Borders
Iran
No lasting settlement has successfully regulated use of the 200 km waterway linking the confluence of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in southern Iraq to the Gulf. Known to Arabs as the Shatt al-Arab (Stream of the Arabs) and to Iranians as the Arvand, bi-national use of the waterway has been organised using the thalweg principle (by use of a dividing line along the middle of the waterway). In 1975, Iraq signed the Algiers Accord in which it recognised the line running down the middle of the waterway as the official border. In 1980, Iraq reneged on the agreement and sought to territorially conquer the waterway and its eastern bank, but abandoned the attempt after eight years of war. The waterway is now clogged with war detritus from three major conflicts and can only be partially used. As part of its plans to increase oil production, Iraq's government wants to give the waterway - a vital oil shipping channel - a complete overhaul, but this will require a complicated resolution to the border dispute with Iran. In December 2009, Iranian troops occupied disputed well number 4 at the Fakka oil field, causing a political row in Iraq. The Iranian troops withdrew a month later.
Kuwait
Reneging on the 1963 agreement that recognised Kuwaiti sovereignty and boundaries, Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, and annexed the country as Iraq's 19th province for seven months. Since 1991, Iraq has made frequent and inconsistent statements about the status of Kuwait and border demarcation in the UN-administered border zone was regularly contested. An anti-tank barrier and territorial defence scheme has been developed and regularly tested by the Kuwaiti armed forces to prevent a future incursion from Iraq. Clashes occurred between Iraqis and Kuwaitis when border posts were strengthened to reduce the risk of terrorist overspill from Iraq in 2005, highlighting the ongoing mutual sensitivities between Iraq and Kuwait. Throughout 2006, there were numerous border skirmishes between Iraqi citizens and Kuwaiti police forces. Though these largely diminished by November 2006, the clashes strained relations and focused Kuwaiti attention on strengthening the physical barriers and putting electronic sensors in place along the border.
Diplomacy
Iran
Iran and Iraq disagree over a number of bilateral issues. Though defeating shared threats (drugs smuggling and other contraband) should theoretically be points of convergence for Iraqi and Iranian interests, corrupt elements on both sides have an interest in slowing co-operation. For example, the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) seek to maintain their smuggling activities in the Gulf. Sub-state actors like the Sunni extremists operating in Iranian Khuzestan or terrorists transiting Iran will also remain points of contention. Increasing Kurdish autonomy in Iraq will likely cause concern in Iran, which fears the awakening of autonomy movements in its own Kurdish community. The emergence of a rival theocratic model in Najaf, such as the model of Shia politics championed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, could also cause tension between Baghdad and Tehran. Finally, Iran's cross-border meddling and penetration of Iraqi political and municipal structures has emerged as a point of contention, although this has not stopped the US and Iraqi governments from engaging with Tehran in an effort to curb this activity.
|
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki meets Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2008. (PA)
1188287
|
Syria
Syria has little interest in seeing Iraq successfully rehabilitated as a major regional power under US auspices. The toppling of Saddam Hussein was a serious blow to the Syrian government, which is similar in nature to Iraq's former regime. The collapse of Saddam's regime has left Syria unsure of its place in the regional order. Syria traditionally saw Iraq as a rival for the leadership of populist Arab nationalism, but the collapse of Saddam's regime did not open the door for Syria to assume that leadership. Rather, the demise of the Iraqi Baath signalled the demise of old-school Arab nationalism as a political force in the Middle East.
Damascus will view involvement with Iraq through the prism of Syria's strategic stand-off with the US. The key point of contention remains the use of Syrian bases and the Iraqi-Syrian border by former regime elements and foreign jihadists. Though the Syrian government has begun to crack down on this flow since late 2003, the regime is struggling against corruption within the intelligence and security services and has not managed to significantly reduce the use of Syria as an insurgent and terrorist sanctuary. The issue of security collaboration was a top priority during Maliki's visit to Damascus in August 2009. The Maliki government has long maintained that Syria is the critical conduit for Sunni jihadists who carry out attacks in Iraq, targeting overwhelmingly the Shia communities. Syria also hosts many former Iraqi Baathists who are believed to bankroll many of the attacks in Iraq. Therefore, a political dialogue with Damascus far outweighs any economic agenda in the short term, although energy co-operation and trade will remain important in the long term. Following the visit in August, Maliki called for the setting up of an international investigation into a major attack in Baghdad that month. He repeated the demand following another two devastating attacks in October in Baghdad that killed 160 Iraqis. Syria has denied any involvement and refused to hand over the Baathist exiles in Syria Baghdad accused of planning and funding the attacks. Relations between the two countries remain tense.
