Sbsp affirmative- arl lab- ndi 2011


***AT: Russian Oil DA*** No link- transition will be slow



Download 1.74 Mb.
Page19/99
Date02.02.2017
Size1.74 Mb.
#15744
1   ...   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   ...   99

***AT: Russian Oil DA***

No link- transition will be slow




Energy transitions are prolonged processes that take decades to have a global effect


Smil modified 11 (Dr. Vaclav, Distinguished Professor in the Faculty of Environment at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, Canada, “considered to be one of the world's leading experts in energy”, Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada (Science Academy), “Energy transitions are inherently slow”, modified 12-20-11, http://ourenergyfutures.org/page-titre-Energy_transitions_are_inherently_slow-cid-23.html) OP
"Energy transitions" encompass the time that elapses between an introduction of a new primary energy source oil, nuclear electricity, wind captured by large turbines) and its rise to claiming a substantial share (20 percent to 30 percent) of the overall market, or even to becoming the single largest contributor or an absolute leader (with more than 50 percent) in national or global energy supply. The term also refers to gradual diffusion of new prime movers (e.g. such as diesel engines and turbines), devices that replaced animal and human muscles by converting primary energies into mechanical power that is used to rotate massive turbogenerators producing electricity or to propel fleets of vehicles, ships, and airplanes. There is one thing all energy transitions have in common: they are prolonged affairs that take decades to accomplish, and the greater the scale of prevailing uses and conversions the longer the substitutions will take.

A full, global transition to renewables take centuries- empirically proven


Fouquet 10 (Roger, Research Associate in Energy & Environmental Economics at Imperial College London, “The Slow Search for Solutions: Lessons from Historical Energy Transitions by Sector and Service”, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CB8QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bc3research.org%2Findex.php%3Foption%3Dcom_wpapers%26task%3Ddownpubli%26iddoc%3D16%26repec%3D1%26Itemid%3D279&rct=j&q=energy%20transitions%20into%20the%20market%20are%20slow&ei=n_kmTpiLF8ytgQeS6aUN&usg=AFQjCNGwmRvEXOf7dqDy1lTprHhENPyO1w&sig2=QrP7vU83jLK0MLHlo2fY8g) OP
Although often considered a single event, the transition from traditional energy sources to fossil fuels was complex and involved numerous services and sectors at different times between 1500 and 1920.The main drivers for the energy transitions were the opportunity to produce cheaper or better energy services. In a majority of cases, the successful new energy source or technology provided the same service (i.e. heating, power, transport or light) with superior or additional characteristics (e.g. easier, cleaner or more flexible to use). The existence of a niche market willing to pay more for these characteristics enabled the new energy source and technology to be refined gradually until they could compete with the incumbent energy source. Nevertheless, this implied that, on average, the whole innovation chain took more than one hundred years and the diffusion phase nearly fifty years.

Price Volatility Inevitable




Price volatility is inevitable and shocks cause high prices.



Paul Roberts, regular contributor to Harpers Magazine and “expert on the complex interplay of economics, technology, and the environment, 2004 (The End of Oil, p. 93-4)
The obsessive focus on oil is hardly surprising, given the stakes. In the fast-moving world of oil politics, oil is not simply a source of world power, but a medium for that power as well, a substance whose huge importance enmeshes companies, communities, and entire nations in a taut global web that is sensitive to the smallest of vibrations. A single oil "event" — a pipeline explosion in Iraq, political unrest in Venezuela, a bellicose exchange between the Russian and Saudi oil ministers — sends Shockwaves through the world energy order, pushes prices up or down, and sets off tectonic shifts in global wealth and power. Each day that the Saudi-Russian spat kept oil supplies high and prices low, the big oil exporters were losing hundreds of millions of dollars and, perhaps, moving closer to financial and political disaster — while the big consuming nations enjoyed what amounted to a massive tax break. Yet in the volatile world of oil, the tide could quickly turn. A few months later, as anxieties over a second Iraq war drove prices up to forty dollars, the oil tide abruptly changed directions, transferring tens of billions of dollars from the economies of the United States, Japan, and Europe to the national banks in Riyadh, Caracas, Kuwait City, and Baghdad, and threatening to strangle whatever was left of the global economic recovery.

No Diversification now

Russia diversification fails- makes them more dependent on oil Gaddy 11 (Clifford, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, economist specializing in Russia Foreign Policy, Global Economy and Development, Center on the United States and Europe, “Will the Russian Economy Rid Itself of Dependence on Oil?”, 6-16-11, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0616_ russia_economy_gaddy.aspx) OP



To ask whether the Russian economy will rid itself of its “dependence on oil” is to ask whether ideology will trump economics. Many people in Russia—including President Medvedev—seem to believe Russia should de-emphasize the role of oil, gas, and other commodities because they are “primitive.” Relying on them, they argue, is “degrading.” From the economic point of view, this makes no sense. Oil is Russia’s comparative advantage. It is the most competitive part of the economy. Oil and gas are something everyone wants, and Russia has more of them than anyone else. It is true that the Russian economy is backward, and that oil plays a role in that backwardness. But oil is not the root cause. The causes of Russia’s backwardness lie in its inherited production structure. The physical structure of the real economy (that is, the industries, plants, their location, work forces, equipment, products, and the production chains in which they participate) is predominantly the same as in the Soviet era. The problem is that it is precisely the oil wealth (the so-called oil rent) that is used to support and perpetuate the inefficient structure. For the sake of social and political stability, a large share of Russia’s oil and gas rents is distributed to the production enterprises that employ the inherited physical and human capital. The production and supply chains in that part of the economy are in effect “rent distribution chains.” A serious attempt to convert Russia’s economy into something resembling a modern Western economy would require dismantling this rent distribution system. This would be both highly destabilizing, and costly in terms of current welfare. Current efforts for “diversification” do not challenge the rent distribution system. On the contrary, the kinds of investment envisioned in those efforts will preserve and reinforce the rent distribution chains, and hence make Russia more dependent on oil rents.



Download 1.74 Mb.

Share with your friends:
1   ...   15   16   17   18   19   20   21   22   ...   99




The database is protected by copyright ©ininet.org 2024
send message

    Main page