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KORUS FTA solves political relations



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KORUS FTA solves political relations



Ratifying the KORUS FTA will strengthen US-ROK alliance

Korea Times, 8 (October 6, Na Jeong-ju, “Lee Calls for Early Ratification of US FTA”, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9670984258&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9670984264&cisb=22_T9670984263&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=174045&docNo=9)
President Lee Myung-bak called for the new U.S. ambassador to Seoul Monday to help achieve an early ratification of the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement (KORUS FTA), saying the accord will benefit both countries and help strengthen their 60-year-old alliance. Lee received credentials at Cheong Wa Dae from Kathleen Stephens, who arrived in Seoul on Sept. 23 to replace Alexander Vershbow and become the first-ever female U.S. ambassador to Seoul. "The KORUS FTA will not only help the United States overcome its financial turmoil, but also bring a lot of economic benefits to Northeast Asia," Lee was quoted as telling Stephens by Cheong Wa Dae deputy spokesperson Kim Eun-hye. "Lawmakers of both countries should ratify the deal as soon as possible as it will be crucial for the two countries to foster a stronger alliance." Stephens told Lee that she will every possible effort to help Seoul and Washington come closer and resolve major pending issues, including the KORUS FTA, which was concluded by both governments in April 2007, but has since been awaiting ratification, according to spokesperson Kim.

The KORUS FTA will reinforce the US-ROK alliance and counter China’s influence.

Mark Manyin, 6 – Analyst in Asian Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division (February 9, “South Korea-U.S. Economic Relations: Cooperation, Friction, and Prospects for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)”, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30566.pdf)


Many proponents of a U.S.-ROK FTA contend that an agreement will boost U.S. strategic interests. Some have called for an FTA as a way to reinforce the U.S.South Korea alliance, which many believe to be under significant stress due to differences over how to deal with North Korea and the size and role of the U.S. troop presence in South Korea.58 A related argument is that an FTA with South Korea will help counter China’s growing economic and political influence in South Korea particularly, and in East Asia generally, developments which some believe are hampering U.S. interests. Some — including Senator Baucus — have coupled this contention with criticism of the Bush Administration’s trade policy of negotiating FTAs with politically important but relatively economically insignificant countries and of neglecting U.S. economic relations with Asia.59

The KORUS FTA would bolster bilateral relations with South Korea.

Shorenstein APARC, 09 (March 31, “New Beginnings in the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Recommendations to the Obama Administration”, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22500/New_Beginnings_FINAL_March_2009_3.pdf, pg. 9)
Passage of the KORUS FTA, which would be the United States’ largest FTA since NAFTA, would demonstrate the Obama administration’s commitment to free trade as a generator of growth. It would bolster the bilateral relationship, and shore up the U.S. strategic position in Asia. South Korea is already moving rapidly to complete comparable agreements with other major trading partners, including the European Union, which would put the United States at a competitive disadvantage if the KORUS FTA were not enacted.. The United States and the ROK should consult closely at top levels to identify modalities and timing for dealing with the domestic political obstacles to early passage of the agreement in both countries.

KORUS FTA Solves Economic Relations




Ratifying the KORUS FTA sustains US credibility in Asia and prevent exclusion from Asian trade.

The Korea Herald, 10 (February 19, “A call for U.S. bipartisanship on KORUS FTA”, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9670984258&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T9670984264&cisb=22_T9670984263&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=158208&docNo=2)
By adding that "with respect to South Korea, there is some concern that, although the deal was good for our telecommunications and our finance system, that our auto exports to South Korea are still subjected to a lot of nontariff barriers," the president offered a tactical explanation why his administration has chosen NOT to move forward with the agreement rather than making strategic arguments for why the Korea-U.S. FTA is in the national interest. The president could have mentioned that Korea has also signed an FTA with the EU, which, if ratified prior to the KORUS FTA, will actually put U.S. firms at a disadvantage vis-a-vis European competitors in the Korean market. Or he could have mentioned that Japan, China, and Korea are discussing the possibility of a regional FTA, which would in effect form an Asian trade bloc, to the exclusion of the United States, and that KORUS could help mitigate the effects of such a development. Or he could have said that China has used preferential trading arrangements as a means by which to promote itself as the center for economic growth (in the post-Google U.S.-China relationship, the need for collaboration with Asian partners is even more important), but the KORUS FTA would set a benchmark for trade liberalization in Asia that would keep the United States in the game as part of the economically most vibrant region in the world. Or he could have mentioned that failure to pass the KORUS FTA (especially in advance of the president's visit to Seoul for the G20 this November) would constitute a setback to the comprehensive strategic alliance with Korea announced in a U.S.-ROK Joint Vision Statement at the White House in June of 2009. Evan Feigenbaum and Bob Manning mention the KORUS FTA as one of the types of engagement needed to sustain American credibility and influence in Asia.



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