Terror Defense No Al Qaida Terror
The conception of failed states is flawed and creates a Westphalian model of statehood which posits states who do not comply with their global order as “failed”
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- Bilgin and Morton 4
- BØA˚ S and JENNINGS 5
The conception of failed states is flawed and creates a Westphalian model of statehood which posits states who do not comply with their global order as “failed”CECON 14 [FRANCESCO CECON, “International Security and “Failed States”: A Cause for Concern?”, 7-25-14, http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/25/international-security-and-failed-states-a-cause-for-concern/, msm] There is an increasing trend in Western capitals to label everything as a security threat, and the question of failed states faced the same fate; weak and failed states are included in a voluminous amount of security sources and are portrayed as both direct and indirect security menaces from which the West should watch out. Yet, in many cases, theoretical frameworks on the matter seem not to resist when matched to empirical analyses on the topic (Logan & Preble, 2011). Using official statements, a failed state is “a security concern, as it provides fertile ground for terrorism, drugs, and the like” (White Paper, USAID 2003, 4). Yet, there is no agreed definition or notion on the features that distinguish a weak or a failed state from those ‘functioning-states’ belonging to the international system. Although the data collected by a number of Indexes such as, for instance, the Human Development Index, the State Fragility Index and the Failed States Index, which use of a large range of economic/political/security criteria to draw up their lists could, at first glance, appear appropriate, a comparative analysis of these tools reveals different outcomes. Indeed, while some countries appear in all of these lists, other states are present in some guides but not in others and vice versa (Newman, 2009).¶ The outcome is that, perhaps, the way the state is conceived itself, together with the understanding of security, needs to be called into question. The different results of these indices reveal, to some extent, that there might be different ways to envision statehood as well as security threats. Which ‘qualities’ define a state as such? And what does constitute a security threat? These inquiries are at the centre of a theoretical security debate on the notion of state and security (Menkhaus, 2004). Generally, approaches to the concept of failed states have undergone from inadequacies as the lack of a clear description of what these states should actually look like and the leaning of grouping all of these countries in one big basket without considering the different contextual characteristics and weaknesses of each unit (Patrick, 2007). Henceforth, the epistemological recurring errors in several scholars’ scrutinises can be attributed to the conventional inclination of placing these countries in one single “catch-all ‘failed states’ category” (Patrick, 2007, 647).¶ The fictional character of the Westphalian state model¶ In a realist, Westphalian alignment, security is still comprehended according to its referent entity, the state, fundamental unit of examination in international security (Newman, 2009). States are then viewed as unitary rational actors that play in an anarchical system and which are compelled simply by the might of other units (Krasner, 2001). Thus, a difference in capabilities of states is an enduring feature of the global configuration (Jackson, 1990). Essentially, realism believes in the sovereignty of these elements and in a security perspective grounded on a military distribution of power in an anarchic international arrangement, where inter-state conflicts should still constitute the major security concern for states. With regard to failed states, then, security concerns may arise from threats such as terrorism and enforced migrations (Newman, 2009). Security threats deriving from weak and failed states are thus regarded as ‘indirect’ threats to Western societies. Including threats such as terrorism and immigration in the security discourse retrieves that rhetoric of the ‘others’ who menace the underlying ideals of Western countries (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002). Undeniably, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the relative decline in number of inter-state conflicts arose the Western concern for the implications of states failures, and this made the construction of failed states as a security issue possible, becoming the “quintessential example of securitization: the process by which issues are accorded security status or seen as a threat through political labelling, rather than a result of their real objective significance” (Newman, 2009, 343). Such a marking gives the green light to Western governments for the implementation of inequitable policies in the global South (Patrick, 2007).¶ Moreover, the definition of a ‘failed state’ itself presumes the reflection of an ideal type that, in this case, is the conception of statehood. State is defined in accordance to the Western idea of it (Newman, 2009; Bilgin & Morton, 2002) and this, as it will be later considered, constitutes one of the basic information needed to understand the broader phenomenon of state failure and, chiefly, the manifestation of the breakdown of several states in the African continent. The archetype state in Western standards is the one formulated in 1648 during the ‘Peace of Westphalia’ and the resulting Westphalian model provides an image of how a sovereign state should look like. Expressly, a state should be established on the fundamental principles of territory, mutual recognition, independence and authority (Krasner, 2001). Hence, states exist within territories and “political authorities are the only arbiters of legitimate behaviour” (Krasner, 1995, 116).¶ Yet, such an ontological construction of the state could fit the actual international distribution only when these elements could be termed as ‘impermeable’ (Herz, 1957). In fact, the Westphalian model has never truly match reality (Newman, 2009). The sovereign state system is basically an intellectual draft typified by an ‘organised hypocrisy’ due to the lack of connection between formal rules and actual practices. There are constructivist statements arguing that the sovereign state standard is not a ‘generative grammar’ but rather a system from which states can diverge. Sovereignty as a principle is given by the shared understanding of which actions a sovereign state should then implement in its internal and foreign affairs (Krasner, 2001) and it can be thus argued to be more a social production arising from specific practices rather than a given settled classification (Bilgin & Morton, 2002). Sovereignty is hence made by the conjunction of the approved external recognition and by the authority exercised by officials on their territory; well-functioning states accomplish both whereas weak and failed states do not. Several failed states did receive formal legal recognition by the international community but, yet, are not able to exercise control over their land and such an external recognition brings with it the implication of non-intervention, another pillar in the sovereign principle edifice, in these countries domestic affairs (Krasner, 2001).