The United States federal government should pursue a defensive space control strategy that emphasizes satellite hardening, replacement, redundancy and situational awareness



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Spending Responses



[ ] Satellite hardening doesn’t cost much – small fraction of satellite costs
Ghoshroy 2004, Research Associate at MIT [Subrata Ghoshroy. “Ensuring America’s Space Security: Report of the FAS Panel on Weapons in Space.” The Federation of American Scientists. September 2004. http://www.fas.org/pubs/_pages/space_report.html. Accessed June 22, 2011.]
The FAS Panel is aware that some U.S. military satellites are being hardened adequately and recommends that hardening of individual military and commercial satellites, especially commercial satellites used by the military, be taken into account before the government puts them to any critical use. It is important to note that the GPS satellites, which are at 20,000-km altitude, are designed to survive a million-rad dose of total radiation over a 10-year lifetime. Moreover, the cost of shielding GPS satellites is reported to be 1% of the program cost. 37 The GPS constellation consists of 24 satellites, which are spread over different orbital planes at an altitude of 20,000 kilometers. To substantially degrade the GPS, the satellites have to be attacked individually, which is difficult to do. The satellites are also hardened against nuclear effects and have on-orbit spares. The robustness of the GPS constellation has been analyzed by Geoffrey Forden and is reported in Appendix D. The analysis shows that the GPS constellation is robust to the extent that it can lose up to four satellites and yet only suffer from periodic loss of function at any place. As stated earlier, this robustness makes the vulnerability of the GPS constellation to ASAT-type attacks rather small.

Security Kritik Responses



[ ] Aff best solves the Security Dilemma – China’s capabilities and intentions uniquely represent Genuine threats, A strong response is key to Clarity which avoids misperception, and the Kritik creates Inaction, which worsens the dilemma.
Kyl 2007 – US senator and Attorney. [Jon Kyl. Published on February 1, 2007. Delivered on January 29, 2007. China's Anti-Satellite Weapons and American National Security. The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Lecture/Chinas-Anti-Satellite-Weapons-and-American-National-Security. Accessed June 21]
QUESTION: I am a student from George Mason University School of Public Policy. We know that, in international relations, a so-called security dilemma often happens. The U.S. suspects the intentions of China, and China also suspects the intention of the U.S. So how can you give a solution to the security dilemma between the U.S. and China, and how can the two nations assure each other that they are not hostile to each other? SENATOR KYL: Probably no country more than China represents this dilemma today with respect to intentions as well as capabilities. It is in the United States' interest to have good relations with a grow­ing, freer, peaceful China, and we look for ways to try to foster that kind of a relationship and influence Chinese development along those lines. But China is a great power, a huge future powerhouse peopled with very smart, well-educated people with a very long history and a long-range view of things as com­pared to our very short-range view sometimes. There are clearly areas in which hostilities between the two countries could quickly become very serious, Taiwan being the most obvious. There are also important areas for both countries that sug­gest that cooperation between the two countries would be the best course of action, and I suspect that both countries are trying to manage this evolv­ing difficult relationship. The area in which I criticize our government is in being sometimes unwilling to speak truth to these issues. Sometimes trying to be too diplomatic cre­ates confusion and uncertainty, and in some areas you need clarity. I understand that in the diplomatic world, some­times you need lack of clarity as well. But when you're talking about two countries with military potential to hurt themselves, you better be pretty clear with each other. Second, I quoted Reagan: We've never had a problem in wars when we were too strong. It's when we've been perceived as being too weak, when we do not respond to potential challenges with strength, that we create the impression that it is pos­sible for a country to gain leverage over us by con­tinuing to push in the direction that they're pushing and that maybe the United States will not respond. Unfortunately, what happens too frequently with the United States is that we don't respond. We want to be left alone. We're all for peace. They clearly can't mean it. Maybe they can be appeased. And then, finally, when the other side has actually com­mitted itself to action adverse to the United States, we wake up to the threat and have to get engaged in a catch-up way, sometimes after a war has been declared against us, and it's too late to save a lot of the lives that could be saved otherwise. So it's better, I think, as you go along, to express our displeasure and to do things which clearly can be seen, by the Chinese in this case, as a serious effort on our part to defend ourselves in the event that the Chinese intentions are not benign and then, finally, to use all of the leverage that we have in dealing with a great country like China.
[ ] Public debate on space military policy is essential – it pushes us past outdated ideas and refocuses the debate
Hyten 2001 Director, Space Programs, Office of the Ass Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, [4 January 01. Air & Space Power Journal . A Sea of Peace or a Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space. Lt Col John E. Hyten. http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/Hyten.html Accessed June 21, 2011.]
The future of the United States is, in many ways, tied to the future development of space. One would think that, given the serious issues facing this development and the potential for conflict, the debate over this future would be widespread and vigorous. This is not the case. Even though a debate is occurring within limited political and military circles, it is not being addressed in any real depth on a national level. In the 1970s and 1980s, in the midst of an active Soviet space threat, the debate was loud, vigorous, and involved not only leading military officers, presidents, and congressmen, but many from the scientific and academic community as well. Significantly, it was also extremely well covered by the mainstream national media. The debate today lacks this national attention and committed involvement as evidenced by the lack of response to a major speech given at the Fletcher School of Diplomacy in November of 1998 by Senator Bob Smith, Chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In this speech, he proposed, in very strong terms, the need for space weapons and perhaps even the need for a separate space force to develop and operate these weapons. Media response to these radical and bold proposals was almost non-existent. For many weeks, the only media coverage to be found was in primarily defense-related periodicals such as Inside the Air Force.5 The first mainstream American newspaper to even mention this speech was the Washington Times when it published an editorial by James Hackett on January 11, 1999 (nearly two months after the speech).6 Even though Congress subsequently passed legislation, included in the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Authorization Bill, which established a special commission7 to evaluate these proposals, the national media has still largely ignored the issue. But at least the debate is beginning. Unfortunately, the discourse thus far seems to focus on two very strong, opposing positions: the need for space weapons vs. the need to maintain space as a sanctuary. This should not be the focus. The focus should be on choices—choices that can help define the future of this nation, and the world, in space. Many aspects of conflict, certainly in the near term, can be assuaged without requiring the controversial development and use of space weapons—without military intervention in space. To do so, however, requires the aggressive implementation of other instruments of national power, specifically economic and political. This also has not occurred. General Richard B. Myers, Commander in Chief of the United States Space Command (CINCSPACE), said in a speech in early 1999, "Just as we can’t expect to successfully fight the next war with the equipment of the last war, we surely won’t see victory in the next war using the policies of the last war. To best prepare for the future, we have to energize our thinking too. We need that national debate on the existing policies and open questions affecting future military capabilities and possibilities in space. And we need resolution of that debate sooner rather than later."8 We are at the dawn of a new century. Now is the moment to be farsighted as we chart a path into the new millennium.



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