Sports Topic Wave 1 Patriot Brief 2014
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- Empirical studies validate
- You should prefer con’s statistics --- their studies are filled with ideological biases
- Every credible sources conclude --- sports subsidies don’t produce substantial economic benefits
- There’s no multiplier effects from sports subsidies
- Areas are already in bad shape – Public subsidies only encourage bad behavior
- The Public Decides what they want
- Public subsidies decrease incomes of people in nearby metropolitan areas
- Job Losses in Arizona City
- Doesn’t Create Jobs in Hamilton County, Ohio → leads to other hardships
- Doesn’t Stimulate Econ Growth Overall
- Decreases Wages/Not Beneficial Workers
*** ConSubsidies BAD --- EconomySubsidies don’t generate any positive economic outcome --- they increase government debtGarofalo, Economic Policy Editor for ThinkProgress.org, 12 (Pat, “If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky Economics of Sports Stadiums,” 7-7-14, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/ Y2K) This is an altogether too common problem in professional sports. Across the country, franchises are able to extract taxpayer funding to build and maintain private facilities, promising huge returns for the public in the form of economic development. For instance, just three of the NFL's 31 stadiums were originally built without public funds. In two of those cases, public funding was later used to upgrade the stadium or surrounding facilities, even as all 32 of the NFL's teams ranked among Forbes' 50 most valuable sporting franchises in the world in 2012. (Only MetLife Stadium, shared by the New York Jets and New York Giants, received no public funding.) Time after time, politicians wary of letting a local franchise relocate -- as the NBA's Seattle Supersonics did, to Oklahoma City before the 2008-2009 season -- approve public funds, selling the stadiums as public works projects that will boost the local economy and provide a windfall of growth. However, according to leading sports economists, stadiums and arenas rarely bring about the promised prosperity, and instead leave cities and states mired in debt that they can't pay back before the franchise comes calling for more. "The basic idea is that sports stadiums typically aren't a good tool for economic development," said Victor Matheson, an economist at Holy Cross who has studied the economic impact of stadium construction for decades. When cities cite studies (often produced by parties with an interest in building the stadium) touting the impact of such projects, there is a simple rule for determining the actual return on investment, Matheson said: "Take whatever number the sports promoter says, take it and move the decimal one place to the left. Divide it by ten, and that's a pretty good estimate of the actual economic impact." Others agree. While "it is inarguable that within a few blocks you'll have an effect," the results are questionable for metro areas as a whole, Stefan Szymanski, a sports economist at the University of Michigan, said. PUBLIC MONEY BALL There are numerous reasons for the muted economic effects. The biggest is that arenas often sit empty for a significant portion of the year. Jobing.com Arena is guaranteed 41 hockey games annually. The other 324 nights, it must find concerts, conventions or other events to fill the schedule, and in Glendale, where the arena competes with facilities in nearby Phoenix, that can be tough to do. "We've looked at tons of these things, and the one that we found that seemed to make sense is the Staples Center in Los Angeles," Matheson said. "But they use it 250 dates a year. They don't make sense when you're using it 41 times a year and competing with another venue down the street." Another reason the projects rarely make sense is because of the way they are structured. Stadiums and arenas are financed with long-term bonds, meaning cities and states will be stuck with the debt for long periods of time (often 30 years). And while cities make 30-year commitments to finance stadiums, their commitments to government workers and other local investments are often made on a year-to-year basis, meaning that, just as in Glendale, it becomes easier to eliminate public sector jobs and programs than to default on debt incurred from arenas. The counterargument -- made by council member Joyce Clark, who voted for the subsidies, and Glendale First, an organization in favor of the package -- is that the Coyotes and their arena provide support to the local economy that otherwise wouldn't be there. "It's a huge economic engine for Glendale," Bea Wyatt, a spokesperson for Glendale First said. According to Wyatt, who doesn't live in Glendale but frequents the city for Coyotes games, sales tax revenue made up 41 percent of Glendale's budget last year, and a significant portion was derived from sales around the arena. Supporters also claim the deal with Jamison is a good one for the city, since he will eventually pay for the arena's management and employ local workers. But again, economists don't seem to buy the argument. While Glendale First claims that more than 600,000 visitors -- three times Glendale's population -- came to the city for hockey last year, the Coyotes finished last in the NHL in attendance. And it is unclear how many of those visitors were, like Wyatt, residents of nearby communities who may patronize restaurants but don't spend money shopping or staying in hotels. Matheson estimates that 