¶ The prohibition of intervention in other states’ domestic affairs constitutes the ‘negative’ side of sovereignty, which led to the formal international rule of laissez faire. The positive side of the principle is instead defined by the actual competences of a government to employ power and control over its territory and, conversely from the negative aspect, it is subject to change. The arrangement of the two sides of the same sovereignty coin goes to constitute the well-known Robert Jackson’s formulation (1990) of the ‘sovereign game’. This definition turns out to be particularly convenient for our inquiry on failed states since it seems to perfectly capture the sovereign paradox that characterises a number of Third World countries that do experience the independence from external ‘intrusion’ but that, at the same time, are unable to deliver public services (Newman, 2009). Labelling a state with the term ‘failed’ does not take into accurate account that, although many countries in the global South own a legal external recognition, have never been de facto states (Patrick, 2007). Moreover, failed states are considered ‘failed’ to the extent that they do not correspond to the Westphalian model of statehood that was created in a entirely different atmosphere from the one in which the world finds itself now, and such a construction has implications on how Western governments conceive security and security threats (Del Rosso Jr., 1995).¶ The political construction of the ideal state appears to serve the major powers, and the Western societies more in general, interests and security agendas (Newman, 2009). The imposition of the notion of statehood does in fact reflect, to some degree, the political hegemony exercised by the global North towards the global South. This hegemony, grasped in Coxian terms as dominance of an accepted knowledge that does not leave space to alternatives (Cox, 1981), imposes a Western shared concept of statehood and development, which also puts boundaries on how security should be understood. When statehood is an imposed model and every state ends up looking as a made-in-series unit, security issues of one particular state tend to be addressed in a flawed manner (Bilgin & Morton, 2002). Also, for those states that do not conform to this model, labelled with the terms of ‘weak’ and ‘failed’ states, the only way of development is the one created to the image of those states belonging to the global North; so adapting to the economic laissez faire of the market and to political liberalism seems to be the paths to follow (in a liberal, democratic peace thesis sense) in order to leave the status of underdevelopment (Bilgin & Morton, 2002).¶ According to the liberal standpoint on global politics, Westphalian sovereign states are the elementary units of the international configuration, which, similarly to the realists’ view on it, are rational and autonomous actors that try to expand their power in the system (Krasner, 2001). Both realists and liberals thus conceive the state failure as the inability of the states to adapt to a certain model; yet, the problem of failure is comprehended in two dissimilar manners. For liberals, the problem lies in the resolution of market flops whereas for realists the concern is with conflicts spill-overs (Krasner, 2001). These schools of thought are though feeding the concern linked with the phenomenon of state failure by portraying it as an indirect, however harmful, threat for the West.¶ Failure is now considered to be the greatest threat to international stability (Atwood, US Agency for Int. Dev. in Del Rosso Jr., 1995). This shift in the security realm can be attributed to the fact that, in the post Cold War (CW) era, structures (and principally the figure of the state) “have been deconstructed before our eyes” (Del Rosso Jr., 1995, 196). While for some scholars the way in which we conceive statehood affects the perception of threats deriving from state failure (Buzan, 1983), for others the phenomenon has “arguably become the single-most important problem for international order” (Fukuyama, 2004 in Patrick, 2006, 27). Truly, the sovereign states prototypical represented by the Westphalian system never matched with reality and “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, 3:17). Certainly, the occurrence of failures in several countries of the developing world seems to confirm this thesis. Besides, what can be argued to be the factors that determine whether a state can be considered a success or a failure (Milliken & Krause, 2002) when the state is a merely “abstraction, an entity existing chiefly in the hearts and minds of people” (Strayer, 1993 in Del Rosso Jr., 1995, 178)?¶ Failed states and non-traditional security threats¶ It has been said that orthodox scholars’ concerns with failed states are linked to the fear that the security issues existing in global South countries could expand and ‘hit’ Western societies. The greatest apprehension is definitely caused by terrorism. This concern derives from the assumption that failed states can provide fertile grounds for harbouring of terrorist organisations since these countries do not exercise a true control over their lands, and the link between the failed states of Afghanistan or of Sudan and al Qaeda, in this respect, are ‘proves’ that ungoverned areas constitute a point of attraction for terrorist groups (Patrick, 2007; Der Derrian, 2004). The ‘fertility’ is due to the possibility of disposing of areas where to recruit and train militants, and where to have a facilitate access to weaponries and economic supplies. With regard to accessing arms resources, the red alarm is tripped by the presumed probability in which terrorists might acquire biological, chemical or nuclear weapons (Patrick, 2006), which, in the hands of senseless players, would pose such a risky threat that the norm of sovereignty would not be enough to protect these states from external intervention (Fukuyama, 2004).¶ However, establishing a direct link between terrorism and failed states is, to some extent, naïve because it does not take into consideration that not all weak and failed states are plagued by terrorism and the case of Afghanistan is not enough to support the previous hypothesis (Patrick, 2007). Afghanistan can be better explained when other elements such as religion and politics are brought to the table; there is, thus, a series of components that need to be studied in each case. Also, the point that not all failed states attract terrorist groups is due to the fact that not all of them offer an ideal safe haven for these groups. Regions of total state collapse, as it is the case of Somalia, do not constitute idyllic places where to settle for terrorist organisations, but are indeed considered quite uncongenial. Terrorists do, in fact, prefer territories that are barely ruled rather than ungoverned and in the hands of tribal clans (Menkhaus, 2004). The formation of a logical tie between the two phenomena of terrorism and state failure actually infers that terrorist organisations could not survive in fully working states (again, the model of functioning state is imposed) because efficient governments would impede their operations (Newman, 2009).