only to determine whether our theories or discourses are true, but also to define the proper relation between discourses about the True, the Good, and the Beautiful. Rorty also argued that this conception continues to underlie not only transcendental philosophy, but also rational psychology, and naturalized epistemology. In one way or another the aforementioned projects all attempt to identify unchanging rules governing any recognized scientific (‘normal”) discourse or to single out one form of discourse as paradigmatic. Rorty's rejection of the conception of philosophy involves both internal criticisms of its failure to fulfill its own claims and an attempt to evoke an alternative model that he refers to variously as pragmatism, hermeneutics, and edifying discourse. Out of his theory, Rorty calls for the proliferation of new forms of discourse, instead of accurate representation. In the quest for Truth, Rorty regards the search for new forms of self-description as our most important task. These concepts are at the center of understanding Rorty. Philosophers tend to see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. Rorty argues that philosophers realize that no appeal to intuition or reference is going to get us off the literary-historical-anthropological-political merry-go-round. Thus philosophers are aware that any new vocabulary that might arise from their activity is not the result of rigorous arguments--for there are no invariant criteria according to which such arguments might proceed: Criteria are temporary resting places constructed for utilitarian ends. Furthermore, Rorty no longer see philosophers as a secular priesthood or community of super scientists. Rorty contends that philosophers operate in areas where the absence of a neutral/objective vocabulary and of an agreement on criteria makes argument impossible. Moreover, Rorty notes that where reflective rather than determinate judgment is called for, they are a species of literary intellectuals who seek not agreement in propositions but the creation of new vocabularies. Thus, the vision Rorty holds out for a culture is one of creative inquiry freed from the bad faith evidenced in the search for ultimate foundations or final justification, a belief from which no one is excluded and in which no one, especially not the philosopher, holds a privileged position. Rorty divides his critics into two groups: (1) technical realists, and (2) intuitive realists. Technical realists are those who believe that recent developments in the philosophy of language can be used to resolve traditional philosophical disputes. Intuitive realists, however, defend an equally unacceptable position Intuitive Realists see the human as having various deep-seated intuitions about the world. The questions for Rorty, however, is whether we should regard such intuitions as insights into the mystery of the world or as products of our social conventions and practices. Rorty sees in this question the still more basic question of what philosophy is (or should be): Should philosophy attempt to clarify and reserve some of our deep intuitions even when they come into conflict with each other, or should it seek to engender new self-descriptions freed from the metaphysical impasses of our past? Rorty’s answer to this question is complicated and confusing. Rorty does not support either position, instead he takes a middle ground that attempts to understand intuitions within self-description. Rorty’s greatest application to contemporary debate practice is his discussion of philosophy, in general, and criteria, in particular. The debater should be essentially interested in his argument that their am no objective criteria in which to judge arguments. These positions may benefit the debater who is interested in making deep-seated criteria attacks against their opponents. 78
Richard Bernstein. “Philosophy in the Conversation of Mankind.” REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS 33 (1980): 745-776.
PEIRCE SOCIETY 18 (1982): 3 11-337. John D. Caputo. “The Thought of Being and the Conversation of Mankind: The Case of Heidegger and Rorty.” REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS 36(1983): 661-685. Abraham Edel. “A Missing Dimension in Rorty’s Use of Pragmatism.” TRANSACTIONS OF THE CHARLES S. PEIRCE SOCIETY 21(1985): 21-38. Ian Hacking. “Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 77 (1980): 579-588. Jaegwon Kim. “Rorty on the Possibility of Philosophy.” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 77 (1980): 588- 597.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Ness, 1991.
Press, 1979. Richard Rorty. “Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference and Pragmatism.” in TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS AND SCIENCE. ed. P. Bieri, R.P. Horsunann, and I. Kruger. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979. 77-103.
Richard Rorty. CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982. Richard Rorty. “Contemporary Philosophy of Mind.” SYNTHESIS 53 (1982): 323-348. Richard Rorty. “Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism.” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 80(1983): 583-589. Richard Rorty. “The Historiography of Philosophy.” in PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY, ed. R. Rorty, lB. Schneewind, and Q. Skinner. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 49-75. Richard Rorty. “Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity.” in HABERMAS ON MODERNITY, ed. R. Bernstein. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Ness, 1985, 161-176. Richard Rorty. “Solidarity and Objectivity.” in POST-ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY. ed. I. Rajchman and C. West. New York: Columbia University press, 1985, 3-19. Richard Rorty, ed. THE LINGUISTIC TURN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Directory: uploads uploads -> 587 Return function, r i(X) r i(0) r i(1) r i(2) r i(3) 1 0 2 4 6 Thermal Station, I 2 0 1 5 6 3 0 3 5 6 10 uploads -> Department of science and humanities department of mathematics part-a questions and answers uploads -> The Case Against the nypd’s Quota-Driven ‘Broken Windows’ Policing What Is It? uploads -> For want of a nail uploads -> Ownership Models There are two different types of ownership models uploads -> Police Militarization uploads -> City of rising star regular meting thursday, july 14, 2016 uploads -> Township of winfield uploads -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 uploads -> The Black Panther Party’s Ten-Point Program What We Want Now! Download 5.81 Mb. Share with your friends:
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