20 percent of fans for a Major League Baseball game come from outside the local area, and that the figure for hockey games is likely much smaller. That's hardly enough to fill the local hotels or to add outside spending to the local economy in other ways, he said. "It's not generating new revenue. This is local spending on a local event," Matheson said, adding that most of the money spent in and around arenas and stadiums would likely be spent elsewhere in the local economy if there were no sporting events to attend. Though it is clear that new facilities are not a wise investment for taxpayers, the argument from Glendale First stems from the fact that Jobing.com Arena is already there. Refusing to use more public financing - and potentially allowing the Coyotes to leave for a new town - Wyatt said, would amount to the city turning its back on its initial investment and risking the failure of hotels, restaurants, and other businesses. Empirical studies validateEasterbrook, a contributing editor at The Atlantic, 13 (Gregg, “How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers: Taxpayers fund the stadiums, antitrust law doesn't apply to broadcast deals, the league enjoys nonprofit status, and Commissioner Roger Goodell makes $30 million a year. It's time to stop the public giveaways to America's richest sports league—and to the feudal lords who own its teams,” 9-18-13, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/ Y2K) It's a story that could have been told in almost any American city over the past two decades. Owners of teams in the "big four" sports leagues — the NFL, MLB, NBA and NHL — have reaped nearly $20 billion in taxpayer subsidies for new homes since 1990. And for just as long, fans, urban planners and economists have argued that building facilities for private sports teams is a massive waste of public money. As University of Chicago economist Allen Sanderson memorably put it, "If you want to inject money into the local economy, it would be better to drop it from a helicopter than invest it in a new ballpark."
"Public subsidies for stadiums are a great deal for team owners, league executives, developers, bond attorneys, construction firms, politicians and everyone in the stadium food chain, but a really terrible deal for everyone else," concludes Frank Rashid, a lifelong Detroit Tigers fan and college English professor. Rashid co-founded the Tiger Stadium Fan Club in 1987, and for the next twelve years he fought an unsuccessful battle against Michigan's plans to spend $145 million in public funds to replace that historic ballpark. "The case is so clear against this being a top priority for cities to be doing with their resources, I would have thought that wisdom would have prevailed by now." You should prefer con’s statistics --- their studies are filled with ideological biasesEasterbrook, a contributing editor at The Atlantic, 13 (Gregg, “How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers: Taxpayers fund the stadiums, antitrust law doesn't apply to broadcast deals, the league enjoys nonprofit status, and Commissioner Roger Goodell makes $30 million a year. It's time to stop the public giveaways to America's richest sports league—and to the feudal lords who own its teams,” 9-18-13, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/ Y2K) For politicians eager to embrace sports deals, it's easy to find consulting firms willing to produce glowing "economic impact studies" — even though sports economists nearly unanimously dismiss them as hogwash. For example: Economic Research Associates told the city of Arlington, Texas, that spending $325 million on a new stadium for billionaire oil baron Jerry Jones's Dallas Cowboys would generate $238 million a year in economic activity. Critics immediately pointed out that this merely totaled up all spending that would take place in and around the stadium. Hidden deep in the report was the more meaningful estimate that Arlington would see just $1.8 million a year in new tax revenues while spending $20 million a year on stadium subsidies. Every credible sources conclude --- sports subsidies don’t produce substantial economic benefitsShultz, a professor @ Hamline University School of Business, 11 (David, the editor of the Journal of Public Affairs Education (JPAE), “Dumb and dumber: The folly of taxpayer handouts for professional sports,” 2-10-11, http://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2011/02/dumb-and-dumber-folly-taxpayer-handouts-professional-sports, Y2K) Three basic arguments are used In general, as one surveys local debates about stadium construction in the United States, three basic arguments are employed to support using public money to build sports stadiums. First, proponents claim that building a new stadium will have a big impact on the economy, generating many new jobs and bringing new businesses to the area. However study after study has demonstrated that advocates of public spending on stadiums consistently exaggerate the benefits of sports to a local economy. A 1996 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, "Tax-Exempt Bonds and the Economics of Professional Sports Stadiums" (Zimmerman 1996) concluded that sports stadiums represent a small percentage (generally less than 1 percent) of a local economy. It also stated that there is little real impact or multiplier effect associated with building sports stadiums. By that, if one looks at the economic impact of the dollars invested in sports stadiums, the return is significantly smaller than compared to other dollars invested in something else. Moreover, the building of stadiums merely transfers consumption from one area or one type of leisure activity to another, and overall, sports and stadiums contribute little to the local economy and instead represent an investment that costs the public a lot while failing to return the initial investment. Dollar for dollar, the opportunity costs of investing in sports stadiums is a terrible option if the goal is economic development, job development, or producing new economic development in a community. In short, the nearly $3 billion in sports subsidies it documented produced little, at the cost of over $120,000 per job. Same conclusion: a bad investment