¶ State failure has also the collateral effect of making the people of a deteriorating state leaving the country, creating consequently massive refugee flows that destabilise neighbouring countries as happened in the case of Africa (Newman, 2009); for instance, since 1990, circa 100.000 exiles left Somalia and moved to bordering Kenya with the side-effect of fuelling some of the inter-ethnic strains existing in the country (Menkhaus, 2004). The primary concern is not related to the destabilisation of a region itself but rather to the following wave of immigration that would ‘disturb’ the global North countries (Newman, 2009). Specifically, immigration acquires an even greater role as a danger for wealthy societies when considered in relation with the spread of HIV/AIDS. With the memory, well bore in mind, of the refugee flows following the Haitian collapse and the Balkan hostilities, the European and the American governments are now willing to avoid the reappearance of similar situations (Singer, 2002). The impacts of these substantial immigration movements are deemed to be the fuse of a cultural conflict (‘clash of civilisations’) between different social configurations (Huntington, 1996).¶ Failed states are constructed and securitised by Western governments as catalysts of threats for their societies (Menkhaus, 2004), yet, the population trapped in these countries should be considered to be the very principal victim of their states failures and this, should be the first reason of concern for the international community (von Einsiedel, 2005). The inability of many Third World countries to provide public security (in all of its aspects) and the following chaotic consequences created, in such areas, authentic humanitarian disasters (Yannis, 2002). The attention should thus be driven from the ‘how failed states threaten the global North status quo dilemma’to the important aspects of ‘human security’. The security scheme of inter-state conflicts defined the functions of global politics for the majority of the human-beings history but should now leave space to a new way of conceiving security. In reality, for “most people today, a feeling of insecurity arises more from […] job security, income security, health security, environmental security, security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of human security all over the world” (Human Development Report, 1994, 3). The definition provided in this Report is based on two fundamental constituents, which are the essential safety for individuals from lasting threats such as disease, oppression, and famine, and security from violent interferences in the daily life of the people. Hence, security is here portrayed in a positive and progressive sense since it points out the importance of moral obligations among people (Busumtwi-Sam, 2002).¶ Human security presupposes the right of the person to be ‘free of fear’ and ‘free of want’, so basically to enjoy protection and well-being (Der Derrian, 2004). Nowadays, the greatest challenges to human security are those related to development and, in several countries of the developing world, where “the state is absent, the local population is left entirely at the mercy of unscrupulous political and economic entrepreneurs” (Poku et al., 2007, 1157). Also, the Western concerns with terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in failed states divert the attention from the real menace to security of the people and to the peace of these regions: the flow and illegal trade of small arms (Patrick, 2006). Third World countries had been particularly appealing receivers of arms allocations by the two world powers during the CW (Ayoob, 1995) and currently there are over 875 millions of small arms circulating worldwide (Geneva Small Arms Survey, 2014), where more than a quarter of these items are estimated to be in Africa (Ripsman & Paul, 2010). The low costs and wide availability of these small, however lethal, tools jeopardise the stability of states and regions by fuelling conflicts and by subjecting civilians to the rules of authoritarian clans, chiefly where the absence or the fragility of the state generates an ideal environment for black market affairs and illicit across-border trades (Patrick, 2006). The porous borders of failed states permit the passage of refugees and the exercise of arms smuggling. Giving data, the amount of arms introduced by Somali exiles in Kenya is approximately 5000 rifles per month (Menkhaus, 2004). Through borders, not only weapons, but also drugs and people become objects of criminal traffics (i.e. the cases of Colombia and Myanmar). This uncontrolled movement of people brings with it the spread of disease, affecting the health aspect of security of the population living in the neighbouring countries (i.e. Zimbabwe) (Newman, 2009).¶ The inability of weak and failed states to provide security to their own people is also reflected by the number of health issues that the locals have to face everyday. States, in many cases, are unable to deliver effective health services and the most serious issue of HIV/AIDS has now become part of the lives of a third of the adult population of the southern African continent (Elbe, 2006); and an approximate 70% of the HIV positive individuals of the world live in the continent (Kaplan, 1994). The HIV/AIDS disease does not simply affect the health aspect of human security but it does also constitute a hurdle for the economic development of the state (Ripsman & Paul, 2010). According to the World Bank, the virus can be assumed to be the principal threat to economic progress in Africa (Singer, 2002). The illness seems, in fact, to affect the more productive section of the society (Singer, 2002; Barnett, 2006; McInnes, 2006) and this has serious impacts on the levels of production of these countries plagued by the virus. The health facilities expenses and the reduction of foreign investments lead to a significant reduction of the GDP that thus expands the gap of poverty and inequality within the society. However, establishing a nexus between the virus and the phenomenon of failure is quite arduous, since the instability caused by the disease has actual effects in societies where the deliver of health services is uneven and the levels of poverty reach elevated percentages (McInnes, 2006). Yet, the spread of the disease is framed as a security issue in Western capitals only to the extent that such a pandemic could expand until touching their societies (Elbe, 2006). International measures on the proliferation of the virus are then undertaken only when there is a perceived national security threat and “the securitisation of the disease removes the issue from more cosmopolitan and altruistic frameworks of health and development, locating it instead within a state-centric framework, where states are primarily concerned with maximising power and security, rather than with addressing wider humanitarian concerns” (Elbe, 2006, 129).