The Origins of the Cold War 1941-49
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- The Origins of Conflict
- The Clash of Systems / Post-War Visions
- The death of Roosevelt April 12, 1945 The Change in Leadership
- Adherence to Agreements
- The Atomic Bomb
- Britain and the fear of Isolation The Ideological Confrontation
- Only one of these power centers was at that time, in hostile hands; the primary interest of the United States in world affairs, therefore, was to see to it that no others fell under such control.
The Origins of Conflict Roosevelt's approach to the Grand Alliance The Clash of Systems / Post-War Visions The Death of Roosevelt April 12, 1945 & The Change in Leadership Adherence to Agreements The Atomic Bomb Stalin’s Paranoia The War and its effect (especially Russia) Britain and the fear of Isolation The Ideological Confrontation The Origins of Conflict (A Geopolitical or Ideological Struggle?) Roosevelt's approach to the Grand Alliance - The unwillingness to negotiate any part of a post-war settlement The War Effort Self-Determination The fear of a separate peace The Clash of Systems / Post-War Visions The Soviet Vision The key issue then became the nature of such post-war cooperation on which again there are no serious disagreements among Litvinov, Maisky and Gromyko: they all see it largely in terms of a great power concert based upon some kind of a division of the world into spheres of influence. This "three policemen" formula of cooperation was thought able to provide for the three major strategic imperatives of the USSR: keeping Germany and Japan down, keeping the Soviet Union in the big council of the world, and legitimizing the USSR's post-war borders and sphere of influence.23 The US Vision The British Vision The death of Roosevelt April 12, 1945 & The Change in Leadership The Transition to Truman The Rise of James F. Byrnes Byrnes, Bevins, & Vishinky 
Roosevelt’s death catapulted Byrnes to the forefront of American diplomacy. Since Truman depended on him for a correct interpretation of Yalta, Byrnes’ mistaken understanding of the provisions regarding Poland and the Declaration of Liberated Europe initially contributed to the President’s erroneous impression that the Soviets were violating the meaning of Yalta.24 The Result - The Significance of the April 23rd Meeting between Truman and Molotov - From Cooperation to Carrot and Stick Harriman had won. His view had become established US policy, to be demonstrated on Poland: two interpretations of the word ‘democratic’ were no longer accepted in the interests of Allied cooperation, and the demand for ‘consultation’ among the three Polish groups, of which the Lubin government was only one, with the insistence on a representative government as the outcome, established a new litmus test to determine whether the United States would ‘collaborate’ and perhaps even ‘co-operate’ with the Soviet Union in the future. Leahy was right in his comment at the White House advisers’ meeting on 23 April. There had been ‘two interpretations’ of the Yalta agreement. The Soviets had not intended to set up á free government’, nor had the United States expected them to. Roosevelt at Yalta had left Eastern Europe and Poland within the Soviet sphere of influence. But that was February. By 23 April, Allied co-operation in the war was coming to an end; cold war was beginning.25 Adherence to Agreements In fact, after the capitulation of Germany, American officials assessed the risks and benefits of compliance and concluded that they had little to gain from adherence to many wartime agreements. … This orientation meant that, from the onset of the postwar era, American officials were interpreting the wartime accords in ways that placed a higher priority on containing Soviet power and projecting American influence than on perpetuating the wartime alliance. The Soviets, too, had to weigh the benefits of compliance. … Given these parameters, Soviet officials chose to define compliance in ways that maximized their authority in Eastern Europe, circumscribed Western power in eastern Germany, and enhance the Kremlin's flexibility in China. These decisions meant that Soviet Officials preferred to place higher priority on unilateral safeguards of their security than on preserving a cooperative approach to postwar reconstruction. As both Moscow and Washington were prone to see the costs of compliance greatly outweighing the benefits, they began to take tentative steps to jettison or reinterpret key provisions of wartime accords. Each such step magnified the suspicions of the potential adversary and encouraged reciprocal actions. Before long, wartime cooperation was forgotten, the Cold War was under way, and a new arms race was imminent. Neither side was innocent of responsibility; each side felt vulnerable, maneuvered to take advantage of opportunities, and manipulated or violated the compromises, loopholes, and ambiguities of wartime agreements.26 The Atomic Bomb The bomb as a merely probable weapon had seemed a weak reed on which to rely, but the bomb as a colossal reality was very different (Henry L. Stimson, Sec. Of War, Roosevelt Admin.)27 Had Roosevelt lived, such lurking political pressure might have powerfully confirmed his intention to use the weapon on the enemy-an assumption he had already made. How else could he have justified spending roughly $2 billion, diverting scarce materials from other was enterprises that might have been more useful, and bypassing Congress?28 ii) The Effect on Relations – The Opposite Effect A The Hiroshima Bomb 
