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NC/1NR Materials — Privacy Link
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- Studies prove that awareness of privacy consequences create impetus for more privacy.
- 2NC Congressional Action Link
- Privacy policies like the aff build the infrastructure for future privacy social movements
- Even limited reform created some momentum — plan creates the opportunity for further reform
- They Say: “Link Non-Unique — Generic”
- No momentum for privacy reform now — only the most privacy conscious of individuals disrupt big data’s control
- No momentum for change — actors like Verizon and Google have historically determined the future of surveillance
- They Say: “Link Non-Unique — NFA”
- New surveillance reform reaffirms a changing political climate
2NC/1NR Materials — Privacy Link2NC Privacy Winners Win LinkPlan shores up support for privacy which spills over.Ozer 12 — Nicole Ozer, the Technology and Civil Liberties Policy Director at the ACLU of Northern California (ACLU-NC), where she developed the organization's Demand Your dotRights online privacy campaign, 2012 (“Putting Online Privacy Above The Fold: Building A Social Movement And Creating Corporate Change” New York University Review of Law & Social Change, Lexis) Unlike modern software, privacy practices and laws do not auto-update. There must be sustained public pressure to support real change. Since 2009, the privacy community has been able to leverage factors to start to build a viable social movement to push for legal and policy change. The next several years will be significant in determining whether a privacy social movement is able to grow and mature like the environmental movement by utilizing recent successes and current attention to put down roots, mobilize broad public support, and achieve major reforms. It is my hope that, by reflecting on recent successes related to online privacy, identifying factors that have contributed to these advances, and [*281] suggesting a focus for privacy work that can reinforce these factors and break down remaining obstacles, this article contributes to the discussion of why and how the privacy community should build and sustain a viable social movement. If the privacy community can continue building the necessary infrastructure and taking the strategic policy steps necessary to increase transparency about how an individual's own information flows through the data ecosystem, it will be possible to sustain a large-scale social movement to ensure that, as technology advances, privacy protections are safeguarded in the modern digital world. Studies prove that awareness of privacy consequences create impetus for more privacy.Lewis, Kaufman, and Christakis 8 — Kevin Lewis, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at Harvard University, Jason Kaufman, Ph.D., is a research fellow at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, Nicholas Christakis, M.D., Ph.D., M.P.H., is a Professor in the Department of Sociology and Health Care Policy at Harvard University, 2008 (“The taste for privacy: An analysis of college student privacy settings in an online social network” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communicaiton 14(1) Wiley) Finally, our data are relevant to understanding online privacy more generally—especially within fledgling communication technologies like SNSs. In Ruling the Waves: Cycles of Discovery, Chaos, and Wealth From the Compass to the Internet, Debora Spar (2001) argues that new technologies tend to undergo a predictable pattern of transitions. At first, they are concentrated only among a small group of “innovators.” This phase is characterized by excitement, freedom, and creativity. Next, the technology becomes “commercialized,” as the lay public rushes en masse to adopt it. Eventually, however, this rapid growth outstrips the spirit of the innovative period. Problems of coordination and competition foster “creative anarchy” and the search for freedom is replaced by a demand for property rights. Finally, government enters the scene, restoring order at the behest of the very pioneers who once sought to escape it. While not identical in form, the negotiation of privacy in online settings may be characterized by a similar pattern. When a new technology such as Facebook is released, there is a high degree of ambiguity over appropriate norms of conduct—the very definition of this space as public or private is contested. College students, professors, parents, employers, and Facebook itself each have different and potentially conflicting interests in the way the technology is used. Students are surely aware that the information they post is “public”—but the full extent and possible consequences of this display may not be recognized by all. Slowly but inevitably, excitement outstrips precaution. The technology diffuses throughout the population, and users provide ever more data on their profiles—all the while maintaining the (rather permissive) default privacy settings, not yet having reason to do otherwise (see Mackay, 1991). Eventually, however, this behavior becomes consequential. The boundary between public and private is suddenly and unequivocally asserted by virtue of being overstepped. Users venture too far into public space with private details, and the consequence is a crashed party, a lost job opportunity, or—at an extreme—sexual assault or identity theft. Awareness is suddenly raised for a certain type of user: those users concerned with safety, or with maintaining a division between their public “face” and their online profile, or whose own high level of online activity gives them a better perception of their surroundings; this awareness spreads, most directly through the social ties represented by Facebook friendships and cohabitation. Communication about the importance of noncommunication takes place. The upshot of this process is that a normative boundary emerges where before none existed. Facebook is increasingly recognized as a space within which some precaution must be exercised, and users respond by retreating behind a virtual line of privacy—in proportion to the extent to which their awareness has been raised by a concern that applies to them personally. Here, we have considered such a progression from excitement and ambiguity to (self-) regulation. However, rather than regulation being at once