Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic and/or diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China
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- 2NC/1NR AT: China Already Trades with the US
- 2AC Affirmative Answers to China Nationalism Disadvantage
- Link Turn: Economic reforms are popular among nationalists
- Impact Calculus
- Non-Unique: Xi looks weak now
- No Internal Link: Xi doesn’t care about nationalists
- Link Turn: Economic cooperation builds US-China relationship and prevents conflict
2NC/1NR Currency Manipulation Link
Hall, 2012 Matthew, “What part does democracy play in the future of China?” POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-summer-12/matthew-hall.pdf However, as previously mentioned, there is a cyclical nature to this power and the CCP are aware of it and fear losing its grip on it above all else. This is why social stability and unanimity is vital, and a guiding ideological component of the success of communism, as well as a defining factor to the triumphant legacy of Mao Zedong (Peerenboom 2006). This creation of a hybrid between communist communitarianism and Confucian obedience to authority wasn‟t modified for over 30 years. It wasn‟t until the arrival of the next iconic leader that China truly “woke up” and “shook the world” as Napoleon had prophesised centuries before (Hays 2008f). It was the arrival and subtle economic revolution of Deng POLIS Journal Vol. 7, Summer 2012 ISSN 2047-7651 214 Xiaoping. „If Chairman Mao was the architect of an assertive, socialist China, Deng pulled off the even tougher feat of reversing most of what Mao had done and calling it “socialism” (The Economist 2011a: 100). Deng Xiaoping introduced capitalist principles through economic reform in the late 1970s. These principles changed the status quo from state planning to state direction. For example, the “within and without” production plan allowed businesses to pursue their own aims after they met their state-set quotas. It encouraged enterprise and factories to keep profits, use merit pay and offer bonuses and other incentives (Hays 2008b). Such economic liberalisations resulted in Deng‟s era being labelled the “Period of Opening Up”, a time where the people were invited to a world of opportunity and diversity never before seen (He 2010). How Deng managed to apply these reforms is not clear, but what is obvious is why he applied them; there was growing civil unrest in China with a stagnant economy and after the passing of Mao‟s rule, people were beginning to be disillusioned with the CCP. This brings forward a defining pillar of modern state China; that these reforms were made to liberalise consumer behaviour in exchange for leaving politics to the Communist party (Anderlini 2011a). It was the only way Deng could have put through such anti-communist, anti-Maoist policies successfully past the hard-liners of the party. He himself even remarks that without such reforms, the CCP would have been toppled (Hays 2008b). Thus, a new social contract was drawn where the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party was based less upon ideological “correctness”, and more upon economic performance (Weiss 2003: 39). 2NC/1NR AT: China Already Trades with the US
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader”] Aside from developing stronger ties with other states, an important element of Xi’s multifaceted strategy has been to energetically create and participate in multilateral institutions. Some of these, such as AIIB, will be useful for dispensing geoeconomically oriented loans to neighbors. Even though AIIB is a multilateral lending institution rather than a Chinese government agency, such organizations can still be used for geoeconomic statecraft, especially given that Beijing will retain significant influence in AIIB’s management and operation as well as a veto. For example, China sought to use the Asian Development Bank to deny loans to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state claimed by China. The misguided refusal of the United States to participate in the AIIB’s creation, and Washington’s failed attempt to persuade friends and allies not to join, denied the United States an opportunity to influence the bank’s rules, development trajectory, and China’s potential use of the bank as a geopolitical instrument. Other organizations in which China has been dominant have served to exclude the United States from regional discussions or provided China a forum that parallels and circumvents global institutions, allowing it to pursue its national interests and attempt to reshape global governance. China’s elevation of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence- Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a forum that does not include the United States, gave Xi the opportunity to advocate an “Asia for Asians” and amplify long-standing criticism of U.S. bilateral alliances. Its creation of the New Development Bank (formerly the BRICS—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—Development Bank) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) parallels the World Bank and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and offers it the ability to wield geoeconomic influence over others. Although many of these initiatives were conceived under Hu, they were given life by Xi. Because China has historically been hesitant to create and lead multilateral initiatives, this self-assured and multidirectional Chinese behavior is yet another example of increased activism related to Xi’s rise. Xi’s decisive leadership style, his unmatched power within the political system, and his strong desire for vigorous Chinese diplomacy have produced a foreign policy that is assertive, coordinated, and diversified across the instruments and targets of statecraft. 2AC Affirmative Answers to China Nationalism Disadvantage
