The [first/next] off-case position is the india da: First, us-india relations are high and driven by mutual distrust towards China



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A2: Not Zero Sum

The aff’s engagement is enough to destroy US-India relations.


deLisle 11 — Jacques deLisle, director of the Asia Program at FPRI and professor of law and political science at the University of Pennsylvania, 2011 (“The Elephant in the Room: Summitry and China’s Challenging Relations with Great Powers in Asia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/01/the-elephant-in-the-room-summitry-and-chinas-challenging-relations-with-great-powers-in-asia/ January, accessed 7/18/16) WP

A new strategic alignment among the U.S., India and China that would parallel the former triangle among the U.S., China and the USSR is likely unachievable and undesirable. It does not follow, however, that the U.S. cannot, or should not, pursue closer cooperation with India and do so partly in furtherance of U.S. policies that respond to China’s rising power and assertiveness. The U.S’s and India’s shared liberal, democratic and rule of law values, broadly compatible foreign policy interests, and extensively overlapping agendas in relations with China provide relatively sturdy and likely enduring foundations on which to build. The George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations have taken sensible and substantial steps here, including reciprocal state visits, a defense framework agreement, a civilian nuclear cooperation accord, and support for India’s integration in international nuclear regulatory regimes and permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council. Consolidating and extending these gains will require sustained effort and attention. Although the focus on fellow democracies in Obama’s Asia trip and his characterization of U.S.-India relations as a “defining partnership” were well-received, much of the significance of such gestures for India was their contribution to assuaging concerns that the U.S. administration regarded relations with other Asian states as secondary to the central, if troubled, U.S.-PRC relationship. Such sensitivities in New Delhi (and other Asian capitals) will remain chronic challenges for Washington so long as ideas of U.S.-China bipolarity (or the more farfetched “G2” duopoly) remain prominently in play and unfortunate incidents (such as U.S. airport security officers’ intrusive pat-down of India’s ambassador) can roil still-delicate relations. U.S. policy also will have to contend with Chinese efforts to discourage a stronger U.S.-India side of the triangle. These tactics likely will include: complaining about U.S. efforts to enlist India as one of many followers in its attempt to impede China’s rise; stressing areas where India and China have commonalities of identity or policy interests not shared by the United States; and generally playing up the less zero-sum aspects of Sino-Indian relations (as Beijing has done with its repeated refrain that China and India are “partners not rivals” in a world where there is “enough space” for both to develop and “enough areas” where the two can cooperate). Fortunately for the U.S., such moves from Beijing face limits that flow from relatively intractable conflicts between Chinese and Indian national interests, the PRC’s worse-than-the-U.S.’s positions (from India’s perspective) on the crucial and overlapping issues of Pakistan, terrorism, territory, and Security Council membership, and China’s seeming inability to resist unleashing its newly assertive and acerbic rhetoric occasionally in India’s direction.

Increased relations with China trade off


Madan 15 — Tanvi Madan, fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, and director of The India Project., 2015 (“The U.S.-India Relationship and China,” Brookings Institution, January 20, Available Online at http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2015/01/20-us-india-relationship-and-china-madan, Accessed 07-15-2016, PAM)

