Tampa Prep 2009-2010 Impact Defense File

AT: Water Terror

While it is important to consider the range of possibilities associated with a particular threat, assessments are typically based on the probability of a particular occurrence. Determining probability is somewhat subjective, and is often based on intelligence and previous incidents. There are historical accounts of intentional contamination of drinking water supplies with biological or chemical contaminants, but most have been associated with wartime activities. The few documented accounts of intentional contamination of public water systems in the U.S. have not resulted in any reported fatalities. The American Water Works Association Research Foundation (AWWARF) is preparing a report on this subject (AWWARF, 2003). Based on these accounts, it would appear that the probability of a successful contamination incident on a drinking water system is relatively low. However, there has been a reported increase in the interest of various terrorist groups in biological and chemical weapons. Furthermore, some intelligence information indicates that terrorist organizations have considered water infrastructure as a possible target. Thus, the potential for such an incident does exist.

Here’s the brutal truth: The nation’s water infrastructure is impossible to fully secure. The sheer vastness of the system with its “raw water” reservoirs and tens of thousands of miles of exposed aqueducts and pipeline with little or minimal security make it logically and fiscally impossible to completely police. To simply put fences around the three raw water reservoirs that the Indianapolis Water Company uses to feed that city’s water needs “would bankrupt the company,” says Peter Beering, IWC’s deputy general counsel.