explicit, legal, and externally imposed (by government), the public/private boundary on Facebook is implicit, normative, and internally negotiated. We may thus see new online spaces as “self-regulating systems” where awareness is the impetus for change and equilibrium the final product—both proceeding along a pattern of predictable regularities. In the meantime, researchers of SNSs will watch their study populations wax and wane, and the sites themselves may become less open and more exclusive. Whether users will still “Facebook” in the future to share ideas and social ties, or whether the form and/or site of these interactions will change, remains to be seen. 2NC Congressional Action LinkThe plan enables reform and self-regulation — it reclaims congressional decision-making authority on intelligence and spurs executive actionBerman 14 — Emily Berman, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, LL.M. (Masters of Law) from New York University School of Law, J.D. from New York University School of Law, B.A. from Duke University, 2014 (“Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection,” Washington & Lee Law Review (71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3 ), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCO Host) The FBI’s mandate to protect civil liberties can be viewed as a “secondary” mission—one that frequently comes into tension with its primary mission of preventing security threats.256 Studies show that an agency will focus on what it considers to be its primary mission, and it will shirk on performing “secondary” or less easily evaluated goals.257 As a secondary mission, protection of civil liberties is, therefore, sure to be short-changed in favor of security in the same way that environmental concerns have so often gone under-addressed in favor of development or other economically profitable activities. 2. Relieving the Tension Among Multiple Missions Fortunately, several administrative law strategies suggest ways to ensure that the Guidelines regime sufficiently takes into account civil liberties concerns as well as security concerns.258 Though all of the options discussed below are possible paths to follow, the final two approaches discussed below seem particularly promising. Congress Reclaims Authority. One option, of course, is for Congress simply to relieve an agency of responsibility for one of [End of p. 67] the competing goals, reclaiming that decision-making authority for itself.259 Following revelations of civil liberties violations in the 1970s, Congress reclaimed some decision-making authority regarding the executive’s surveillance powers by enacting the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).260 Or Congress could generate more piecemeal limitations, barring particular techniques that pose threats to civil liberties, or defining the circumstances under which such techniques could be used. Congress could, for example, statutorily reinstate the rule regarding the use of undercover agents to investigate First Amendment protected activities as it existed in the Guidelines in 2001, which required that the FBI have probable cause or a reason to believe a crime had been committed before sending an agent into the meetings of a religious or political group.261 Congress need not legislate to bring such changes about. If Congress wanted to alter particular investigative tactics, or even to pressure the Justice Department to adopt of its own volition the type of procedural framework suggested in this Article, it has an array of tools at its disposal to press for its desired policy change. Just the threat of legislation, so long as it is credible, can spur executive action. Recall that the original Attorney General’s Guidelines were implemented to sap the momentum from Congress’s efforts to enact a legislative charter for the FBI.262 So long as the option of enacting an FBI charter remains a viable means for Congress to limit the Attorney General’s discretion when it comes to FBI investigations, the threat of such legislation can be used to press for Congress’s desired policy outcomes. Congress possesses carrots as well as sticks—its control over the FBI and Justice Department’s budget also can impose a great [End of p. 68] deal of pressure for policy change. Given the political economy of this policy area,263 however, reliance on Congress to reconcile the tension between the FBI’s security mission and civil liberties is not the most promising route. 2NC Privacy Policy LinkPrivacy policies like the aff build the infrastructure for future privacy social movementsOzer 12 — Nicole A. Ozer, the Technology and Civil Liberties Policy Director at the ACLU of Northern California, developed the organization's Demand Your dotRights online privacy campaign, 2012 (“Putting Online Privacy Above The Fold: Building A Social Movement And Creating Corporate Change,” New York University Review of Law & Social Change (36 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 215), Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis) Conclusion Unlike modern software, privacy practices and laws do not auto-update. There must be sustained public pressure to support real change. Since 2009, the privacy community has been able to leverage factors to start to build a viable social movement to push for legal and policy change. The next several years will be significant in determining whether a privacy social movement is able to grow and mature like the environmental movement by utilizing recent successes and current attention to put down roots, mobilize broad public support, and achieve major reforms. It is my hope that, by reflecting on recent successes related to online privacy, identifying factors that have contributed to these advances, and [*281] suggesting a focus for privacy work that can reinforce these factors and break down remaining obstacles, this article contributes to the discussion of why and how the privacy community should build and sustain a viable social movement. If the privacy community can continue building the necessary infrastructure and taking the strategic policy steps necessary to increase transparency about how an individual's own information flows through the data ecosystem, it will be possible to sustain a large-scale social movement to ensure that, as technology advances, privacy protections are safeguarded in the modern digital world.