Today, both India and the U.S. have relationships with China that have elements of cooperation, competition and, potentially, conflict—though in different degrees. Each country has a blended approach of engaging China, while preparing for a turn for the worse in Chinese behavior. Each sees a role for the other in its China strategy. Each thinks a good relationship with the other sends a signal to China, but neither wants to provoke Beijing or be forced to choose between the other and China. Each also recognizes that China—especially uncertainty about its behavior—is partly what is driving the India-U.S. partnership. Arguably, there have been three imperatives in the U.S. for a more robust relationship with India and for supporting its rise: strategic interest, especially in the context of the rise of China; economic interest; and shared democratic values. Indian policymakers recognize that American concerns about the nature of China’s rise are responsible for some of the interest in India. New Delhi’s own China strategy involves strengthening India both security-wise and economically (internal balancing) and building a range of partnerships (external balancing)—and it envisions a key role for the U.S. in both. Some Indian policymakers highlight another benefit of the U.S. relationship: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does. But India and the U.S. also have concerns about the other when it comes to China. Both sides remain uncertain about the other’s willingness and capacity to play a role in the Asia-Pacific. Additionally, Indian policymakers worry both about a China-U.S. condominium (or G-2) and a China-U.S. crisis or conflict. There is concern about the reliability of the U.S., with the sense that the U.S. will end up choosing China because of the more interdependent Sino-American economic relationship and/or leave India in the lurch. Some in the U.S. also have reliability concerns about India. They question whether the quest for “strategic autonomy” will allow India to develop a truly strategic partnership with the U.S. There are also worries about the gap between Indian potential and performance. Part of the rationale for supporting India’s rise is to help demonstrate that democracy and development aren’t mutually exclusive. Without delivery, however, this rationale—and India’s importance—fades away. As things stand, neither India nor the U.S. is interested in the other’s relationship with China being too hot or too cold—the Goldilocks view. For New Delhi, a too-cosy Sino-U.S. relationship is seen as freezing India out and impinging on its interests. It would also eliminate one of Washington’s rationales for a stronger relationship with India. A China-U.S. crisis or conflict, on the other hand, is seen as potentially destabilizing the region and forcing India to choose between the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, any deterioration in Sino-Indian relations might create instability in the region and perhaps force it to choose sides. Too much Sino-Indian bonhomie, on the other hand, would potentially create complications for the U.S. in the bilateral, regional and multilateral spheres.

Increased relations with China embolden converging interest between the US and India


Economist 16---Online/Print global news report, 2016, (“Warming relations between India and America A suitable boy?”, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21697031-pentagon-wooing-india-bride-still-coy-suitable-boy, Schloss)

Yet with regional stars realigning, Indian pride has grown less prickly and American prejudice less smug. “Pivoting” to Asia during Barack Obama’s presidency, America has sought new friendships just as India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, finds it lacks the punch to back his bigger ambitions for India on the wider stage. There will be no flashy wedding between the two in the near future. But what is emerging is a quiet, cautious meeting of mutual interests. American officials call it a strategic handshake, Indian ones a strategic partnership. Neither would utter the word “alliance”, but if the relationship continues to thicken, that is what conceivably might take shape somewhere down the road. The latest development is small but significant. During a visit to India between April 10th and 12th, his second in less than a year, the American defence secretary, Ashton Carter, joined his Indian counterpart, Manohar Parrikar, in promising quickly to sign a logistics agreement to enable smoother mutual support between the two armed forces. Two other pacts, covering communications and protocols for digital mapping, are also close to conclusion. Together they will make it easier for the two countries’ forces to co-operate, and allow India access to a bigger range of American equipment. Indian logic rules America has similar arrangements with dozens of countries. But in India’s case it has taken a decade of haggling to get this far. Before concluding the logistics deal, India insisted on a change of names to distinguish its own version. It is to be a Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement rather than the usual Logistics Support Agreement. “We changed the initials so we don’t seem to follow the same logic as US allies,” says C. Uday Bhaskar, a military analyst and former Indian naval officer. He added that there remain “strong views in our services” about too close an embrace with America. Those views have a long history. After independence, India prided itself on being “non-aligned”, while turning to the Soviet Union for military supplies. It has been wary of other countries’ causes, a wariness reinforced by watching America bungle in Vietnam and later in Iraq and Afghanistan. Trounced by China in a brief but bloody border war in 1962, India is also cautious about provoking its big neighbour, or being seen as part of an American-led gang-up. Most of all India resents the continued military support America gives to Pakistan, even in the face of evidence that Pakistan has sponsored anti-Indian terror attacks and worked to undermine American-led efforts to bring peace to Afghanistan. Yet disdain for America is weakening. The latest agreements come on top of a growing pile of protocols that go beyond defence co-operation to include a “joint strategic vision” for Asia signed in January 2015. American armed forces now hold more joint exercises with India than with any other country. And two years ago India overtook Pakistan as a buyer of American weaponry. It helps that America has the kinds of goods that India’s armed forces want as they seek to project power more widely in the Indian Ocean, including long-range patrol aircraft and drones, maritime helicopters, aircraft-carrier technology and anti-submarine gear. America has also moved nimbly to accommodate India’s plans (see article) for strengthening its own defence industry. Aside from half-a-dozen existing partnerships involving such things as jet-engine design and avionics, the two sides have suggested jointly producing fighter aircraft, probably an Indian version of the F-18. The trigger for all this is the growing boldness of China. With a GDP that is now five times India’s, the regional heavyweight has courted India’s smaller neighbours with aid. Chinese warships now regularly push into the Indian Ocean, and the Chinese government has sought to build a network of bases or, at the least, friendly ports extending from Myanmar to Pakistan to Djibouti. India has mostly stayed aloof from troubles outside its immediate waters. When American officials jumped the gun in February by claiming that India would join patrols in the South China Sea, where China is pressing maritime claims over the objections of everyone else, India issued a vigorous denial. But Chinese pressure closer to home raises alarms. It is over China that Indian and American interests converge most. Mr Bhaskar says that Americans want India to become more capable and “carry a bigger load”. They may seek more than that. Speaking last month in Delhi, the Indian capital, Admiral Harry Harris, who heads America’s Pacific Command (responsible, he said, for American military operations “from Hollywood to Bollywood”), described expanded military co-operation with India as “arguably the defining partnership for America in the 21st century”.