¶ The centricity of the state in this approach goes beyond the case of disease but, as already noted, involves every possible threat that might derive from the occurrence of states failure. Dangers are constructed in a securitisation process by the major powers policy-makers as scapegoats to divert the attention from their societies’ troubles to the developing world and to justify their policies towards this latter (Newman, 2009). Indeed, by displaying the potential threats incubated in failed states as menaces to the Western life style, societies are persuaded of a ‘false vulnerability’ (Logan & Preble, 2011). ¶ State failure in Africa¶ The notion of statehood, understood in Westphalian terms, had been applied/imposed in the African continent during the decolonisation process in the sixties/seventies (Ignatieff, 2005). Although independence from the colonial dominion had been a great attainment for the locals, the application of a European notion of sovereignty, seen as the exercise of an effective governmental control over a specific territory, just did not fit with the African context (Herbst, 1996; Milliken & Krause, 2002). The new wave of liberation brought to the new countries a simple juridical recognised independence but, once again, theory did not find any empirical confirmation (Jackson, 1990), and the creation of new states, with artificial confines that unobserved the cultural background, and the absence of a proper governmental control turned out to be a naïve effort of projecting the Western state model in a completely different setting (Del Rosso Jr., 1995; Poku et al., 2007). New entities were then labelled with the term ‘state’ but the population within these ‘states’ did not enjoy any of the rights stemming from the freshly gained juridical autonomy, and such a condition of ‘quasi-states’ reflected a shortage of domestic nation-building processes in favour of external recognition (Jackson, 1990).¶ Additionally, the rise of so many new states after the process of decolonisation caused a shift in the international configuration and introduced a high quantity of new members in the system (Ayoob, 1995) that were crafted and instilled by the principle of self-determination and, simply imagining the hypothesis of state failure was considered to be repulsive towards the principle itself (Helman & Ratner, 1993). The sudden disruption in the configuration of the international system shifted the ‘sovereignty game’ to a new dimension based on the value of self-determination and on the development claims of these disadvantaged nations, which nowadays is reflected in the existing friction between sovereignty privileges and external interventions in case of great human rights violations (Jackson, 1990). In several occasion, the principle of sovereignty has been claimed to prevent external interventions in questions related to the suffering of the local population in terms of health, environment and drugs/human trafficking (Helman & Ratner, 1993).¶ African countries provide a striking example of how the application of the Westphalian notion of statehood in the continent is at the root of the instability of many areas and of the resulting human suffering. The rapid course of decolonisation left some unqualified administrations to rule over portions of territory that did not experience any form of administrative arrangements since the colonial dominion was majorly exercised in the urban zones of a land. This made the development of dominant subnational groups and entities possible, and, in several instances, these constitute the actual authorities over specific areas in a country (Herbst, 1997; Duffield, 2005). Warlordism, a clan centred form of authority, is now a spread phenomenon in the continent (i.e. Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC) and this is significant to the extent that it implies that sovereignty is thus a social construction arising from conventional practices (Bilgin & Morton, 2002).¶ The work of William Reno (1999), a milestone in the field, understands Warlordism in relation to their type of ‘political economy’ defining them as egotistic actors whose main interest is the increase of their power and whose command fail to deliver whichever public service to their communities. However, Reno’s analysis lacks an account on the important role of the hegemony established by these lords, which are respected and supported by their population who would not otherwise have any other kind of rule or ‘protection’ (Marten, 2007). The absence of a superior authority, ethnic tensions and the easy access to weapons leave ample space to conflict outbursts (Herbst, 1997; Gupta, 1993). Internal civil wars have a massive impact on the people. The rapid spread of diseases among soldiers have effects on the larger population (Patrick, 2006) and conflicts trap the countries into political and social quagmires that do not allow them to provide not even basic services; and their consequences are echoed by a long-term wave of poverty, instability and a situation where countries experience a “victory of guns over normal politics […] with autocrats that deny freedom to their people” (Crocker, 2005, 35). The human security threat of poverty is the cause of starvation and mortality between under five year old children (Poku et al., 2007). In the case of Somalia, the internal conflicts have also destroyed the education system and “by 2004 only 15% of children were attending primary school” (Marten, 2007, 70). Human security is more threaten in Africa then anywhere else, where the levels of poverty are higher than in the rest of the globe.[1] However, policies directed to the continent are still driven by Western national concerns with the containment of these threats outside of their societies, whereas there is an urgent necessity for a ‘people-centred’ tactic (Poku et al., 2007).¶ Conclusion: leaving Westphalia¶ The occurrence of the phenomenon of state failure is another sign that the Westphalian model is not supported by an empirical basis; it is rather a simple political construction that calls for a shift to a ‘post-Westphalian era’ (Newman, 2009). The Western notion of statehood tended to ignore the fact that many entities have never been actual states (i.e. African countries post-decolonisation), and to have a homogeneous vision of failed states that did not consider the different settings of each situation (Patrick, 2007). This is also reflected by the fact that while some countries are highlighted as security threats in Western capitals, as represented by the cases of Afghanistan or Somalia, others are essentially disregarded (i.e. Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau) (Newman, 2009). The fiasco in addressing effective specific policies towards these countries can be thus attributed to a lack of understanding of the circumstantial dissimilarities of each case (Patrick, 2006; Migdal, 1988). Failed State Framing is flawed and is used to justify intervention – if states are not strong, they must be assimilated into the liberal peace of the WestBilgin and Morton 4 [Pinar Bilgin is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University, Ankara. Adam David Morton is Professor in Political Economy in the Department of Political Economy at the University of Sydney, which he joined in 2014. “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism”, POLITICS: 2004 VOL 24(3), 169–180, msm] The need for a better appreciation of state ‘failure’¶ A better appreciation of state failure is not likely to materialise unless the socio- economic conjuncture within which such ‘failure’ emerges is analysed. However, little reference is commonly made to the processes through which these states have come to ‘fail’ whilst others ‘succeeded’. In other words, the conditions that allow for state failure to occur are almost never investigated (Milliken and Krause, 2002a is a significant exception to this generalisation). Yet, this is an important avenue for research because existing approaches are rooted in the assumption that ‘failures’ are caused by the intrinsic characteristics of certain states without neces- sarily reflecting upon their colonial background and/or their peripheral position in global politico-economic structures. The broader point to make is that the ways in which deepening our understanding of the factors that have led some states to ‘fail’ may also help us to take alternative action.