Turkey
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq has experienced abrupt shifts in its relations with Turkey. In addition to economic interests in opening oil lines between the two countries, Turkey's broad interest has been a realist strategy aimed at preserving Iraq's territorial integrity and unity, as well as preventing Iraqi Kurds from declaring independence from the government in Baghdad. It is also intent on eradicating the last remaining members of the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) holed up in remote mountain regions of northern Iraq. Prior to the war, Turkey regularly crossed the border to attack PKK rebels in northern Iraq. The violations of Iraqi territory damaged relations with Baghdad's old regime; the massive incursions of March 1995 and May 1997 were particularly harmful to the two countries' relations.
|
Turkish military reconnaissance photograph from February 2008 showing an alleged PKK camp in northern Iraq. (PA)
1188272
|
Turkey claims the right to pursue PKK rebels across the border and into Iraq if the Iraqi regime fails to do enough to apprehend them, a claim which has been rejected by the Iraqi government. Such unilateral action by Turkey is tempered by concern over how Washington will respond, but this did not stop a series of limited attacks (air, artillery and helicopter raids) into Iraq in search of PKK rebels in late 2007. Then, in February 2008, Turkey surprised many by launching a large-scale military incursion into northern Iraq with the aim of destroying PKK bases. Although partly successful, the invasion was cut short by international pressure and has damaged US and Iraqi trust in Turkish restraint. With the resumption of PKK activity a certainty every season when the winter snows have thawed, recurrent mini-crises between Iraq and the Turkey are likely. However, at the end of October 2009, in a sign of a sea change in relations, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu visited Arbil and met with the president of the Kurdistan Regional Government, Masoud Barzani. Kurdish Prime Minister Barham Salih described the visit as historic.
Alignment/Alliances
Iraq was not able to develop bilateral alliances until it had a constitutionally empowered government after the 15 December 2005 elections. In the interim, it engaged in numerous economic deals (oil-swaps, electricity supply) to ease near-term concerns.
United States
The Iraqi government has signed a formal Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that defines the legal status of US military personnel. Iraq signed an Article 98 agreement with the US that would prevent the handing over of US personnel to the International Criminal Court. The US provides assistance via the Department of Defense's International Military Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing programmes.
Iran
In February 2010, senior US military and civilian officials in Iraq again accused Iran of exercising malign influence in Iraq, mainly through legislator Jamal Jaafar al-Muhandes, who the US accuse of being an advisor to Iranian Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the IRGC Quds Force. The US also accused Iran of continuing to fund, arm and train anti-government insurgent groups.
Aid
The bilateral low-cost or no-cost grant of military and reconstruction equipment has been provided by a large number of states. Key donors include: Bahrain, Germany, Hungary, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the UK and the US.
Multilateral/Regional TOP
Resources
Riparian issues (Iraq/Syria/Turkey)
More than two-thirds of the cultivated land in Iraq requires irrigation to stay productive and this farming relies on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Relations with upstream states like Syria and Turkey are vital in protecting the survival of these rivers. Turkey contributes 88 per cent of the water potentially carried by the Euphrates, and Syria 11 per cent. The Tigris river also has its springs in the highlands of Eastern Turkey (providing an estimated 52 per cent of water), but also receives contributions from tributaries in Iraq (estimated at 48 per cent).
The past three decades witnessed the biggest alteration in the natural systems of the Euphrates and Tigris by these upstream states, causing dramatic alteration to the hydrology of Iraq. Syria's building of the al-Thawra dam created a political crisis with Iraq in 1974, further reducing the Euphrates' flow. Iraq threatened to bomb the dam and massed troops along the border. The crisis was resolved by mediation. By 1980, the Euphrates River annual flow at the Iraqi border with Syria had decreased from 28 billion m3 to around 10 billion m3. Between 1980 and 1982, a Joint Technical Committee on Regional Waters was created by the three states. According to an agreement between Syria and Iraq (1990), Iraq shares the Euphrates' waters with Syria on a 58 per cent (Iraq) and 42 per cent (Syria) basis, based on the flow received by Syria at its border with Turkey. Since Turkey has unilaterally promised to secure a minimum flow of 15.8 billion m3 per year at its border with Syria, this agreement would de facto represent nine billion m3 per year for Iraq.