Krepinevich, 2015 [Andrew, President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments , “How to Deter China The Case for Archipelagic Defense” March/April, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-02-16/how-deter-china] China claims that its rise is intended to be peaceful, but its actions tell a different story: that of a revisionist power seeking to dominate the western Pacific. Beijing has claimed sovereignty over not only Taiwan but also Japan’s Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu Islands) and most of the 1.7 million square miles that make up the East China and South China Seas, where six other countries maintain various territorial and maritime claims. And it has been unapologetic about pursuing those goals. In 2010, for example, China’s then foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, dismissed concerns over Beijing’s expansionism in a single breath, saying, “China is a big country, and other countries are small countries, and that is just a fact.” Consider Beijing’s recent bullying in the South China Sea. In March 2014, Chinese coast guard boats blocked the Philippines from accessing its outposts on the Spratly Islands. Two months later, China moved an oil rig into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, clashing with Vietnamese fishing boats. The moves echoed earlier incidents in the East China Sea. In September 2010, as punishment for detaining a Chinese fishing boat captain who had rammed two Japanese coast guard vessels, China temporarily cut off its exports to Japan of rare-earth elements, which are essential for manufacturing cell phones and computers. And in November 2013, China unilaterally declared an “air defense identification zone,” subject to its own air traffic regulations, over the disputed Senkaku Islands and other areas of the East China Sea, warning that it would take military action against aircraft that refused to comply. Some have suggested that as its military grows stronger and its leaders feel more secure, China will moderate such behavior. But the opposite seems far more likely. Indeed, Beijing’s provocations have coincided with the dramatic growth of its military muscle. China is now investing in a number of new capabilities that pose a direct challenge to regional stability. For example, China’s People’s Liberation Army is bolstering its so-called anti-access/area-denial capabilities, which aim to prevent other militaries from occupying or crossing vast stretches of territory, with the express goal of making the western Pacific a no-go zone for the U.S. military. That includes developing the means to target the Pentagon’s command-and-control systems, which rely heavily on satellites and the Internet to coordinate operations and logistics. The PLA has made substantial progress on this front in recent years, testing an antisatellite missile, using lasers to blind U.S. satellites, and waging sophisticated cyberattacks on U.S. defense networks. China is also enhancing its capacity to target critical U.S. military assets and limit the U.S. Navy’s ability to maneuver in international waters. The PLA already has conventional ballistic and cruise missiles that can strike major U.S. facilities in the region, such as the Kadena Air Base, in Okinawa, Japan, and is developing stealth combat aircraft capable of striking many targets along the first island chain. To detect and target naval vessels at greater distances, the PLA has deployed powerful radars and reconnaissance satellites, along with unmanned aerial vehicles that can conduct long-range scouting missions. And to stalk U.S. aircraft carriers, as well as the surface warships that protect them, the Chinese navy is acquiring submarines armed with advanced torpedoes and high-speed cruise missiles designed to strike ships at long distances. Beijing’s actions cannot be explained away as a response to a U.S. arms buildup. For the last decade, Washington has focused its energy and resources primarily on supporting its ground troops in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. defense budget, which until recently stood at above four percent of the country’s GDP, is projected to decline to less than three percent by the end of the decade. Simply put, the Pentagon is shedding military capabilities while the PLA is amassing them. Yet if the past is prologue, China will not seek to resolve its expansionist aims through overt aggression. Consistent with its strategic culture, it wants to slowly but inexorably shift the regional military balance in its favor, leaving the rest of the region with little choice but to submit to Chinese coercion. For the most part, China’s maritime neighbors are convinced that diplomatic and economic engagement will do little to alter this basic fact. Several of them, including Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, are increasingly focusing their militaries on the task of resisting Chinese ambitions. They know full well, however, that individual action will be insufficient to prevent Beijing from carrying its vision forward. Only with U.S. material support can they form a collective front that deters China from acts of aggression or coercion.
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader"] The impact of this situation on Xi’s political position is evolving. For now, Xi remains strong, his opposition is divided, and nothing indicates that his leadership is in jeopardy. Media reports suggest, however, that senior party members were alarmed by the gyrations of the stock market in the summer of 2015 and the country’s sputtering growth and are holding Xi accountable. They are encouraging him to focus more on the economic situation than the anticorruption campaign, which some contend slows growth by paralyzing rank-and-file officials who fear that action on new projects could land them in jail.30 If the economy continues to weaken, party elites who have suffered under the anticorruption campaign may seek to exploit the situation to undermine Xi, who now has the dubious distinction of presiding over the slowest growth in thirty years and whose agenda and image are underwritten by public support that could wane. Xi will need to take clear steps to strengthen his position against rival elites, fortify his public image, and shield the party from the economic downturn. To that end, he will probably intensify his personality cult, crack down even harder on dissent, and grow bolder in using the anti- corruption campaign against elites who oppose him. Above all, he will almost certainly choose to intensify and stimulate Chinese nationalism in response to slower growth. Ever since Deng dispatched communist ideology in favor of pragmatic capitalist reforms, the party’s legitimacy has been built on two pillars: economic growth and nationalist ideology. Because the former is fading, the latter may be the primary tool to support the office of the party and Xi’s strongman image.