US-Sino-Indian relations are zero sum—plan is bilateral with US as chief reference


Chaulia 11 — Sreeram Chaulia, Professor and Executive Director of the Centre for Global Governance and Policy (CGGP) at the Jindal School of International Affairs of O.P. Jindal Global University. He holds a Doctorate (Ph.D.) and a Master of Arts (M.A.) in Political Science and International Relations from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, 5-17-2011 ("Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan," No Publication, 5-17-2011, Available Online at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME17Df04.html, Accessed 7-25-2016, Schloss)

Yet, the elephant in the room of this most consequential of all diplomatic forums was literally the elephant. There was no seat for India at the table, even though all prognoses indicate that India will join China and the US in a triumvirate of the world's largest economies in the coming decades. The purely bilateral framing of the whole event in Washington belied awareness that changes to contemporary strategic relations among China, India and their traditional third-party interlocutor - the United States - militate towards engagement in trilateral dialogue. The parallel rises of China and India and the global implications of their problematic relations require three-way dialogue Uqchannels, instead of plain bilateralism, involving the two Asian principals and their chief global reference point, the US. During the presidency of George W Bush, India relied on antagonism between the US and China for competitive strategic advantage. In its relations with Washington, Delhi often acted on expectations that the former favored alliance with a democracy and remained wary of an authoritarian and faster-growing Beijing. But this reading is now obsolete, as the Barack Obama administration has softened its predecessor's approach to China, showing a willingness to overlook human-rights violations and crafting a bilateral re-engagement with China. The US helplessly rests on Chinese shoulders to keep East Asia's black sheep, North Korea, in check. The financial meltdown since 2008 introduced delicate edges into China-US interdependence, premised on extensive Chinese holdings of US Treasury bonds. American author and economist Zachary Karabell sees "superfusion" between the Chinese and American economies and contends that this symbiotic union holds the key to anchor the shaky global economy. Since the Sino-Indian relationship had long been mediated/buffered/wedged by favoritism on one side or the other on the part of the US, and this trend has now changed, vulnerabilities emerge with which India must reckon. Dependence on US counter-balancing tactics against China is no longer a viable option for New Delhi. The zero sum assumptions of the Sino-US-Indian triangle are giving way to complex three-way dynamics in which it is in the best interests of the three countries to engage in comprehensive strategic dialogue about major world issues. India must prevent the dreaded "Group of 2" formation (joint governance of the world by China and US) from materializing and hindering its own position as a global player that is worth consulting on all major international policies.

India allies with the US to counterbalance China.


