Free Trade No Impact
Haider 13 (Ejaz, senior journalist and has held several editorial positions including most recently at The Friday Times. He is currently senior adviser, outreach, at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute, “Wars and trade”, http://tribune.com.pk/story/500245/wars-and-trade/)
So, how does one explain that through the interdependence argument? The realist correlation seems to be right but, as David Copeland argues in his International Security article (Vol 20, no 4; Spring 1996), “trade levels had been high for the previous 30 years [in the run-up to WWI]; hence, even if interdependence was a necessary condition for the war, it was not sufficient.” Copeland offers a different approach and calls it a theory of trade expectations: “Trade expectations theory introduces a new causal variable, the expectations of future trade, examining its impact on the overall expected value of the trading option if a state decides to forgo war. This supplements the static consideration in liberalism and realism of the levels of interdependence at any point in time, with the importance of leaders’ dynamic expectations into the future. “Levels of interdependence and expectations of future trade, considered simultaneously, lead to new predictions. Interdependence can foster peace, as liberals argue, but this will only be so when states expect that trade levels will be high into the foreseeable future. If highly interdependent states expect that trade will be severely restricted — that is, if their expectations for future trade are low — realists are likely to be right: the most highly dependent states will be the ones most likely to initiate war, for fear of losing the economic wealth that supports their long-term security. In short, high interdependence can be either peace-inducing or war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade.” The good news, however, is that trade is inevitable. To put it simply, until there is a seller and a buyer, trade will happen. There is empirical data to support this, compiled by Katherine Barbieri. Barbieri also co-authored with Jack Levy an article in the Journal of Peace Research (Vol 36, no 4, 1999), captioned, “Sleeping with the Enemy: The Impact of War on Trade”. Barbieri and Levy maintain that “there are numerous historical cases of trading with the enemy during wartime, including trade in strategic goods that directly affect the ability of a state to prosecute the war.” Trade will continue even when states are at war. While dyadic trade will be negatively impacted, trade through third parties and circuitously will continue. This is not to say that states must fight or that trade through third parties in such circumstances is preferable to dyadic trade. The point is that empirical data does not support the central tenet of the liberal theory that trade promotes peace or the realist assumption that states, because of vulnerability, will snap those ties. If there’s a demand for item X made by state Y in state Z, X will get to Z, regardless of the conditions of war and peace. This is also borne out by informal trade linkages between Pakistan and India, especially trade through third parties.
U.S. Leadership Defense Naval Power
Sequestration kills naval power—plan can’t overcome budgetary constraints
Wise 15 [David, head of corporate development for BDM International (a Fortune 500 technical services firm), “The U.S. Navy is risking everything on a fatally flawed technology”, The Week, May 29 2015, http://theweek.com/articles/557433/navy-risking-everything-fatally-flawed-technology] AW
Before asking whether it makes sense to continue to invest in aircraft carriers, we must ask the question whether we can afford them. The Pentagon commissioned the USS George H.W. Bush in 2009 at a cost of $6.1 billion. America's most recent aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, will cost more than double that in constant dollars. The carriers' air wings cost about 70 percent again the cost of the ship itself. In an era when personnel costs — including healthcare and pensions — are consuming the military from within, the fact that these craft require 46 percent of the Navy's personnel to man and support places them in the crosshairs in an extreme budget-constrained environment. The Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments stated that being the most expensive piece of military equipment in the world makes "them a prime — and perhaps even a necessary target — in this era of belt tightening." If 11 carriers — as required by legislation — is the minimal number required to have an effective supercarrier force, then carrier proponents are hoist upon their own petard. "If our fleet of small numbers is so fragile that it cannot afford the loss of a single ship due to budgeting, how will it survive the inevitable losses of combat?" Commander Phillip E. Pournelle wrote in Proceedings. That day has already come. As of early 2014, the Navy only has 10 operational supercarriers. Sequestration delayed the deployment of the Harry S. Truman and has the Navy scrambling to come up with funds to refuel the Abraham Lincoln, raising the question whether the latter will ever come back into service. It appears dubious that the Ford will have overcome major development issues to come into service in 2016. Furthermore, if sequestration persists, the Navy might have to mothball four of nine air wings, making the discussion of 11 carrier platforms moot. Due to these substantial constraints, the Congressional Budget Office and former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel both floated the possibility of the Navy going down to as few as eight supercarriers. The Navy, like the other services, has proven itself incapable of running an effective weapons acquisition program in recent decades. Instead, the services pay increasingly more money for progressively fewer units that often fail to meet original specifications. The current shipbuilding plan calls for the Navy to have 306 ships while the actual number has dwindled 285. The CBO recently concluded that there is approximately a 30 percent gap between what the Navy would require to meet its shipbuilding plan and what it will likely obtain through the appropriation process. The Navy's own acquisitions chief recently told Congress that given the current trends and budget outlook, the Navy could slip to as few as 240 ships in the next several decades.
