*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention

*General Affirmative Solvency Arguments*

U.S. Democracy Promotion in Mideast Effective—Should Increase

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 24-5

Chapter 23 makes clear that the case against democracy promotion can’t be made out of budgetary concerns, since the total cost of all democracy assistance programs is only a small percentage even of the international affairs budget of the United States. Neither can it be justified as an unwarranted intrusion, given the strong and growing demand for democracy in so many developing and postcommunist countries, and the urgent appeals of civil society actors in these countries not only for increased financial and technical assistance, but for more resolute and consistent diplomatic and moral support as well. Many Americans now shy away from “democracy promotion” because they associate it with the use of force and the subsequent beleaguered effort to “impose” democracy in Iraq. But as I explain in this chapter, force is only one instrument for trying to spread democracy around the world; it is not the most important and effective tool; and democracy promotion should never be the main motive for going to war. Much more effective are the use of various diplomatic tools to pressure autocrats and provide symbolic and political support to democrats (short of backing particular political parties and leaders) sanctions and aid conditionality as a way of bringing pressure on autocrats to loosen up and allow democratic change, and of rewarding governments that implement democratic reforms; targeted sanctions as a way of changing the calculus and shaping the choices of specific authoritarian regime leaders; and grants and training to political parties, independent media, think tanks, human rights and women’s groups, NGOs, trade unions, business associations. Fortunately, donors have increasingly come to appreciate the importance of advancing not just the formal institutions of democracy but the deep structures and norms that ensure good governance as well. This requires a flexible, steadfast, and country-specific approach that works on both the supply side—to strengthen accountability and the rule of law—and the demand side of public pressure for good governance reforms. Steadfastness requires patience and a long-term commitment. One of the biggest mistakes democracy promoters make is to “graduate” new democracies from assistance programs well before the institutions and norms of liberal democracy have been truly consolidated.
US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION HAS BEEN MAKING GRADUAL PROGRESS IN THE MIDEAST

Dionysis Markakis, Center for International and Regional Studies- Georgetown University, 2016, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The Pursuit of Hegemony, p. 69

In a statement highlighting one of the many paradoxes of political reform in the Middle East, the Arab Human Development Report of 2004 notes that “totally or partially elected parliaments now exist in all Arab countries except Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.” Contrary to popular belief, the Middle East has experienced several waves of electoralism, even prior to the uprisings of 2011. These have become more pronounced in the aftermath of the Cold War, as a result of endogenous but particularly exogenous pressures. Following American actions in 1991, 2001, and 2003, the region experienced flurries of electoral activity. Kuwait’s liberation by the US during the first Gulf War of 1991 was partly on conditions of political reform. Subsequently, after restoring the Constitution and the National Assembly, it held parliamentary elections six times between 1991 and 2008. Following 11 September 2001, both Bahrain and Qatar introduced new constitutions, approved through popular referenda. In 2002 Bahrain resumed parliamentary elections after a pause of almost thirty years. And after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saudi Arabia held rare municipal elections. Steven Cook argued:

“While one can argue that now-King Abdallah [of Saudi Arabia] recognized the need to pursue a measure of political reform independently of US policy, the timing of the Kingdom’s recent municipal elections – the first in more than forty years – betrays an implicit effort to respond to the Bush administration’s assertive calls for political change.”

“In Bahrain last year, citizens elected their own parliament for the first time in nearly three decades. Oman has extended the vote to all adult citizens; Qatar has a new constitution; Yemen has a multiparty political system; Kuwait has a directly elected national assembly; and Jordan held historic elections this summer. Recent surveys in Arab nations reveal broad support for political pluralism, the rule of law, and free speech. These are the stirrings of Middle Eastern democracy, and they carry the promise of greater change to come.”

Therefore with each crisis stemming from the region, American pressures, both direct and indirect, have led to the implementation of small but tangible reforms. Sadiki concludes that there “is a minimum and immaterial conditionality tacitly written in the new Pax-Americana in the Arab Gulf; no protection without a form of representation.” At the very least, however flawed, such electoral cycles condition Arab citizens in aspects of the institutional framework that underpins the promoted liberal democratic ideology. This conforms with a long-term, gradualist approach to democracy promotion in the Middle East.