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Time, April 2016 [“Xi Jinping’s Thin Skin Makes Him Look Weak”, 4/7 http://time.com/4284795/panama-papers-xi-jinping/] The President has also faced criticism inside China. Last month, an anonymous letter calling for his resignation was somehow published on a government-affiliated website. Official media have complained openly of censorship. Recently, stories have emerged of disappearing journalists and their intimidated families. This is all at a time when critics warn that Xi has amassed too much power and is building a cult of personality. China’s latest embarrassment comes as other emerging world leaders are fending off corruption charges and fighting for their political lives. Fallout from a massive bribery scandal will probably force Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff from power. Malaysia’s Najib Razak has tried to explain that hundreds of millions deposited into his bank account by a Saudi royal were merely a gift. South Africa’s Jacob Zuma says a swimming pool and millions of dollars in other upgrades to his home were intended to enhance its security. The Panama Papers appear to show that current and former members of Britain’s Conservative Party, including Prime Minister David Cameron’s late father, have shielded wealth in offshore accounts. They also suggest that some of Vladimir Putin’s closest friends have become filthy rich in murky ways. But China is different because of its growing importance for the entire global economy. Any public blow to Xi’s authority will make it more difficult for him to sweep away corruption and advance much-needed economic reforms. Draconian retaliation against unflattering press or internal critics, however, doesn’t project self-confidence. Attempts to exempt top leaders from criticism make the regime look brittle. China’s growth and the party’s grip are strong enough that it won’t matter in 2016, but a sharper slowdown in the future will test Xi’s authority as never before
Weiss, 2014 [Jessica Chen, associate professor of government at Cornell University, “Chinese Nationalism: The CCP's 'Double-Edged Sword'”, 11/25, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/chinese-nationalism-the-ccps-double-edged-sword/] In your book, you challenge the commonly held belief that nationalistic protests in China (and, by extension, nationalism in general) are simply drummed up by the Chinese government. How would you describe the relationship between the central government and public nationalism? The Chinese government has selectively tolerated displays of popular nationalism, recognizing that it is both a potential liability and source of strength for the Chinese Communist Party. Demonstrations of nationalist anger can be helpful when the Chinese government wants to show resolve but can also make diplomatic compromise and flexibility more difficult. On the other hand, when street protests might have jeopardized efforts to improve diplomatic relations and defuse potential crises, Chinese authorities have repeatedly stifled grassroots nationalist protests — often at great cost to the Chinese government’s patriotic credentials and domestic legitimacy. As I note in Powerful Patriots, nationalist activists are often quietly cynical about the role they play. One activist told me: “To speak plainly, the government uses us when it suits their purpose. When it doesn’t suit them, it suppresses us. This way the government can play the public opinion card. After all, Japan is a democracy and respects public opinion. Even in a non-democratic country like China, the government can still point to the public’s feelings.” In the book, you argue that the decision to encourage or discourage protests is often a form of foreign policy signaling. How can other governments (particularly Japan, one of the most popular targets for such protests) use this information to better respond to crises in their relationships with China? Other governments can learn a lot about Chinese foreign policy intentions by observing whether China restricts or permits popular mobilization over a particular issue, including online petitions, street protests, and other symbolic attempts to defend Chinese sovereignty, including voyages to disputed islands and waters. After the 2001 EP-3 incident, for example, China prevented anti-American street demonstrations. These efforts helped China send a signal of reassurance to the Bush administration as both sides negotiated a face-saving compromise over the release of the American crew. As John Keefe, special assistant to Ambassador Prueher, later recounted: “University students wanted to hold demonstrations to vent their anger. The government forbade them from taking such action [and] repeatedly stressed… that this event should not be seen as a major affair in U.S.-China relations.”
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2016 [International, bipartisan organization, “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage Chinese Foreign Policy Under a Powerful but Exposed Leader"] Nevertheless, China’s growing geopolitical ambitions are tempered by the reality of its economic relationship with the United States and a variety of shared international interests between the two countries. China will continue to seek to expand its influence and in some instances will compete directly with the United States, and Xi may criticize Washington to score points at home, but bilateral economic inter- dependence will, in most cases, provide a floor for the relationship. This is, of course, different from the longtime U.S. objective of constraining and ultimately moderating Chinese behavior by broadly integrating China into the international system, a strategy that appears not to have substantially shaped China’s more assertive external policies. In sum, Xi does not want to trigger a confrontation with the United States, especially during a period of economic uncertainty in China. Directory: wp-content -> uploads -> 2015 2015 -> Police Militarization 2015 -> 2015 ihbb championships: hs history Bowl Round 4 – Prelims First Quarter 2015 -> Wrtp/big step · 3841 W. Wisconsin Ave., Milwaukee, wi 53208 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 December 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Darton College 2015 -> Training Workshop on Planning and Implementation of Multi-Sectoral Development Programme (MsDP) in Bihar Date : 6th 2015 -> Rao bulletin 15 June 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 September 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Rao bulletin 1 August 2015 html edition this bulletin contains the following articles 2015 -> Science, and transportation united states senate Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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