Kapur and Ganguly 7 — S. Paul Kapur, Associate Professor in the Department of Strategic Research at the US Naval War College, visiting professor at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and Sumit Ganguly, Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Director of the India Studies Program, and Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, 2007 (“The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future,” Asian Survey, Vol. XLVII, No. 4, July/August, pp.642-656, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ProQuest)

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War had profound consequences for India’s foreign and security policies. As noted above, despite its “non-aligned” status India had maintained a close relationship with the Soviets. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced India’s policy makers to recalculate their strategic options. No longer could they rely on their superpower ally’s military and diplomatic protection. Nor, the Russians made clear, would the Indians be able to continue purchasing arms under exceptionally favorable Cold War terms. As a result, Indian officials began exploring other possibilities. Slowly, they undertook measures to improve their relations with China. More importantly, the Indians largely abandoned their reflexive opposition to American strategic, economic, and diplomatic policies, evincing a new openness to the pursuit of mutually beneficial endeavors. While determined to avoid becoming a pawn in U.S. efforts to contain China, the Indians realized that a closer relationship with the U.S. could help them fill the vacuum left by the Soviet Union’s fall and also balance against rising Chinese power. The U.S., for its part, was no longer forced to view India in light of the latter’s friendship with the Soviets and could re-evaluate Indo-U.S. relations on their own merits. 18 Thus, the massive structural shift that resulted from the end of the Cold War foreclosed India’s old Soviet-centric strategic policies and drove it to consider an approach more amenable to cooperation with the U.S. The shift also enabled the U.S. to be more receptive to this new orientation.

China and India are deeply suspicious of each other — this impacts US-India relations.


Curtis 8 — Lisa Curtis, Lisa Curtis focuses on U.S. national security interests and regional geopolitics as senior research fellow on South Asia in The Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center.,” The Heritage Foundation, November 25, Available Online at file:///C:/Users/bensons/Downloads/bg2209%20(1).pdf , Accessed 07-15-16, PAM)

As the relationship between the world’s oldest and the world’s largest democracies develops, Washington will need to pay close attention to the dynamics of the India–China relationship. The future direction of relations between China and India, two booming economies that together account for one-third of the world’s population, will be a major factor in determining broader political and economic trends in Asia directly affecting U.S. interests. While on the surface Indian–Chinese relations appear to be improving (trade has increased eightfold in the last six years to almost $40 billion), both sides harbor deep suspicions of the other’s strategic intentions. Signs of their deep-seated disagreements have begun to surface over the last two years and it is likely that such friction will continue, given their unsettled borders, China’s interest in consolidating its hold on Tibet, and India’s expanding influence in Asia. China has moved slowly on border talks and conducted several incursions into the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh since January 2008.1 Some Indian analysts believe that China is pursuing a two-pronged strategy of lulling India into com- No. 2209 page 2 November 25, 2008 placency with greater economic interaction while taking steps to encircle India and undermine its security. China is strengthening ties to its traditional ally Pakistan and slowly gaining influence with other South Asian states. Beijing is developing strategic port facilities in Sittwe, Burma; Chittagong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; and Gwadar, Pakistan, in order to protect sea lanes and ensure uninterrupted energy supplies. China also uses military and other kinds of assistance to court these nations, especially when India and other Western states attempt to use their assistance programs to encourage respect for human rights and democracy.

India sees relations as Zero-sum – US engagement with China would be seen as a threat


Malik 4 — Mohan Malik, Professor of Security Studies at the APCSS, 2004 (“India-China Relations: Giants Stir, Cooperate and Compete,” APCSS, http://apcss.org/Publications/SAS/AsiaBilateralRelations/India-ChinaRelationsMalik.pdf October, accessed 7/19/16) WP

