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Alongside organised regional militias, there is a growing network of local or neighbourhood-level armed groups. The complex mosaic of ethnic and sectarian tensions in transitional Iraq has resulted in a rising number of tit-for-tat killings, with neighbourhood violence reflecting national tensions. Local violence is generally sparked by a specific incident, such as a decision to build a new mosque, sparking a downward spiral of protest and violence that quickly subsumes initial causes within a violent momentum of vendetta and recrimination, often including the abduction and execution of large numbers of young males. Multi-ethnic communities are, in many places, homogenising through the migratory effects of sustained tit-for-tat killings, exacerbating the potential for the type of ethnic self-annexation that has been seen in the Balkans. The reduction in such violence is partly due to the fact that areas have effectively been ethnically cleansed through this process.

Although Maliki has promised to move forward on the disbandment of militias, there are no signs of progress in the disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation process.

There is a strong argument that demilitarisation and demobilisation of militias is happening from the bottom-up. Strong recruitment of a continually enlarged Iraqi Army is sucking many militia elements - Shia and Sunni, although the latter community continues to complain about favouritism across most of the security forces structures that benefits the former - into government jobs, with the prospect that over time these forces will become enmeshed in the system. CLCs have been partially paid by the Iraqi government as a line item in the Ministry of Interior budget since the beginning of 2008, drawing further militiamen into government employ, either temporarily or permanently. Iraqis highly value the steady wage of government employment and are slowly becoming accustomed to certain features of Iraqi Army roles (such as deployment outside their home area). The process is being unevenly applied, however, with certain Shia 'death squads' being singled out as 'accelerants' of sectarian conflict while US forces have been authorised to arrange local ceasefires with other militias, notably Sunni and Shia nationalists.

Counter-terrorism            TOP

Iraq counter-terrorism environment rating. (Jane's) 1131734

Iraq counter-terrorism environment
Counter-terrorism Intelligence Capabilities	3
Size and Resources	4
Expertise and Capabilities	3
Understanding of Threat	3
Sympathies/Orientation	2
Frontier Security	2
Border Security	2
Coastal/Port/Airport Security	4
Unregulated Migration	1
Legal Environment	4
International Co-operation	3
Public Co-operation	2
Grade from 1-5. 1 = Lowest 5 = Highest

The Iraqi government and MNF operate a tiered approach to armed groups within Iraq. Formalised militias associated with large sectarian factions (SCIRI, KDP and PUK) are not subject to any form of government control but represent the most reliable paramilitary forces available to the central government. A second tier of threat actors, such as local Sunni Arab militias and the Jaish al-Mahdi militia, are subject to paramilitary treatment when they undertake anti-coalition and anti-government activities and are subject to close observation at all times. The Iraqi government and MNF have taken steps to split anti-coalition and anti-government forces by showing a nuanced ability to differentiate between irreconcilables and those who will accept amnesty and alternative employment.

Some success has been achieved in drawing unofficial spokesmen of the Sunni Arab community (from groups such as the Association of Muslim Scholars: AMS; and the Iraqi Islamic Party: IIP) into the political process, and in convincing such umbrella movements to condemn certain actions (for example mass casualty bombing attacks and the fostering of sectarian discord). Under Maliki, the Iraqi government has committed to a major amnesty programme for large swathes of the nationalist insurgent community. The third class of threat actors includes Iranian-backed Shia 'special groups', the hard core of Sunni Baathist insurgent factions and all militant Islamist terrorists. The Iraqi government and the MNF believe that these types of adversary can only be dealt with using paramilitary tools.

Discrete intelligence-led operations against specific insurgent and terrorist personnel or locations are undertaken throughout the country, inflicting steady attrition on the terrorist networks. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed on 7 June 2006 in this type of operation, and many other members of AQI continue to fall to such activities. More visible disruptive operations are also undertaken on a routine basis or to reduce terrorist disruption of key events (such as elections, referendums, Ramadan offensives). MNF offensives may break up coalescing areas of insurgent control before they become true 'no-go' zones for government and MNF troops.

