Subsidies BAD --- Economy --- Framing

Subsidies BAD --- Economy --- Framing

Sports subsidies get out of control --- causes additional expenditure that are expensive

(Stanley, "Public Teams, Private Profits," 07-08-14, http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2000/0300eitzen.html, bdg)

Sweetheart Deals: And the subsidies don’t end with the cost of the stadium. Fans need to be able to drive to the new facility — so the federal government pays the cost of new roads, overpasses, highway access, and the like. In addition, team owners typically get all or much of the revenue from parking, concessions, and nonsport events that take place in the new arena. Sometimes cities even provide owners with moving expenses, practice facilities, office space, land, and special investment opportunities to entice them to stay or to move their team to the city. Owners are usually allowed to sell the right to name the stadium or arena. For example, Baltimore Ravens owner (and former Cleveland Browns owner) Art Modell will receive $105 million over 20 years, for giving the name "PSINet Stadium" to the facility provided him by the city of Baltimore.
Reverse Welfare: When stadiums are built and paid for by taxpayers, there is a clear transfer of wealth from those taxpayers to owners and players. Urban scholar Mark Rosentraub says that "sales taxes paid by lower-income people produce excess profits that are divided between players and owners, all of whom enjoy salaries about which the taxpayers can only dream."

A stadium subsidy, in addition to defraying the owners’ construction or renovation costs, also increases the value of a team, so that when it is sold the owner reaps higher capital gains. In 1993, for example, baseball’s Cleveland Indians had a market value of $81 million. The next year, with the opening of their new Jacobs Field facility, the team’s value immediately jumped to $100 million, then to $125 million by 1996; last year, the team sold for $320 million — a return of 295% in the three years following the new stadium’s debut.

Clearly the mayors, governors and legislators who work against welfare to the poor are more than generous with their handouts to the rich. And the wealthy team owners, who favor private enterprise and marketplace solutions in other business activities, insist on subsidies to maintain their lucrative professional franchises. Faced with what they consider inadequate subsidies, they’ll move their teams to new localities, where the public is more generous. The residents of America’s cities continue to put up with this hypocrisy — though by pouring money into a team, they actually make it less likely that many of them will be able to afford to see the games in person. The price of tickets — which is going up in any case — rises even faster when a new stadium is built. Thus the people who helped pay for the shiny new stadium may end up being priced out of entering it.

Subsidies BAD --- Economy --- A2: Teams Will Relocate

Cities will never lose the teams

(Gregg, “How the NFL Fleeces Taxpayers: Taxpayers fund the stadiums, antitrust law doesn't apply to broadcast deals, the league enjoys nonprofit status, and Commissioner Roger Goodell makes $30 million a year. It's time to stop the public giveaways to America's richest sports league—and to the feudal lords who own its teams,” 9-18-13, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/ Y2K)

Yet the amount of public money being spent on sports facilities continues to rise. According to Harvard urban planner Judith Grant Long, cities, states and counties spent a record $6.5 billion on stadiums and arenas in the 1990s, then shattered that mark the following decade with an additional $10.1 billion — a 31 percent increase after accounting for inflation. And that's not counting hidden subsidies like lease breaks, property tax exemptions and the use of tax-exempt government bonds, which Long estimates have added at least another 10 percent to the public's tab.

Why do new sports facilities have such a hold on local elected officials? The simplest explanation is fear: because team owners can choose new cities but cities can't choose new teams — thanks to the leagues' government-sanctioned monopolies over franchise placement — mayors feel they must offer owners anything they want. "Politicians continue to believe that it would be political disaster to lose a team on their watch," Baade says.

Actually losing a team, though, is extremely rare. Most team owners prefer to keep plugging for new stadiums in their hometowns even after their bluff has been called. Florida Marlins president David Samson first declared in 2004 that a new stadium bill "has to happen in the next week. And if not, we'll move on." He repeated similar threats for four years, until the city of Miami and Miami-Dade County finally agreed to kick in more than $478 million for a new stadium with a retractable roof.