s Stimson had expected, as a colossal reality the bomb was very different. But had American diplomacy been altered by it? Those who conducted diplomacy became more confident, more certain that through the accomplishments of American science, technology, and industry the "new world" could be made into one better than the old. But just how the atomic bomb would be used to help accomplish this ideal remained unclear. Three months and one day after Hiroshima was bombed Bush wrote that the whole matter of international relations on atomic energy "is in a thoroughly chaotic condition." The wartime relationship between atomic-energy policy and diplomacy had been based upon the simple assumption that the Soviet government would surrender important geographical, political, and ideological objectives in exchange for the neutralization of the new weapon. As a result of policies based on this assumption American diplomacy and prestige suffered grievously: an opportunity to gauge the Soviet Union's response during the war to the international control of Atomic energy was missed, and an atomic energy policy for dealing with the Soviet government after the war was ignored. Instead of promoting American postwar aims, wartime atomic-energy policies made them more difficult to achieve. … Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the culmination of the process, became symbols of a new American barbarism, reinforcing charges, with dramatic evidence, that the policies of the United States contributed to the origins of the cold war.29 Later, when Stalin learned through his excellent network of agents that Truman and Attlee opposed any sharing of atomic secrets with the Soviet Union, he must have felt vindicated in his worst fears. … "Anglo-Saxon alliance of atomic power" … The Bomb destroyed Stalin's expectations of being second to none among the great powers and of promoting Soviet state interests through partnership with Western powers.30 This is the greatest thing in history. (Harry S. Truman in response to the news of Hiroshima)31 f) Stalin’s Paranoia g) The War and its effect (especially Russia) But the bargaining room was limited. Stalin's doctrine and his determination that Russia would not again be invaded from the west greatly narrowed his diplomatic options. So too did the tremendous devastation of the war. Rapid rebuilding under communism required security, required access to resources in Eastern and Central Europe, and continued tight control over the Russian people. The experience of war was indelible. Russia viewed almost everything in their lives through their "searing experience of World War II," as one psychologist has phrased it. The conflict had destroyed 1700 towns and 70,000 villages and left 25 million homeless. Twenty million died; 600,000 starved to death at the siege of Leningrad.32 Britain and the fear of Isolation The Ideological Confrontation The Riga Axioms The Yalta Axioms The Long Telegram – George Kennan (22 February 1946) The True Nature of Russia T George Frost Kennan 
here could be, no permanent resolution of differences with such a government, which relied on the fiction of external treats to maintain internal legitimacy. "Some of us here have tried to conceive the measures our country would have to take if it really wished to pursue, at all costs, [the] goal of disarming Soviet suspicions," Kennan noted in March. We have come to [the] conclusion that nothing short of complete disarmament, delivery of our air and naval forces to Russia and resigning of [the] powers of government to the American Communists would ever dent this problem: and even then we believe - and this is not facetious - that Moscow would smell a trap and would continue to harbor [the] most baleful misgivings. "We are thus up against the fact," Kennan continued, "that suspicion in one degree or another is an integral part of [the] Soviet system, and will not yield entirely to any form of rational persuasion or assurance. … To this climate, and not to wishful preconceptions, we must adjust our diplomacy."33 Kennan's Containment - Particularization (It's the Soviet Union stupid) … Kennan told students at he National War College that there were "only five centers of industrial and military power in the world which are important to us from a standpoint of national security." These were the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Only in these locations "would [you] get the requisite conditions of climate, and industrial strength, of population and of the tradition which would enable people there to develop and launch the type of amphibious which would have to be launched if our national security were seriously affected." Only one of these power centers was at that time, in hostile hands; the primary interest of the United States in world affairs, therefore, was to see to it that no others fell under such control.34 Download 4.26 Mb. Share with your friends:
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