Terror Defense No Al Qaida Terror
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- NCW Fails
- NCW comes with a serious weakness of physical insecurity
- Time and tech obsolescence hamper NCW deployment
- Interconnectedness makes insider attacks devastating
- Cost and dependence on private vendors makes NCW useless
- US military only cares about its budget – NCW is irrelevant and the Aff won’t change inherent structural issues
Net Centric WarfareNCW Dependence BadDependency on NCW could cripple US forces in the futurePeeler and Dahlstrom 13 «NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES» by Michael P. DAHLSTROM; David L. PEELER, Jr. Lt. Col. David L. PEELER, Jr. is currently a U.S. Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow, working for a year with a private sector firm. Michael P. DAHLSTROM, Lt. Col. (ret.) US Air Force, is the F-35 Lightning II Financial Management Site Lead in the US Air Force F-35 Program Office Source: Strategic Impact (Impact Strategic), issue: 3 / 2013, pages: 94100, on www.ceeol.com. ♥Tina When an entire military infrastructure, from doctrine, to training, to equipping a force is dependent upon the advantage that NCW provides, disrupting NCW can cause the entire house of cards to collapse. One of the most obvious examples the military has sought to prepare for is the disruption of the Global Positioning System (GPS) signal, upon which virtually all “smart weapons” depend for targeting guidance. If you create an entire military command, control, communications and information system dependent upon NCW principles like everywhere access, trusted communication, and high-speed data, you give an enemy a detailed map of how to defeat you. As a result, systems have to be not only robust, but your doctrine and training has to be tolerant of working without NCW available, and that least-common-denominator or worstcase-scenario undermines all the effort and work spent on an NCW system. While cliché, the old saw “The enemy gets a vote” is all too true, and depending entirely and inflexibly upon a single concept of any sort is a sure step on the road to defeat. \NCW is too reliant on tech infrastructure. It’s a liability and an easy target. One Jammer could crush warfighting capabilities.Robb 14 Modern Militaries and a Network Centric Warfare Approach JONJO ROBB, Bachelor’s degree, International Relations JAN 9 2014 http://www.e-ir.info/2014/01/09/modern-militaries-and-a-network-centric-warfare-approach/♥Tina One of the major issues identified with NCW is a heavy reliance on technology, particularly infrastructure. There are various reasons why reliance on infrastructure brings with it significant risk. It can become the ‘primary centre of gravity for opponents to exploit’.[19] This is particularly hazardous if alternative ways of working are not available.[20] If NCW becomes so critical to warfare that forces become incapable of fighting in a non-network centric fashion, there is little doubt that any disruption to networks that they are dependent on could be catastrophic and potentially crippling for a military. Nor is there any doubt that a capable enemy would attempt to exploit this weakness by disrupting networks. A case in point would be the proliferation of GPS jammers. The Commander of United States Air Force Space Command has identified that US forces have ‘a very heavy reliance on space and we consider GPS foundational in military operations’.[21] Indeed, GPS has been described as ‘the core asset required for NCW to work’.[22] However, in recent years GPS jammers which can block GPS signals have become more widely available than ever before. If a jammer is used by an enemy it has the potential to ‘eliminate GPS navigation and precision guidance capabilities within an extensive area of operations’.[23] Quite clearly, a loss of GPS capability would have calamitous effects on the US’ war fighting capability, as would be the case with the majority of the world’s armed forces that utilise the GPS system. This would be mostly damaging for those forces relying on network-centric navigational systems, to which GPS is a major component. NCW FailsUnavailability of bandwidth/nodes, and harsh environs hamper NCWPeeler and Dahlstrom 13 «NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES» by Michael P. DAHLSTROM; David L. PEELER, Jr. Lt. Col. David L. PEELER, Jr. is currently a U.S. Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow, working for a year with a private sector firm. Michael P. DAHLSTROM, Lt. Col. (ret.) US Air Force, is the F-35 Lightning II Financial Management Site Lead in the US Air Force F-35 Program Office Source: Strategic Impact (Impact Strategic), issue: 3 / 2013, pages: 94100, on www.ceeol.com. ♥Tina Ultimately, it is important to recognize that possibilities exist for increasing the efficiency of existing systems and processes without the massive investment in large, complex, networked systems. Considering the depth of required technology distribution, security/encryption issues, bandwidth requirements, and Moore’s Law, etc., the more reliant the military becomes on NCW, the more susceptible it becomes to both technical factors in addition to the real threat of an information technology sophisticated enemy. All these factors are exacerbated by the types of environments the United States and her allies typically engage in military operations. Bandwidth, power, access, and nodes are scarce in harsh, isolated environs. The sensitivity of modern hightechnology systems to heat, dust and moisture, as well as the large standing army of personnel to manage and support such systems in the field create a significant support tail. NCW comes with a serious weakness of physical insecurityPeeler and Dahlstrom 13 «NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES» by Michael P. DAHLSTROM; David L. PEELER, Jr. Lt. Col. David L. PEELER, Jr. is currently a U.S. Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow, working for a year with a private sector firm. Michael P. DAHLSTROM, Lt. Col. (ret.) US Air Force, is the F-35 Lightning II Financial Management Site Lead in the US Air Force F-35 Program Office Source: Strategic Impact (Impact Strategic), issue: 3 / 2013, pages: 94100, on www.ceeol.com. ♥Tina Physical security of NCW system nodes are an especially troubling vulnerability. Satellites are an obvious example, and have become increasingly COTS-like and less hardened than the military systems of the recent past or Cold War era. As a result, they are highly vulnerable to kinetic attack, electronic interference, or other means of rendering them ineffective. Natural forces, like sunspots, can also add uncertainly to operations. Additionally, defending network relays is difficult with the vulnerability of ground nodes, many of which are provided by commercial vendors outside of secure locations. Another major security concern is data integrity as meaningful information requires continuously maintaining information trust, structure, and credibility. Finally, pure information volume strains fusion and control mechanisms, and either human or machine issues could exacerbate a problem and lead to mission failure. Time and tech obsolescence hamper NCW deploymentPeeler and Dahlstrom 13 «NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES» by Michael P. DAHLSTROM; David L. PEELER, Jr. Lt. Col. David L. PEELER, Jr. is currently a U.S. Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow, working for a year with a private sector firm. Michael P. DAHLSTROM, Lt. Col. (ret.) US Air Force, is the F-35 Lightning II Financial Management Site Lead in the US Air Force F-35 Program Office Source: Strategic Impact (Impact Strategic), issue: 3 / 2013, pages: 94100, on www.ceeol.com. ♥Tina Resource expenditures will not only be felt in terms of finances. Research and development can take years. That amounts to an uncertain opportunity cost equation as valuable time and attention is spent on NCW and not on other concerns, missions, or allied interoperability. Additionally, the risk of obsolescence during such processes is almost guaranteed as so many NCW-like systems are built on a foundation of Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment and software that advances based on commercial demand versus military need. The complexity inherent in developing systems with highly fused data requirements can take more than five years to reach the field; while computer hardware typically refreshes every 18 months and commercial operating systems on a 12-14 month cycle, driving either obsolescence or increased cost as the government has to pay suppliers for diminishing manufacturing sources or delayed software end-of-life agreements. Interconnectedness makes insider attacks devastatingPeeler and Dahlstrom 13 «NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES» by Michael P. DAHLSTROM; David L. PEELER, Jr. Lt. Col. David L. PEELER, Jr. is currently a U.S. Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow, working for a year with a private sector firm. Michael P. DAHLSTROM, Lt. Col. (ret.) US Air Force, is the F-35 Lightning II Financial Management Site Lead in the US Air Force F-35 Program Office Source: Strategic Impact (Impact Strategic), issue: 3 / 2013, pages: 94100, on www.ceeol.com. ♥Tina Beyond resource consumption, security is almost impossibly difficult. An integrated network-centric configuration is only as secure as the most vulnerable platforms, operating systems, interfaces, and users. As the Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden cases have recently made plain, insider attacks are a significant risk with highly networked systems full of sensitive data. A single individual with elevated access and an axe to grind can completely undermine the entire network, all the information it contains, and the security/capability it projects. Cost and dependence on private vendors makes NCW uselessPeeler and Dahlstrom 13 «NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES» by Michael P. DAHLSTROM; David L. PEELER, Jr. Lt. Col. David L. PEELER, Jr. is currently a U.S. Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellow, working for a year with a private sector firm. Michael P. DAHLSTROM, Lt. Col. (ret.) US Air Force, is the F-35 Lightning II Financial Management Site Lead in the US Air Force F-35 Program Office Source: Strategic Impact (Impact Strategic), issue: 3 / 2013, pages: 94100, on www.ceeol.com. ♥Tina A primary disadvantage of NCW is that it is highly resource intensive. Procuring necessary hardware and software is not only expensive, but is an ongoing cost with no ceiling, as both hardware and software systems reach obsolescence at ever increasing speed. Maintaining said wares, as technology evolves, will be even more costly. The overdependence by DoD on commercial information technology providers with conflicting goals (maximizing shareholder value vs. providing national security) has the potential of compromising national security by constructing a system on a platform over which you have no direct control. While this risk can be mitigated somewhat by organic development on open-source platforms, there is a very limited existing capacity to do this at the present time, not to mention, no known inclination to do so. US military only cares about its budget – NCW is irrelevant and the Aff won’t change inherent structural issuesLind 14 William Lind is director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation William Lind: thoughts about 4GW, why we lose, and how we can win in the future 21 November 2014 http://fabiusmaximus.com/2014/11/21/william-lind-4gw-war-military-strategy-73112/♥Tina The primary reason the American military remains stuck in the Second Generation, and intentionally ignores the Fourth, is money. At senior levels all that matters is the budget. So long as the budget stays high (and preferably grows) war does not matter. Losing wars, repeatedly, does not matter. As Army Lt. Col. Paul Yingling wrote, “{A} private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.” That is a statement of literal fact, as the repeated promotions of senior field commanders who failed to higher positions, including service chief, demonstrates. All that matters is protecting the money flow. That is institutional corruption, not merely monetary corruption but corruption of institutional purpose, on a grand scale. It presages an equally grand collapse, military, financial or both (I await both). It may take the American state with it, ushering in widespread 4GW on American soil. The only way to revive the U.S. military as an institution with both interest in and competence at warfare is a massive purge of the senior leadership, uniformed and civilian, coupled with major budget cuts, larger reductions in the size of the officer corps and elimination of most contractors. The chances of that happening are the same as the chances of any other major reform program coming out of Washington. If you think those changes are more than zero, I own a great bridge up in Brooklyn I’d like to sell you. 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