(Andrew Zimbalist, Roger Noll, Economic Professor at Stanford University, Sports, Jobs, & Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth the Cost? 1997, http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/1997/06/summer-taxes-noll, AM) Unfortunately, these arguments contain bad economic reasoning that leads to overstatement of the benefits of stadiums. Economic growth takes place when a community's resources—people, capital investments, and natural resources like land—become more productive. Increased productivity can arise in two ways: from economically beneficial specialization by the community for the purpose of trading with other regions or from local value added that is higher than other uses of local workers, land, and investments. Building a stadium is good for the local economy only if a stadium is the most productive way to make capital investments and use its workers. In our forthcoming Brookings book, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes, we and 15 collaborators examine the local economic development argument from all angles: case studies of the effect of specific facilities, as well as comparisons among cities and even neighborhoods that have and have not sunk hundreds of millions of dollars into sports development. In every case, the conclusions are the same. A new sports facility has an extremely small (perhaps even negative) effect on overall economic activity and employment. No recent facility appears to have earned anything approaching a reasonable return on investment. No recent facility has been self-financing in terms of its impact on net tax revenues. Regardless of whether the unit of analysis is a local neighborhood, a city, or an entire metropolitan area, the economic benefits of sports facilities are de minimus. As noted, a stadium can spur economic growth if sports is a significant export industry—that is, if it attracts outsiders to buy the local product and if it results in the sale of certain rights (broadcasting, product licensing) to national firms. But, in reality, sports has little effect on regional net exports. Sports facilities attract neither tourists nor new industry. Probably the most successful export facility is Oriole Park, where about a third of the crowd at every game comes from outside the Baltimore area. (Baltimore's baseball exports are enhanced because it is 40 miles from the nation's capital, which has no major league baseball team.) Even so, the net gain to Baltimore's economy in terms of new jobs and incremental tax revenues is only about $3 million a year—not much of a return on a $200 million investment. Sports teams do collect substantial revenues from national licensing and broadcasting, but these must be balanced against funds leaving the area. Most professional athletes do not live where they play, so their income is not spent locally. Moreover, players make inflated salaries for only a few years, so they have high savings, which they invest in national firms. Finally, though a new stadium increases attendance, ticket revenues are shared in both baseball and football, so that part of the revenue gain goes to other cities. On balance, these factors are largely offsetting, leaving little or no net local export gain to a community. One promotional study estimated that the local annual economic impact of the Denver Broncos was nearly $120 million; another estimated that the combined annual economic benefit of Cincinnati's Bengals and Reds was $245 million. Such promotional studies overstate the economic impact of a facility because they confuse gross and net economic effects. Most spending inside a stadium is a substitute for other local recreational spending, such as movies and restaurants. Similarly, most tax collections inside a stadium are substitutes: as other entertainment businesses decline, tax collections from them fall. Promotional studies also fail to take into account differences between sports and other industries in income distribution. Most sports revenue goes to a relatively few players, managers, coaches, and executives who earn extremely high salaries—all well above the earnings of people who work in the industries that are substitutes for sports. Most stadium employees work part time at very low wages and earn a small fraction of team revenues. Thus, substituting spending on sports for other recreational spending concentrates income, reduces the total number of jobs, and replaces full-time jobs with low-wage, part-time jobs. A second rationale for subsidized stadiums is that stadiums generate more local consumer satisfaction than alternative investments. There is some truth to this argument. Professional sports teams are very small businesses, comparable to large department or grocery stores. They capture public attention far out of