Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights



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Posner Indicts


SHOULD SUBJECT “MORAL” INSTINCTS TO ETHICAL INTERROGATION

Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 83

Even at a commonsense level, Posner’s position is implausible. Whatever the moral instincts may turn out to be, why exempt just those ones from the power of ethical argument? Our instincts, moral and nonmoral, developed during the eons of time in which we and our ancestors lived in circumstances very different from those in which we live today. For most of our evolutionary history, we lived in small groups in which everyone knew everyone else in the group, and interactions with members of our species who were not also members of our group were rare. The planet was sparsely populated, which was just as well, since we had no way of consciously regulating our reproductive capacities. There were ample uncleared forests, no ill effects from our emissions of greenhouse gases, and our weapons killed one at a time, and only in close proximity. Isn’t it highly probable that moral instincts formed under those circumstances should be changed by ethical argument based on our current, very different circumstances?
APPROPRIATE TO CHALLENGE MORAL INSTINCTS IN WAYS OTHER THAN POINTING OUT FACTUAL ERRORS IN ASSUMPTION

Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 83



The only way in which Posner is prepared to allow argument to have an impact on our moral instincts is by demonstrating a factual error in the assumptions on which our instincts are based. (For example, correcting factual errors about the capacities of animals to suffer, or that sexual intercourse with an animal leads to the birth of a monster, is in his view an acceptable way of arguing against an instinct). Sometimes, however, we need to change moral instincts that do not rest on factual errors. Although it is a always controversial what I really an instinct, and what is acquired by culture and education, we can take, as an example, preference for my “own kind” over someone who talks, looks, or smells differently. This preference, which is plausibly instinctive, does not require any false factual beliefs. Rather, people add factual beliefs about the negative characteristics of the outsiders in order to strengthen the hold of the instinct that they already have.

Posner Indicts



ARGUMENT THAT MORAL INSTINCTS CANNOT BE CHALLENGED WRONG – HISTORICALLY HAD INSTINCT TO KILL MEMBERS OF OTHER GROUPS

Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 85-6

As another example, take the tenacious instinct that leads humans to show unprovoked hostility, sometimes to the point of murder, against those who belong to different tribes or nations. Those who believe that this is not an instinct, but the product of relatively recent economic, social, or cultural circumstances, should read the Bible, and see how often the Israelites massacred their neighbors, often without serious provocation. But in ancient times, there was nothing unusual about this. War, as Lawrence Keeley has shown, has been a regular part of the existence of the overwhelming majority of human cultures. Massacred of entire groups seem not to have been unusual. Additional evidence that this killing has its roots deep in our biological nature is provided by observations of similar intraspecies killing among our close relatives, the chimpanzees. Yet, tenacious as this instinct is, we are making progress in confronting it. It is a sobering thought that in many tribal societies, despite the absence of machine guns and high explosives, the percentage of the population killed annually in warfare far exceeds that of any modern society, including Germany and Russia in the twentieth century. Though the conflict between Israel and Palestine is tragic and depressing, there is widespread agreement that it should not be solved by the methods used by the ancient Israelites. Since the mass genocide of the twentieth century, we have developed principles of humanitarian intervention to stop such occurrences, and even instituted an International Criminal Court to bring to justice those who commit crimes against humanity. Needless to say, these positive developments have been accompanied by plenty of ethical argument, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—a document drafted, incidentally, by a commission on which two men who had been “academic philosophers” played a significant role—to the statements of countless prominent secular and religious figures. While one could certainly wish that these ethical arguments had been more

effective, to claim that they are all completely without effect is, to use one of Posner’s phrases, sheer assertion, and not particularly plausible assertion at that.
POSNER IGNORES MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO EFFECTIVE ETHICAL INTERROGATION

Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 86-7

How is it possible that ethical argument can be effective given that, as Posner and many others have pointed out, there is great difficulty in establishing the first premises of any ethical position? The answer is that ethical argument does not always proceed from first premises. It may, for example, show that widely held view is inconsistent, or leads to conflicts with other views that its supporters hold. (Look again at the ethical argument about the moral status of animals with which this essay opened, and you will see that it takes this form). Ethical argument can also show that particular views have been held unreflectively. Once they have are subjected to critique, and applied to a wider range of situations than had previously been considered, the view may become less attractive. Though ethical argument would be easier if we could establish first premises, it is a mistake to assume that without it, it must be ineffective.



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