Teams will not relocate

(Neil, "Why do Mayors Love Sports Stadiums," 07-07-14, http://www.thenation.com/article/162400/why-do-mayors-love-sports-stadiums#, bdg)

Why do new sports facilities have such a hold on local elected officials? The simplest explanation is fear: because team owners can choose new cities but cities can’t choose new teams—thanks to the leagues’ government-sanctioned monopolies over franchise placement—mayors feel they must offer owners anything they want. “Politicians continue to believe that it would be political disaster to lose a team on their watch,” Baade says.

Actually losing a team, though, is extremely rare. Most team owners prefer to keep plugging for new stadiums in their hometowns even after their bluff has been called. Florida Marlins president David Samson first declared in 2004 that a new stadium bill “has to happen in the next week. And if not, we’ll move on.” He repeated similar threats for four years, until the city of Miami and Miami-Dade County finally agreed to kick in more than $478 million for a new stadium with a retractable roof.

Subsidies BAD --- Budget --- Expensive

The significant percentage of expenses provided by public sources

F PhD 2012 (J, Them’s that Got will Get, 7-8-2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2012/05/economics-sport,YAC)
On Monday, Minnesota's governor, Mark Dayton, signed into law a remarkable deal authorizing a new stadium for the hapless Vikings. The stadium is projected to cost $975m, of which the Vikings will pay less than half. The rest ($498m) will come from the state, through an expansion of gambling revenue, and from a Minneapolis hospitality tax. The Falcons want a new stadium to replace the admittedly dreary Georgia Dome; it is projected to cost nearly $1 billion, $300m of which will come from taxpayers. The Rams want a $700m upgrade to their 17-year-old, publicly-funded field; St Louis wants to cap public contributions at $60m.

Subsidy Amounts for Rutgers Athletics increase

Sargeant and Berkowitz, 2014 (Keith-A Home News Tribune staff writer, and Steve-USA Today projects/database reporter/editor, “Subsidy of Rutgers athletics jumps 67.9% to $47 million,” 7-8-14, http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/02/23/rutgers-university-athletics-subsidy-jumps/5761371/, MB)

Rutgers receives approximately 21 percent its revenue from state appropriations, which means taxpayers fund part of the school's overall operating budget. According to the 2013 FY financial report, Rutgers' $78,989,475 budget made up approximately 4 percent of the university's nearly $2 billion allocations fund.

The report, obtained in response to an open-records request from USA TODAY Sports and Indiana University's National Sports Journalism Center, shows that the Rutgers athletics department received nearly $47 million in subsidies from the university's allocations fund to make up for a shortfall in the approximately $79 million athletics budget during the 2012-13 season. It's an increase of 67.9% from the $27.9 million subsidy the athletics department received in 2012.

NFL can’t be classified as a non-profit organization with a commissioner who makes more than 30 million a year

NPR Staff, 2014 (“The NFL; Big Business With Big Tax Breaks,” 7-8-2014, http://www.npr.org/2014/01/18/263767372/the-nfl-big-business-with-big-tax-breaks, MB)

The NFL is registered as a not-for-profit, tax-exempt organization — even with a commissioner who makes nearly $30 million a year. From the tax code to big stadium deals, critics say the NFL is getting millions of public dollars that would be better spent elsewhere.

He found an audience in Arlington, a city just outside of Dallas. The price tag for the public was $325 million. (Jones was responsible for the balance of the money for the $1.2 billion stadium. Dallas News says Jones' contribution "was paid with commercial loans, league funding and proceeds from a ticket and parking tax.")

With a useful life span of 30 years, and an investment of 21.7 billion, the return on the investment does not justify the investment

Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2014 (John-B.S. Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY; Economics (1967)

M.A. Pennsylvania State University, Univ. Park, PA; Economics (1969)

Ph.D. University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI; Economics (1972), and Andrew-Robert A. Woods Professor of Economics at Smith College, “The Economics of Sports Facilities and their Communities,” 7-8-14, http://www.uwlax.edu/faculty/anderson/micro-principles/stadiums.pdf, MB)

More than $21.7 billion will be spent on these 95 stadiums and arenas built or planned since 1990. Public coffers will contribute close to two-thirds of this amount. Table 1 provides historical evidence on expenditures on new sports facilities and the level of public support, while Table 2 reports expenditures on refurbished sports facilities. The building boom initiated during the 1990s reflects a sports facility construction cycle. It follows the 1960–75 cycle of cookie-cutter stadiums. Since sports facilities seem to exhibit a useful economic life of around 30 years, we can anticipate the beginning of a new cycle around the year 2020.

