[ ] China wants to attack U.S. space infrastructure to gain dominance and deny U.S. resources. Cheng 2011 - Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center [Dean Cheng. Published February 11,2011. Delivered January 26, 2011. Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. China’s Active Defense Strategy and Its Regional Impact. The Heritage Foundation. http://www.heritage.org/Research/Testimony/2011/01/Chinas-Active-Defense-Strategy-and-Its-Regional-Impact. Accessed June 21.] In the tactical and operational realm, PLA observation of Western conflicts has led them to conclude that, in order to conduct the high-tempo, dispersed operations typical of recent Local Wars, it is essential to have access to space. Chinese analyses of the first Gulf War, the conflicts in the Balkans, and the march to Baghdad are rife with statistics on the number of satellites employed, whether maintaining surveillance over opponents, providing essential weather information, or guiding munitions and forces. Thus, as one PLA analysis notes, in places like Afghanistan, when U.S. military forces have identified the enemy, they have promptly exploited GPS to determine the enemy’s location and satellite communications to transmit the target’s location to weapons operators, in order to attack targets promptly. Similarly, in Iraq, the use of space was essential for the U.S. military’s intelligence gathering and battlefield command and control.[1] From their perspective, the ability to exploit space is essential for the ability to wage non-contact, non-linear, non-symmetric warfare.This reliance is so extensive that another Chinese analysis posits that the U.S. could not conduct the kind of warfare it prefers, but only high-level mechanized warfare, if it could not access space. The implication is that an essential part of any Chinese anti-access/area denial effort will probably entail operations against the U.S. space infrastructure, both in order to secure space dominance, zhitian quan, for the PLA, as well as to deny it to the United States. Space dominance, in this case, is defined as the ability to control the use of space, at times and places of one’s own choosing, while denying an opponent the same ability. [ ] China will view U.S monopolization of space as a threat to its national security – must protect its own interests in space Chase 2011 -Associate Research Professor and Director of the Mahan Scholars Program at the U.S. Naval War College [Michael S, Jamestown Foundation Publication, “Defense and Deterrence in China’s Military Space Strategy” http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37699&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=e3f0fcd233f563e2364ad7bc49425244, accessed June 21, 2011]
A review of Chinese writings on military space operations indicates that Chinese strategists are concerned about a wide variety of perceived threats to Chinese space systems. In particular, Chinese analysts characterize U.S. space policy as inherently threatening to China’s interests because of its emphasis on space dominance. As Zhang Hui of Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs writes, "Many Chinese officials and security experts have great interest in U.S. military planning documents issued in recent years that explicitly envision the control of space through the use of weapons in, or from, space to establish global superiority" [7]. Similarly, according to Bao Shixiu, a senior fellow at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science (AMS), "the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United States unilaterally seeks to monopolize the military use of space in order to gain strategic advantage over others" [8]. Given that China must protect its own interests, Bao argues, "China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country." Consequently, he asserts that U.S. space policy "poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes" [9]. Chinese writers also assert that U.S. space war exercises reflect the growing militarization of space. Yet Beijing’s concerns are not limited to the realm of policy statements and war games. Indeed, some Chinese strategists appear to believe that other countries are actively developing counter-space capabilities that could threaten Chinese satellites.
They Say “ASAT tests will promote Weapons Ban”
[ ] Chinese ASAT tests don’t cause negotiations – they harden American support for their Own ASATs Mulvenon, 2007 - Received his PhD from the University of California Los Angeles[http://www.defence.org.cn/aspnet/vip-usa/uploadFiles/2007-04/20070415093803____kZR0e4.pdf Date used: 6-22-2011 Date publish: 4-15-2007 Rogue Warriors? A Puzzled Look at the Chinese ASAT Test] Yet why would a witting civilian leadership approve the test, given the possible negative implications of success? One theory offered by both Chinese and Western observers alike is that China tested an ASAT in order to force the United States to change its previous opposition to negotiating a treaty banning weapons in space. If true, this is a startling misperception on Beijing’s part, since it assumes that Washington would reverse its published National Space Policy and decades of public opposition to space arms control. Instead, a better-informed and culturally nuanced analysis of possible American responses would come to the opposite conclusion, arguing that a successful ASAT test would likely strengthen the hands of those within the U.S. system lobbying for more aggressive offensive and defensive ASAT programs. Indeed, the Chinese test has been an early Christmas for these advocates, as it has removed the significant barrier of the informal international moratorium in place since the last known test in 1986. [ ] ASAT tests won’t spark negotiations – China’s demonstrations hardened opposition Hitchens 2007 – Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense Information [Thersea, U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From “War of Words” to Cold War in Space?, cs5_chapter2.pdf, Accessed June 21, 2011] Further, if the ASAT test was part of an effort to drive the United States into space-related negotiations with China, again it may backfire – at least in the near term. It is true that there has been a chorus of calls for the United States to now undertake efforts to ban ASATs, or at a minimum, ASATs that create debris. For example, Rep. Ed Markey, D-Mass., stated: “American satellites are the soft underbelly of our national security, and it is urgent that President Bush move to guarantee their protection by initiating an international agreement to ban the development, testing, and deployment of space weapons and anti-satellite systems.”22 Industry weekly Space News also urged the Bush administration to change course and consider “whether new and verifiable accords – such as a ban on the testing of anti-satellite weapons in space,” noting that it “only makes sense to ban an activity that increases debris that threatens the satellites of multiple countries.”23 However, there are no signs that the administration intends to heed such advice. Rather, quite the opposite. An unnamed State Department official told Space News in the immediate wake of the Chinese test: “We do not think there is an arms race in space. …. Arms control is not a viable solution for space.”24 Similarly, attitudes among congressional hard-liners are expected to harden even more; while some moderates may be pushed into more hard-line stances. For example, Rep. Terry Everett, R-Ala., former chairman of the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee and long a moderate Republican voice on the issue of space weapons, issued a statement condemning the Chinese test and noting: “We cannot afford to stand idly by and not address these threats immediately.”25