Planet Debate 2011 September/October l-d release Animal Rights
Should Extend Legal Personhood to Animals
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Should Extend Legal Personhood to AnimalsWE HAVE HISTORICALLY EXPANDED THE COMMUNITY OF MORAL PERSONS Stephen R. L. Clark, professor of philosophy at Liverpool University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 121 The moral truth that lies behind the error that others have called “speciesism” (and justly rebuked) is that we both do and should treat those “of our kind” better. But now recall the remarks that I have already made about the actual nature of a species. We retain the word as physicists retain the word “atomic”. But modern atoms are not atomic (which is indivisible), and modern species are not specific (any more than Aristotle’s were). Species kinship rests on relationship, and not resemblance, although there will be various similarities to reckon with within and without the kind. UNESCO’s sloganeers did not recognize that Pan, Pongo and Gorilla were our sister, any more than the writers of the American Declaration of Independence fully realized what they had committed themselves to by saying that all men were created equal. They and their successors could have insisted that no mention was made here of women, or that the obvious intention at the time was not to include Negroes (since the passages denouncing Britain’s involvement in the slave trade were, of set purpose, omitted from the final document.) Instead, the real implications were allowed to emerge. All those of one kind with us begin as equals: we are, each one of us, a part of one long, variegated lineage, sharing enough of our habits, gestures, and abilities to reveal our common source.
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 131 If we extend the right not to be property to animals, then animals will become moral persons. To say that a being is a person is merely to say that the being has morally significant interests, that the principle of equal consideration applies to that being, that the being is not a thing. In a sense, we already accept that animals are persons; we claim to reject the view that animals are things and to recognize that, at the very least, animals have a morally significant interest in not suffering. Their status as property, however, has prevented their personhood from being realized. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL CONSIDERATION ONLY WAY TO ENFORCE MORAL CONSIDERATION FOR ANIMAL INTERESTS Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 121 Alternatively, if we are to make good on our claim to take animal interests seriously, then we can do so in only one way: by applying the principle of equal consideration—the rule that we ought to treat like cases alike unless there is good reason not to do so—to animals. The principle of equal consideration is a necessary component of every moral theory. Any theory that maintains that it is permissible to treat similar cases in dissimilar way would fail to qualify as an acceptable moral theory for that reason alone. Although there may be many differences between humans and animals, there is at least one important similarity that we all already recognize: our shared capacity to suffer. In this sense, humans and animals are similar to each other and different from everything else in the universe that is not sentient. If our supposed prohibition on the infliction of unnecessary suffering on animals is to have any meaning at all, then we must give equal consideration to animal interests is not suffering.
Laura G. Kniaz, J.D., University at Buffalo, Copyright (c) 1995 Buffalo Law Review (: Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground Railroad) 1995 (lexis) Rights should be endowed upon animals themselves. Many scholars have argued that animals deserve legal recognition of their inherent rights because they may be injured, they have interests, and they may directly benefit from legal rights. n369 If animals were granted personhood, they would have standing themselves and could pursue remedies for their injuries through a legal representative. Should Recognize Animal RightsBASIC EQUALITY PRINCIPLE DEMANDS RECOGNIZING BASIC RIGHTS FOR NON-HUMAN ANIMALS Steven M. Wise, President of the Center for the Expansion of Fundamental Rights, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 39 At some point, autonomy completely winks out and with it any nonarbitrary entitlement to liberty rights on the ground of possessing practical autonomy. Judges and legislators might decide to grant even a completely nonautonomous being basic liberty rights. But it’s hard to think of grounds upon which they might do it nonarbitrarily. However, this strengthens the argument that, as a matter of equality, nonautonomous animals of many species should be entitled to basic rights.
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 140 Amendments 5 and 14 bestow the constitutional rights most applicable to nonhumans. The Fifth Amendment applies to the federal government and the District of Columbia; the 14th applies to state governments. These amendments prohibit government from depriving any “person” of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” “Liberty” includes bodily integrity and physical freedom. If nonhumans were constitutional persons, governments couldn’t subject them to maiming, battery, torture, or other bodily harm. Nor could governments unjustly incarcerate them or otherwise restrict their movements. “Without due process of law” means unfairly or arbitrarily. The Constitution prohibits government from depriving a “person” of life, liberty or property for patently unjust reasons or without following proper judicial procedure. Nonhuman personhood would prohibit government from unjustifiably depriving nonhumans of life, liberty or property.
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 142 Along with a legal right to life, emancipated nonhumans would need a legal right to liberty (which includes physical freedom and bodily integrity). Without such a right, they could be trapped, confined, and otherwise denied physical freedom by any human who considered them a threat. Without a right to liberty, nonhumans would also be vulnerable to human violation of their bodily integrity. Consider “domesticated” sheep who would exist during the transition period immediately following legal emancipation. No longer property, they still would need legal protection against battery or sexual assault by a human, just as humans do. Similarly, a right not to be tortured exists apart from a right not to be property. Although property status vastly increases the opportunity for sadism, it isn’t a necessary component of sadism. A human can torture a dog whether or not the dog is property. EQUALITY PRINCIPLES JUSTIFY FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHTS FOR GREAT APES Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and law professor, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 543 At least three independent equality or proportionality arguments supports fundamental legal rights for the great apes. First, great apes who possess Kant’s full autonomy should be entitled to dignity-rights if humans who possess full autonomy are entitled to them. To do otherwise would be to undermine the major principled against racism and sexism. Second, great apes who possess a practical autonomy should be entitled to dignity-rights in proportion to the degree to which they approach full Kantian autonomy. Thus, if a human is entitled to the degree with which they approach full Kantian autonomy. Thus if a human is entitled to fewer, narrower, or partial legal rights as their capabilities approach the quality Q, so should nonhuman animal whose capabilities also approach the quality Q. Third, in perhaps the clearest argument for equality, great apes who possess either full Kantian autonomy or a practical autonomy should be entitled to the same fundamental rights to which humans who entirely lack autonomy are entitled. Placing the rightless legal thing, the bonobo Kazni, beside an anencephalic 1-day-old human with the legal right to choose to consent or withhold consent to medical treatment highlights the legal aberration that is Kanzi’s legal thingood. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 1.43 Mb. Share with your friends:
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