Taxpayers pay for half of the stadium, and then continuously pay for services within the stadium, without a shred of gain from the facility itself

Perekhov, 2012 (Vitaliy-Masters Student, “Public Funding for Professional Students,” 7-8-14, http://www.billtrack50.com/blog/uncategorized/public-funding-for-professional-sports/, MB)

Minnesota just built a new baseball stadium for the hometown Twins. Target Field is luxurious and spacious and the perfect confines for a competitive baseball team. The Minnesota Vikings, however do not play baseball and thus need a stadium of their own, or so they say. The Hubert H. Humphrey Metrodome housed both teams for upwards of 25 years, but the Twins moved and the Vikings lease on the stadium has run out. The team had lobbied the state legislature for public funding for the stadium, claiming that the Metrodome was no longer profitable enough for the team to compete. Thus, a $975 million stadium will be built in its place, with just over half the funds coming from taxpayers. The passing of HF 2810, was done in the belief that “the expenditure of public money for this purpose is necessary and serves a public purpose.”

The Economic gain from a sports facility, over a live span of 30 years, does not justify over 57% of the funding for the facility coming from taxpayers

Zaretsky, 2001 (Adam-Journalist for The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Should Cities Pay for Sports Facilities,” 7-8-14, https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=468, MB)

Between 1987 and 1999, 55 stadiums and arenas were refurbished or built in the United States at a cost of more than $8.7 billion.1 This figure, however, includes only the direct costs involved in the construction or refurbishment of the facilities, not the indirect costs—such as money cities might spend on improving or adding to the infrastructure needed to support the facilities. Of the $8.7 billion in direct costs, about 57 percent—around $5 billion—was financed with taxpayer money. Since 1999, other stadiums have been constructed or are in the pipeline (see table below for some examples), much of the cost of which will also be supported with tax dollars. Between $14 billion and $16 billion is expected to be spent on these post-'99 stadiums and arenas, with somewhere between $9 billion and $11 billion of this amount coming from public coffers. The use of public funds to lure or keep teams begs several questions, the foremost of which is, "Are these good investments for cities?"

Evidence: Taxpayer contribution to Texas Team (Con)

Kurilof, Writer at Bloomberg, 12 (Aaron, “In stadium building spree US taxpayers lose 4 billion,” 07-07-14,

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/in-stadium-building-spree-u-s-taxpayers-lose-4-billion.html, AW)

New York Giants fans will cheer on their team against the Dallas Cowboys at tonight’s National Football League opener in New Jersey. At tax time, they’ll help pay for the opponents’ $1.2 billion home field in Texas.
Evidence: Taxes and Public Funding for Miller Park and MetLife Stadium is Enormous (Con)

Cohen, Writer at Athletic Business magazine, 12 (Andrew, “How stadium construction costs reached the billions”, 07-07-14

http://www.athleticbusiness.com/stadium-arena/how-stadium-construction-costs-reached-the-billions.html, AW)
1.6 billion On MetLife Stadium

In some circles, outrage accompanied the 2001 opening of Miller Park, the Milwaukee Brewers' new home. The state senator who cast the deciding vote in favor of a sales-tax increase to pay the public's $290 million portion of the construction cost had been recalled in a public referendum and three workers had died after a crane collapsed, delaying the stadium's scheduled opening by a year. The stadium's fan-shaped retractable roof proved problematic, necessitating a $13 million fix paid for by a settlement reached between the Miller Park Stadium District and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of America, averting further litigation. That one signature element was a prime culprit in the stadium's ultimate $400 million construction cost, at the time the second-highest price tag for a new professional baseball stadium.