2NC New Reform LinkEven limited reform created some momentum — plan creates the opportunity for further reformKopstein 15 — Joshua Kopstein, cyberculture journalist and researcher focusing on Internet law and disorder, surveillance and government secrecy, 2015 (“USA Freedom Act gives NSA everything it wants — and less,” Al-Jazeera America, June 2nd, Available online at http://america.aljazeera.com/blogs/scrutineer/2015/6/2/usa-freedom-act-gives-nsa-everything-it-wants--and-less.html, Accessed 7-21-15) Even people within the NSA have been candidly celebrating the Freedom Act's surveillance “reforms,” calling it “a nothingburger for the privacy community.” And they might be right — with so many overlapping and redundant surveillance authorities, it'd be foolish to think the Freedom Act has ended bulk collection in any significant capacity. That doesn't mean there's no reason to celebrate the first step, but Congress will have to hit the ground running if it wants to build on the Freedom Act's momentum. In the House, Reps. Thomas Massie, R-Ky., and Zoe Lofgren, D-Ca., are already proposing an amendment to an upcoming “must-pass” Department of Justice appropriations bill that would stop the agency from compromising encryption standards, a measure that was removed from the original Freedom Act. (In September of 2013, Snowden revealed that the NSA and its British counterpart GCHQ routinely inject vulnerabilities into commonly used encryption software and influence the development of crypto standards from within the scientific community.) A separate amendment to the same bill, by Lofgren and Republican Ted Poe of Texas, would also block the FBI from demanding these encryption backdoors. And another from Colorado Democrat Jared Polis would block the Drug Enforcement Administration from collecting bulk phone records — a response to recent reports that the agency for decades ran a domestic phone records database that preceded the NSA's. Barring all that, the next major opportunity to challenge NSA surveillance won't be until 2017, when Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is due to expire. But now that more transparency is in place, Congress has a chance to make up for the Freedom Act's shortcomings by putting the wheels in motion for real, comprehensive reform. They Say: “Link Non-Unique — Generic”Privacy movement is losing momentum — success strategies haven’t translated into wins.Hosein 09 — Gus Hosein, Executive Director of Privacy International and Previous Visiting Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009 (“Challenges in Privacy Advocacy,” Reinventing Data Protection, Edited By Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul De Hert Cecile de Terwangne, Sjaak Nouwt, pg. 254-255) Over the past decade the landscape for privacy protection has transformed. A decade ago, privacy groups were focused on a number of policing and national security campaigns (e.g., closed-circuit television cameras), communications surveillance (e.g., surveillance being designed into the infrastructure), communications security (the ‘crypto-wars’) and free expression issues (particularly on-line issues). Privacy campaigners also focused on the private sector surveilling its customers, whether through collecting medical records (e.g., US laws on health insurance), financial records (e.g., credit records), or the then-budding area of electronic commerce. Campaign successes were achieved through coalition building and educational campaigns on the importance of privacy. Media organisations were becoming more aware of these challenges and began regularly covering some of these issues, though they were often too arcane for the general population. Politicians were coming to terms with the new political realities of the globalisation of markets, the movement of people and data across borders and technological advancements. It was still a nascent field in many ways, with a few strong leaders and small groups making the most out of their small resources. In the last ten years, the challenges grew, the coalitions fragmented and the moods of the public and the media fluctuated. The level of uncertainty rose, along with the stakes. Privacy groups were caught in the storm of trying to research the policies while rushing out responses to media and political developments. A number of successful ‘response’ strategies emerged. Media organisations around the world documented the greater incursions upon the private lives of the individual, with a particular focus on the actions of the US government even if it meant ignoring domestic programmes. Parliaments and privacy commissioners issued condemnations and damning analyses of proposed plans to collect, profile and share data. Legal and academic institutions released studies assessing proposed policies and identifying the fault lines. Some national constitutional courts released opinions that upheld the right to a private life, though surprisingly the number of cases brought before these courts dwindled. Despite these response strategies there have been practically no clear ‘wins’ in the past decade. Indeed, some amendments to policies have increased oversight and reduced harms. Some policies have withered, such as the data profiling of US citizens, whether under the ‘Total Information Awareness’ project (TIA) or the ‘Computer Aided Passenger Pre-Screening Program’ (CAPPS II), though the creators of these systems are insisting that these programmes be offered lifelines. Meanwhile, Europe seems set to become the next home of data-mining as these systems are the subject of government-funded research and play a key component in future government plans. As examples, the EU-funded iTRACS consortium is conducting research into data mining techniques that can be applied to financial, travel and communications data, albeit in a privacy protective way (if this is possible); and the EU plans for next generation border management that involves the collection and mining of travel, biographic, biometric and behavioural data. Just as bad policies travel worldwide, rarely has a privacy-invasive