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RORTY’S DISMISSAL OF “TRUTH” IS UNTENABLE AND HYPOCRITICAL



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RORTY’S DISMISSAL OF “TRUTH” IS UNTENABLE AND HYPOCRITICAL

1. RORTY ATTACKS ABSOLUTISM BY BEING ABSOLUTIST HIMSELF

Scott Roulier, professor of political science at Dowling College, JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES, Vol. 9, 1997, p. 19.

It would be impossible to completely deconstruct the Rortyian offensive against representationalism or objectivism, dealing solely with his public/private distinction. Yet, Rorty's plea to completely drop the objectivist game is unconvincing. One particularly odd thing about the attack on "representationalism" is the unmistakable representational form it takes itself. After upbraiding his philosophical forebears for their allegedly naive metaphysical views, Rorty replaces obsolete metanarratives with ones more to his liking. Indeed, for all his lexical maneuvering, it appears that Rorty has barely moved beyond one of his arch-enemies--Immanuel Kant. In place of the rather prosaic Kantian viewpoint that we cannot know the "thing-in-itself"--the appearance/reality dichotomy--Rorty substitutes his novel idea that no historical vocabulary can accurately describe the dense, opaque dust blobs that are "out there." On the internal front, the noumenal self is discarded in favor of a preferred "centerless web of beliefs and desires" (Rorty 1988: 270). These Rortyian, pictorial backdrops push all others to the side and provide the framework on which he hangs all the elements of his liberal utopia (1991b: 113-25). While Rorty beseeches us to view our beliefs as "adaptions to the environment rather than as quasi-pictures," or as "habits of acting rather than as parts of a 'model of the world," his own writings, infused with representations, betray his aim, proving how difficult it is for vision-centered beings to grow out of their pictorial-perceptions (1991b: 10).


2. RORTY MUST BE ABSOLUTIST IN ORDER TO “REJECT” ABSOLUTISM

Scott Roulier, professor of political science at Dowling College, JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES, Vol. 9, 1997, p. 19.

There is another dilemma associated with Rorty's claims about the radical contingency of language and the incommensurability of vocabularies. Quoting Joshua Cohen, Will Kymlicka points out that, for Rorty, "the notions of community and shared values mark the limits of practical reason" (1988: 202). But, continues Kymlicka, Rorty and Walzer are not just "predicting that there are such limits to practical reasoning. They claim to know such limits exist--they claim to know this in advance of the arguments. They claim to know that reasons will only be compelling to particular historical communities, before these reasons have been advanced" (1988: 202). This, concludes Kymlicka, is nothing short of dogmatism (1988: 202).
3. CLAIMS THAT THERE IS NO “TRUTH” ARE THEMSELVES TRUTH-CLAIMS

Scott Roulier, professor of political science at Dowling College, JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES, Vol. 9, 1997, p. 19.

Rorty has, putatively, not discovered that "there is no truth out there," and he cannot, without lapsing into dogmatism, claim to know the limits of practical reason. Hence, the argument that Rorty's dismantling of all forms of foundationalism is a fait accompli fails to persuade. Even if one is inclined to accept the contention that the pursuit of objectivism is fruitless, that we are simply stuck with a plethora of competing vocabularies which cannot be marketed via rational argument, the same person will likely reject, on aesthetic or emotive grounds, Rorty's own peculiar mapping of the boundaries of public and private.

RORTY’S DEFENSE OF CAPITALISM PREVENTS LIBERATION

1. RORTY’S EMBRACE OF CAPITALISM DESTROYS HIS LIBERAL IDEALS

Alan Johnson, lecturer in social sciences at Edge Hill College, NEW POLITICS, Summer 2000, pp. 109-10.

The free market was “as fatal to the realization of liberty for all as it is to the realization of equality.” Liberalism, Dewey concluded, must “become radical” to save itself and his prescription went far beyond anything Rorty has so far proposed. While Rorty thinks liberal values can be realized within the free market Dewey thought the free market the “chief obstacle” to liberal values, reducing people to “hands” and breeding authoritarianism and alienation in equal measure. While Mill’s On Liberty remains the name of Rorty’s utopia Dewey thought liberty was meaningless as mere “negative liberty” and was really a demand for power.


2. RORTY’S REFORMISM IGNORES THE NEED FOR DEEP STRUCTURAL CHANGES

Alan Johnson, lecturer in social sciences at Edge Hill College, NEW POLITICS, Summer 2000, p. 110.

Finally, while Rorty calls for piecemeal reforms to realize social justice Dewey warned precisely that “piecemeal policies taken ad hoc” would not be enough to challenge the might of corporate and state power. Only “thoroughgoing changes in the set-up of institutions” would be enough. Rorty has regressed from Dewey’s positions at a time when global capitalism offers daily confirmations of their accuracy.
3. FAILURE TO EMBRACE ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM DOOMS HIS POLITICAL PROJECT

Alan Johnson, lecturer in social sciences at Edge Hill College, NEW POLITICS, Summer 2000, p. 112.

But there is a wild oscillation in Rorty’s politics between proscriptive caution and descriptive radicalism. This oscillation is caused by two pressures on Rorty. On the one hand, the polarization of U.S. society as global capitalism sends inequality soaring, eats the environment, and swallows the political process. On the other hand, since 1989, Rorty has concluded that there is no alternative to the market; Stalinism is what you get when you try an alternative. Rorty’s political thought bounces between these two pressures, unstable and unsettled. Its future direction will likely be to follow the logic of one or the other.
4. RORTY IGNORES THE EVIL DONE TO THE POOR BY THE POWERFUL

Alan Johnson, lecturer in social sciences at Edge Hill College, NEW POLITICS, Summer 2000, p. 115.

Rorty is the philosopher for the Nike age. “Just Do It!” is his message. He tells us that the only human needs not defined by imagination are calories per day. For everything else we only feel constrained by “some past act of imagination.” The post-Nietzschean philosophical themes of anti-foundationalism, anti-representationalism, and anti-essentialism do lend support to his utopian reformist project. For if nothing has an “in itself” nature, not human beings nor capitalism nor the Democratic Party, nor anything, then there are no limits to whether or not a “reformist left” can be created nor what it can achieve. Just Do It! In this Nikean mood Rorty thinks it “easy” to avoid the Orwellian future his despairing side frets over. All that is needed is for “all classes to confront the new global economy together…in the name of our common citizenship.” This, remember, includes a super-rich class which he has already told us operates “without any thought of any interests save [its] own.” Presumably after the super-rich have listened to enough sentimental stories their little piggy eyes will turn to “our common citizenship.”



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