However, in 1983 Turkey initiated the South Eastern Anatolia Development Project, also known by its Turkish acronym GAP, which covers, in addition to the irrigation and hydropower schemes, all the related social and economic sectors including industry, transportation, mining, telecommunications, health, education, tourism and infrastructure projects needed to reduce popular dissent in the Kurdish southeast of the country. This initiative will eventually affect both the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and could lead to further tensions. Iraq, as the outermost utilising riparian state of both the rivers, also claims that it has ancient rights, acquired through thousands of years of irrigation in Mesopotamia. The Iraq Ministry of Water Resources will continue to push for a greater downstream flow.
Alignment/Alliances
Arab League
Although the predominantly Sunni Arab leaders of the Arab League were reluctant to acknowledge any Shia-led government appointed by the US in Iraq, pressure was put on its members directly and indirectly. Iraq was subsequently allowed to fill its seat at the Arab League in late 2003. Nonetheless, the overall relations in the post-Saddam era between Baghdad and the Arab League as a multilateral organisation can be characterised as extremely limited and hesitant. Iraqi officials, including the president and the prime minister, have publicly accused the Arab League of failing to in any way or shape support Iraq's governments in moral, political and economic terms. The level of mistrust in the Arab League is particularly high among Iraq's Kurdish and Shia policymakers who variously view the league as one that is Sunni or Arab-centric. Moreover, while these suspicions limit Iraq's role in the league, the real barrier to stronger ties remains the broad ineffectiveness of the Arab League as a political body.
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)
As a collective institution, the GCC has little ability to contribute much to the reconstruction of post-war Iraq. Debt relief is a bilateral issue and has been dealt with on this basis. In the longer term, some members of the GCC, most notably Kuwait, remain resolutely opposed to the idea of Iraq joining the organisation.
Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
Iraq is unlikely to leave OPEC. Although Iraq might stand to gain certain advantages from such a move (unlimited production quotas), Iraqi oil export capacity is currently quite limited and high oil prices mean that bumper revenues are being harvested anyhow. Furthermore, leaving OPEC would in the short-run hurt Iraq's image as a founding member of the organisation, which historically symbolised the solidarity of developing countries vis-à-vis the more powerful industrial consuming countries. Other members of the Group of 77 may see it as a betrayal of that solidarity.
Aid
Although 77 countries and 20 international organisations attended the Iraq Donors' Conference at Madrid in October 2003, almost three quarters of the pledged amount came from three sources: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Japan. Key pledges came from the following categories of contributor:
-
International Organisations: The World Bank pledged USD3 billion to USD5 billion of grants in the 2004-2007 period. The IMF pledged a further USD2.4 billion to USD4.25 billion of loans in the 2004-2006 period.
-
Japan: Tokyo offered a further USD3.5 billion of loans on top of the USD1.5 billion grant that it had previously pledged to Iraqi reconstruction.
-
EU states: EU countries pledged a total of USD1.53 billion in the 2004-2007 period, though only USD178 million emerged from central EU funds. Only USD118 million was donated by Germany and France pledged less than USD50,000.
-
Gulf States: Saudi Arabia pledged USD500 million in loans and an equal amount in export credit guarantees, Kuwait added a further USD500 million to its standing USD1 billion aid pledge, and the United Arab Emirates pledged USD215 million dollars.
Nonetheless, key donors such as France and Russia did not pledge funds at Madrid, and contributions from the Gulf States were limited. The most significant criticism of the conference is likely to address the confusing nature of pledges, which are split between grants, loans, export credit guarantees and other forms of aid, in addition to being spread out over the 2004-2007 period.
In terms of foreign debt, USD66.5 billion of Iraq's overall USD120.2 billion foreign debt has been forgiven. The Paris Club cancelled USD42.3 billion, including Russia's USD12 billion. A number of non-Paris Club members have cancelled a total of USD8.2 billion on Paris Club terms. A total of USD16 billion has been cancelled by commercial creditors, also on Paris Club terms. Iraq owes USD56.6 billion to USD79.9 billion of remaining debt, including USD7.6 billion of outstanding Paris Club debt, USD32.4 billion to USD55.4 billion of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) debt, and USD15.9 billion to USD16.2 billion of other non-Paris Club debt.