Evidence: Amount Taxpayers have Contributed Towards Different Sports Buildings (Con)

Dart, Economist Writer, 14 (Andrew, “Omnibus Eastmarks,” 7-7-14, http://www.akdart.com/sports.html, AW)

• $750,000 for the Baseball Hall of Fame

• $202,500 to the Suffolk Sports Hall of Fame, Sports Research Center in Patchogue, New York for facilities renovations

• $405,000 to the Staten Island Soccer League of New York for facilities construction

• $800,000 to the New York Olympic Regional Development Authority for facilities construction for the Mount Van Hoevenberg Olympic Sports Complex

• $90,000 for the City of Waterbury, Connecticut for an economic feasibility study focused on construction of a multi-purpose sports facility

Evidence: Public Dollars Spent into 55 New Stadiums in the US (Con)

Zaretsky, Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 01 (Adam, “Should cities pay for sport facilities?” 07-08-14, https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=468, AW)

Between 1987 and 1999, 55 stadiums and arenas were refurbished or built in the United States at a cost of more than $8.7 billion.1 This figure, however, includes only the direct costs involved in the construction or refurbishment of the facilities, not the indirect costs—such as money cities might spend on improving or adding to the infrastructure needed to support the facilities. Of the $8.7 billion in direct costs, about 57 percent—around $5 billion—was financed with taxpayer money. Since 1999, other stadiums have been constructed or are in the pipeline (see table below for some examples), much of the cost of which will also be supported with tax dollars. Between $14 billion and $16 billion is expected to be spent on these post-'99 stadiums and arenas, with somewhere between $9 billion and $11 billion of this amount coming from public coffers. The use of public funds to lure or keep teams begs several questions, the foremost of which is, "Are these good investments for cities?"

The short answer to this question is "No." When studying this issue, almost all economists and development specialists (at least those who work independently and not for a chamber of commerce or similar organization) conclude that the rate of return a city or metropolitan area receives for its investment is generally below that of alternative projects. In addition, evidence suggests that cities and metro areas that have invested heavily in sports stadiums and arenas have, on average, experienced slower income growth than those that have not.

Estimated Cost and Contribution (millions of dollars)

Team or City Total Public Dollars Percent Public

Cincinnati Reds 280 280 100

Seattle Seahawks 430 300 70

St. Louis Cardinals 370 250 68

San Diego Padres 411 275 67

Chicago Bears 587 387 66

Houston (new NFL) 310 195 63

Philadelphia Eagles 395 234 59

Philadelphia Phillies 345 174 50

Boston Red Sox 550 200 36

New England Patriots 325 0 0
Evidence: Bills from the NFL to Taxpayers (Con)

Easterbrook. Writer at the Atlantic, 13 (Gregg, “How the NFL fleeces taxpayers,” 07-07-14 http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/10/how-the-nfl-fleeces-taxpayers/309448/, AW)

Taxpayers in Hamilton County, Ohio, which includes Cincinnati, were hit with a bill for $26 million in debt service for the stadiums where the NFL’s Bengals and Major League Baseball’s Reds play, plus another $7 million to cover the direct operating costs for the Bengals’ field. Pro-sports subsidies exceeded the $23.6 million that the county cut from health-and-human-services spending in the current two-year budget (and represent a sizable chunk of the $119 million cut from Hamilton County schools). Press materials distributed by the Bengals declare that the team gives back about $1 million annually to Ohio community groups. Sound generous? That’s about 4 percent of the public subsidy the Bengals receive annually from Ohio taxpayers.

Evidence: Over 73 Cities Force Taxpayers to Pay for Stadiums (Con)

Bast, President of the Heartland Institute, 90 (Joseph, “Subsidizing Sports Stadium: Is it worth?” 07-08-14, http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/8086.pdf, AW)