proportion to their economic significance. Broadcast and print media give so much attention to sports because so many people are fans, even if they do not actually attend games or buy sports-related products. A professional sports team, therefore, creates a "public good" or "externality"—a benefit enjoyed by consumers who follow sports regardless of whether they help pay for it. The magnitude of this benefit is unknown, and is not shared by everyone; nevertheless, it exists. As a result, sports fans are likely to accept higher taxes or reduced public services to attract or keep a team, even if they do not attend games themselves. These fans, supplemented and mobilized by teams, local media, and local interests that benefit directly from a stadium, constitute the base of political support for subsidized sports facilities. The Role of Monopoly Leagues While sports subsidies might ow from externalities, their primary cause is the monopolistic structure of sports. Leagues maximize their members' profits by keeping the number of franchises below the number of cities that could support a team. To attract teams, cities must compete through a bidding war, whereby each bids its willingness to pay to have a team, not the amount necessary to make a team viable. Monopoly leagues convert fans' (hence cities') willingness to pay for a team into an opportunity for teams to extract revenues. Teams are not required to take advantage of this opportunity, and in two cases—the Charlotte Panthers and, to a lesser extent, the San Francisco Giants—the financial exposure of the city has been the relatively modest costs of site acquisition and infrastructural investments. But in most cases, local and state governments have paid over $100 million in stadium subsidy, and in some cases have financed the entire enterprise. The tendency of sports teams to seek new homes has been intensified by new stadium technology. The rather ordinary cookie-cutter, multipurpose facility of the 1960s and 1970s has given way to the elaborate, single-sport facility that features numerous new revenue opportunities: luxury suites, club boxes, elaborate concessions, catering, signage, advertising, theme activities, and even bars, restaurants, and apartments with a view of the field. A new facility now can add $30 million annually to a team's revenues for a few years after the stadium opens. Because new stadiums produce substantially more revenues, more cities are now economically viable franchise sites—which explains why Charlotte, Jacksonville, and Nashville have become NFL cities. As more localities bid for teams, cities are forced to offer ever larger subsidies. Do not stimulate growthSiegfried, Professor of Economics at Vanderbilt University, 2000 (John, "The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their Communities," 07-07-14, http://www.uwlax.edu/faculty/anderson/micro-principles/stadiums.pdf, bdg) More than $21.7 billion will be spent on these 95 stadiums and arenas built or planned since 1990. Few fields of empirical economic research offer virtual unanimity of findings. Yet, independent work on the economic impact of stadiums and arenas has uniformly found that there is no statistically significant positive correlation between sports facility construction and economic development. The conclusion that sports teams and facilities do not stimulate economic growth is surprising to many people. With live telecasting of games, daily coverage on television news and in the sports sections of newspapers, professional sports play a huge role in U.S. culture. Yet sports teams are small businesses. Yearly average team revenues in 1999 are around $55 million in the NHL, $75 million in the NBA, $85 million in MLB and $100 million in the NFL. For a medium-size city like St. Louis, the baseball team accounts for less than 0.3 percent of local economic activity; for a large city like New York, a baseball team contributes less than 0.03 percent of economic output. Johnson, University of Denver, 11 (Garrett, “The Economic Impact of New Stadiums and Arenas on Cities,” University of Denver Sports and Entertainment Law Journal, 7-9-14, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/sports-and-entertainment-law-journal/issues/10/Johnson-Article-Spring-2011.pdf, AM) Areas are already in bad shape – Public subsidies only encourage bad behaviorMataconis, associate's degree, 2013 (Doug, Despite Bankruptcy, Detroit Subsidizing New Red Wings Stadium, 7-8-2014, http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/despite-bankruptcy-detroit-subsidizing-new-red-wings-stadium/,YAC) Despite the fact that Detroit’s financial situation is so bad that the city was forced to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, plans are still moving forward for a new stadium for the Detroit Red Wings that includes the expenditure of more than $400 million in taxpayer dollars\ Detroit’s financial crisis hasn’t derailed the city’s plans to spend more than $400 million in Michigan taxpayer funds on a new hockey arena for the Red Wings. Advocates of the arena say it’s the kind of economic development needed to attract both people and private investment dollars into downtown Detroit. It’s an argument that has convinced Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder and Kevyn Orr, the emergency manager he appointed to oversee the city’s finances, to stick with the plan. Orr said Detroit’s bankruptcy filing won’t halt the arena plans. Detroit city services are already stretched extremely thin. On