Uncertainty is inevitable - even if warming isn't the sole cause of wars it's a huge proximate cause
Evans 10 (Alex Evans, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, September 9, 2010, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Evans.pdf)
As concern over both climate change and resource scarcity has increased in recent years, so speculation has grown that they will lead to increased risk or incidence of violent conflict. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, for example, said in 2007 that “changes in our environment and the resulting upheavals - from droughts to inundated coastal areas to loss of arable lands - are likely to become a major driver of war and conflict”.31 However, while climate change and resource scarcity do pose risks – especially for poor people and fragile states, which as discussed below are most vulnerable to their effects – caution is needed in forecasting their effects, particularly in the area of violent conflict.In part, this is because the impacts of resource scarcity or climate change will in practice almost always blur with those of other risk drivers, with the effect that it becomes extremely difficult to attribute particular impacts solely to climate change or resource scarcity. The rise in the number of undernourished people from 854 million people in 2007 to over 1 billion in late 2009, for example, is only partly attributable to the effects of the food price spike: also critical were the subsequent effects of the global downturn, which further eroded the purchasing power of many poor people.32 Similarly, while poor people are undoubtedly vulnerable to the direct impacts of climate change, the most far-reaching effects of global warming may be the indirect “consequences of consequences” – such as political instability, economic weakness, food insecurity or large-scale migration (see below).33 Secondly, it is important to remember that the actual risk of violent conflict posed by climate change or resource scarcity depends as much on the vulnerability of populations, ecosystems, economies and institutions as on the strength of climate or scarcity impacts. The fact that poor people are more exposed to price spikes, resource scarcity and climate impacts is well-established, for example – as is the fact that environmental risks are among the most frequent, costly and impactful causes of the kinds of shock that can cause people to become poor in the first place, and that make escape from poverty so difficult.34 Similarly, the institutional and political weaknesses of fragile states have been argued to make them more susceptible to conflict risk arising from climate change and resource scarcity. A 2007 report from International Alert, for example, found that 46 countries, home to 2.7 billion people, would experience a “high risk of violent conflict” as a result of climate change interacting with economic, social and political problems, while in a further 56 countries with 1.2 billion inhabitants “the institutions of government will have great difficulty taking the strain of climate change on top of all their other current challenges”.35 Climate change and resource scarcity are rarely, if ever, the sole cause of violent conflict, then: instead, they are better understood as ‘threat multipliers’ that will in practice interact both with other risk drivers, and with diverse sources of vulnerability.36 However, this is not to say that climate and scarcity do not increase the risk of violent conflict. On the contrary, as a United Nations Environment Programme report recently argued: “the exploitation of natural resources and related environmental stresses can be implicated in all phases of the conflict cycle, from contributing to the outbreak and perpetuation of violence to undermining prospects for peace”.37 Kahl (2006) cites a range of evidence for the argument that scarcity can increase the risk of violent conflict, including quantitative studies that suggest population size and density are significant conflict risk factors, and statistical work indicating that countries highly dependent on natural resources, as well as those experiencing high rates of deforestation and soil degradation or low per capita availability of arable land and freshwater, have higher than average risks of conflict.
AT: Oceans Check
Oceans absorb Co2 – that kills everything in it – your turns flow aff
Hutchings et al 12 (Jeffery Hutchings, Prof. Isabelle M. Côté Prof. Julian J. Dodson Prof. Ian A. Fleming Prof. Je rey A. Hutchings (Chair) Prof. Simon Jennings Prof. Nathan J. Mantua Prof. Randall M. Peterman Dr. Brian E. Riddell Prof. Andrew J. Weaver, FRSC, The Royal Society of Canada Acedmic of Arts, February 2012, http://www.rsc.ca/documents/RSC_MBD_1_3_25_Twenty-Five_EN_FORMAT.pdf)
Climate Change: Observed and Projected Stressors The immediate consequences of climate change are likely to include ocean warming, altered sea levels, and acidification of the ocean. All of these are already changing marine biodiversity. Water and air temperature are both pivotal in determining distribution of ocean plants and animals. Altered temperature patterns affect marine biodiversity, and potential yields from fisheries, by changing where different species live. Increased precipitation and warmer temperatures can change salt content and the density of water, or wash more nutrients from land into rivers and then into the sea; those kinds of changes reach right down to “primary production”, the development of the most basic organisms in the food chain. Changes there could reduce the transfer of food value from organic matter. Inevitably, every organism is affected. Climate change can also cause disconnects between the needs species have for survival and their access to vital resources. An earlier bloom of plankton, for example, may mean that fish larvae or newly hatched seabirds don’t get the food that they need. The consequences of these resource ‘mismatches’ can be transferred up the food chain. At the species level, effects can be seen in Chinook salmon, where climate change is making some streams too warm or too shallow for young fish to survive and grow properly. That’s projected to reduce population abundance and significantly increase the chance of extinction for affected populations. Temperature change also affects where species live. Empirical and theoretical studies suggest marine fish and invertebrates respond to ocean warming by shifting between 30-130 km per decade pole-wards and 3.5 m per decade deeper. That could lead to local extinction of some species, while others invade new areas. We think this will inevitably lead to significant changes in fisheries. In the northern hemisphere, that could mean declines in fishing in temperate regions (25oN-50oN), but increases at higher latitudes, particularly in the sub-Arctic. However, benefits further north might be countered by the loss of species at lower latitudes in Canadian waters.Climate change also plays a role in depleting oxygen in water. When surface water gets warmer, the water may not produce and exchange oxygen well. Heavier precipitation that increases freshwater discharge and the flux of nutrients adds to the problem. Along the Oregon coast, low-oxygen events have caused fish and crab kills during the last several years, events that were not observed in the previous century. The world’s oceans absorb some 84 per cent of the carbon dioxide generated by burning fossil fuels. As the concentration of CO2 in the oceans increases, more carbonic acid (H2CO3) is formed, which partially dissociates into bicarbonate (HCO3) and hydrogen (H+) ions. The combination of increased acidity and decreased carbonate means many marine organisms that use calcium carbonate to construct their shells or skeletons— including corals, some phytoplankton, lobsters, mussels, snails and sea urchins—are at risk from acidification. Analyses of corals on the Great Barrier Reef show that calcification rates declined 21% between 1988 and 2003. By the middle of this century, coral reefs may be eroding faster than they are growing