According to economist Robert Baade (Lake Forest College, Illinois), there are more stadiums in the U.S. than there are teams to fill them. In 1987, 20 of the country’s 60 largest cities were planning to build new stadiums. Another 13 smaller cities had similar plans. With all these new stadiums under construction, professional sports teams are in a buyer's market, and they've been taking advantage of it. It is common practice now for professional teams to insist on free rent, a significant percentage of each game’s ticket sales, and a share of parking and concession revenues. Most cities negotiate contracts that leave taxpayers holding the bag if attendance is below expectations. Taxpayers in cities with public stadiums are sopping up the red ink spilled by teams that can? Even cover their stadium’s operating costs; much less return to taxpayers the cost of building these domed and landscaped palaces. Professor Dean Bairn of Pepperdine University has carefully studied the profit and loss statements of sports stadiums around the country. He analyzed financial data for 14 stadiums for which complete information was available. Between the time of their construction and today, 13 of those 14 stadiums have cost taxpayers (in capital costs and operating expenses) more than they have earned. Cincinnati’s Riverfront Stadium has posted losses of $3.4 million; Jack Murphy Stadium has cost taxpayers in San Diego $8.7 million, while RFK Stadium has cost taxpayers in Washington, DC over $9 million. The New Orleans Superdome has cost taxpayers an amazing $70 million. The only profitable stadium Dr. Bairn could find was Dodger Stadium in Los Angeles, which has earned about $2 million above the cost of taxpayer-funded road and utility improvements. Dodger Stadium was privately built, and since then it has been privately owned and privately managed. Dr. Bairn estimates that taxpayers nationwide have lost $136 million on subsidies to sports stadiums. He concludes that “the massive costs of modern facilities make it very unlikely that municipally built stadiums will earn enough to cover debt service expenditures regularly enough to return a profit to the city for building the stadium. “” What an understatement!

Subsidies BAD --- Budget --- Trade-Off

Sports subsidies trade-off with other public services

Garofalo, Economic Policy Editor for ThinkProgress.org, 12

(Pat, “If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The Risky Economics of Sports Stadiums,” 7-7-14, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/ Y2K)

With the city shedding jobs and cutting services, the logical decision would seem to be to take back the funding it has promised to Coyotes in order to preserve those jobs and programs, a stance taken by city council member Phil Lieberman, who voted against the funding package. "I can use that $15 million [annual payment] for good things for Glendale," Lieberman said. "Open our libraries up again...Replace the 55 cops that we're short right now."

But if the city and its residents are desperate to keep the Coyotes in town, they have to understand that doing so comes at a cost that likely won't be replaced -- not by sales tax revenue, not by economic growth, and not by outside spending. When the city subsidizes hockey, it reduces its ability to pay for public safety officials, public transportation, and services upon which its citizens rely.

That's a choice the city is free to make, of course, but it shouldn't pretend that the mere presence of the Coyotes is an economic investment. Doing so simply enables a further transfer of public dollars to a private enterprise, without much hope for a return.

Subsidies BAD --- Sports Diplomacy

Sports Diplomacy Wastes Taxes

Coburn, U.S. Senator, 2012

(Tom, “Athletes’ Overseas Vacations - (Department of State) 5.5 Million: http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b7b23f66-2d60-4d5a-8bc5-8522c7e1a40e Wastebook 2012, 7-9-14, dsk)

“SportsUnited is touted by the Department of State as being the premier sports exchange

program for what the department calls “sports diplomacy.” Through this initiative, the

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs sends American professional athletes and

coaches all around the world to “conduct drills, lead team building sessions, and engage

youth in a dialogue on the importance of education, health, and respect for diversity.”

Taxpayers will spend [spent] $5.5 million on SportsUnited this year [in 2012]. Since 2005, the United States has sent over 220 athletes to more than 50 countries. Taxpayers have sent Major League Soccer player Tony Sanneh to Ethiopia, NBA players like Dikembe Mutumbo and George Gervin to Sudan and India, and a former WNBA star to

China. SportsUnited also brings athletes from other countries to the United States as part of their

Sport Visitors program. The program has brought nearly 1,000 international visitors since

2003. For example, the government paid for Tunisian swimmers’ trip to the U.S. Olympic

Swimming Trials this summer. Taxpayer dollars also paid for track and field athletes to

travel from the Caribbean to Oregon and beach volleyball players from Russia to southern

California. In our current fiscal climate, investing scarce resources in overseas trips for high-paid, jet- setting professional athletes should not be a high priority for the federal government”

Subsidies BAD --- Urban Sprawl BAD

Public subsidies create urban sprawl

Rasmussen, 2014

(Spencer, The Holdout Problem, Urban Sprawl, and Eminent Domain, http://sites.duke.edu/urbaneconomics/?p=1088, 03-1-14, AM)

Purpose: To acknowledge the holdout problem, which is a type of land market failure, that contributes to urban sprawl by creating a bias towards the fringes of cities for large land developments
The Holdout Problem: “is a form of monopoly power that potentially arises in the course of land assembly. Once assembly begins, individual owners, knowing their land is essential to the completion of the project, can hold out for prices in excess of their opportunity costs” or “individual owners, realizing that they can impose substantial costs on the developer, seek prices well in excess of their true reservation prices.”