average, police take about an hour to respond to calls for help, and 40% of street lights are shut off to save money. “If you want people to live in the city, and not just visit to go to games, you have to invest in schools, in having the police to respond to calls,” said Gretchen Whitmer, the Democratic leader in the state senate. “There are so many investments that should trump a sports stadium.” The Public Decides what they wantMelaniphy, PhD, 2013 (John C.,The Impact of Stadiums and Arenas, 7-8-2014, http://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-32513493/the-impact-of-stadiums-and-arenas, YAC) The reality of either positive or negative impacts of stadiums has been the subject lately of a great deal of controversy with experts lining up on both sides of the issue. The issue can only be properly addressed by considering the stadium, its location, the major team or teams that will play there and overall utilization. The stadiums and arenas reflect marked differences between baseball, football and basketball attendance and their respective economic impacts. It goes without saying that the team or teams must be at least marginally successful in playing their respective sports and in winning the hearts and minds of the local public. The issue is far more complicated than how it is often viewed. It is not simply dollars and cents, as many would like us to believe. There really is an issue of city image and personal pride. We are a sports crazy country, and it's our tax dollars. In Denver, the community voted new sales taxes to finance the $215,000,000 Coors Field, while they voted down a $32,000,000 bond issue for schools. It does not make sense; however, the people had the opportunity to speak. It was their choice, regardless of what the critics think. In other communities, while the critics complain, the public votes with its wallet. According to a study, The Stadium Binge, published in a special sports section of USA Today (Friday, September 9, 1996), "45 new stadiums will be built in this decade at a cost of over $9 billion." The residents of roughly 45 cities have and or will have their say on this issue, while the critics will continue to grumble. On a personal note, while a city's image can be difficult to define, I live in Chicago and no matter whether I am in Europe, South America, the Middle East or the Far East, everyone wants to know about Michael Jordan. Al Capone may have put Chicago on the map, but Michael Jordan has remade the city's image. Over the years, I have had numerous occasions to address the stadium issue while evaluating the impacts of stadiums throughout the United States and Canada. The focus has been on the impacts of stadiums in or near downtown areas; the value and impacts of Wrigley Field and the Chicago Cubs on their Wrigleyville neighborhood, the City of Chicago, Cook County and State of Illinois; forecasting attendance for numerous public facilities; continuing to evaluate the impact of the proposed new Milwaukee stadium on the surrounding and adjacent properties; and studying the opportunities for restaurants, stores and concessionaires in numerous arenas, amusement parks, airports, schools, universities, etc. I have evaluated the impacts of night versus day baseball and the benefits of singleuser versus multi-user stadiums. I have seen both sides of the issues, the debates, the emotion and the hype. Neither side is ever truly correct; however, both the pros and the cons make salient points regarding the benefits (or lack of) and the costs.
In contrast to other existing studies, we find evidence that some professional sports franchises reduce the level of per capita personal income in metropolitan areas and have no effect on the growth in per capita income, casting doubt on the ability of a new sports franchise or facility to spur economic growth. We also find evidence that results obtained from estimating reduced form relationships, a common practice in the literature, are not robust to alternative statistical model specifications. Job Losses in Arizona CityGarofaldo and Waldron, economic policy editor for ThinkProgress.org and economics and sports reporter for Thinkprogress.org, 2012 (Pat and Travis, If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky Economics of Sports Stadiums, accessed 07-07-14, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/, dsk) By all indications, the Coyotes are more Atlanta than they are Nashville, particularly in the sense that they have yet to be embraced by the local population even during periods of success. "This is hockey in a non-hockey city where the average resident hasn't seen ice outside of a margarita," Matheson said. With the city shedding jobs and cutting services, the logical decision would seem to be to take back the funding it has promised to Coyotes in order to preserve those jobs and programs, a stance taken by city council member Phil Lieberman, who voted against the funding package. "I can use that $15 million [annual payment] for good things for Glendale," Lieberman said. "Open our libraries up again...Replace the 55 cops that we're short right now." But if the city and its residents are desperate to keep the Coyotes in town, they have to understand that doing so comes at a cost that likely won't be replaced -- not by sales tax revenue, not by economic growth, and not by outside spending. When the city subsidizes hockey, it reduces its ability to pay for public safety officials, public transportation, and services upon which its citizens rely.
