Water wars will never happen – war’s economic costs outweigh any potential benefit
Wolf, 97 (Aaron T. Wolf Ph.D., professor of geoscience at Oregon State University. “Conflict and Cooperation Over International Waterways.” http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/conflict_coop/)
It is tempting to add an economic argument against "water wars." Water is neither a particularly costly commodity nor, given the financial resources to treat, store and deliver it, is it particularly scarce. Full-scale warfare, on the other hand, is tremendously expensive. A "water war" simply would not cost out. This point was probably best made by the Israeli Defense Forces analyst responsible for long-term planning during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. When asked whether water was a factor in decision-making, he noted, "Why go to war over water? For the price of one week's fighting, you could build five desalination plants. No loss of life, no international pressure, and a reliable supply you don't have to defend in hostile territory" (cited in Wolf 1995b).
Water wars won’t escalate – treaties are resilient and your authors are hacks
Nicol, 03 (Alan Nicol, political scientist specializing in the water sector. "The dynamics of river basin cooperation: The Nile and the Okavango basins"http://www.odi.org.uk/wpp/publications_pdfs/Okavango.pdf)
The issue of water and conflict is the focus of frequent media reports, usually written by ill-informed journalists keen to cover column inches. The publication of such reports is often proportional to concerns over water scarcity in various regions of the world, with the Middle East and Southern Africa in the spotlight. Some reports even portray impending ‘water wars’, quoting out-of-context statements made by politicians and technocrats who mostly have vested national interests. The statement made in 1995 by a prominent water sector professional that the next world war would be over water is a case in point (Serageldin 1995). In fact, the history of conflicts or disputes over water is somewhat threadbare—instances of cooperation and agreement far outstrip those of dispute and conflict (for a comprehensive listing of agreements and treaties see ).
AT: WTO
Sungjoon Cho, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007 [“Doha’s developments”, 25 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 165, LEXIS]
During its first decade in existence, the WTO has failed to live up to its appellation. As an organization where three out of four members are poor countries, n3 the balance sheet of this global enterprise reveals a troublingly disproportionate distribution of profits in favor of rich countries, n4 with the [*166] exception of a handful of advanced developing countries such as Brazil, China, and India. This development disparity is silhouetted against lavish protection of products in rich countries that are poor countries' only lifelines, such as rice, wheat, sugar, cotton, and clothing. For example, rich countries spend about one billion dollars a day to protect their agricultural industries from foreign competition, enough to fly rich countries' 41 million dairy cows in first class around the world one and a half times. n5 These generous agricultural subsidies to rich countries' farmers eventually drive farmers from poor countries out of the global market. This is a situation hardly obliging for addressing a global poverty context in which twenty percent of the world's population lives on less than a dollar per day. n6
2. There’s zero empirical evidence that the WTO has increased free trade.
Andrew Rose, Professor of International Business at UC Berkeley, 11-7-02
(Do WTO Members have More Liberal Trade Policy?, p. Google) [Bozman]
In 1987, Indian tariff revenues reached 53% of import values. India had been a founding member of the GATT in 1948. Yet Indian tariffs revenues have never fallen below 20% of Indian imports, at least during the 25 years for which we have data. This from a measure of tariffs known to be biased down since highly taxed goods tend not to be imported! Comparable tariff data exist for 91 countries in 1987, at which time 89 countries had lower tariffs than India. 23 of these 89 countries were not members of the GATT; they had tariff rates averaging 15.7%. GATT members collected tariffs averaging 11.4% (a figure that is statistically indistinguishable from that of outsiders at even the 10% level). Nor is there something special about 1987; average tariff rates have been insignificantly different for members and non-members for all years since the mid 1970s at the standard 5% confidence level. Succinctly, tariff rates don’t seem to be significantly different for GATT members and outsiders. Nor do other measures of trade policy. In this short paper, I have used simple conventional statistical techniques to analyze the relationship between GATT/WTO membership and international trade policy. Despite my use of over sixty measures of trade policy, I have been unable to find convincing evidence that membership in the multilateral trade system is associated with more liberal trade policy. The exception is that members of the system usually enjoy slightly more economic freedom using the Heritage Foundation’s index. There are almost no discernible differences between GATT/WTO members and non-members for tariff rates, measures of non-tariff barrier coverage, price-based measures, measures of openness, and so forth. Are we really so sure that the WTO has actually liberalized trade ... or is actually liberalizing it?
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