SPS will be perceived as a weapon – violates space treaties
Fan et al 11 [William, Harold Martin, James Wu, Brian Mok, "SPACE BASED SOLAR POWER," Industry and Technology Assessmen, 6-2, http://www.pickar.caltech.edu/e103/Final%20Exams/Space%20Based%20Solar%20Power.pdf]
Due to the high energy transmitter that it will utilize, space based solar power could potentially be in violation of international space treaties. In 1967, the Outer Space Treaty was signed by the United States and other world powers. One of the key issues addressed by this treaty is space based weapons. The Outer Space Treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space or on any celestial body. This could become a serious issue for space based solar power because of the potential for the transmitter to become a dual use weapon. Additionally, the newly proposed Space Preservation Treaty could severely hinder the implementation of space based solar power, as it would ban the any kind of weapon from being placed in space. In addition to political issues, there may be social disapproval of having a potential weapons system in space
SPS paves way for space weaponization – enables space lasers and radio jammers
THERESA HITCHENS 07 DIRECTOR THE WORLD SECURITY INSTITUTE’S CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION. http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/HitchensTestimony.pdf
Solar power technology also enables many space applications. Again, rapid reconstitution of space assets occurs with solar power satellites. With power already available, satellites for various tasks are smaller and easier to launch. They are also cheaper. Currently, the maneuver 25 capability of satellites is constrained. Electrical propulsion combined with electricity beamed form a solar power satellite allows satellites to maneuver at will without degrading their on-orbit life span. Many different concepts for force application are currently under study. Two of them, space-based lasers and an electronics jamming system, are limited by the amount of power current technologies can produce. Add the electricity produced by a solar power satellite into the equation and these concepts become technologically feasible. The same is true for space-based radar. Still more advantageous is the coupling of satellites to provide information services such as voice, video, and Internet access as well as power.
SSA = Space Weapon
Space situational capabilities are the first step to space weaponization
Gasparini and Miranda 10 [Giovanni, space expert at Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy and Valerie, “Space situational awareness: an overview,” Studies in Space Policy, 2010, Volume 4, 4, 73-87]
The debate over the best way to protect American space capabilities and ensure U.S. control of space is thus part of a wider and heated discussion over space weaponisation in which SSA initiatives play a key role. Indeed, some argue that these latter are the first step towards the acquisition of space-based weaponry. Laurence Nardon, for instance, claims that while the Eisenhower Administration formally excluded the weaponisation of space in 1958, deeming it to be too destabilising, the 2001 Rumsfeld report and the three-phase-USAF plan represent a change in attitude. The 2006 National Space Policy seems to go in the same direction. Despite the denials of the Bush Administration, the principle that “the United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space” 72 has been interpreted by many experts as a thinly veiled authorisation of space weaponisation. For instance, Michael Krepon, co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center, said this new policy would reinforce international suspicions that the United States may seek to develop, test and deploy space weapons.
Unilateral space awareness systems cause backlash
Gasparini and Miranda 10 [Giovanni, space expert at Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy and Valerie, “Space situational awareness: an overview,” Studies in Space Policy, 2010, Volume 4, 4, 73-87]
A Space Awareness system that does not work as a confidence-building measure between potentially competing space actors will inevitably increase the likelihood of a conflictual posture in space that exploits the asymmetrical vulnerability of U.S. military space assets. This could also create an environment in which non-military security and commercial satellites would not be adequately protected. A commonly agreed governance and data policy system that resolves the tradeoff between the effectiveness of the transparency approach and the secrecy requirements of the military and intelligence community could bridge the current gap between the European and U.S. positions. The key to this approach is to allow differentiated access to data according to the real “need to know” of the potential users. In the case of commercial operators and the wider public, this would exclude knowledge of the characterisation of satellites unless specifically requested when an event requiring the assessment of legal liability occurs. U.S. authorities need to take more account of the dual character of space. At the same time, European institutions need to think more strategically. This discussion should take place between all U.S. Space Agencies on the one side and the European Council, the European Commission and ESA on the other. The problem with other space nations that are not bound by the Transatlantic Alliance is however much more complicated. China and to a lesser extent Russia, as well as other minor space-capable countries such as Iran, would feel potentially threatened by a non-inclusive American or even transatlantic approach to space awareness. As it is unlikely that they will field a national SSA system, the incentive for them to develop ASAT capabilities would be high. This is particularly true due to the complexity and high cost of defending a space asset compared to the relative small cost of attacking it.
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