India and China have long been suspicious about the other’s relationship with the United States and see it in zero-sum terms. For the first time in decades, both are simultaneously working to establish a multidimensional engagement with Washington. However, Beijing is concerned about a shift in the regional balance of power in view of Indo-U.S. strategic engagement and is proactively wooing India to prevent Washington and New Delhi from coming too close for China’s comfort. While championing multipolarity and opposing the growing U.S. unilateralist policies, both India and China remain suspicious of each other’s long-term agenda and intentions and attempt to fill any perceived power vacuum or block the other from doing so. Interestingly, both are also courting the United States, each one seeking to move closer to Washington, albeit temporarily. How India and China resolve their differences on Pakistan, border dispute, and the UN Security Council expansion will have significant implications for Asia and America’s place in it. Other issues that will determine the nature of the India-China-U.S. triangular dynamics include India’s economic prospects, proliferation and terrorism, and geopolitical contest between the United States and China, and China and India. First, economic stagnation or slower economic growth under the Left Front-backed Congress government would heighten India’s anxieties about China’s relative power and perhaps prompt New Delhi to either appease or bandwagon with Beijing. In contrast, slower economic growth under the nationalist BJP-led government that worsens India’s insecurities vis-à-vis China would see India balancing China by tilting toward the United States and/or reaching out to other “China-wary countries” such as Russia, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam. On the other hand, a sustained economic growth rate of 8-10 percent would impart greater confidence to pursue an independent (nonaligned) foreign policy without any fear of China’s ability to undermine India’s vital interests. In short, an economically strong India is less likely to give in to Beijing’s inducements and pressures to weaken its ties with Washington than a weak India. Second, nuclear and missile proliferation by China and its proxies—Pakistan, North Korea, and Burma—in India’s neighborhood might tempt New Delhi to retaliate in ways that would undermine global nonproliferation and invariably influence the U.S.-ChinaIndia relations. Third, the Global War on Terrorism impinges a great deal more on IndiaU.S. relations than on China-U.S. relations. Both India and China are critical of the Bush Administration for diverting its energies and resources from the Global War on Terrorism to the War on Iraq. However, New Delhi does not want Washington to fail, for then the jihadis will assume that the rest of the world is theirs for the taking, and India would bear the full brunt of jihadi terrorism. Thus, unlike the Chinese, who might rejoice over the U.S. strategic discomfort in Iraq and Southwest Asia as it gives them greater strategic latitude and rules out new U.S. entanglements in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula, India will have more to lose from the U.S. defeat in that region. Fourth, in the short- to medium-term, China and Pakistan taken together will remain more valuable as strategic partners for the United States than India because of their assistance in dealing with terrorism and nuclear proliferation concerns. Over the long term, however, this perception could change if U.S.-China relations deteriorate as China’s power and ambitions grow and U.S. expectations from China are not met. Strained U.S.- China relations would make India the pivotal power in the U.S.-China-India triangle. Conversely, tense India-China relations would put the United States in a pivotal position. Last, New Delhi’s efforts to establish closer ties with Southeast and East Asian countries and emerge as an independent power suggest future tension and friction between India and a China that aspires for regional and global dominance. Security concerns regarding a rising China have prompted many Southeast Asian countries to cultivate India as an alternative power to prevent the region from becoming an exclusive Chinese sphere of influence, an objective shared by the United States and Japan. In one sense, India’s “Look East” policy sends a “signal to China that India can become part of an anti-Chinese coalition should China take stances that threaten the security of its neighbors.”

A2: Link Non-Unique

US engagement with China causes Indian retaliation — previous relations with China were smaller and fixable but large forms of engagement would destroy relations.


Joshi et al 13 — Sunjoy Joshi, C. Raja Mohan, Vikram Sood, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Ph.D., James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Walter Lohman, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors, Ph.D., writers at Heritage Foundation, 2016 (“Beyond the Plateau in U.S. – India Relations,” Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/beyond-the-plateau-in-us-india-relations, accessed 7/15/16) WP