Peace Processes TOP
Ceasefire
Iraq remains technically in a state of war with Iran and Israel. Joint Iran-Iraq committees continue to meet to facilitate the ceasefire and exchange the remains of war dead.
Peacekeeping
Multi-National Forces Iraq (MNF-I)
Since 2003, more than three dozen countries contributed troops to the coalition forces in Iraq. By mid-2009 most had withdrawn their troops, leaving only US and UK forces, as well as some Australian and Romanian units. With the exception of US troops, all remaining coalition units were expected to withdraw in 2009. MNF-I's UN authorisation, which expired on 31 December 2008, has been replaced by individual agreements between the Iraqi government and the remaining countries making up MNF-I. All US combat troops are scheduled to be out of Iraq by 2010, with all other troops removed by 2011, regardless of a spike in violence. Meanwhile, the Iraqi parliament is debating amendments to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the US, which if approved by the electorate would mean US troops would have to leave Iraq by January 2010.
NATO
NATO opened headquarters in Baghdad and a Joint Staff Centre-Training Academy in Iraq in September 2005. The mission is supported and funded by all 26 nations of the alliance. The duration of this NATO mission is open-ended.
Proliferation and Procurement TOP
-
Iraq's current land and air forces procurement programme is unstructured and corruption-prone.
-
The country currently shows no interest in restarting its weapons of mass destruction programmes.
-
Iraq poses a key proliferation risk in terms of small-arms and military explosives.
|
State legal TOP
Development of the new Iraqi army and other security forces has driven rapid procurement programmes undertaken by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Ministry of the Interior. The process has not gone smoothly, and haste has made waste on a number of occasions. Even without factoring in corruption, the MoD procurement programme does not represent a fully structured procurement effort as much of the equipment entering service was provided through no-cost or low-cost grants by foreign governments. Nevertheless, in 2007 the US has placed great emphasis on the development of the Iraqi MoD and the Iraqi army. This has led to increasingly strong investment and procurement.
Defence spending remains far below that required to reconstitute an effective offensive military capability, and any sign of a major military build-up in Iraq would trigger international censure that the fragile national recovery effort can ill afford. Despite these sensitivities, Iraq will receive 77 T-72M1 main battle tanks donated from Hungary. Other key armoured vehicle donations include: 100 M113A1 tracked armoured personnel carriers (APC), 100 Spartan APC and 50 BTR-94 APC donated by Jordan; 32 Panhard VCR and 38 Panhard M-3 APC donated by the UAE; and 30 ASV-150 wheeled APC donated by the US. In May 2007, Iraq decided not to procure a further 72 T-55 and 77 T-72 main battle tanks because these platforms were not priority requirements for counter-insurgency operations.
Instead, armoured and soft-skinned land transport vehicles have been prioritised in early Iraqi procurement plans. Iraq will be the launch customer for 400 M1151 Hummer ammunition carriers and 10 M1113 Hummer mobile workshops. Four hundred ambulances will be supplied by Turkish firm Otokar and around 200 Polish wheeled vehicles supplied by the Zasta Company. One hundred Jeep TJC vehicles will be delivered by Egyptian Arab-American Vehicles. The UK Ministry of Defence Procurement Agency has donated 72 Land Rovers. Future purchases are likely to include the Textron Marine and Land Systems M1117 Cougar Armoured Security Vehicle series and follow-on sales of new Hummer variants. In May 2007, US Congress announced the possible sale of a further 522 Humvees (or, as an alternative, 276 light armoured troop carriers), 66 heavy cargo trucks and eight tracked heavy recovery vehicles, in addition to ambulances, light vehicles and hundreds of generators. Pakistan's Heavy Industry Taxila (HIT) manufactured Talha tracked armoured personnel carriers (APC) have been purchased by Iraq since 2004 in orders likely to see final delivery of 44 Talha, 60 Al Mohafiz Security Vehicles and 300 Aahan Armoured Guard Posts.
