Prolif good – War
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- AT Theft/Terrorism
- No terror / stolen – MAD theory but smaller scale
- Terrorists have no motivation for a nuclear attack
- Nope – if there was terrorism – there’d be more control
AT RivalriesEven bitter rivals are deterred by nuclear useWaltz 95Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, 1995 p11 Ajones First, new nuclear states may come in hostile pairs and share a common border. Where states are bitter enemies one may fear that they will be unable to resist using their nuclear weapons against each other. This is a worry about the future that the past does not disclose. The Soviet Union and the United States, and the Soviet Union and China, were hostile enough; and the latter pair shared a long border. Nuclear weapons caused China and the Soviet Union to deal cautiously with each other. But bitterness among some potential nuclear states, so it is said, exceeds that felt by the old ones. Playing down the bitterness sometimes felt by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China requires a creative reading of history. Moreover, those who believe that bitterness causes wars assume a close association that is seldom found between bitterness among nations and their willingness to run high risks. AT Theft/TerrorismNOPE – bunches of warrantsSeng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,] Third, analysts worry that Third World leaders might lose possession of their nuclear weapons. Third World states are plagued with high levels of domestic instability. Governments might lose control of their weapons through nuclear coup de tas; that is. rebel Factions could seize the weapons as part of a power grab.5 Rebels may not understand the command and control systems in place, which could compromise the effectiveness of the systems. Alternately, analysts suggest that Third World weapons might be stolen by terrorist groups. Third World states may not have electronic usecontrol and tamper-control devices that would help prevent weapons use by thieves. Some analysts suggest that organizational or financial limitations could translate into poor security at weapons storage or launch sites.6 Third World proliferators will have two important advantages in terms of command and control that help alleviate the concems of analysts. One, because their arsenals will be so small, their launch bureaucracies and control organizations can be very small. Third World proliferators may well cultivate positive control by delegating launch capability to peripheral commanders, And / or the lack of electronic use-control devices may make it difficult for central commanders to physically prevent peripheral commanders from launching weapons inappropriately. However. the limited numbers of weapons in Third World arsenals will mean that there need not be more than a handful of peripheral launch commanders. There may be more than one "˜finger on the button' in Third World nuclear states, but not many more. Peripheral commanders can be carefully screened and tightly supervised by central command. Moreover, because the numbers of personnel involved in nuclear launches will be very small. Third World proliferators will not suffer the dangers of large and complicated organizational routines and standard operating procedures that plagued the superpowers. The organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even ifa few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite and unambiguous decision to press that button. Finally, small arsenals are also easy to secure from thieves and terrorists. The requirements of securing small arsenals are not likely to overburden the resources of Third World states.
[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,] Fears concerning the nuclear coup d’etat can be mitigated through consideration of the strategic goals of domestic combatants and the destructive nature of nuclear weapons. First, while there may be some symbolic significance to a rebel group gaining possession of a government`s nuclear weapons, one wonders how such a development could translate into political currency. A rebel group that steals a few nuclear weapons is then threatening the very society whose loyalty it seeks to win with nuclear possession. There is a certain amount of prestige associated with the possession of advanced weaponry, but such prestige would seem to be outweighed by the threatening nature of such weaponry. This brings up a second and more general point concerning the strategic usefulness of nuclear weapons in domestic disputes. As Waltz writes. "What is hard to comprehend is why, in an internal struggle for power, the contenders would start using nuclear weapons Who would they aim at? How would they use them as instruments for gaining or maintaining contro1?"'6 Waltz's point is most valid in situations in which combatants are vying for control over the same territory: the use of nuclear weapons in such a dispute would be tantamount to destroying the very thing which each side Finds valuable. To a somewhat lesser degree, the same logic applies to situations involving separatist groups seeking to wrest a piece of territory away from a central government." are most often based on ethnic identities or traditional people groupings. An ethnic group whose territory has been subsumed into a central government is likely to spread throughout the larger state to some degree. Separatist militaries may thus Find it hard to fire nuclear weapons that could destroy numbers of their "˜own people.