The Emergence of Anti-Communism (The Linkage of Economic Policy to Foreign Policy)
B
Churchill's Iron Curtain Speech
Truman Doctrine Speech
y early 1947 the Truman administration had made three major decisions concerning Europe: to restrict Soviet and Eastern European access to American trade and capital, to restore Western European productivity and commerce, and to reidustrialize Germany. Until the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, however, the president lacked a clear rationale by which to mobilize the public and the congress behind a sustained program of European reconstruction. White House officials already had found, in the congressional debate on the British loan of December 1945, that anticommunism was a far more effective rallying cry than their rather prosaic arguments for multilateralism. As Undersecretary of State Acheson noted, the new Congress was especially unlikely to welcome another foreign aid measure since it "was understood when the British loan was made last year that not further requests for direct loans to foreign governments would be asked of Congress." Thus, in seeking approval for aid to Greece and Turkey from the parsimonious Republican-controlled 80th Congress, Acheson and other officials again emphasized the Communist danger.35
The Division of Germany, Byrnes - Stuttgart September 6, 1946
Atomic Energy- Acheson-Lilienthal proposal / Bernard Baruch
The Truman Doctrine, March 12, 1947
America Declares Cold War – LaFeber’s Thesis
T The Division of Germany
he Truman Doctrine was milestone in American history for at least four reasons. First, it marked the point at which Truman used the American fear of communism both at home and abroad to convince Americans they must embark upon a Cold War foreign policy. This consensus would not break apart for a quarter of a century. Second, as Vandenberg knew, Congress was giving the President great powers to wage this Cold War as he saw fit. Truman's personal popularity began spiraling upward after his speech. Third, for the first time in the postwar era, Americans massively intervened in another nation's civil war. Intervention was justified on the basis of anticommunism. In the future, America would intervene in similar wars for supposedly the same reason and with less happy results. Even Greek affairs went badly at first, so badly that in late 1947 Washington officials discussed sending as many as two divisions of Americans to save the situation. That proved unnecessary, for when Yugoslavia left the communist bloc in early 1948, Tito turned inward and stopped aiding the rebels. Deprived of aid the Greek left wing quickly lost ground. But it had been close, Americans were nearly involved in a massive civil war two decades before their Vietnam involvement. As it was, the success in Greece seemed to prove that Americans could, if they wished, control such conflicts by defining the problem as "Communist" and helping the conservatives remain in power.