In 2006, these operations were augmented with new types of operation; those aimed at dampening the flames of sectarian and factional conflict. The mid-2006 Baghdad security plan and the 2007 'surge' of forces to Iraq have succeeded in significantly reducing sectarian killings, although critics point out that growing homogenisation of neighbourhoods and physical barriers (neighbourhood 'peace walls') have played a large part in the reduction of violence.

Counter-terrorism operations are, albeit to a lessening extent, still reliant on the MNF, which remain at 120,000 at the end of 2009. However, even now that the MNF are drawing down, the process will be slow and key enablers (intelligence, special forces and air support) will remain in place for many years. As Iraq's security forces grow, their ability to saturate areas after they have been cleared (instead of immediately leaving them) should also grow. The Iraqi Police Service (IPS), currently suffering epidemic levels of attack by insurgent forces, will be key to making control of neighbourhoods permanent in the long-term.

The Ministry of Interior also runs the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) and Oil Police units guarding key infrastructure. These units are undergoing extensive re-blueing to reduce militia penetration. In 2009, the Oil Police numbered around 30,000 while the FPS numbered 144,000.

State Stability            TOP

Central governance in Iraq is weak and highly dependent on oil export revenue, but the state is slowly regaining the monopoly on armed paramilitary forces, although sporadic large-scale attacks continue to occur. The fabric of Iraqi society is under attack by ongoing sectarian rivalry and violence and dissolving elements such as crime and a lack of economic opportunity. The government lacks simple near-term solutions to any of its problems. It must risk inflicting economic pain on the population to correct structural problems in the economy and highly-devolved federalism is the extreme but perhaps inevitable means of holding the country together in a loose confederation.

Political stability            TOP

Governance

Iraq has a 325-member parliament, the Council of Representatives. Laws are passed by a simple majority and parliament is quorate when at least 138 members are present. As a result, it requires between 70 and 138 votes to pass laws. The December 2005 election resulted in a parliament split between the following large groupings; the Kurdistan Alliance (53 seats); the Supreme Iraq Islamic Council (SIIC) and Dawa (approximately 80 seats); the Sunni Iraq Accord Front (IAF) (44 seats); the Sadrist bloc (30 seats); the nationalist Iraqiyah list (25 seats); and Fadhila (15 seats).

Parliamentary seats are distributed over Iraq's 18 governorates as follows: Baghdad (68), Ninawa (31), Basra (24), Dhi Qar (18), Babel (16), As Sulaymaniyah (17), Anbar (14), Arbil (14), Diyala (13), Salahiddine (12), Najaf (12), Kirkuk (12), Wasit (11), Diwaniya (11), Maysan (10), Karbala (10), Dahuk (10), Al Muthanna (7). Seven seats are compensation seats reserved for the diaspora vote, while eight seats are reserved for the minorities of the Christians, the Yazidis, the Shabak and the Sabeans.

Government formation following the election was predictably slow. It began with a false start as Ibrahim al-Jaafari was nominated by the Shia bloc as its candidate for prime minister, but the nominee lacked the confidence of a sufficient proportion of the new parliament to allow government formation to start. In April 2006 the deadlock was broken and Dawa Party member Nouri al-Maliki was instead selected by parliament as prime minister. Maliki formed a council of ministers in May 2006. The new cabinet was built around the Kurdistan Alliance and SIIC/Dawa. The government could just about achieve a simple majority in parliament.

Federal government successes in the security sphere in 2007 and 2008 strengthened the near-term political stature of the prime minister. Maliki has slowly drawn in the Iraq Accord Front to preserve the sense of a trilateral 'unity' government. With sufficient preparation, the government is able to pass laws at will. The most stubborn legislative hurdles have been those that broached issues disputed by Kurds and Arabs (such as the role of foreign oil companies in Iraq) or involving the Sunni (such as rehabilitation of former Baathists). In January, the Accountability and Justice Commission announced the disqualification of 511 candidates on charges of publicising Baathist thought. Among them was Saleh al-Mutlaq, a Sunni heavyweight and ally of Ayad Allawi . After long deliberation and foreign intervention, the vast majority of the disqualifications were reversed.

