Terror Defense No Al Qaida Terror
Download 2.62 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- No aerospace industry collapse – 3 reasons
- High/Increasing Now
- Can’t Solve Military Power
- Can’t Stop ISIS
- U.S. air power alone can’t solve – Sunni support and Iraqi army organization are key to stopping ISIS.
Air PowerAerospace IndustryNo decline – they’re insulated and they’ll just move overseasADAMS 13 [Gordon Adams is a professor of international relations at American University's School of International Service and is a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center. “U.S. Defense Industry Flees the Country”, FP, http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/21/u-s-defense-industry-flees-the-country/, msm] The defense drawdown is now well underway, and the defense industry is starting to pack up, if one is to believe what is being said this week at the Paris Air Show.¶ Defense budgets peaked in FY 2010, including war funding, and have been down about 10 percent in constant dollars. Factor in the budget sequester for this year, which looks like it will hang on through the rest of the fiscal year (and maybe make a repeat appearance next January), and the defense budget will have fallen 24 percent in constant dollars from their height.¶ The future does not look different. If the sequester remains, one can expect another roughly $500 billion to disappear from projected defense budgets over the next nine years.¶ Oddly, defense contractors seem to be doing OK, so far. Sales had declined a bit even before sequestration set in, but profit margins are holding strong for the big guys — Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman, L3.¶ This apparent fiscal health is actually an economic Potemkin village. Profit margins may hold, but U.S. sales are clearly headed down. The illusion stems from the reality that the major defense contractors are still working on programs funded in previous years, when budgets were higher.¶ But as the U.S. defense budget heads down, DOD’s dollars to buy stuff will drop more quickly than the overall budget, as they have in every drawdown since the Korean War. Between FY 1985 and FY 1998, for example, the defense budget declined 31 percent in constant dollars, while funding for research and purchases of hardware fell 53 percent.¶ This reality is already apparent today — budgets for weapons research and acquisition, before the sequester, were already down nearly 20 percent in constant dollars since FY 2010, and, with the sequester, could decline nearly 30 percent.¶ I like to see the major defense contractors as the canaries in the budgetary coal mine — they get the earliest signal of a change in fiscal direction, and they start to react well ahead of the policymakers and elected officials, many of whom think that the party is going to last forever.¶ The industry response to the coming decline began several years ago. Major contractors sold or consolidated business units, entered new markets (largely through acquisitions), and trimmed the workforce. Northrop Grumman, for example, sold its Newport News shipyard in 2011, leading to the creation of an independent business — Huntington Shipyards.¶ Boeing is reducing its management workforce by 30 percent and has closed defense production operations in Kansas and California. L-3 sold its consulting and government services businesses. Lockheed Martin already began consolidation and cutbacks in its missile and training operations in 2012. Overall, aerospace industry employment, which grew through the past decade, began a predictable decline in 2012, in advance of any implementation of the sequester.¶ As in the past, when the U.S. market tails off, the big contractors prepare to leave the country, hoping that international markets will make up for the loss in sales volume in the United States. The latest straw in the wind is an increasingly aggressive industry push to make up overseas for the sales that are declining at home.¶ And the U.S. defense industry has products it urgently wants to sell overseas. Lockheed hopes its F-35 will have a big export market. It is, after all, being built in partnership with Britain, Turkey, Italy, and Denmark, among other countries, which are expected to buy it — that was the whole point of cooperative agreements on F-35 development and production. For Lockheed and the U.S. aerospace industry, F-35 international sales are critical; this is the only fifth-generation fighter on the international market. If it sells, it would guarantee a leading position for U.S. firms in the international fighter market for years to come.¶ The Paris Air Show — on this week — has made this shift abroad abundantly clear. Fighters aren’t the only market U.S. companies are leaving the country for. Capital Alpha analyst Byron Callen reports from Paris that Lockheed anticipates 150-200 overseas sales of its workhorse C-130J transport plane, 300 of which have already been sold in the United States and overseas. This aircraft almost died in the Pentagon’s last drawdown, but industry pressure saved it and the Air Force has been buying it ever since.