The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness



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Cadre Solvency Mechanisms



[ ] Incorporating civilian space professionals is key to improve the Space Cadres
Handelman, 2010 Assistant Defense Secretary [Kenneth B, Active Defense Secretary of The Department of Defense, United States, Biennial Report on Management of Space Cadre within the Department of Defense, 12/2/10, accessed 6/21/11 http://www.acq.osd.mil/nsso/SpaceCadre/literature/PKG-USP011361-10-DEPSECDEF-SIGNED.pdf,
Way Ahead/Challenges There are numerous challenges in maintaining a healthy cohort of space professionals to meet Service and national needs. Among them: Tracking Civilian Space Professionals The Services are seeking a common approach to cataloging and tracking their civilian space professionals. They recognize a civilian professional development plan must be tailored to unique civilian personnel requirements, since the military programs are not directly transferable to civilian personnel. Civilian space professionals are not coded, and as such, potential space billets are not identified as space billets. Furthermore, there are no space professional development education, training, or experience requirements linked with these positions. 21The Services are currently identifying positions and people. Methods for coding, tracking, and measuring progress for DoD civilians must be developed. The Air Force has made an initial effort using the Space and Missile Systems Center as a test case, and is currently conducting an Air Forcewide effort. These results will be shared with the other Services. The Services are meeting regularly to address this issue.
[ ] Incorporating Space Cadre training into Promotion tracks will increase interest in the Marine Corps Space Cadre
Handelman, 2010 Assistant Defense Secretary [Kenneth B, Active Defense Secretary of The Department of Defense, United States, Biennial Report on Management of Space Cadre within the Department of Defense, 12/2/10, accessed 6/21/11 http://www.acq.osd.mil/nsso/SpaceCadre/literature/PKG-USP011361-10-DEPSECDEF-SIGNED.pdf,
Way Ahead/Challenges The primary challenge in continuing to maintain a qualified Marine Corps space cadre is training and education. Though afforded ample school seats at NPS, NSSI, and ASOpS, it is sometimes difficult for commanders to support a Marine’s extended absence from a unit to attend space training, especially considering today’s operational tempo. Also, deeply ingrained in Service culture is a perceived promotion risk associated with attending graduate-level education in-residence followed by a 3-year payback tour outside fleet operating forces. Despite these challenges, Marines with a serious interest in space continue to apply for and complete the education and training required to become space professionals. In order to shift some of these cultural paradigms and strengthen the Marine space cadre, the Service is working with the Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM) to make NSSI’s Space 200 a MOS-producing course. If Space 200 is accepted as a MOS-producer, Marines can attend Space 200 en route to a space billet and all costs will be funded by TECOM (rather than unit-funded). Furthermore, the Service works closely with curriculum branches at NPS, NSSI and ASOpS to ensure the curriculum accurately addresses the challenging environments in which Marines operate. Finally, the Marine Corps continuously reviews billets coded for space professionals to ensure Marines are being placed in jobs with the requisite skill sets in order to support Marine Corps operations.
[ ] Ensuring Space Cadre funding is critical to future program stability
Handelman, 2010 Assistant Defense Secretary [Kenneth B, Active Defense Secretary of The Department of Defense, United States, Biennial Report on Management of Space Cadre within the Department of Defense, 12/2/10, accessed 6/21/11 http://www.acq.osd.mil/nsso/SpaceCadre/literature/PKG-USP011361-10-DEPSECDEF-SIGNED.pdf,
Funding Funding for new systems and modifications is important, but so is funding that develops a qualified cadre in sufficient numbers with the appropriate education and training. Although current manpower, education, and training are sufficient for mission needs, sustained funding is required to ensure future requirements are adequately addressed through timely manpower actions and viable education and training programs, provided by robustly resourced institutions. Emerging Requirements On a similar note, accurate identification of emerging manpower needs is critical to force planning. The Services must closely monitor new systems development and force structure changes to ensure a sufficient inventory of space professionals to meet requirements.