In the longer term, there is likely to be considerable change in the parliamentary elections of March 2010. The Arab segments of Maliki's coalition (SIIC, Dawa and IAF) arguably only achieved their dominance of parliament because 'grassroots' movements such as radical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's movement and Sunni tribal leaders did not fully participate in December 2005. The 2010 elections are likely to see a further diffusion of control of parliament as new 'grassroots' factions enter politics.

Civil-military relations

There is considerable scope for re-centralisation and authoritarianism in post-Saddam Iraq. The first step along such a path would be the identification of a strong leader who was viewed as cross-sectarian, with former prime minister Ayad Allawi representing an archetype of this kind of politician. Such a leader would need at least one dependable security organ. The Iraqi Army is quickly strengthening and maintains the confidence of the people due to its deep cross-sectarian roots in Iraqi society plus ongoing US influence over army units. Even the relatively weak Maliki has been successful in centralising security decision-making on his office, and it may be even easier for a more charismatic and forceful premier to extend his power in the future.

Throughout 2007, it is arguable that the federal government managed to recentralise a considerable amount of coercive military power. The huge growth of the Iraqi Army and the development of new operational commands and special forces groups directly commanded by the prime minister pose interesting civil-military issues in a country with a long history of military domination over civilian government. The transition to police primacy and provincial control over security is being continually pushed back, with the Iraqi Army and its operational commands threatening to become a semi-permanent tool of central government control in the provinces, with considerable political clout.

Economic

In structural terms, Iraq's economy continues to lack revenue diversity and is vulnerable to various types of economic shocks, including the late-2008 steep drop in international oil prices. A drop of USD1 in oil prices could potentially reduce Iraq's budget by up to USD1 billion. Oil sits at the heart of the key economic issues and the government plans to increase oil production almost two-fold. Oil revenues account for 70 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 95 per cent of government revenues. Production averaged about 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) at the end of October 2009, with exports estimated at 1.93 million bpd. High oil prices have sustained oil smuggling; at around USD.023 per litre, it remains immensely profitable to export cheaply-bought domestic oil onto the high-price world markets.

However, the benefits of oil-richness have so far been absent in post-war Iraq. Low government capacity to spend has meant that oil receipts have sat in currency reserves when they should have been rebuilding shattered power, water, sanitation, telecommunications, transportation and oil derivatives infrastructure.

Map of Iraq showing regional attack variations and oil infrastructure 2008-2009. (IHS Jane's) 1187436

The oil sector is slowly developing. The government has proved willing to use Saddam-era oil legislation until new hydrocarbon legislation has been passed. On the back of five years of ad hoc technical fixes involving foreign companies, six Technical Service Agreements were to be formally awarded in June 2008 but the deal collapsed and the drilling and well-workover projects are now being individually tendered. A second oil and gas licensing round, initially yielding only one sale, ended in June 2009 with the award of six oil fields and two gas fields. A third licensing round took place in December 2009, when the government held an auction, and later assigned, 10 of its biggest, largely undeveloped, oil and gas reservoirs.

The global financial crisis has also affected Iraq, causing the budget to be cut from USD80 billion in 2008 to USD67 billion in 2009, with USD15 billion allocated for investment in the country's infrastructure. However, before the 2003 war, Iraq's annual budget did not exceed USD4 billion.

Civil disobedience, protests and the formation of political parties have complex effects on political stability in Iraq. Muscular political and sectarian blocs with armed militias act with some autonomy. Protests are often launched to pressure other political blocs directly rather than to pressure the government, although protests against cuts to government subsidies are likely to proliferate in the future.