¶ The competition is heating up for shorter-haul aircraft as well. Boeing and Embraer announced that they are combining forces to market the Brazilian KC-390 competitor in Europe and the Middle East. And EADS/Airbus is still hoping for global sales of its long-awaited A300M. As the belt tightens at home, the sales effort is expanding abroad for everyone.¶ Even with defense budgets shrinking in the United States and Europe, the increasingly sexy drone market is another prime export target. General Atomics, maker of the Predator and Reaper drones — which have been on full display overseas in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen — told the Paris crowd that it was heading into Europe. Predators and Reapers have already been sold to Britain and Italy, with French and German sales coming soon, according to Defense News. The industry drone push is spreading anxiety in the European defense industry. BAE (Britain), Dassault (France), and others have had joint drone research programs for about 20 years, as my colleague, the late Guy Ben-Ari, and I pointed out seven years ago. They have failed, so far, to produce a global competitor to the Predator/Reaper family. In desperation, Dassault, Italy’s Finmeccanica, and the continental European giant EADS combined forces at the start of the air show to appeal to European governments to put more money into indigenously developed drones, or risk losing the market to the U.S. firms. The three firms said they would join forces to build a medium-altitude, long endurance drone for the European market (they were silent on BAE’s role, maybe a side-effect of the failed effort to merge BAE and EADS late last year).¶ Spend more money, they said, so that "European sovereignty and independence in the management of information and intelligence… be guaranteed." A continental drone would "foster the development of high technologies and contribute to sustaining key competencies and jobs within Europe." Good luck with that as European defense budgets continue to fall.¶ The rush for the door marked "international sales" goes on and on. Boeing and Bell Helicopter companies are pushing the V-22 VSTOL transport plane into international markets, including Israel and the UAE, with prospects in Britain,¶ France, Canada, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Italy, Colombia, Brazil, India, Japan, and Singapore. This for a program that has lived the perilous life of Pauline in the U.S. Marine Corps budget for more than a decade, but which the Marines now say has performed well in Iraq and Afghanistan.¶ The U.S. government has been lower key in Paris this year, arguing that sequestration prevented it from flying its fighters at the air show. And even Northrop Grumman, from whose pavilion I watched the Paris show back in 1999, skipped it this year. Perhaps everyone already knows enough about its Global Hawk drone. Japan, South Korea, and Australia have been interested, and NATO is already buying five for its Air Ground Surveillance system.¶ Global hope springs eternal for U.S. defense contractors — the same bum rush was on in the 1990s during the last defense drawdown. And maybe there are a few niche opportunities, especially in the Middle East and Asia. But there is a long history of competition in these markets, a natural tendency for others — especially the Europeans — to circle the wagons around national and regional industries, reflecting an inevitable uneasiness about relying on the United States as a defense supplier.¶ In the end, there is a mirage-like quality to the global market from a contractor perspective. Smaller sales is the likely trend across all markets. Jobs and corporate success are both at stake, which has generally led the U.S. government to support international sales.¶ But this trend begs some critical policy questions. Pursuing economic self-interest is one goal — a healthy defense technology base is part of national security. Strengthening alliance relations is another — cooperating with important allies and partners is part of the national security mission. Security is a different goal: Selling into regions with significant conflict issues may help allies and the technology base, but it can also exacerbate tensions (the Middle East) and stimulate arms races that are already gathering steam (Southeast and East Asia). The defense industry has the first goal at the front of its attention as the U.S. market declines. The administration needs to strike a balance with the other two missions. As the market shrinks, these are the issues that will move to the front of the discussion. No aerospace industry collapse – 3 reasonsMisch 2-24 [Phil, “3 Aerospace Manufacturing Trends Taking Flight in 2015”, 2-24-15, http://www.arfpcorp.com/blog/3-aerospace-manufacturing-trends-taking-flight-in-2015, msm] For U.S. commercial airlines, 2014 was a banner year. Last year marked the fifth consecutive profitable year for airlines, during which time aggregate net income exceeded $30 billion. Record-low oil prices and new technologies have both played a big role in the industry’s steady growth. ¶ What’s next for aerospace? We’ve identified three major trends poised to disrupt aerospace in 2015. ¶ 1. Increased demand will put pressure on supply chains.