Naval power is irrelevant—too many vulnerabilities
Wise 15 [David, head of corporate development for BDM International (a Fortune 500 technical services firm), “The U.S. Navy is risking everything on a fatally flawed technology”, The Week, May 29 2015, http://theweek.com/articles/557433/navy-risking-everything-fatally-flawed-technology] AW
The famed Adm. Horatio Nelson observed that "a ship's a fool to fight a fort." In the new age that is dawning, the "fort" is an increasingly sophisticated range of over-the-horizon anti-ship missiles that render surface ships vulnerable, and which will deny them proximity to the coastlines where U.S. carriers have reigned for decades. These include ballistic missiles fired from a wide range of platforms, including easy to conceal mobile launchers. In a sweeping 2013 paper on the carrier's future, Navy Capt. Henry Hendrix estimated China could produce 1,227 DF-21D ballistic anti-ship missiles for the cost of a single U.S. carrier. Although one missile might not sink a carrier, a single missile might cause sufficient damage to take it out of commission. Further, the radar signature of a 100,000-ton ship is very large and the sensors used on the carrier's current defense systems only increase that signature. In such an attack, the fleet must be able to defend against a large number of incoming weapons approaching on evasive trajectories at greater than twice the speed of sound, while the attacker needs to only score a few hits. These new anti-ship missiles "put U.S. forces on the wrong side of physics," the U.S. Naval War College's Andrew Erickson warned. Emerging anti-ship technology also places the aircraft carrier on the wrong side of basic arithmetic. In its capacity as a force projection platform, the carrier operates by launching various types of attack and tactical fighter aircraft from its decks. The unrefueled radius of the Navy's current F/A-18E Super Hornet falls within 390–450 nautical miles. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will have an unrefueled combat radius of 730 nautical miles. The Department of Defense, however, estimates that the range of the DF-21D anti-ship missile to be 1,500–1,750 nautical miles and some speculate the range to be greater. Recognizing the fact that these numbers will require placing the carrier strike groups well outside of their range, former Naval War College Dean Robert Rubel observed that "a successful defense of a carrier does no good if the carrier cannot in turn succeed in attacking enemy naval forces." Although a sustained attack from land-based ballistic missiles would be more than a challenge for the Navy's current "hard kill" defense systems, the situation is potentially more serious. The Navy's plan to disrupt ballistic missile command-and-control systems with electronic measures would be inhibited by the same "range" arithmetic that keeps such craft far from shore. "Even more ominous," military analyst Robert Haddick wrote, "are the squadrons of maritime strike fighters capable of launching scores of long-range, high-speed anti-ship cruise missiles, in volumes that threaten to overwhelm the most modern fleet defenses." A reality-check exercise would be to conduct a theoretical battle with the rapidly developing People's Liberation Army Navy. The Chinese have around 100 fast missile boats — primarily of the Hubei class with stealth catamaran hulls — that carry eight anti-ship cruise missiles with current ranges of 160 nautical miles. A coordinated attack would also likely include aircraft and Sovremenny-class destroyers and, in the next decade, an estimated 75–80 submarines — both nuclear and diesel — armed with torpedoes and some with wave skimming, supersonic anti-ship missiles supplied by or copied from advanced Russian models. Russia has been developing sea- and bomber-launched anti-ship missiles for decades. Russia is also a major arms merchant, making these anti-access systems potentially among its most attractive wares. In addition, those that are not purchased could also be reverse-engineered. Iran has, for obvious reasons, a very strong interest in and an unknown arsenal of such weapons. As the costs of these weapons come down, the rate of proliferation will increase and place this technology in the hands of smaller states and potentially non-state groups. With such proliferation, the latitude of carrier task groups to own the coastlines along which they wish to operate in a power projection role will evaporate.
No contest to US Naval power—forward deployment, and ships superiority
Mizokami 14 [Kyle, defense and security issues in Asia writer for The Diplomat, “The Five Most-Powerful Navies on the Planet”, The National Interest, June 6 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-five-most-powerful-navies-the-planet-10610] AW
First place on the list is no surprise: the United States Navy. The U.S. Navy has the most ships by far of any navy worldwide. It also has the greatest diversity of missions and the largest area of responsibility. No other navy has the global reach of the U.S. Navy, which regularly operates in the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as well as the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa. The U.S. Navy also forward deploys ships to Japan, Europe and the Persian Gulf. The U.S. Navy has 288 battle force ships, of which typically a third are underway at any given time. The U.S. Navy has 10 aircraft carriers, nine amphibious assault ships, 22 cruisers, 62 destroyers, 17 frigates and 72 submarines. In addition to ships, the U.S. Navy has 3,700 aircraft, making it the second largest air force in the world. At 323,000 active and 109,000 personnel, it is also the largest navy in terms of manpower. What makes the U.S. Navy stand out the most is its 10 aircraft carriers—more than the rest of the world put together. Not only are there more of them, they’re also much bigger: a single Nimitz-class aircraft carrier can carry twice as many planes (72) as the next largest foreign carrier. Unlike the air wings of other countries, which typically concentrate on fighters, a typical U.S. carrier air wing is a balanced package capable of air superiority, strike, reconnaissance, anti-submarine warfare and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions. The U.S. Navy’s 31 amphibious ships make it the largest “gator” fleet in the world, capable of transporting and landing on hostile beaches. The nine amphibious assault ships of the Tarawa and Wasp classes can carry helicopters to ferry troops or act as miniature aircraft carriers, equipped with AV-8B Harrier attack jets and soon F-35B fighter-bombers. The U.S. Navy has 54 nuclear attack submarines, a mix of the Los Angeles, Seawolf, and Virginia classes. The U.S. Navy is also responsible for the United States’ strategic nuclear deterrent at sea, with 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines equipped with a total of 336 Trident nuclear missiles. The USN also has four Ohio-class submarines stripped of nuclear missiles and modified to carry 154 Tomahawk land attack missiles.
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