A holdout problem must require assembly, which is the need for at least two distinct properties for a development.

Result: Large-scale projects that require assembly, like housing developments, parks and open spaces, stadiums or shopping malls, will have high bargaining costs. This will create incentives for developers to look for land where ownership is less dispersed, which will minimize assembly. This will lead to these large building projects taking place on the fringes of cities leading to unnecessary urban sprawl In order to combat urban sprawl…
i. Developers can maintain their secrecy about projects by utilizing dummy buyers to help acquire assemblies. This would be useful because sellers would not know that a single buyer is attempting all of the land in a certain area. This is more difficult for government-backed projects because they often require openness.

ii. Governments can create incentives or subsidies for building in city centers or disincentives for building in the suburbs. The justification for this can come from redevelopment of central areas.

iii. The use of eminent domain, but this often raises issues about whether or not a private organization should be able to benefit from the use of eminent domain.

The holdout problem “represents a situation where landowners whose property is essential to the completion of some large development project to seek to block completion of the project in an effort to extract monopoly rents” This biases development away from areas where ownership is the most dispersed, city centers, and towards areas where ownership is more concentrated, the fringes or suburbs of cities

Subsidies BAD --- Urban Sprawl BAD

Urban sprawl is bad --- most Americans oppose and causes negative economic impact

Pope, Executive Director of the Sierra Club. Based in San Francisco, No Date

(Carl, Urban Sprawling the pros and cons, http://perc.org/articles/urban-sprawl-pro-and-con, AM)

On Election Day 1998, Americans from California to New Jersey voted to slow growth, save forests and farmlands, and rein in development. In an unmistakable signal of rising saliency and political power, growth and land-use measures appeared on more than 200 state and county ballots nationwide.
In New Jersey, voters approved a 10-year plan to raise $1 billion to preserve 1 million acres of open space.

In Ventura County, California, voters overwhelmingly supported an initiative to prevent local planners from rezoning farmland and open space without voter approval.

In Florida, voters decided to extend the Florida bond authority to protect public land from sprawl.

What do millions of Americans know that Randall Holcombe's defense of sprawl ignores? To begin with, Americans are reacting to the actual impact of sprawl on their lives, not to Holcombe's abstract economic argument that it could be good.