¶ Along with diving fuel prices and rising demand for air travel, production rates for commercial airline manufacturers are increasing with no signs of slowing down. This increase in demand will place more pressure on every part of the supply chain. The challenge will be managing total costs and forecasting.¶ Look for more commercial airline manufacturers to outsource aspects of their production in order to stabilize supply chains. Contract manufacturing, because it is a long-term commitment with a more comprehensive scope, has the potential to create a more agile and stable supply chain in the wake of shifting market conditions.¶ 2. Boeing will continue to innovate with new products and services.¶ Boeing is one of the most well-known names in aerospace. In September 2014, the company continued its tradition of introducing new products and services to the market with the launch of the 737 MAX 200 plane.¶ Based on the 737 MAX 8 airframe, the 737 MAX 200 features up to 200 seats, modern sculpted sidewalls and window reveals, larger pivoting overhead storage bins, and LED lighting that enhances the sense of spaciousness. The 737 MAX 200 also features a longer airframe then its Boeing relatives, providing travelers more flexibility and space in the cabin. ¶ Europe’s leading low-cost carrier, Ryanair, will be the first airline to operate the 737 MAX 200. ¶ Boeing’s new aircraft opens up new opportunities to increase revenue potential for commercial carriers and provide an overall better, more comfortable customer experience. ¶ 3. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturers will experience rapid growth.¶ Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), or drones, had quite a year in 2014—helping Amazon deliver packages, landing on the White House lawn and then being banned from Super Bowl XLIX.¶ While many are unsure whether mass production and usage of drones is a major security concern or a breakthrough to embrace (or a bit of both), the technology is poised to disrupt a variety of industries including agriculture and meteorology. ¶ For example, farmers’ processes for monitoring crops were traditionally tedious and inefficient. Farmers have long needed a better way to collect data on their crops so they can proactively manage potential problems, including insects, watering issues and wandering cattle. Drones fill the data collection gap for farmers.¶ Because of the many beneficial use cases for drones, we believe industries from farming to defense will contribute to the rapid growth of UAV manufacturers.¶ What other trends will impact the aerospace industry in 2015? Share your thoughts in the comments below. High/Increasing NowU.S. air power increasing now – reforms are improving weapons and increasing training.Spalding and Lowther 14 (Robert Spalding III, Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Adam Lowther, Research professor at the Air Force Research Institute, “America's Enemies Beware: The U.S. Air Force Is Set to Soar (and Become Even Deadlier),” The National Interest, October 22 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/americas-enemies-beware-the-us-air-force-set-soar-become-11521?page=2, *fc) American Airmen will also be transformed. The new Air Force will identify much less with platforms as virtually any computer, network, aircraft or spacecraft becomes a platform not only to acquire, move and process knowledge, but also to deliver long-range weapons. Tankers, airlifters and computers will be just as likely to deliver a killing blow as fighters and bombers have been in the past. As opposed to the vision of Skynet as a dispassionate, computerized, sentient being, the new Airman will be a cyber-aided warrior with tremendous reach. Aided by a global network that ties them into the “hive-mind,” Airmen will operate freely in the cognitive domain from anywhere on Earth as they securely share information across vast distances—giving Airmen prominence over the weapon systems they operate. This new Airman will require much more training and sophistication. To realize the full potential of an Air Force with super-empowered Airmen, they will need to understand how to incorporate, analyze and employ data from a globally connected and globally aware sensor and strike network. Thus, while survival training in the past consisted of learning to live off the land in a hostile environment, future Airmen will learn not only to survive, but thrive in a hostile information environment. Ubiquitous global cyber on-ramps will ensure that Airmen can become a useful part of “Skynet” no matter where on Earth they roam. Simultaneously, American Airmen will interface and engage their peers from allied and partner nations. They will help to educate and train them, enabling them to take on the burdens of keeping the peace in their own regions. American Airmen will harness the power of computing to become increasingly better communicators. They will establish relationships that form the bonds of friendship and trust needed when a crisis arises. These bonds will strengthen and help preserve the relations formed with like-minded nations. Can’t Solve Military PowerAir power can’t solve military power – the air force only serves as a support for the rest of the Army.Farley 14 (Robert Farley, Assistant Professor at the University of Kentucky’s Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, with