In 2007, the Iraqi Army made a strategic shift toward US/NATO-standard small-arms systems. In a previous notification, the US government announced the sale of thousands of 5.56 mm M16 rifles, M4 carbines and M249 Squad Automatic Weapon machine guns. These will be backed by extensive ammunition, parts and training sales. Body armour, second generation night vision equipment and uniforms will also increasingly resemble US/NATO models.
In the field of air mobility, Iraq has also benefited from no- or low-cost equipment transfers. Jordan has donated two eight-ship squadrons of Jordanian UH-1H Huey medium military transport helicopters. A third light transport squadron will comprise airframes donated by the UAE, including four Bell Jet Ranger light helicopters and seven Comair 7SL six-seat fixed wing aircraft built by Aerocomp International. This force is likely to make up part of the future VIP fleet used by government officials. The fledgling Iraqi Air Force (IQAF) is adding US military surplus to its holdings, with three Lockheed Martin C-130E medium transport. Australian firm Seabird, meanwhile, has delivered all ten of the Seeker SB7L-360 multimission surveillance aircraft. The IQAF is looking to increase its capabilities with the potential acquisition of eight basic two-seat turboprop counterinsurgency (COIN) aircraft by April 2009. The deal sits alongside a USD900 million contract notified to US Congress by the US Defense Security Co-operation Agency, which includes 24 King Air 350ERs for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and 24 King Air 350ER or PZL M-18 Skytruck aircraft for a light transport role.
Uncertainty surrounds the status of a raft of Polish helicopter contracts that committed Polish Bunar arms consortium to supply 44 helicopters to the nascent Iraqi military (24 reconditioned Mil Mi-17 'Hip' medium military transport helicopters and 20 Polish-built Sokol W-3 medium military transport helicopters, manufactured by the PZL Swidnik company). In April 2006 it was announced that only two Sokol W-3 helicopters will be used by Iraq for VIP transport, while the medium helicopter requirement will instead be met by new-build Mi-17 helicopters from Russia.
In the 2010-2015 timeframe, Iraq has announced that the IQAF intends to buy 30 Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter aircraft.
The Iraqi Coastal Defence Force (ICDF) will purchase four shallow-draught armed Diciotti-class P61 offshore patrol vessel (OPV) that Fincantieri developed for the Armed Forces of Malta from the Saettia-class OPVs in service with the Italian Coast Guard. The Iraqi forces modernisation programme also calls for another 15 smaller patrol boats and two offshore support vessels.
|
The Iraqi navy patrol craft Fatah. (Multinational Security Transitional Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I))
1335027
|
Imported military training has been more significant than any platform purchases. Militiary Training Teams (MTT) include around 4,500 embedded US military advisors. In addition to assisting with initial force generation, these instructors are achieving some success in mentoring Iraqi security forces. Earlier attempts by contractors to train, equip, coach, teach and mentor Iraqi forces simply did not produce the desired results in terms of quality, quantity or sense of urgency. Embedded MTT trainers and partnering Iraqi and Coalition units have had a measurably superior effect.
State illegal TOP
There is no evidence that Iraq's government plans to reconstitute the country's prior weapons of mass destruction programme or seek offensive weaponry that might contravene the Missile Technology Control Regime. Seizure and monitoring of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological warfare specialists has been carried out reasonably successfully. A raft of programmes have been developed to track and rehabilitate approximately 25,000 scientists. Within the Iraqi budget, the Ministry of Science and Technology allocated USD13.4 million exclusively for the purpose of hiring "1500 defence industry engineers and scientists", and to re-establish "control over nuclear sources". The Nation Building Projects section of the 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) budget indicated that approximately USD60 million was being allocated for "WMD Scientist Retention", with follow-on funding for this programme set at USD20 million per year for 2005 and 2006. The US Department of State provides approximately USD2 million of annual funding from its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry (IICSI). The US Department of Energy (DOE) also hosts Iraqi nuclear scientists through its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Program-funded Sandia National Lab and the Arab Science and Technology Foundation (ASTF), based in the UAE.
Non-state legal TOP
Iraqi citizens are entitled by law to keep a single rifle in their household for personal protection. Gun ownership is near ubiquitous.
Non-state illegal TOP
Due to the massive proliferation of war matériel in Iraq, large numbers of Iraqis have illegal access to multiple small-arms, heavy weapons and explosives.
|
