Collaboration with Asian countries increases perceptions of US leadership
Friedman February 14, 2011 (Lou Friedman recently stepped down after 30 years as Executive Director of The Planetary Society. He continues as Director of the Society's LightSail Program and remains involved in space programs and policy. “American leadership” The Space Review. http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1778/1) hss American leadership in space is much more desired that resented—except when it gets used unilaterally, as in the past Administration’s call for “dominance in cislunar space.” Asian countries (China, Japan, India) are especially interested in lunar landings; Western countries, including the US, much less so. However, cooperating with Asian countries in lunar science and utilization would be both a sign of American leadership and of practical benefit to US national interests. Apollo 11 astronaut Buzz Aldrin has been a leader advocating such cooperation. At the same time American leadership can be extended by leading spacefaring nations into the solar system with robotic and human expeditions to other worlds. The US can’t do everything alone. Climate monitoring, Earth observation, space weather prediction, and ultimately asteroid deflection are huge and vital global undertakings that require international participation. That is also true with exploration projects sending robots and human to other worlds. American leadership in these areas is welcomed and used by other countries, even as they develop their own national programs. The US government should make more of this and not treat it as an afterthought—or even worse, prohibit American leadership as the House of Representatives is doing this week by banning any China collaboration or cooperation. (The proposed House continuing resolution for fiscal year 2011 prohibits OSTP or NASA funds to be used for anything to do with China.)
AT: China space=peaceful
China is upgrading technology to compete with the US Militarily – Taiwan
Seedhouse, 10 (Eric, Med. Science PhD, The New Space Race: China vs. The US, JG)
Space activities are normally considered dual-use in nature, meaning the same space technologies that can lift a human into orbit can easily be used to deliver a warhead onto a target. As with the Americans and the Soviets in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Beijing's most important justification and motivation for pursuing a manned space program is based firmly in the military arena, which is not surprising, since national security remains a potent justification for the large expenditures demanded by a space program. To that end, US space-based military assets have been routinely studied by the Chinese during the two Gulf Wars, and the campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. From observing US military operations, such as Desert Storm, the Chinese soon realized that the military strength of the US was largely due to its advanced command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance abilities. These capabilities mostly rely on military satellites - assets the Chinese hope to match before employing their use in an attack on Taiwan (Panel 1.4). To achieve this goal, China is constructing a space-based surveillance infrastructure, including 20 differential global-positioning system stations to enhance the accuracy of the PLA's short-range ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan.
Motive of China Space Program – Challenge the US Military
Seedhouse, 10 (Eric, Med. Science PhD, The New Space Race: China vs. The US, JG)
While international relations, political progression, and the other incentives cited in this section undoubtedly contribute to China's overall influence and provide Beijing with opportunities for international leadership, the true purpose of China's spaceflight program lies in the dual-use nature of space technology. Although Beijing is loath to mention the military utility of its spaceflight program, the development of space hardware, combined with China's space doctrine, has several negative-sum aspects for the US, which may lead to future confrontation in space.4 While many readers may be familiar with the recent successes of Beijing's manned spaceflight program, China's human space program and lunar exploration missions are intended to counteract concerns and divert attention from China's military uses of space. In reality, by striving to be a major space power, China has increased its comprehensive national power (CNP),* but its improving military space capabilities have resulted in the US viewing China as potentially coming into conflict with its own interests. The rise of China as a potential peer competitor raises concerns for the US, which, as we shall discover later, will increasingly define the rising dragon by military considerations, given the inherently military nature of the Chinese spaceflight program.
AT: China-US cooperation inevitable
Co-op is highly unlikely
Seedhouse, 10 (Eric, Med. Science PhD, The New Space Race: China vs. The US, JG)
China has embarked on an ambitious space program designed to compete with the US in both the civil and military arenas of space exploration and space utilization. Concerns regarding China's military intentions and its ambitions to land taikonauts on the Moon have led some to question whether the US should cooperate with China. Others have arguedthat any Sino-US cooperation is out of the question, citing concerns of technology leaks or inadvertent assistance, possibly leading to China becoming a more formidable space power. Given the financial burdens that a space race would impose, it would seem to be in the interests of both the US and China to consider opportunities for cooperation. Such a partnership would ensure that the space infrastructure remains intact for the international community. However, given the extremely limited transparency between the two countries and the technological lead maintained by the US, any incentive to cooperate is unlikely.
Major Hurdles before we can cooperate with China
Seedhouse, 10 (Eric, Med. Science PhD, The New Space Race: China vs. The US,
Ultimately, while arguments can be made for the benefits of cooperation, in reality, pursuing this path would require both the US and China to share resources and technology - a step neither is willing to take, regardless of the potential benefits. Undoubtedly, one of the most important security challenges in the next decade will be how the US deals with China, but it is unlikely that the option of cooperation will be on the table. Some of the reasons why the US will not entertain the notion of collaboration have been discussed in this chapter. Perhaps a more powerful reason is the nature of the national security relationship between Beijing and Washington - a dynamic reminiscent of the US-Soviet relationship in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Back then, the US maintained the high ground in nuclear power, believing that although the Soviets were making progress, the US still had an unmatched ability to decimate the Soviet Union with strategic airpower. After the Sputnik shock, the US had to recalibrate, as evidenced by President Eisenhower's broad educational effort to reassert American leadership in space while raising the public's understanding of the global security situation. The difference this time around is that there will be no Sputnik shock and, with US superiority in space all but assured, there is no incentive for Washington to seek common ground with the Chinese.While the potential clash of interests may not yet be sufficiently severe to be visible to casual observers, the course would appear to be set towards greater competition rather than collaboration