bill not become law, a technological infrastructure not been developed, a data collection scheme abandoned. Even the withering programmes and policies have returned under new guises. As examples, data profiling systems re-emerged in the US to be applied at the border under the ‘Automated Targeting System’; UK Parliamentary initiatives to reduce the invasiveness of plans to analyse communications records were corroded when the UK government managed to push a more invasive policy through the European Union; data breach legislation is being watered down to minimise the impact upon companies while disarming the rights of consumers. Many of these surveillance initiatives outlast the campaigns to oppose them. Often the decisions to implement surveillance systems take place behind closed doors, after controversies have subsided to some extent. The Passenger Name Record debate is a key example of this: original campaigns in 2003 against the US plans seem to lead somewhere as the EU was rejecting US demands for data from EU carriers. By 2004 a limited agreement was settled upon and another campaign followed that questioned the legality of the agreement. Many twists and turns later, we ended up in 2006 with an interim agreement that was worse and in 2007 with an agreement that was even worse than that. In the end, the EU agreed to an expansive regime of data sharing with the US because, behind closed doors, the EU was hoping that the US would offer data from its own carriers to the EU for its own expansive purposes. Campaigners tried as much as they could to follow this arcane issue during its 5 year gestation period but they were eventually shut out of a negotiations process involving secret agreements and oversight arrangements that involved non-disclosure agreements. No momentum for privacy reform now — only the most privacy conscious of individuals disrupt big data’s controlMohan 13 — Vivek Mohan, Associate with the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program's (STPP) Project on Technology, Security, and Conflict in the Cyber Age (Cyber Project) at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, J.D. from Columbia, 2013 (“Privacy Consciousness in the Big Data Era,” Hive, May 13th, Available online at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/23095/privacy_consciousness_in_the_big_data_era.html, Accessed 7-20-15) Exploring how we are coping with our inability to answer the questions "who owns my data? And…why do they have it?" has become an increasingly popular topic for the mainstream media (notably, the Slipstream column in the New York Times). But prayers for regulation aside, the collection, use, and resale of data that was once exceptionally private is here to stay. I'm not here to vilify data collectors — far from it. Despite my strong inclination towards maintaining the traditions of days past (I'm probably the only person in his twenties who still reads physical newspapers), societal inertia cannot be held up ipso facto to argue for stronger privacy protections when we ourselves are responsible for sharing the data that is now traversing the endless servers of cyberspace. The benefits of the big data revolution are myriad, cut across sectors, and the best is surely yet to come. But how did we get to the point where I — theoretically a privacy and cybersecurity expert — find myself inured to the amount of data that I'm signing away the rights to at any given time? (Although, I must say it is comforting to say that it's not quite 1984 in the land of big data — Google Now seems to think I'm a Cubs fan). To focus the conversation a bit, let's focus on mobile — and let's talk about how application and ecosystem developers together have, for lack of a better word, conspired to remove bargaining power over data ownership from the individual. We are all (presumably) familiar with the process of installing an app on a smartphone. Once an app has been located on Google Play or the Apple App Store, we tap "install," whereupon we are presented with a list of device features that the app requests permission to access. I'm sure many of you — like me — have asked yourself "Why does that program need access to my GPS location?" It's even possible that when faced with a particularly egregious misrepresentation as to what's new in an app, you have refused to update. But that puts you in the minority — the rest of us absentmindedly tap "Accept and Download" and move on living our monitored lives. How many crashes do you think were fixed by Facebook having more access to location data? How did we end up here? Well, app developers have a pretty sweet deal given the current mobile ecosystems. In a classic case of fine print combined with unequal bargaining power, the ability of consumers to control their data have been eviscerated in a totally legal way. If you don't agree to the proposed permissions, you can take your smartphone and go home — you don't get to play with the latest, greatest apps. Those responsible for the major mobile ecosystems — Apple and Google — made a decision at some point, perhaps for technical reasons, to disallow users from toggling individual permissions on an app — it is all or nothing. In this world, why wouldn't Facebook throw the kitchen sink of permissions in? Only the most privacy conscious of individuals would be willing to give up the benefits of such a critical app for the marginal, ineffable privacy benefits — after all, the preinstalled Google Maps is already collecting your location — what's the matter if Facebook has it as well? In essence, the bigger and more valuable the app, the more able the developer is to collect data — on the terms that he or she sees fit. If the terms of service of the app say the data can be resold, that's that — the consumer has entered into a contractual relationship with the developer — in law school, we called this a "meeting of the minds." I'd argue that given current data collection practices, consumers and data collectors are about as far as possible from reaching a "meeting of the minds" each time an app is downloaded.