Third, there have been genuine policy missteps in both New Delhi and Washington with unintended negative consequences for the bilateral relationship. The first year of the Obama Administration saw the United States try to construct stronger relations with Pakistan and China without reference to India's sensitivities and interests. The assumption in Washington that the road to peace in Afghanistan demanded Indian political concessions to Pakistan raised genuine concerns in New Delhi that President Obama was abandoning President Bush's neutrality on the question of Kashmir. Similarly, President Obama's attempt to accommodate China's rise through “strategic reassurance” and collaboration on regional and global issues generated deep apprehensions in New Delhi about the potential consequences of a Sino–U.S. duopoly in Asia. To be sure, President Obama corrected the direction and reaffirmed the importance of India in the American worldview. But there was no denying the damage in New Delhi and the perceived need to hedge against significant reversals in the U.S. policy toward India. In New Delhi, the Congress Party, which returned triumphant in the 2009 elections, believed that economic populism was the key to its political success. This, in turn, resulted in a de-emphasis of economic reforms, and public discussion of some of the old foreign policy approaches, such as non-alignment. There is some recognition in New Delhi of the costs of these strategic errors, and the Indian government is working on reviving economic reforms and rejuvenating its foreign policy. Yet, there is no denying that the past three years generated many anxieties among India's friends in the United States and beyond about New Delhi's political commitment to the partnership. India's parliamentary management of the nuclear-liability legislation also created difficulties for the U.S. nuclear industry, which was hoping to make big investments after the historic civil initiative.

Empirics

A2: Trade Solves

Economic cooperation alone can’t sustain the US-India relationship


Nayyar 15 — Dhiraj Nayyar, a journalist in New Delhi, formerly worked at the Financial Express, India Today and Firstpost.com, editor of "Surviving the Storm: India and the Global Financial Crisis," Doctoral Research, Economics, Trinity College, Cambridge, 2015. (“Good Friends, Not Enough Benefits,” Bloomberg View, January 20th, Available Online at https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-01-20/obama-india-trip-won-t-transform-economic-relationship, Accessed 07-20-2016, aqp)

Next week, Barack Obama will become the first U.S. president to visit India twice while in office, as well as the first to attend India’s missiles-and-dancing-girls festivities for Republic Day. That it's taken more than two decades since the end of the Cold War for India and the U.S. to achieve this level of political intimacy shows how hard it is for even natural partners -- the world's two largest democracies -- to build meaningful trust.



Despite new enthusiasm on both sides, it's going to take even longer to add real depth to their economic partnership. Bilateral trade in goods and services between the two nations amounted only to $93 billion in 2012, according to the U.S. Trade Representative's office. By contrast, trade between China and the U.S. that year came in more than six times larger at $579 billion. Perhaps more significant, at least from the perspective of capital-scarce India, are foreign investment levels. In 2012, U.S. foreign direct investment into India totaled $28 billion, compared to the $50 billion that flowed into China.

Of course, China's economy is much larger than India’s and has grown at much faster rates for the last three decades. Anything India does to boost its own GDP growth will lead to increased U.S. trade and investment. But there's also a fundamental disconnect between U.S. and Indian priorities that no presidential photo op is likely to solve.



U.S. investors are primarily interested in India's $1.3 trillion services sector -- including retail and insurance, to name just two examples. In these areas, India's policy regime remains protectionist and is highly unlikely to change. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s otherwise reformist government has ruled out opening up the retail sector to FDI, while in insurance, it's resisted raising the cap for foreign ownership above 49 percent, thus stripping investors of any meaningful control. There's little that Obama can offer to change Modi's mind: Political pressure from small retailers -- a backbone of support for the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party -- is intense. And after the global financial crisis, India's longstanding hesitation about liberalizing its financial sector has only grown stronger.

A2: India Likes China

India and China tensions are rising – territorial disputes and Chinese aggression make India suspicious and increasing lyimpatient.


Saurabh 15 — Punit Saurabh, senior faculty member at International Centre for Entrepreneurship & Career Development and researcher in the domain of technology innovation management and International relations and has handled government innovation programs in India in the past, 2015 (“Opinion: India and U.S. Grow Closer Against a Backdrop of An Expansionist China,” USNI news, https://news.usni.org/2015/06/15/opinion-india-and-u-s-grow-closer-against-a-backdrop-of-an-expansionist-china, accessed 7/15/16) WP

