China has a comparative advantage over the united states for allying with Saudi Arabia
Luft and Korin 2004 (Gal Luft and Anne Korin, Commentary Magazine, Institute for Analysis of Global Security, http://www.iags.org/sinosaudi.htm)
Even if Saudi Arabia does not pursue nuclear status, however, it has abundant reasons for looking east to China both for markets and for military assistance, just as China has abundant reasons for looking west to Saudi Arabia for continued access to Middle Eastern oil. And aside from these mutual interests, an alliance with China would hold other attraction for the Saudis. Unlike the U.S., the Chinese do not aspire to change the Arab way of life, or impose freedom and democracy on regimes that view such ideas with skepticism and fear. Indeed, Chinese attitudes toward the open societies of the West are markedly similar to those of the Arab despotisms themselves. The Chinese also have at their disposal immense reserves of manpower, which they can deploy to protect the oil resources of any new allies they acquire. Thousands of Chinese soldiers disguised as oil workers, for example, are used today to guard petroleum facilities in Sudan. With 11 million men reaching military age annually, China could easily replicate this elsewhere. Finally, while the U.S. is continually castigated by the Arabs for its closeness to Israel, China's ties with Jerusalem have never risen above the level of indifference.
China will fill the regional security vacuum
Luft 2004 (gal, executive director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, “fuelling the dragon” http://www.iags.org/china.htm )
A key component of China's strategy to guarantee access to Persian Gulf oil is the special relations it has cultivated with Saudi Arabia. The ties with Riyadh go back to the mid-1980s when China sold Saudi Arabia intermediate range ballistic missiles. Since then, the relations have grown closer. High-level visits of Chinese leaders to Saudi Arabia culminated in 1999 with President Jiang Zemin's state visit in which he pronounced a "strategic oil partnership" between the two countries. China has offered to sell the Saudis intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Saudis have so far preferred to turn down many of the proposals and limit their procurement from China in order to maintain their special relations with the U.S. But continuous deterioration in Saudi-American relations or, in the longer run, a regime change in the oil kingdom, could drive the Saudis to end their reliance on the U.S. as the sole guarantor of their regime's security and offer China an expanded role.
***AFF Answers*** Relations Low
Relations at an all time low
Herald, 2011 (International Herald Tribune, 3-19, "For Obama, Bahrain is Mideast's hottest spot; Region in Revolt" LEXIS, SRM)
The brutal crackdown in Bahrain poses the greatest Middle East democracy dilemma yet for the administration of President Barack Obama, deepening a rift with its most important Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, while potentially strengthening the influence of its biggest nemesis, Iran. Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia are at their coldest since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. Saudi officials, still angry that Mr. Obama abandoned President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in the face of demonstrations, ignored U.S. requests not to send troops into Bahrain to help crush Shiite-led protests there. A tense telephone call between Mr. Obama and King Abdullah on Wednesday, Arab officials said, failed to ease the tensions. ''King Abdullah has been clear that Saudi Arabia will never allow Shia rule in Bahrain - never,'' an Arab official who was briefed on the talks said. He said King Abdullah's willingness to listen to the United States had ''evaporated'' since Mr. Mubarak was forced from office.
Relations low now - countless reasons
Washington Post 2011 (May 16, "The U.S.-Saudi split", LEXIS, SRM)
A tectonic shift has occurred in the U.S.-Saudi relationship. Despite significant pressure from the Obama administration to remain on the sidelines, Saudi leaders sent troops into Manama in March to defend Bahrain's monarchy and quell the unrest that has shaken that country since February. For more than 60 years, Saudi Arabia has been bound by an unwritten bargain: oil for security. Riyadh has often protested but ultimately acquiesced to what it saw as misguided U.S. policies. But American missteps in the region since Sept. 11, an ill-conceived response to the Arab protest movements and an unconscionable refusal to hold Israel accountable for its illegal settlement building have brought this arrangement to an end. As the Saudis recalibrate the partnership, Riyadh intends to pursue a much more assertive foreign policy, at times conflicting with American interests. The backdrop for this change are the rise of Iranian meddling in the region and the counterproductive policies that the United States has pursued here since Sept. 11. The most significant blunder may have been the invasion of Iraq, which resulted in enormous loss of life and provided Iran an opening to expand its sphere of influence. For years, Iran's leadership has aimed to foment discord while furthering its geopolitical ambitions. Tehran has long funded Hamas and Hezbollah; recently, its scope of attempted interference has broadened to include the affairs of Arab states from Yemen to Morocco. This month the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, Gen. Hasan Firouzabadi, harshly criticized Riyadh over its intervention in Bahrain, claiming this act would spark massive domestic uprisings. Such remarks are based more on wishful thinking than fact, but Iran's efforts to destabilize its neighbors are tireless. As Riyadh fights a cold war with Tehran, Washington has shown itself in recent months to be an unwilling and unreliable partner against this threat. The emerging political reality is a Saudi-led Arab world facing off against the aggression of Iran and its non-state proxies.
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