Stealth - Inherency




[ ] Stealth Satellite legislation failed to get appropriations
Walsh 2007 – Primary Editor at the US Naval War College [Kathleen, Chinese Defense, Security and Space Policy, http://gallery.ida.org/chinaforum/forum/china_satellite_test.html, Accessed June 21, 2011]
Another expected response will be on Capitol Hill. One issue currently under review is a reportedly new stealth satellite program that Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell and leading Senate leaders have determined is not needed but that appropriators might include in upcoming legislation using the Chinese ASAT test as justification. Other legislative efforts are likely to invoke China’s ASAT activities, particularly when paired with Beijing’s spring announcement of a nearly 18% increase in annual military spending. As one Congressional observer notes, “Whether or not Beijing’s decisions to go forward with the ASAT test and to increase its military budget were intentional, they have sharply redirected skeptical attention on China within Congress.”

Stealth - Solvency



[ ] Satellite hardening is critical to survivability – Stealth and Armor Geometry are crucial
Mackey, 2009 - Air Force Institute of Technology [Accessed on 6-21-11 Fall Birmingham- Southern College;; Deputy group commander at Eglin AFB, Florida -Air and Space Power Journal “US and Chinese Anti-satellite Activities” proquest]
Other means of protecting satellites include enhanced situational awareness, employment of stealth/radar-absorbing technologies, and better design techniques.38 Differentiating between manmade and natural threats, such as purposeful directed-energy attacks and secondary effects from solar storms, is crucial in ascertaining whether an actual attack is in progress. Additionally, if a hostile force attacks a satellite, determining the source of the attack and taking evasive action or counterattacking are time critical. Multiple satellites working in concert to determine the source and nature of any satellite attack will provide operators the level of enhanced awareness to enable decision makers to act quickly and appropriately in response to threats.39 Given the costs of launching satellites into orbit, present satellite design has focused on squeezing the most utility out of each kilogram, and very little thought has gone into applying stealth technologies to satellites. Exploiting current radarabsorbing technology by incorporating such materials onto sensitive satellites could produce a successful passive defense. Research into active "cloaking" technologies shows promise in hiding satellites- enabling them to better blend into their background. Integration of these technologies into smaller satellites would decrease their vulnerability by making them harder to detect and strike. Yet another means of increasing the survivability of satellites involves using appropriate geometry in design effortsapplying the proper shaping to diminish exposed satellite surfaces. Reducing the effective head-on surface area would lessen the probability of penetration; moreover, it would serve as a deflecting mechanism, similar to techniques used in the design of main battle tanks.
[ ] Stealth is key to Satellite hardening
Lewis 2005 - Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program [James A. Lewis. November 1, 2005. House Armed Service Committee, Panel on Asymmetric and Unconventional Threats Center for Strategic and International Studies. http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:Cr-YrlZ_4YJ:csis.org/files/media/csis/congress /ts051101_lewis.pdf+hardening+satellites&hl=en&gl=us&pid= bl&srcid=ADGEES jqa8YKzjyP3GZoZvlk1KzXGHAwK2bzuk03clno4BciLnY3pLmf12TN75rlMuAJFzw3E5JmOGq lWin0d1Ldf9UWz9NEeduREpcsvzljHCJIJUjNEHfpnuem7nvvZ7gEdyHm4&sig=AHIEtbT9LZ1I2M32TCFG4GFWgdeaoiEjEQ. Accessed June 21]
One controversial aspect of hardening involves stealth. Stealth makes sense if opponents will try to find and attack U.S. satellites. Some argue that with the end of the Soviet Union, we no longer face an anti-satellite threat. This is true now, but we cannot be sanguine about the next decade. Our potential opponents know they can gain an advantage by attacking our space assets. Any nation that can achieve space flight can attack satellites, and this includes Iran and North Korea. China reportedly has experimental anti-satellite programs to disable or destroy U.S. spacecraft. Further research on how to increase the stealthiness of future satellites would be beneficial.



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