In fact, it turns out not to be good. Sprawl is a ubiquitous problem, and Americans-whether they live in urban Atlanta or rural Washtenaw County, Michigan -are deciding that current planning and development practices come with more costs than benefits. Development plans that may have worked fifty years ago are no longer the answer for today's growth.
There are the obvious environmental costs of sprawl-lost open space and natural habitats, increased air pollution from more traffic, depleted water quality caused by urban runoff. Holcombe's argument that "low densities" help the environment shows an abysmal shallowness. He seems to assume that if yards were not filled with trees and grass, there would be less vegetation in the metropolitan area. In reality, of course, sprawl neighborhoods typically replace farmland or open space that was 100 percent vegetation and permeable soils and replace them with neighborhoods that are 30 percent or more concrete, asphalt, or structure with unvegetated, impermeable surfaces.
The worst environmental impact of sprawl is the least avoidable. Sprawl, by definition, fragments landscapes-and fragmented landscapes are the biggest threat to America's wildlife heritage. Sprawl is very good for the most adaptable and common creatures-raccoons, deer, sparrows, starlings, sea gulls-all do well-and devastating for wildlife that is more dependent upon privacy, seclusion, and protection from such predators as dogs and cats.
There are obvious qualityof- life problems caused by sprawl-more time caught in traffic caused by auto-dependent lives, abandoned urban communities, remote and isolated suburban neighborhoods.
But sprawl has an economic cost, too. Tax policies contribute to the public's growing dissatisfaction with sprawl. American taxpayers are actually subsidizing the extent and pace of sprawl through local, state, and federal spending, which increases to fund new development. That means a choice between more taxes or less spending in other deserving areas.
Some advocates of sprawl argue, "Well, then just get rid of the subsidies." Holcombe blithely opines that "it is the responsibility of local governments to see that the costs of water, sewer, roads, and so forth are charged to development."
I wonder what planet he lives on. When localities try to charge developers even a fraction of the true costs, those developers and other sprawl advocates fight back fiercely. In California efforts to charge new developments the full costs of new water supplies, which are far greater than those of the more efficient reservoirs built first, have run into tremendous resistance. In Alabama and New York developers are trying to hold on to federally subsidized flood insurance on the ground that it is a "right." The reality is that if we really got rid of the subsidies to sprawl, we would also get rid of sprawl.
The sums involved in the subsidies are huge. In Fairfax County, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C., the 1997 budget of $1.8 billion ran a deficit of $146 million. In nearby Prince William County, taxpayers spend $3,838 to provide services to a single household, but only receive $2,150. A report released last month by Rutgers University looked at the costs of sprawl to South Florida. Adding up the price tags on new land development, new roads, and new infrastructure, the report found that sprawl in South Florida alone is costing an astounding $6.15 billion.
Holcombe does not cite a single case in which the kind of low-density sprawl he defends occurred in the absence of massive public subsidies. He doesn't because he can't. There are no such examples.
It is not accidental that in the last era of metropolitan growth prior to the massive federal and state subsidies for highways, sewers, etc., the development pattern that emerged was of compact suburban developments with mixed use, light and heavy rail transit, and an almost total absence of leapfrog and strip development-America's streetcar suburbs from the 1900Ð 1925 era.
Taken together, these factors are fueling local action and a national debate. Americans are demanding common-sense solutions and smarter growth.
Fortunately, there are at least three options that provide guidance for urban growth planners charged with preparing plans for future growth:
The first option is purchasing open space and farmland for preservation. Citizens in Peninsula Township in Northwest Michigan recently voted to pay farmers to keep farming rather than sell their land to developers for subdivision. Voters in Austin, Texas, supported an increase in water rates to raise money to protect thousands of acres of environmentally sensitive land around the city. Such purchase programs, ideally, could be financed from the windfall profits made by landowners who benefit from new publicly financed infrastructure -those around a new

The second option growth planners should utilize is marking and promoting urban growth boundaries (UGBs). Oregon and Washington states have blazed trails in this area by requiring all communities to design long-term UGBs. Portland, Oregon, has had an urban growth boundary in place since the 1970s. While Portland is one of the most popular cities in America and has witnessed significant population growth, its urban growth boundary has preserved open space around Portland and helped make Portland one of the world's most livable cities.

The third option planners should pursue is reinvestment in urban areas and revitalization of existing towns and cities. In 1997 Maryland enhanced its existing planning requirements with Smart Growth legislation, which promotes state funding to priority growth areas such as existing municipalities and enterprise zones.

Taken together, these three options for controlling growth will help alleviate the costs and consequences of new development.

Holcombe argues that "left to its own devices, development will occur in a decentralized manner, which will usually lead different types of activity to be conveniently located in relation to one another." This fascinating argument overlooks hundreds of years of urban history in which development, left to its own devices, prior to the era of either zoning or governmental subsidies, followed anything but a decentralized pattern.
Indeed, the classic original argument for both regulation and subsidy in urban landscapes was that, left to its own devices, development was too centralized and intense for human welfare. Freeways, zoning laws, and urban renewal were all developed to overcome the "natural" tendency of development to concentrate and cluster.
If there is any one constant in our history, it is our nation's ability to learn from our mistakes, to change with the times, to try something "new and improved." We have come to a new day in national growth policy. The economic and social benefits of urban renewal far outweigh the national drain accompanying sprawl. Americans everywhere are promoting a new approach to community planning, and the time has come for the planners to catch up with the public.

Urban sprawl has a negative impact on rural community development

Theobald, Ph.D. Woods-Beals Professor of Urban and. Rural Education at Buffalo State College, 14

(Paul, Districts On The Edge: The Impact of Urban Sprawl on A Rural Community, n/a http://jrre.vmhost.psu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/5-2_8.pdf, AM)

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