Aaron, “America Has a Stadium Problem,” 07-07-14, http://www.psmag.com/navigation/business-economics/america-has-a-stadium-problem-62665/, dsk) “All the while, American cities, counties, and states continue to struggle. Glendale, Arizona, may actually sell City Hall so they can afford to keep subsidizing a hockey team that few people actually pay to see. Detroit isn’t exactly the paragon of fiscal responsibility, with its Emergency Manager—they have an honest-to-god “emergency manager”—offering a stern warning: In a report to be presented to Michigan’s treasurer on Monday, Kevyn D. Orr, the emergency manager appointed in March to take over operations here, described long-term obligations of at least $15 billion, unsustainable cash flow shortages and miserably low credit ratings that make it difficult to borrow. But, they’re somehow on the verge of finding $450 million for a new hockey arena.And in Hamilton County, Ohio, where a combined $805 million in taxpayer money built the new football and baseball stadiums, police and education budgets have been slashed, while one in seven people live below the poverty line.”
(John and Andrew, “The Economics of Sport Facilities and Their Communities, 7-7-14, http://www.uwlax.edu/faculty/anderson/micro-principles/stadiums.pdf Journal of Economic Perspectives, dsk) The conclusion that sports teams and facilities do not stimulate economic growth is surprising to many people. With live telecasting of games, daily coverage on television news and in the sports sections of newspapers, professional sports play a huge role in U.S. culture. Yet sports teams are small businesses. Yearly average team revenues in 1999 are around $55 million in the NHL, $75 million in the NBA, $85 million in MLB and $100 million in the NFL. For a medium-size city like St. Louis, the baseball team accounts for less than 0.3 percent of local economic activity; for a large city like New York, a baseball team contributes less than 0.03 percent of economic output.Sports teams typically employ between 70 and 130 people in their front offices.Beyond this, they hire approximately 1000–1500 day-of-game personnel who work in unskilled, low wage, temporary, part-time jobs. An NFL team is assured of playing 10 home games a year (including preseason games). At four hours of work per game, an NFL team provides day-of-game employment for the equivalent of 20 to 30 full-time, year-round jobs. As we shall see, however, it is problematic to attribute even these jobs to the sports team. Of course, the controversy about the economic impact of professional sports teams on their local economy is not just about the teams themselves, but also about how specific local restaurants, hotels, and other businesses might be affected. However, even if one assumes, optimistically, that on average people spend as much outside the sports facility as they do inside, the economic impact of sports teams in proportion to a typical metropolitan economy is diminutive.
Dennis and Brad, “The Effect of Professional Sports on the Earnings of Individuals: Evidence from Microeconomic Data”, 7-7-14, http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_03_104.pdf UMBC Economics Department, dsk) “In this paper we have examined the impact of professional sports on average weekly earnings of a sample of workers in narrow occupational groups drawn from the Current Population Survey March Supplement. These occupational groups are among those that proponents of public funding of professional sports claim will benefit economically from subsidies. The approach here contrasts with that in previous research which focused on aggregate measures of income. However, the results of this study confirm conclusions of earlier research that the overall sports environment is frequently statistically significant as a determinant of earnings and that the predicted mean impact of sports on wages is negative. In this study, the effect of sports is an annual average decrease in inflation adjusted earnings of $47.95 for workers in the sample. However, the results also show that the effects of the sports environment differ across job-types. For example, for workers employed in retail occupations, annual earnings rise on average due to the presence of professional sports. Our results cast further doubt on the idea that professional sports can be an effective economic development tool in metropolitan areas. Although some specific occupational groups clearly benefit from the presence of professional sports franchises and facilities in our sample of 37 cities, it does not appear that workers in other related occupational groups benefit. Instead, workers in these other occupational groups have lower wages as a result of the wider impact of professional sports on the local economy.”
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