The Origins of the Cold War 1941-49
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2 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. 1988. Page 10. 3 John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War.” Diplomatic History. (Summer 1983). Page 172-173. John Lewis Gaddis is presently a Professor of History at Yale University and is one of the most prolific writers on the Cold War. His view is generally that much of Cold War orthodoxy is correct but that not enough attention has been paid to the construction of an American Empire after the Second World War. 4 Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War.” Pages 180-181. 5 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford University Press, 1992. Page 99. Melvyn Leffler is presently a Professor of History at the University of Virginia. His focus has primarily been the Truman administration and its policy development. 6 Vladislav Zubok & Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev. 1996. Page 4. Zubok and Pleshakov are two Russian scholars who have attempted to use the newly opened Soviet Archives to explain the Soviet side of the Cold War. 7 Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-97. Oxford University Press, 1998. Page 158. 8 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947. Columbia University Press, 1972. Pages 360-361. This was Gaddis’ dissertation on the origins of the Cold War. He focused a great deal on the internal US issues, he did not have access to all the evidence we do now. 9 Walter LaFebber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1996. 8th ed. McGraw-Hill, 1997. Page 8. First published in 1967, LaFeber’s book is an example of how a revisionist can move to post-revisionism. 10 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford University Press. 1997. Page 115. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of the Soviet Archives many of the long-standing questions regarding the Cold War were answerable. We Now Know is Gaddis’ attempt to use these new findings to answer these questions. 11 Sadao Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration." Pacific Historical Review. 67:4, November 1998. Page 480-481. 12 Raymond Birt, "Personality and Foreign Policy: The Case of Stalin." Political Psychology. 1993. Page 616. 14 Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation. Princeton University Press. 1985. Page 32. Larson’s argument is that we can come to a deeper understanding of the origins of the Cold War by understanding the psychological motivations of the combatants. 15 Kissinger, Diplomacy. Page 395. 16 Kissinger, Diplomacy. Page 395. 17 Kissinger, Diplomacy. Page 395. 18 Vladislav Zubok & Constantine Pleshakov, Page 14. 19 Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Post-War Relations with the United States and Great Britain." Cold War International History Project: Working Paper#13. July 1995. Page 21. The Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C. was established in 1991 to disseminate new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry. 20 Pollard, Robert A., "Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War: Bretton Woods, the Marshall Plan, and American Rearmament, 1944-50." Diplomatic History. Summer 1985. Page 273. Pollard focuses on the development of the idea economic cooperation and interdependence as a corner stone of the policies of Harry S. Truman. Pollard’s study is an example of how most revisionist historians try to go beyond the general label of both the orthodox and revisionist historians. 21 Melvyn P. Leffler, “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War.” International Security. 11:1, Summer 1986. Page 92. 22 Zubok & Pleshakov, Page 27. 23 Pechatnov, Page 17. 24 Leffler, “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War.” Page 119. 25 Diane S. Clemens, “Averell Harriman, John Deane, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the ‘Reversal of Co-operation’ with the Soviet Union in April 1945.” The International History Review. May 1992. Page 306. A post-revisionist history of the change in policy that occurred shortly after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945. The culmination of this policy shift toward confrontation with the Soviet Union was meeting between Truman and Molotov April 23, 1945. 26 Leffler, "Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War." Page 120. 27 Martin J. Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic-Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941-45." American Historical Review. October 1973. Page 945. A revisionist history of the Atomic Bomb and its effect on United States diplomacy during the war. 28 Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered." Foreign Affairs. January/February 1995. (Page 139). Post-revisionist efforts at explaining the Atomic bomb both in the context of World War II and the Cold War. 29 Sherwin, Page 967-968. 30 Zubok & Pleshakov, Page 44-46. 31 Sherwin, Page 967. 33 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. Oxford University Press, 1982. Page 20. 34 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. Page 30. 35 Pollard, Page 279. 36 LaFeber, Page 57-58. 37 Kissinger, Diplomacy. Page 463-464. 38 Kissinger, Diplomacy. 445. 39 Scott D. Parish, "New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan, 1947." Cold War International History Project: Working Paper #9. March 1994. Page 8. 40 Pollard, Page 280. 41 Pollard, Page 281 Download 4.26 Mb. Share with your friends:
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