With its growing economic clout—against the backdrop of a fumbling Russia—China has found new reasons and grounds to claim its right wherever it finds an easy target. Chinese claims over the territorial waters of Vietnamese, Philippines, Malaysian, Singapore, Thailandand Indonesia have heightened tensions with the South Asian nations. Japan and Australia have also realized the need to stand up to thwart the Chinese designs. But why is India upping the ante against China—with which it shares its longest borders? The reason for India to suddenly become more aggressive emerges from the history of an ugly spat. With a vexed border issue spiraling out of control and increasing claims over Arunachal Pradesh as its landmass, China lately has been making things difficult for India to remain at peace. China has purposely transgressed and makes a claim over vast areas of Indian territory that it considers its own, having captured it during a brief war in 1961. It considers McMohan line (boundary existing between India and China) as illegal. Until the arrival of the Modi government, China had been making routine transgressions into India-controlled areas to put pressure on the Indian government to back off its claims. China’s overt and covert support to the Pakistani defense buildup, aimed at Indiam through supply of submarines, JF-17 fighters and strategic inroads in Pakistan-held Kasmir (classified by India as its territory) creates more suspicion of its designs against India than anything. Lately the port transfer of Gwadar in Pakistan to China and the rising interest of China in Sri Lanka and Chittagong port, Bangladesh has unnerved India to a certain extent. The rapid inroads in the India Ocean by Chinese naval crafts and nuclear subs as part of its “String of Pearls” strategy to encircle India, has not gone unnoticed by Indian counter-strategists too, nor the covert support provided to North East Militants to destabilize India. More so, the deep inroads made by China in making friends in the Indian neighborhood has ruffled quite a few feathers and India is waiting to pluck some of the pearls out of its “String of Pearls.”

India aggression against China is at an all-time high – they are quickly militarizing.


Saurabh 15 Punit Saurabh, senior faculty member at International Centre for Entrepreneurship & Career Development and researcher in the domain of technology innovation management and International relations and has handled government innovation programs in India in the past, 2015 (“Opinion: India and U.S. Grow Closer Against a Backdrop of An Expansionist China,” USNI news, https://news.usni.org/2015/06/15/opinion-india-and-u-s-grow-closer-against-a-backdrop-of-an-expansionist-china, accessed 7/15/16) WP

Since the emergence of Modi government, India as part of a strategic shift, has moved toward an assertive Act East Policy from a relatively subtle Look East Policy, to boost its engagement with its South Asian neighbors. India has started a rather frequent dispatch of warships to the South China Sea to assert its dominance. These indigenously designed ships—INS Ranvir (a guided-missile destroyer) and INS Shakti (a Finacentri designed fleet tanker—along with INS Satpura (guided-missile stealth frigate) and INS Kamorta anti-submarine corvette) are on a two-month deployments that take them to Freemantle, Australia; Kuantan, Malaysia; Sattahip, Thailand; and Sihanoukville, Cambodia. A series of naval exercises with Australia, Japan, Singapore, the United States, and other south East Asian nations gives an unmistaken signal to China that in an event of a military standoff, India will not remain friendless. At home, India has steadily given a go-ahead to $40 billion investment in defense invigoration including construction of 6 nuclear subs, a mountain division of 60,000 trained soldiers , bases in India and outside, all of it aimed to checkmate the Chinese tactics. Its two aircraft carriers are already patrolling the Indian Ocean region, a major deterrence against any Chinese intrusion; a third was recently launched on in June giving it an edge over China. With Southeast Asian nations such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Japan repeatedly objecting to Chinese transgressions, sentiment is rapidly drifting against China and in India‘s favor. Recent incursions in Malaysian waters have not helped China either, with Malaysia raising its voice for the first time. The incident was reported by the Borneo Times in June of a Chinese navy ship intruding into the Malaysian waters and laying anchor 84 nautical miles from the coast of Sarawak (much inside its exclusive economic zone), Malaysia immediately lodged a strong protests and vowed of diplomatic action if the intrusions did not stop.

