Philosopher views
Download 5.81 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- DUALISM
SIDGWICK ON KANTSidgwick’s principle of justice owes at least a part of its content to Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. The categorical imperative states that we as humans should, “Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.” Your actions should be not only good for you, but good if everyone adopted the same action in the same situation. However, Sidgwick criticized Kant’s categorical imperative while simultaneously learning from it. Sidgwick begins by critiquing Kant’s derivation of duties from the categorical imperative. He says that there is a question that will often disburse the false appearance of rightness, which our strong inclination has given to it. There may be times that we should not think it right for another, and therefore it cannot be right for us. To Sidgwick, this error lies in the fact of supposing that formal logic supplies a complete criterion of truth. Sidgwick is disturbed by the lack of variety or individualism allowed by the categorical imperative. Sidgwick goes on to criticize Kant’s “deduction” from the categorical imperative of the duty of promoting happiness of others. According to Kant, the maxim that each should be left to take care of himself without either aid or interference can be a universal law, since it does not contain a contradiction. However, Kant argues that it would be impossible for us to will it to be a universal law. Thus, Sidgwick quotes from Kant, “a will that resolved this would be inconsistent with itself for many cases may arise in which the individual thus willing needs the benevolence and sympathy of others.” Therefore, according to Kant, we regard ourselves as the end for others and claim that they should contribute to our own happiness. Sidgwick questions why we wouldn’t be able to recognize, according to the categorical imperative, the duty of making their happiness our end. Either the principle is to help others, or it is to define ourselves as needing the help of others. Sidgwick criticizes Kant’s effort to combine these two seemingly contradictory positions in one theory. Sidgwick argues that the idea that every man in need wishes for aid of others is an empirical proposition, which Kant cannot know a priori. It is possible that a person would choose to help others rather than receive aid from others in a time of need. Even if everyone who was in a time of need chose to help others rather than aid him or herself, they may have more troubles than profit because of the general adoption of the egoistic maxim. Therefore, this general principle which is supposed to bring the greatest good to the greatest number actually hurts those who use it as a decision-making tool. The decision to help others or ask for help cannot be predicted. Sidgwick also criticizes Kant’s perception of free will. Sidgwick distinguishes between three conceptions of freedom. The first is the idea of good or rational freedom. This means that a man is free in proportion as he acts in accordance of reason. The second conception is the idea of neutral or moral freedom, which means that a man is free to choose between good and evil. The third is the idea of capricious freedom, which means that a man is free in so far as he has a power of acting without a motive. Freedom as a holistic term is too vague, and needs to be broken down into these three conceptions in order to be conceptualized and discussed. Sidgwick’s main contention is that while Kant expressly repudiated capricious freedom and adopted rational freedom, he actually uses neutral freedom as well as rational freedom. Sidgwick says that in some cases, the two conceptions are incompatible, “If we say that a man is a free agent in proportion as he acts rationally, we cannot also say, in the same sense of the term, that it is by this free choice that he acts irrationally when he does so act.” Thus there are inconsistencies. These are problematic only if you are not distinguishing between the different types of freedoms. Furthermore, according to Sidgwick, Kant uses the conception of neutral freedom wherever he has to connect the notion of freedom with that of moral responsibility. If a free man makes a wrong choice, that is choice against a moral law or a dictate of capital reason, we wish to ask his responsibility, and we also wish to prevent him from shifting his responsibility onto causes beyond his control. “Free” in the context clearly presupposes neutral freedom. Moreover, Kant’s appeal to neutral freedom is a very essential part of his ethical ideas. Kant distinguishes between a noumenon and a phenomenon. According to him, every action regarded as a phenomenon determined in time must be regarded as a necessary result of determining causes in antecedent time. It may also be regarded in relation to the agent considered as a thing in itself as the noumenon or which the action is the phenomenon. Sidgwick concludes this point by saying that if we accept this view of freedom at all, it must obviously be neutral freedom. It must express the relation of a noumenon that manifests itself as a scoundrel to a series of bad actions in which the moral law is violated. Thus, the relation of a noumenon that manifests itself as a saint to good or rational actions in which moral law or categorical imperative is obeyed. DUALISMSidgwick’s ethical theory terminates in a doctrine of “the dualism of the practical reason.” His absolute ethical principle has to do with the reduction of goodness to terms of pleasure, that is carried out by analyzing conscious life into its elements and showing that each in its turn (except pleasure), when taken alone, cannot be regarded as ultimate good. This analytic method is characteristic of Sidgwick’s thinking, as it was of that of most of his predecessors-intuitionist as well as empirical. It rests on the assumption that the nature of a thing can be completely ascertained by examination of the separate elements into it which it can be distinguished by reflection-an assumption which was definitely discarded by the contemporary schools. It has been said that Sidgwick did not produce a system of philosophy. He made many suggestions towards construction, but his work was mainly critical. Directory: uploads uploads -> 587 Return function, r i(X) r i(0) r i(1) r i(2) r i(3) 1 0 2 4 6 Thermal Station, I 2 0 1 5 6 3 0 3 5 6 10 uploads -> Department of science and humanities department of mathematics part-a questions and answers uploads -> The Case Against the nypd’s Quota-Driven ‘Broken Windows’ Policing What Is It? uploads -> For want of a nail uploads -> Ownership Models There are two different types of ownership models uploads -> Police Militarization uploads -> City of rising star regular meting thursday, july 14, 2016 uploads -> Township of winfield uploads -> Stop Militarizing Law Enforcement Act of 2014 uploads -> The Black Panther Party’s Ten-Point Program What We Want Now! Download 5.81 Mb. Share with your friends:
|