¶ A second problem is that the contributors to present debates reduce state ‘success’ or ‘failure’ to an empirically observable capacity to manipulate (usually) coercive resources resulting in a not-so-democratic overtone of control and subordination (see Migdal, 1988 and 2001). Such insistence on the need for strong states to estab- lish stability and political control is again not new but reminiscent of Cold War approaches to modernisation and development in the less-developed world when explanations were sought for the prevalence, particularly in Latin America, of authoritarian rule and ‘strong’ state corporatist regimes.¶ Third, the stance of many contributors to state ‘failure’ analysis is reminiscent of the liberal peace ‘two worlds’ approach that has characterised post-Cold War debates on international security. The ‘two worlds’ – labelled as ‘core’ and ‘periph- ery’ by James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul (1992) – are represented as the zone of conflict (periphery) and zone of peace (core). The practical implication of the ‘two worlds’ approach is that the structural and constitutive relationships between the two realms of security are obscured. The only alternative left to the ‘failed’ states of the world is presented as that of becoming ‘strong’ states and joining the liberal peace. Yet what is left underemphasised is the centrality, for instance, of arms exports to many Western economies, which effectively underlines the contradictions at work in the making of the ‘zone of peace’ and ‘zone of conflict’. What sustains such relations within the arms trade industry, despite the critical voices raised by non-governmental organisations, is the representation of some states as ‘failed’ within ‘zones of conflict’. Therefore, the inherently unequal structural rela- tionships between the two zones are sustained.¶ Fourth, prevalent approaches to state failure and collapse, as ‘deviance’ from the norm, help to establish ‘both a justification and legitimacy for intervention’, thereby marginalising alternative approaches (and practices) (see Duffield, 2002, p. 1050). After all, as Milliken and Krause (2002b, p. 762) remind us, ‘what has collapsed is more the vision (or dream) of the progressive developmental state that sustained generations of academics, activists and policymakers, than any real exist- ing state’. Hence the authors’ call to analyse state failure (and collapse) as part of a ‘broader and more prevalent crisis in the capacities and legitimacy of modern states’ (Milliken and Krause, 2002b, p. 755). Failed State rhetoric is wrong and relies on a flawed analysis – causes serial policy failureBØA˚ S and JENNINGS 5 [Morten Bøa˚s is a researcher at Fafo – Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo. He has published extensively on African politics, the multilateral system, and regions and regionalisation. Kathleen M. Jennings is a researcher at Fafo, focusing on conflict and post-conflict and human security issues. “Insecurity and Development: The Rhetoric of the ‘Failed State’”, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol.17, No.3, September 2005, pp.385–395, msm] INTRODUCTION¶ The heightened sense of insecurity engendered by the so-called ‘war on¶ terror’ has led to a focus on ‘failed states’ as a security threat to the Western¶ world – and world peace in general. This perception is built on a flawed¶ understanding of state recession. In this article, we argue that the assumptions¶ underlying the dominant terminology of ‘failing’ or ‘failed states’ privilege a¶ misguided and unhelpful analysis, with detrimental results for research and¶ policy responses.¶ To speak of ‘fragile’ states implies that states’ weaknesses are linked to the¶ likelihood of break-up or secession; similarly, when we employ the term ‘state¶ failure’, we assume that all states are essentially alike and are supposed to¶ function in the same way. The first assumption may not be applicable in most¶ cases; the second is not applicable in any. Contemporary states are the result of¶ unique historical processes, and, while some states may fail to provide an¶ environment of human security, they may be efficient providers of regime¶ security. Problems therefore emerge if we use the term ‘state failure’ to focus our¶ analysis on the state and its institutions – rules as well as organisations – when in¶ many cases the power relations that matter for regime security are private and¶ informalised. When we speak of failed states, we are in actual fact usually¶ referring to states in which power primarily resides outside the state’s formal¶ institutions. In other words, in ‘failed states’ decisions about distribution and¶ redistribution are taking place outside and in-between official state structures. For¶ those in power, this is not necessarily a failure; in fact, it may be their objective,¶ by improving the security of the regime and consolidating networks of power and¶ enrichment for elites.¶ We therefore argue that if we are to continue to employ the concept of ‘state¶ failure’, it should be as the basis for investigations into human security – that is, a¶ state’s ability or willingness to function in a manner conducive to the welfare of¶ the majority of its citizens.1 The question for researchers and policymakers is not¶ which states are failed states, but rather for whom is the state failing, and how?¶ By asking questions about the people and communities the state is failing, we¶ open up an analytical perspective that can inform us about the dynamics at work¶ that undermine both social and economic development and state and human¶ security.¶ Finally, this article will assert that changing the assumptions around ‘failed¶ states’ is insufficient to effectively address problems of insecurity, development¶ and governance so long as the states in question continue to be viewed in¶ isolation. These states do not exist in a vacuum. They have a neighbourhood, and¶ understanding the webs of networks and alliances between ‘a failed state’ and the¶ region in which it exists is crucial if solutions to problems of insecurity,¶ development and governance are to be found.¶ 386 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH¶ STATES AND STATE FAILURE¶ Prior to 11 September 2001, the United States and Western Europe paid little¶ systematic attention to the phenomenon that analysts termed ‘state failure’.¶ However, the attacks on New York and Washington, DC – and particularly the¶ fact that al-Qaeda planned the attacks in the safe haven provided by Afghanistan,¶ considered to be a ‘failed state’ – pushed the problem to the top of the security¶ agenda in Western capitals, as evidenced by the declarations of the European¶ Security Strategy [European Union, 2003] and the US National Security Strategy¶ [White House, 2002] that ‘failed states’ are one of the key threats confronting the¶ European Union and the United States, respectively.