a Ph.D. from the University of Washington in Political Science, “The Real Problem with the U.S. Air Force,” The National Interest, 20 November 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-real-problem-the-us-air-force-9778?page=2, *fc) The creation of the Air Force in 1947 turned airpower into a zero-sum game for the U.S. military services. Aerospace innovations developed in one service threaten the turf of the other two. This leaves the Air Force to justify itself through explicit denigration of the contribution of the other services. Indeed, Dr. Lowther manages, in this short piece, to imply that soldiers are incapable of understanding aerial maps, and that the Navy can’t contribute to antiaccess warfare. This is the inherent tension in the modern air force; shorn of its original strategic bombing justification, it struggles to conceive of itself as a support arm while simultaneously insisting that it is not a support arm. These problems exist not because air force officers and airpower theorists are bad people, but rather because we’ve established a system of military organization that makes destructive interservice conflict inevitable. The Air Force didn’t want the A-10, but felt compelled to buy it in order to undercut Army demands for intrinsic aviation. The Air Force doesn’t want drones, but letting the Army have them would threaten the future of the service. The Air Force has grown bored with its nuclear missiles, but can’t give them up because such a move would encroach upon institutional prerogatives. None of the services are holy (not even the Marines). Rather, they are organizational forms designed to resolve national strategic problems. The Air Force is, at heart, one of several possible bureaucratic solutions to the problem of training pilots, procuring aircraft, and managing aerospace power during peace and war. There are other options, and the United States should explore them more fully. Can’t Stop ISISAir strikes can’t stop terror – ISIS is adapting by fighting within civilian populations and holding prisoners to deter attacks.Engel 5/26 (Pamela Engel, Reporter covering crime for Business Insider with a B.A. in journalism from Ohio University, “The US-led air war against ISIS is failing,” Business Insider, 26 May 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/why-airstrikes-alone-wont-stop-isis-2015-5, *fc) The US campaign to defeat the Islamic State terror group in Iraq and Syria has hinged mostly on air strikes and training Iraqi troops, which doesn't seem to be going well. A new report in The New York Times exposes one critical flaw in the strategy — the US says it is holding back on bombing some Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh) targets over fears that they might hit civilians as well as militants. So the air war is decidedly restrained. "The international alliance is not providing enough support compared with ISIS’ capabilities on the ground in Anbar," Maj. Muhammed al-Dulaimi, an Iraqi officer in Anbar Province, told The Times. "The US airstrikes in Anbar didn’t enable our security forces to resist and confront the ISIS attacks. We lost large territories in Anbar because of the inefficiency of the U.S.-led coalition airstrikes."
The US has been training Iraqi security forces and supplying weapons in addition to carrying out air strikes against ISIS, but the ground troops the US is backing haven't been able to prevent ISIS from advancing in some key areas. And because the US doesn't have a very big footprint on the ground, it's also hard to gather intelligence on possible air strike targets. The Times pointed out that the White House won't let US troops "act as spotters on the battlefield, designating targets for allied bombing attacks." President Obama has been criticized for not having a viable long-term strategy for defeating ISIS. U.S. air power alone can’t solve – Sunni support and Iraqi army organization are key to stopping ISIS.Engel 7/7 (Pamela Engel, Reporter covering crime for Business Insider with a B.A. in journalism from Ohio University, “The US still doesn't have a strategy that has a chance of defeating ISIS,” Business Insider, 7 July 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/there-are-still-huge-problems-with-the-us-strategy-for-fighting-isis-2015-7, *fc) The Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh) has lost key territory along the Turkish border — a frontier that it uses to funnel foreign fighters into its territory — and near Raqqa, the capital of its so-called "caliphate." A US-led anti-ISIS coalition has been using air strikes in an attempt to But the US still isn't meeting its capacity for training anti-ISIS fighters. And it's unclear how many Sunnis have joined the Iraqi security forces to retake territory from ISIS. Sunnis are key to the US strategy. ISIS is a vehemently sectarian Sunni group, and most of the cities ISIS has seized and that US and Iraqi forces are preparing to retake, including the Baghdad suburb of Ramadi, are Sunni-dominated. President Barack Obama said Monday that "more Sunni volunteers are coming forward," but did not say when they'll be ready to join an offensive on Ramadi or how many fighters are being trained, according to The New York