` Of course, depending on boundaries and geography, nuclear fallout from an attack against the central state may well cause deaths within the breakaway territory itself On the other hand, if the distribution of ethnic populations and the boundaries of break-away territories do not prevent separatists from using nuclear weapons against the central state. then it is also probable that the central state will have no reason not to retaliate with nuclear weapons against the separatists. In other words. a mutual deterrence situation could quickly obtain. and nuclear use and spill-over conflagrations would seem unlikely. With regard to spill-over conflagrations themselves, analysts' suggestions that civil nuclear conflicts will spill-over into regional disputes are underspecified. By what chain of events might this occur? It is unlikely that an adversarial state would behave aggressively against a nuclear proliferator during a domestic upheaval because it is precisely at that point that the proliferator would be most desperate-most threatened by incursions, most unable to respond with purely conventional rebuffs, and most likely to lose negative control of its weapons. For similar reasons, it is unlikely that a state preoccupied with domestic upheaval would embark on nuclear escapades abroad. Perhaps it might be suggested that separatist groups would attack third parties to draw them into the fray-to get other states to apply pressure to the central state government to end the conflict to the separatists' liking. Perhaps, but such an action would seem like a huge gamble to take for the sake of a little added political pressures against the central state. Any state or sub-state that uses nuclear weapons in an attack-especially an attack as unprovoked as one aimed at drawing a third party bystander into a civil dispute-risks nuclear retaliation either by the targeted state or some other state concerned with protecting the international community (for instance, a large, advanced nuclear power like the U.S. might consider an overwhelming counterforce strike against a state or group that had such disregard of life that it had attacked a third party bystander for political purposes). In any case. nuclear use against third parties is likely to result in the most intense forms of political, commercial and strategic isolation, and therefore is not the sort of policy a young, break-away government would normally favor. Terrorists have no motivation for a nuclear attackWaltz 2k—Kenneth, pol sci prof at Berkeley (Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 1, Number 1, Winter/Spring 2000, Interviewed by Jeremy Goldberg & Parag Khanna “Interview: Is Kenneth Waltz Still M.A.D. about Nukes?”, http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/gjia/gjia_winspr00f.html, ZBurdette) Journal What about non–state actors? Can nuclear weapons deter terrorists? Waltz Well, first you need an address; you have to know whom you are retaliating against. Oddly enough, as the number of terrorist incidents–worldwide and in the United States–has decreased, our concern with terrorism has increased. Former CIA Director John Deutch said that in 1996 alone, the United States experienced the lowest number of terrorist incidents in the last twenty–five years. That is rather striking. Journal Will terrorists themselves seek to acquire nuclear weapons? Waltz Would they want them? I think that the answer is no. Terrorists have always been in the position where they could have done more damage than they have chosen to inflict. As Brian Jenkins, one of the great experts on terrorism, said a long time ago: “Terrorists want more people watching, not more people dead.” They are trying to make a point. They are fighting what looks to be a weak and hopeless cause, and they adopt these drastic measures because they do not have the strength to make their cases in an acceptable fashion. False Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,] In short. nuclear weapons would not be very useful in domestic disputes for either symbolic or strategic purposes, and thus it is unlikely that domestic combatants will compromise negative control of weapons by fighting over them. With some straining, one can imagine situations in which nuclear weapons might be used in battles of national separation. but even then their use is not likely to result in intemational conflagration. One might add that unstable states are unlikely to achieve nuclear weapons capability in the first place. As Waltz suggests. Small arsenals solve. Seng, 1998 [Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,] First, limited nuclear proliferators will have very small nuclear arsenals. This in itself will greatly aid in the security of nuclear weapons. There will only be a handful of weapons to guard. It is unlikely that any state's organizational or financial resources will be stretched too thin by the security requirements of a few dozen nuclear weapons. Personnel for guarding such a small number of weapons can be hand-picked, and screened for loyalty and competence (just as all personnel for controlling nuclear weapons in states with small arsenals can be hand-picked and highly trained). Also, deployment of those few weapons in Third World states is not likely to be far-flung or complicated. Third World proliferators do not have to worry about safeguarding weapons in foreign countries like the U.S. did. Neither do Third World states have to worry about weapons on submarines, aircraft carriers or destroyers. In addition, Waltz has suggested that because Third World states will need long lead times to develop large arsenals, leaders will have lots of time to learn proper control and security on small arsenals that will not place much demand on their limited organizational and financial resources. [9 His argument is sound enough as far as it goes. However, as I made clear in chapter two, it is highly unlikely that Third World states will ever buildup arsenals beyond very small numbers of weapons. Limited nuclear proliferators in the Third World will enjoy the advantages of having to secure only small numbers of weapons; they will probably get better at it over time, and the growth of their arsenals-if there is growth-will not outstrip their resources.
[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”,] Second, if a state suffers from an unstable domestic scene, one would expect it to be more worried about weapons security, not less worried. It is unlikely that Third World nuclear stares will compromise their weapons security out of negligence. lf a government suffers from separatist agitation, for instance. given limited nuclear proliferators' ability to hand-pick control and security personnel, one would expect central governments to exclude operators of questionable_ loyalty from the "˜loo p.' Such exclusive patterns are seen in militaries in many unstable or potentially unstable states. Saddam Hussein reserves his best equipment and most sensitive tasks For his elite Red Guard troops. Most of the more sensitive resources of the Yugoslavian army were kept in the hand of Serbians by the Serbdominated central government before the national break-up.
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