The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness
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- They Say “Stable Deterrence”
Extend – Debris Scenarios[ ] Even small space debris can cause catastrophic damage to satellites Denmark 2010 - Fellow with the Center for a New American Security [By Abraham M. and Dr. James Mulvenon CNAS, Jan, Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested %20Commons%20Capstone_0.pdf Accessed Jun 21] The high speeds and the amount of debris in orbit — hardware and spacecraft fragments that have broken up, exploded or otherwise become abandoned — render the space commons themselves inherently fragile. There are more than 19,000 objects in orbit larger than 10 centimeters, and more than 1.5 million objects less than 10 centimeters. 72 Since 1947, more than 6,000 satellites have been put into space, and about 800 are operational now. These objects in orbit make for a crowded, and dangerous, commons (Figure 3). A tiny speck of paint that had broken off of a satellite once dug a pit in a space shuttle window nearly a quarter-inch wide, causing a near catastrophe. It is estimated that a pea-sized ball moving in orbit would cause as much damage to a satellite or manned spacecraft as a 400-pound safe travelling at 60 mph. 73 Without a more robust governance regime, this situation is likely to worsen. The destruction of satellites threatens the space commons, as explosions in orbit create millions of small pieces of debris, some of which can remain for decades. About 50 percent of all trackable objects in orbit are due to in-orbit explosions or collisions. 74 A broad kinetic anti-satellite campaign could be analogous to fighting World War II They Say “Stable Deterrence”[ ] Chinese space deterrence undermines US military hegemony – it is a form of psychological warfare that denies US access to forward projection Cheng 2011 - Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center [Dean Cheng. Published February 11,2011. Delivered January 26, 2011. Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. China’s Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Impact. The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/01/Chinas-Active-Defense-Strategy-and-Its-Regional-Impact. Accessed June 21.] Chinese Concepts of the “Three Warfares” and Anti-Access/Area Denial Operations The issue of space deterrence links space to “psychological warfare,” one of the “three warfares” that was highlighted in this year’s DOD report. The “three warfares” were publicly set forth in the “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Political Work Regulations (zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi gongzuo tiaoli),” which were promulgated in 2003. Among the tasks of political work, according to Chapter 2, Section 18 of the Regulations, is conduct of the “three warfares” of psychological warfare, public opinion warfare, and legal warfare. The “three warfares” would seem to serve three purposes: To sap U.S. will and raise doubts about the justification of intervention, hopefully retarding U.S. responses; To attenuate U.S. alliances, thereby affecting access to vital ports and resupply facilities, as well as limiting foreign support for U.S. efforts; To reinforce domestic will and sustain the conflict, compelling the U.S. to confront the prospect of a longer war. Psychological warfare (xinli zhan), can occur at the tactical, operational, or strategic level. But, according to some PLA analyses, it is at the strategic level that psychological warfare may have the greatest impact, since it may undermine the enemy’s entire will to resist. Psychological warfare at that level is aimed not only at an opponent’s political and military leaders, but also at their broader population. It is also aimed at one’s own population and leadership cohort, in order to strengthen the will to fight. Finally, it also targets third-party leaders and populations, in order to encourage support for one’s own side, and discourage or dissuade them from supporting an opponent. PLA descriptions of how space deterrence can be effected are consistent with this definition of psychological warfare. For example, Chinese analysts note that space systems are very expensive. It is possible, then, to hold an opponent’s space infrastructure hostage by posing a question of cost-benefit analysis: is the focus of deterrence (e.g., Taiwan) worth the likely cost of repairing or replacing a badly damaged or even destroyed space infrastructure? Moreover, because space systems affect not only military but economic, political, and diplomatic spheres, damage to space systems will have wide-ranging repercussions and second-order effects.[7] Will those impacts also be worth it? Through such psychological pressures as space deterrence, as opposed to actual attacks, it may be possible to persuade an opponent that they cannot attain victory at an acceptable price. [ ] Chinese ASATs aren’t a Deterrent – multiple tests prove Hitchens 2007 – Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information [Thersea, U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From “War of Words” to Cold War in Space?, cs5_chapter2.pdf, Accessed June 21, 2011] According to U.S. government officials, China tested the launch vehicle (with or without a kill mechanism seems to be unknown) at least three times in the past, although details in various media reports are sketchy and somewhat contradictory.8 Some analysts have claimed that Chinese ASAT efforts reach back to the late 1980 and 1990s – which would mitigate against the “deterrent” and “bargaining chip” arguments, and bolster the “offensive” rationale. The most worrisome of all is whether China’s other rival nations will seek to react in kind. [ ] Protecting satellites is essential – deterrence won’t prevent other countries from developing space weapons Denmark 2010 - Fellow with the Center for a New American Security [By Abraham M. and Dr. James Mulvenon CNAS, Jan, Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a Multipolar World http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS%20Contested %20Commons%20Capstone_0.pdf Accessed Jun 21] American military primacy will not dissuade rising powers from acquiring capabilities designed to contest U.S. power on the sea, in the air, in space and in cyberspace. Thus, while the United States should continue to develop military capabilities to ensure it can counter anti-access threats posed by state and non-state actors in the global commons, it must recognize that it cannot and should not protect the commons alone. [ ] Deterrence in space is fragile – it is easier to cross the threshold to using weapons due to misperceptions MacDonald 2008 – Council on Foreign Relations [Bruce, Council Special Report No. 38 September China, Space Weapons, date accessed : June 24th, 2011, http://www.cfr.org/china/china-space-weapons-us-security/p16707] It is unclear whether China’s offensive counterspace capabilities are intended for deterrence or as usable weapons of war, though deterrence is repeatedly discussed. As a possible precedent, China’s strategic nuclear policy has been one of minimum deterrence and declared “no first use.” The small Chinese nuclear force is not meant to wage war, but is capable of destroying a few cities, a capability that allows China to resist potential foreign coercion. However, space and nuclear deterrence are not the same. Because the effects are not as devastating as the detonation of a nuclear weapon, crossing the space weapons “threshold” is easier, especially if the effects are temporary. Some PLA writings suggest China is considering a “no first use” space weapons policy, though the lower level of destruction in space conflict makes it more likely China would preempt in space if it were advantageous to do so. Directory: files files -> Answer True False 2 points Question 2 files -> Integer programming and game theory files -> 4 Integer Programming files -> Bpa vehicle Window Repair Scenario #1 task: Procure vehicle window relacement. Objective files -> Pop Warner History files -> North Carolina Inclusion Initiative Mapping Where Children with ieps are Being Served Purpose files -> Fall 2013 Spring 2014 Program Data: Standard 1 Exhibit 4d files -> Hanban – asia society confucius classrooms network 2010 request for proposal files -> Northern England’s set-jetting locations Download 1.07 Mb. 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