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US-Japan relations Good- Heg Alliance key to American heg
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US-Japan relations Good- HegAlliance key to American hegCalder 09[Kent E. Calder, Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University. “Pacific Alliance” 2009 pp 4-5 ]Japan contributes directly to U.S. military preeminence, both by providing bases for U.S. forces and by supplying substantial levels of host-nation support—well over $4 billion annually.7 Even more important, Tokyo quite consistently supports the role of the U.S. dollar as a global reserve currency and generally acts to stabilize its exchange-rate value. This "exorbitant privilege," as Charles de Gaulle once put it, of providing the global key currency allows the United States an autonomy from fiscal constraints on its military deployments available to no other nation. It allowed the Reagan administration to accelerate military spending in the 1980s, despite rising fiscal deficits, so as to force the collapse of the Soviet Union. It also afforded George W. Bush the leeway two decades later of flexibly pursuing the Iraq War. The Japanese financial contribution to the bilateral alliance is, of course, a function of Tokyo's capital surpluses and capital exports. These began to accumulate in earnest during the early 1980s, with the relaxation of Japanese capital controls, and keep growing to this day. Japanese transactions within the United States in domestic and foreign securities swelled from $6.6 billion in 1980 to $130.6 billion in 1985 and to $1.1 trillion in 1989, before dropping by half in 1992. Japanese purchases picked back up, however, to $1.2 trillion in 2007.8 Such flows continue to enhance American fiscal flexibility, including the critical strategic ability to raise military spending when circumstances demand. International foreign-exchange market instability, including a sharp revaluation of the yen or other foreign currencies, could obviously disrupt such flows and thus constrain American strategic flexibility. For Japan, roo, ongoing changes in the global political economy generate important new rationales for the transpacific alliance. Japan, after all, is a middle-range power, lacking strategic depth, which finds benefit in alignment with a larger power in world affairs. Japan is also an island nation, for whom alignment with a preeminent global naval power has particular attraction. That was the logic underlying the Anglo-Japanese naval treaty of 1902, and it still has some parallel relevance today. The United States and Japan are natural geostrategic allies, in the view of many.9 Heg prevents nuclear war.Khalilzad ’95 (Zalmay, RAND Corporation, Washington Quarterly, “Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold Water”, 18:2, Spring, L/N) Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. Ext. US-Japan relations Good- HegRelations Solve HegOkamoto 02[Yukio Okamoto, president of Okamoto Associates, Inc., special adviser to the cabinet and chairman of the Japanese prime minister’s Task Force on Foreign Relations. The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2002, http://www.twq.com/02spring/okamoto.pdf]Fifty years have passed since Japan and the United States signed the original security treaty and more than 40 years have passed since the current 1960 treaty came into force. Neither Japan nor the United States has a desire to alter the treaty obligations, much less abrogate the alliance. Nevertheless, exploring potential alternatives to the alliance is worthwhile, if only to illuminate [End Page 71] why it is likely to survive. For Japan, treaty abrogation would result in a security vacuum that could be filled in only one of three ways. The first is armed neutrality, which would mean the development of a Japan ready to repel any threat, including the region's existing and incipient nuclear forces. The second is to establish a regional collective security arrangement. This option would require that the major powers in Asia accept a reduction of their troop strengths down to Japanese levels and accept a common political culture--democracy. Neither of these conditions is likely to be met for decades. The third option, the one outlined in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, is for Japan's security to be the responsibility of a permanent UN military force, ready to deploy at a moment's notice to preserve peace and stability in the region. Such a force, of course, does not yet exist. None of the three possible replacements for the Japan-U.S. alliance is realistic. The alternatives also seem certain to increase the likelihood of war in the region, not decrease it--the only reason that Japan would want to leave the U.S.-Japan alliance.An overview of aftereffects on the United States of an abrogation of the alliance runs along similar lines. In the absence of a robust, UN-based security system, relations between the giant countries of Asia would become uncertain and competitive--too precarious a situation for the United States and the world. The United States would lose access to the facilities on which it relies for power projection in the region. Much more importantly, it would also lose a friend--a wealthy, mature, and loyal friend. 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