Times. The US is training an estimated 2,000 fighters total in Iraq right now. But US advisers and personnel have the capacity to be training 6,700, leaving a large gap while an often-dysfunctional Iraqi army is already spread thin defending other areas. The US hasn't yet provided a timeline for the Ramadi offensive. The operation to retake Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city and another ISIS stronghold, will likely be shelved until next year, even though the US military originally planned for a Spring 2015 push against the city. Richard Spencer, The Daily Telegraph's Middle East correspondent, pointed out the problems that are still present with the anti-ISIS coalition's strategy, calling the administration's view of Iraq "increasingly delusional": As Spencer notes, the issue isn't just the numbers of troops the US trains in Iraq. There's also the disorganization of the Iraqi military itself. Department of Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said the Iraqi army lost the "will to fight" when ISIS stormed into Ramadi in May. Iraqi security forces withdrew in the face of truck bomb attacks despite outnumbering ISIS militants. And Iraq's Shiite-dominated government doesn't seem willing to divert fighters from defending Baghdad to send them into Sunni areas. They're also reluctant to train and arm Sunni-organized defense forces over fears that even anti-ISIS Sunnis might one day rise up against Baghdad. Consequently, the most effective fighting forces on the ground have been the Kurds — an ethnic group with longstanding tensions with the Baghdad government — and Shia militias backed by Iran. Sunnis with an incentive to defend their own territories have barely been relevant to the fight against ISIS. So while the strategy of air strikes supported by ground forces might be successful in pushing back ISIS in the short term, the coalition gains could end up being "quick wins" that aren't sufficiently backed through a long-term strategy, as Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy explained to The Washington Post. "This is where the focus on quick wins becomes problematic," Hamid told the Post. "The US isn’t thinking about what happens after ISIS is pushed out of an area." Air power can’t stop ISIS – terror organizations won’t be coerced and it’s impossible to sort out civilian populations from enemies.Dolan 14 (Daniel Dolan, Strategy and War Professor at the Naval War College’s Distance Education program and Adjunct Professor of history at the University of Maine, “Opinion: U.S. Air Power Won’t Defeat ISIS,” USNI News, 17 June 2014, http://news.usni.org/2014/06/17/opinion-u-s-airpower-wont-defeat-isis, *fc) As Iraq and Syria Islamic State (ISIS) insurgent forces advance on Baghdad, some American political leaders, led by Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), have urged that the United States begin airstrikes immediately to stop the growing unrest in Iraq. Although air power may be the only expedient and politically acceptable option, there are several reasons why that all-too-familiar impulse to use our asymmetric advantage in airpower will not defeat ISIS. In fact, history is almost devoid of examples of air power—when used alone—achieving anything resembling a decisive result. The 1999 NATO punitive bombing operation against Serbia stands as one of the only successful uses of air power alone in achieving a stated political objective.
The ISIS insurgents probably do not care that the United States moved another carrier strike group (CSG) into the Persian Gulf. If the United States can sort out the complex situation and actually determine what targets to hit in the dense ISIS-ontrolled urban territory, the mufti-clad insurgents will only hug the civilian population closer. Sorting out the bad guys will be a daunting task from 10,000 feet. Our regional allies and the American public may appreciate the gesture of an extra CSG, but lawless insurgents are concerned only with local optics. Back to Kosovo, it was only when NATO realized that stopping a few Serbian military forces in Kosavar villages armed with cans of gasoline and a pack of matches was a tough mission for an F-15 that they began picking off important economic and infrastructure targets. It was then that the Serbian government agreed to negotiations. One must wonder of the wanna-be nation of ISIS: What are the economic and infrastructure targets that matter to a terrorist-led group that longs for the good old days of A.D. 900? Finally, the most popular counter-factual argument being voiced by pundits is that if the United States had left a counterterrorism task force in Iraq, then crisis either wouldn’t have happened (because the insurgents would have feared the U.S. military), or the insurgents could have been easily defeated. If that is valid, then why is the flow of foreign fighters and motivated insurgents still a problem in Afghanistan? And why did it remain a persistent problem throughout our seven-plus years in Iraq? We have total air supremacy in Afghanistan and had it in Iraq, but that did not yield a decisive victory in either conflict. Air power alone did not win those wars—why then would it win this one? Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
|