As an entrepreneur developing applications that take advantage of the plentiful data collected and disseminated by today's app economy, it's easy to be of the mindset that collecting all the data that you can and sorting it out later is the best way to go. But it is important to take a strategic view — the present inequality in bargaining power will not last forever. Those developers are privacy conscious, and expressly so, will be hailed as leaders when the pendulum of privacy norms in our society swings the other way. That said — don't hold your breath for Congress. No momentum for change — actors like Verizon and Google have historically determined the future of surveillanceAgur 13 — Colin Agur, a PhD candidate in communications at Columbia University and a visiting fellow at Yale Law School’s Information Society Project, 2013 (“Negotiated Order: The Fourth Amendment, Telephone Surveillance, and Social Interactions, 1878-1968,” Information & Culture: A Journal of History, Volume 48, Number 4, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse) For researchers of telecommunications and the law, the history of telephone surveillance offers important lessons. In telephone surveillance [End of p. 441] we see how decisions by actors gave a device a particular social meaning and how that meaning evolved over time and space thanks to an ongoing negotiation process among the key actors. Human agency played a significant role in the formation of rules on telephone surveillance, and the social organization that emerged in the late 1960s was the result of a long-term negotiation involving a wide range of participants. Thus, rather than a case of a technology determining or (in the words of Thomas Hughes) giving “momentum” to a set of social changes,112 the jurisprudence governing telephone surveillance has been constructed by those who were able to establish practices and norms in telephony. In our efforts to understand the negotiation of telephone surveillance law and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, Balkin’s theory of cultural software serves us well. By examining a long-term economy of exchange involving technological, institutional, and cultural inputs, we can understand the social organization of the law. And by focusing on the negotiations and contexts in which they took place, we can understand the role of ideology in institutional practices, Supreme Court decisions, and legislation. At the same time, the history of telephone surveillance law helps us see the limitations of ideology and the importance of human agency. The actions of key agents, from engineers to administrators to lawmakers to judges, each contributed to ideology, which in turn shaped the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. They Say: “Link Non-Unique — NFA”The link is unique — the New Freedom Act allowed momentum to dissipate and extended 215Raimondo 14 — Justin Raimondo, an American author and the editorial director of Antiwar.com, 2014 ("The ‘USA Freedom Act’ Is A Fraud," Antiwar.com, November 17th, Available Online at http://original.antiwar.com/justin/2014/11/16/the-usa-freedom-act-is-a-fraud/, Accessed 7-21-2015) Some civil liberties groups, like the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, argue that the present bill is "a first step," and is better than nothing. This is nonsense: this bill is worse than nothing. With the passage of the USA Freedom Act the momentum for real reform will be blunted and allowed to dissipate. Further efforts to roll back the awful power of the NSA will be met with cries of "Didn’t we already do this?" If this bill passes, the Washington insiders will win out, and the Surveillance State will remain intact – arguably even more powerful than before. Some may say: But aren’t you taking an all-or-nothing attitude? The answer is: not at all. A real reform means a partial reining in of the NSA, with no new extensions of its reach. This bill includes a full-scale codification of abuses coupled with ambiguous and easily reinterpreted "reforms" that don’t mean what they appear to mean.
Passage of legislation this week to rein in the National Security Agency was the first major congressional action to limit government spying in a generation, and it was a move away from the aggressive national security measures put in place after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks. But whether the congressional view of surveillance has changed for good remains to be seen, with the battle over NSA reform set to play out again during the 2016 race for the White House.
"This is only the beginning," said Sen. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), one of Congress's most vocal privacy hawks. "There's a lot more to do." The USA Freedom Act renews Section 215 of the Patriot Act and two other provisions that had expired on Monday morning. But in doing so, it also ends the NSA's bulk collection of U.S. phone records and other data. The bill reauthorizes the Patriot Act provisions through Dec. 15, 2019, setting the stage for another showdown during the next administration. But civil libertarians want to go much further to curb government spying. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.51 Mb. Share with your friends:
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