The highly autonomous activities of municipal and provincial governments are another emerging trend in Iraqi political stability. Local de-selection of central government-appointed officials is commonplace. Oil-rich provinces such as Basra have made regular calls for increased autonomy from the central government, and have sought to unilaterally impose taxation on oil revenues at the source or to hold back a disproportionate share of electricity generation for local use.

Social stability            TOP

Iraq experienced growing low-level non-organised crime in the 1990s as sanctions and economic stagnation hollowed out the middle classes, reduced living conditions and removed legitimate mechanisms for economic enrichment in Iraq. A steep rise in prostitution was a notable indicator of collapsing local economies. Following Saddam Hussein's 2002 release of criminals from Iraq's jails and the end of Baathist rule on 9 April 2003, law and order experienced a complete collapse, resulting in a massive redistribution of almost any commodity, fixture or fitting. This included the destruction of buildings as bricks were looted for re-use. As well as highly organised looting of banks and museums by regime security forces, this period of looting normalised criminal activity for a considerable period of time, creating huge markets for looted items, diverted oil products and copper wiring stripped from the country's electricity transmission grid and phone network. As the price and availability of these commodities and others such as cars and fuel has stabilised, so the incidence of looting, sporadic car-jacking and attacks on petrol stations has receded.

Like most transit countries, Iraq is experiencing growing drug addiction problems. The Ministry of Health has warned that drug abuse is rising steadily among men and women of all ages in Iraq, especially in the capital Baghdad and in the south of the country. Unemployment, underemployment and trauma are key drivers of growing drug abuse. The Ministry of Health reports that the number of registered addicts in suburban Baghdad has rapidly increased in recent years, including a rise from 3,000 in 2004 to over 7,000 in 2005. In municipalities outside Baghdad, the number of registered drug addicts has tripled, or in places such as Karbala, increased ten-fold. A rising proportion of addicts are involved in local drug peddling and petty crime to support their habits.

Before August 1990, the health care system in Iraq was based on an extensive and developed network of primary, secondary and tertiary health care facilities linked by a large fleet of ambulances and service vehicles, and by a good communications network facilitating referral to the next level of the health care system. At its pre-1990 best, the system gave 97 per cent of urban and 79 per cent of rural Iraqis access to advanced health care. Despite US-funded efforts to construct and equip primary health care clinics throughout the country, access to health care remains well below 1990 levels.

Insufficient Ministry of Health funding (annual budget of USD1 billion, or about USD37 per Iraqi citizen) and slow disbursement of US aid have reduced the impact of curative and preventative health care. Underpaid, unpaid and overworked medical staff are beginning to succumb to the 'brain drain' that is affecting other portions of the Iraqi economy. An estimated USD4 billion is needed to renovate Iraq's dilapidated medical buildings and additional funds are needed to prevent the current shortfalls of basic medications and chemicals (which greatly reduce the number of major surgical interventions and access to laboratory services). Perhaps the most rapid progress has been made in the fields of preventative public health activities such as an expanded programme of immunisations and tuberculosis control activities. Though underdeveloped and sabotaged water and sanitation systems continue to pose a risk to public health, the Ministry of Health has re-established a national disease surveillance and response system to minimise the spread of epidemics and up to 95 per cent of Iraqi children have now received key immunisations.

Demography

Iraq has a fast-growing, young population. About 40 per cent of Iraqis are under the age of 15. In ethnic terms, Arabs make up 75 to 80 per cent of the population, Kurds a further 15 to 20 per cent, with Turkoman, Assyrians and other ethnicities making up the balance. An estimated 97 per cent of the population is Muslim (Shia 60 to 65 per cent, Sunni 32 to 37 per cent) and most of the balance is Christian. These demographic trends are unlikely to see significant shifts in the foreseeable future. Until civil society develops sufficiently and Iraqis politically affiliate at levels other than their 'primary identity' (ethnicity, sect), the demographic balance will be a direct indicator of the political power balance.