¶ Although the rhetorical and policy adoption of ‘failed states’ is quite recent,¶ intellectually speaking the concept has been around for a long time. Indeed,¶ ‘failing’ or ‘failed’ are simply the most recent in a long list of modifiers that have¶ been used to describe or attempt to explain why states residing outside of the¶ geographical core of Western Europe and North America do not function as ‘we’¶ think they are supposed to. They have been called, among other things,¶ ‘neopatrimonial’ [Me`dard, 1982 ], ‘lame’ [Sandbrook, 1985 ], ‘weak’ [Migdal,¶ 1988 ], ‘quasi’ [Jackson, 1990 ] and ‘premodern’ [Cooper, 2003 ]. What ‘failed’¶ has in common with these other qualifiers is the assumption that every state can¶ be evaluated on the basis of a prototype of an advanced state. This advanced state¶ is essentially that which exists in the Western core: it is the normative goal, the¶ top end of a single and universalised spectrum of proper state functioning, and it¶ is towards this model that all states ideally should move, as it is the only viable¶ option to bring them out of the poverty and misery that makes them such easy¶ prey to criminal and terrorist networks.¶ Against the backdrop of the prototypical state, the notion of ‘failed states’¶ and ‘state failure’ is shorthand for those states undergoing severe political,¶ economic and humanitarian crises, such as – to pick just a few examples –¶ Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. These countries are diagnosed¶ as such because the state institutions are seen as so weak that they cannot¶ maintain order and authority beyond the capital (and in some cases not even¶ there). Designations of state failure often coincide with the existence of¶ widespread violent conflict and humanitarian crisis, which would sometimes¶ precede and be instrumental in causing, and at other times follow, the¶ institutional collapse of the state. Regardless of the sequencing, the convergence¶ of conflict, institutional implosion and humanitarian crisis are all part of the¶ general phenomenon of state failure, which can lead to the total collapse of¶ governance [Zartman, 1995 ].¶ Few would disagree with general statements such as ‘the Liberian state is a¶ failure’ or ‘Afghanistan is a failed state’. The question, however, is what these¶ pronouncements really tell us about security and development in these states.¶ THE ‘FAILED STATE’ 387¶ In actual fact, the answer is very little. The way in which the terms ‘failed’ and¶ ‘failing’ states is currently being used in reports coming out of Washington,¶ Brussels or other Western capitals reflect this limitation: the concepts are used in¶ a way that is less analytical than descriptive and categorical, lending itself to a¶ narrow, checklist approach to policy that may result in extremely misguided¶ planning and interventions. Reading various policy and strategy documents,¶ furthermore, it is quickly evident that they are essentially self-referential: failed¶ states only matter insofar as they affect ‘our’ security [see e.g. White House,¶ 2002; EU, 2003; USAID, 2005 ]. This instrumentalist approach to the affected¶ states is seriously problematic. When all problems and solutions are seen through¶ the dominant lens of Western security interests, the singularity of each crisis –¶ and the dissimilarities between one and the others – gets lost; after all, everyone¶ and everything looks the same when you see only yourself in the mirror. Policy¶ interventions thus assume a standardised form on the basis of what has worked in¶ other places before. Yet this obfuscation of vital differences cripples policy¶ effectiveness from the outset, by reducing the complex nexus of actors,¶ incentives, power structures and networks into a homogenised, easily digestible¶ form that bears little resemblance to the situation on the ground.¶ This is unsurprising, because the concept of ‘state failure’, predicated as it is¶ on the existence of the prototypical state, is built on a faulty assumption of¶ uniformity in state organisation, structure and behaviour. To say that something¶ ‘fails’ or ‘is failing’ is a normative judgement that is only meaningful in¶ comparison to something else; in this case, that something else is the existence of¶ a Westernised, ‘healthy’ state that, unfortunately, has little relevance to most of¶ the states in question because it has simply never existed there. Comparing a¶ ‘failing’ state to mature states thus entails a neglect of history, demography,¶ culture and economics, and their relationship to regional dynamics and patterns.¶ It is the analytical equivalent of comparing apples and oranges, which also elides¶ the critical role played by agency and incentives in determining why a state looks¶ and functions as it does. Thus, categorising regimes and enacting policy decisions¶ and interventions on the basis of a simplified, analytically questionable notion of¶ failed states will result in the continued failure of attempts to improve outcomes¶ in the states and regions in question.¶ For example, if asked whether Liberia was (and is) a failed state, most people¶ would answer yes, and some could even list some reasons why. But as an¶ analytical inquiry, this only becomes meaningful when we ask: ‘For whom is the¶ Liberian state failing, and how?’ If this is not specified, analysis will remain in the¶ realm of the ahistorical and abstract. It is only when we add these questions [see¶ also Bøa˚s, 2000 ] – thus going beyond descriptions of institutional behaviour to¶ examine the full ramifications of it – that we can shed light on the human¶ security, lived realities and coping strategies of the affected population, as well as¶ on the role of non-state (including non-regime economic, ethnic and communal)¶ 388 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH¶ actors. This perspective enables a nuanced and differentiated view of¶ development, security and needs that may be facilitated or alleviated by certain¶ policy interventions.¶ FAILED STATES AND HUMAN SECURITY¶ We therefore contend that, insofar as the concept of failing and failed states is¶ useful, it is only so in the context of an examination into human security. We¶ believe that a human security-centric approach enables a fuller analysis of the¶ lived realities and coping strategies co-existing in the state. This in turn promotes¶ – even demands – an examination of agency, interests and incentives on the part¶ of the various players that shape and constrict those coping strategies, including¶ local, national and regional, governmental (regime) and nongovernmental,¶ actors. In short, this approach captures the key element of state recession, and¶ why – far from being unanticipated or the sudden result of a catastrophic¶ collapse – this outcome may in fact be the goal of regime and non-state elites in¶ ‘failing’ states.¶ Before proceeding, clarification is in order. Human security is a broad¶ concept; in its most common understanding, human security is:¶ not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity.¶ Human security is people centred... first, safety from such chronic threats as¶ hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from¶ sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in¶ homes, in jobs or in communities. [UNDP, 1994: 22–3]¶ Our understanding of human security is as an approach that takes the individual,¶ rather than the state or other entity, as referent, and that prioritises an¶ understanding of how individuals actually cope with insecurity and conflict and¶ how this affects relationships between individuals and their communities, the¶ state, and non-state actors [see also Bøa˚s, 2003 ]. This is ‘human security from¶ below’, retaining the focus on the individual but using a ground-up rather than¶ normative, universalistic rights-based approach, so as to better comprehend¶ insecurity as it is experienced by individuals and households [Bøa˚s et al., 2004 ].¶ Just as implied by the definition from UNDP [1994] above, we are concerned¶ with both traditional and non-traditional threats to individuals – including among¶ the latter hunger, poverty, disease, environmental degradation, pollution and¶ organised crime – but do not accept that this must involve an inevitable¶ expansion of security and security studies into all possible dimensions of human¶ life. We instead maintain that these considerations must inform analyses of the¶ state’s relationship with respect to its own citizens: that is, although we would not¶ classify an individual or household’s health status as a security issue, we would¶ contend that a state can harm its own citizens not just through repressive¶ THE ‘FAILED STATE’ 389¶ (traditional) security measures but also through active or benign neglect of the¶ basic human rights and services to a threshold below which humans cannot truly¶ function [see Nussbaum, 2000 ].¶ Employing the concept of ‘state failure’ as the basis for investigations into¶ human security therefore means examining the extent to which a state is able or¶ willing to function in a manner conducive to the welfare of the majority of its¶ citizens, and the conditions of and context in which state action (or inaction)¶ occurs. Seen from this perspective, it is clear that state failure, as it relates to¶ human security or insecurity, is primarily related to the recession of the state.¶ Making this determination consequential – in other words, using it as an effective¶ basis for policy decisions and actions – thereby entails examining the varying¶ roles, incentives, and activities of the state and non-state actors that are¶ determinative in the processes around state recession. In addition to the players¶ mentioned above, this group also includes national and international business¶ interests, and, if applicable, resistance groups and militias operating in-country or¶ in neighbouring states.¶ State recession refers to the processes by which the state has receded – in¶ terms of political and territorial control, effective legal authority, and provision of¶ security and services, including access to goods and markets – and the¶ concomitant informalisation or privatisation of the economy and other state¶ functions, including security. This is not generally a sudden collapse of authority,¶ but a gradual process that occurs over time in all areas – political,¶ economic/markets, health, education, infrastructure, law enforcement, physical¶ security – that are important to society. Recessed states typically exercise¶ marginal control over, and offer limited franchise and protections to, most of¶ society, but exert predatory control over resources deemed strategic to regime¶ control and enrichment.¶ State recession is the common characteristic underpinning most of the states¶ labelled as ‘failing’. The problem is not necessarily that analysts and¶ policymakers are not aware of the recession of the state; it is that they have¶ misunderstood the reasons for it and implications of it. In particular, agency is not¶ often recognised with respect to state recession: the dwindling of the state is¶ generally either taken as given or perceived to be the result of crippling macro¶ socio-economic forces beyond regime control, rather than investigated as¶ something that is planned and implemented for the profit and consolidation of¶ power of regime and non-regime elites [see Reno, 1998 ].2 After all, why would¶ anyone plan for failure? Yet considering that informalised or corrupt privatised¶ power structures are often in the financial interest of both regime elites and nonregime¶ economic (national or international) actors, the excision of agency and¶ incentives is strange and limits analytical precision.¶ Furthermore, overlooking agency and incentives means that another¶ important aspect of the recessed and ‘failing’ state is obscured. Regime elites¶ 390 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH¶ do not act alone or in isolation; rather, they are enmeshed in formal or informal,¶ political, economic, corporate and ideational transnational networks that create or¶ reinforce incentives to informalise or privatise the state. As elaborated below, the¶ state and its institutions constitute only one facet of the story in states generally¶ categorised as ‘failing’ – equally, if not more, important are the power relations¶ and decisionmaking that occur outside those formal institutions. Cumulatively,¶ therefore, the recession of the state must be conceptualised and understood in¶ terms of agency and the role of both state and non-state actors, including not just¶ regime elites and security services but also national and international business¶ interests and organised crime networks. This in turn enables a fuller¶ understanding of human security and the various ways in which it is threatened¶ by the activities or absence of the state and affiliated actors.¶ Similarly, the activities and goals of resistance groups and non-state militias¶ must also be understood against the backdrop of state recession, marginalisation,¶ agency, and the existence of complex, regionalised formal and informal networks¶ and power structures. Investigating agency on the part of non-state or informal¶ actors is no less important for understanding the situation in a country than¶ investigating the role of regime and economic elites. For example, movement¶ actors – political, social, economic or ideational – that do not want to work ‘in¶ the system’ are reflexively seen as threats, regardless of the merits of the system¶ itself or whether the actors have violent intentions.3 But if the system has always¶ neglected or exploited them, why is it reasonable to assume that they should want¶ to work within it?¶ This is not to say that all such movements, particularly armed resistance¶ groups, are benign; many do in fact constitute new threats to the human security¶ of those not in their ranks. But the threat posed by non-state groups does not¶ obviate or make irrelevant the context in which these groups form and the¶ motives they have for acting, which in many cases are in reaction to persistent¶ threats to human security – be they physical, economic, political or healthrelated¶ – resulting from the abdication of responsibility by the recessive state.