Tensions are high between India and China — border disputes, Tibet, Pakistan and Dalai Lama prove


Beech 15 — Hannah Beech, Southeast Asia bureau chief for TIME, 2015 ”Why China and India Just Can’t Get Along,” May 13, Available Online at http://time.com/3856833/china-india-relations-narendra-modi-xi-jinping/ Accessed 07-22-2016, PAM)

Yet for all the feting of Xuanzang, India and China’s relations remain tenuous. The world’s two most populous nations comprise more than one-third of humanity. Yet bilateral trade hovers around $70 billion, less than half the dollar figure of commercial ties between China and Australia. Memories of border battles — the most recent in 1962 — fester, and the 4,000-km frontier, which cuts through disputed territory, remains tense. “The bilateral relationship cannot be very good unless the border dispute is solved,” says Zhao Gancheng, a South Asia expert from the Shanghai Institute for International Studies. Imagine: there is not a single direct flight between two of Asia’s financial capitals, Shanghai and Mumbai. Between Beijing and New Delhi, nonstop flights only run three times a week. In 2013, 175,000 Chinese went on holiday in India, according to the Indian Ministry of Tourism. Thailand, meanwhile, attracted 4.6 million Chinese visitors last year. Ahead of his China trip, Modi joined Weibo, the Chinese social-media service that has flourished partly because Twitter is blocked by Chinese censors. Modi may be a Twitter rock star, with 12.2 million followers, but he has attracted fewer than 50,000 fans on Weibo. By comparison, Apple CEO Tim Cook garnered 300,000 Weibo acolytes within 3½ hours of joining the Chinese microblogging network this week. Modi’s Weibo feed was seized upon by Chinese nationalists who demanded that India return “South Tibet,” as they refer to the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. “South Tibet belongs to China,” went one comment. “Give it back to us. Otherwise we will take it back by force sooner or later.” Such incendiary rhetoric notwithstanding, Modi spoke on the eve of his China trip of resetting the Sino-Indian relationship, focusing on economic pragmatism over troublesome politics. “I look forward to working out a road map for qualitatively upgrading our economic relations and seek greater Chinese participation in India’s economic growth,” he told Chinese media in New Delhi, “especially in transforming India’s manufacturing sector and infrastructure.” Still, the stumbling blocks are hard to budge. China’s historic friendship with Pakistan hasn’t helped, nor has India’s decades-long hosting of the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader whose political counterpart Modi invited to his inauguration last year. Asked to comment on Sino-Indian ties, several India experts from leading Chinese universities refused to talk to TIME, citing the sensitivity of the bilateral relationship.

Diplomatic engagement contradicts the Indian counterweight towards China’s rise


Chatterjee 11--- Ananya, pursuing a MPhil degree, International Relations at the University of Reading, has previous teaching and research experiences in India. She also acts as an assistant to the Teaching and Learning Dean, UoR., 2011, (“India-China-United States: The Post-Cold War Evolution of a Strategic Triangle”, Political Perspectives, http://www.politicalperspectives.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Evolution-India-China1.pdf, Schloss)

Diplomatic meetings between the leaders of India, China and the United States in recent years have drawn worldwide attention. Although critics said that the visits were more symbolic in nature, few would question their far-reaching impact on reshaping the bilateral relationships between America and the two rising global powerhouses: China and India. Therefore, it can be concluded that the United States remains a major factor in the evolving India-China-U.S. triangle and both India and China seeks to maximise the benefits from this bilateral relationship with the United States in the context of the present international political system. On the other hand, Washington's engagement of the world's two most populous nations, each experiencing strong economic growth and a raised profile on the international stage, is strategically significant. As the U.S. Government's National Intelligence Council pointed out earlier in 2005 in its report ‘Mapping the Global Future’, “the likely emergence of China and India as new major global players will transform the geopolitical landscape in the early 21st century” (US National Intelligence Council [online]). The Report predicting a rising Asia by 2020 points out that “China will continue to strengthen its military through developing and acquiring modern weapons, including advanced fighter aircraft, sophisticated submarines, and increasing numbers of ballistic missiles. China will overtake Russia and others as the second largest defence spender after the United States over the next two decades and will be, by any measure, a first-rate military power”. With regards to India, the Report outlines that “as India’s economy grows governments in Southeast Asia—Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and other countries—may move closer to India to help build a potential geopolitical counterweight to China. At the same time, India will seek to strengthen its ties with countries in the region without excluding China.”


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