¶ Unfortunately, the atmosphere of marginalisation and resistance that festers in¶ the absence of a functioning state is often overlooked or deemed secondary by¶ efforts to explain conflict in terms of polarities such as ethnic hatred or rampant¶ greed on the part of non-state combatants [e.g. Horowitz, 1985; Collier and¶ Hoeffler, 1998; Berdal and Malone, 2000 ]. Yet attempting to properly¶ contextualise, if not excuse, the activities of militias and resistance groups is¶ particularly crucial, because policy interventions are doomed to failure if the¶ underlying reasons for resistance and conflict are not understood.4¶ Thus far our discussion has focused on human security in relation to state¶ recession, chiefly because the role of state recession, the threat it represents to¶ the citizens of that state, and its implications for human, regime and regional¶ security are often misunderstood. However, it is equally important to note that¶ THE ‘FAILED STATE’ 391¶ a benefit of using human security as the basis for conceptualising state failure is¶ that it implicates states that are not typically considered as failing, particularly¶ those states with strong – perhaps overly strong – institutions and rules. Iran¶ and North Korea, for example, have been joined in the common imagination¶ through their inclusion in the ‘axis of evil’ proclaimed by the Bush¶ administration, yet in terms of institutions, rules, and political and security¶ control, these states are strong, despite the insecurity that they pose to their¶ citizens. Similarly, can it really be analytically correct to label a state like the¶ 1994 Rwandan state – a perpetrator of genocide – as a failed state? Using¶ human security as an entry point may be a more productive and empathetic¶ exercise for both researchers and policymakers, in terms of understanding the¶ lived realities, needs and coping strategies in place and, in particular, how those¶ may affect and interact with any potential external policy interventions. In the¶ same vein, the human security-based approach can be extended to critical¶ analyses of countries generally excluded from discussions of state failure, but¶ where human security and the assertion of human rights are subsumed or¶ threatened in the name of ‘national security’.¶ However, we would also emphasise that our argument should not be¶ interpreted as advocating the adoption of a new framework or checklist,¶ according to which countries can be categorised and characteristics ticked off.¶ We merely suggest using human security as the basis for guiding local and¶ regional analysis and prioritising enquiries and interventions.¶ FAILED STATES AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF¶ INFORMALISATION¶ We argue above for cultural specificity: that the actual nature of the state in¶ question can only be properly addressed and understood within its own social,¶ economic and historical contexts. We recognise, however, that while all states¶ labelled as ‘failed’ are unique, in most cases their societies also share a similar¶ context of marginalisation. Citizens are marginalised by the lack of resources and¶ opportunities provided by the recessive state. National borders are permeable,¶ and for many the state exists more as a fiction than an empirical reality. For the¶ most part, decisions about distribution and redistribution take place outside and¶ in-between official state structures, and the power relations that matter for regime¶ security are private and informalised. This dynamic implies that researchers must¶ examine the nature, form and implications of informalised power relations, and¶ how these matter for human security. It also suggests a need to investigate more¶ closely how people living in the conflict zone of a ‘failed state’ relate to their own¶ and other states – both as an abstraction (i.e. as an idea) and as manifestations of¶ power from which can emanate both resources and coercion – and how this is¶ reflected in their coping strategies.¶ 392 THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH¶ We argue elsewhere [Bøa˚s, 2003 ] that conflict zones, in addition to being¶ understood as an ‘environment of extreme uncertainty’ [see Berner and Trulsson,¶ 2000 ], should be conceptualised as lived social space. This conceptualisation¶ sees the conflict zone as territory, material or imagined, that is an intersection of¶ moving bodies: made, defined and redefined by the sets of movements that take¶ place within it [see Certeau, 1984 ]. It is a dynamic entity and a social construct; it¶ is delimited not by official borders, but by social practice. It is both formal and¶ informal. This conceptualisation is essentially an inversion of the normal modes¶ of thinking around the societal impacts of conflict, which tend to focus on social¶ breakdown and destruction, while ignoring that it is also a site for innovation that¶ can reorder the social, economic and political life for individuals and groups of¶ people in the country and area in question [Bøa˚s, 2003 ]. We contend that ‘failed¶ states’ should be examined and understood on the same basis, with similar¶ attention to the nexus of social practices and networks that underpin and emerge¶ from situations of recession and informalisation. Furthermore, the emphasis on¶ sociality, ideational movements and practical realities facilitates an analysis that¶ circumvents the constraints imposed by a focus on the singular state.¶ Informalisation does not just reduce the functionality of a state; it also, in a¶ sense, regionalises it, or consolidates underlying, existing transnational processes¶ and relationships. Informal networks and power structures facilitate and¶ encourage trans-border activities by elites, opposition actors and ordinary¶ citizens just trying to survive: cross-border financial, arms and smuggling¶ networks enable elites to fortify their bank accounts and grip on power;¶ repressive security forces expel opposition groups and non-state actors into¶ neighbouring countries, where they may make mutually beneficial alliances of¶ convenience with other governments or non-state groups; and beleaguered¶ citizens depend on informal economies and smuggling networks as key elements¶ in their coping strategies. These networks do not emerge from thin air: they build¶ on existing structures, both material and identity-based. These complex and fluid¶ regionalised webs of political, economic, identity and security relationships¶ sustain and reinforce themselves, putting paid to the notion that development and¶ security can be best advanced within the confines of the nation-state.¶ POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND MAIN CONCLUSIONS¶ We argue that the assumption about state sameness underlying the concept of¶ ‘failed states’ is a misnomer. Policy interventions carried out on the basis of, or¶ built on, this assumption will therefore be flawed. The human security approach¶ advocated here may partially redress this problem, as it helps us to see how the¶ actual coping strategies of individuals and groups are tied to the actual nature and¶ logic of the state in question. This approach also takes into account the complex,¶ fluid, regionalised web of political, economic, social, security and ideational¶ THE ‘FAILED STATE’ 393¶ relationships that shape, enable or prohibit certain coping strategies, alliances and¶ elite decisionmaking. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 2.62 Mb. Share with your friends:
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