U.S. Democracy Promotion in Mideast Effective—Can Address Arab Democracy Gap

U.S. Democracy Promotion in Mideast Effective—Mirrors Latin America

Dionysis Markakis, Center for International and Regional Studies- Georgetown University, 2016, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The Pursuit of Hegemony, p. 4-5

From the origins of the term itself to the borders of the states it encompasses, the modern Middle East has been shaped considerably by its interactions with the West. Since the early twentieth century in particular, powers such as Britain, France, and the US have sought to directly influence the politics of the region. The US came to regard the Middle East as a vital sphere of interest at the end of the Second World War, motivated initially by the presence to oil, and later by a key ally in Israel. It consolidated its position as the predominant external power in the aftermath of the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. Since then, the Middle East has been perhaps the only region with a comparable degree off penetration by the US to that of only region with a comparable degree of penetration by the US to that of Latin America, the proverbial American “backyard,” and one that served as an early milieu for the strategy of democracy promotion. As such Latin America provides a measure of comparison, situating US democratic promotion in the Middle East within a broader context, crucial given that the strategy there is still in its early stages. As was the case in Latin America over previous decades, authoritarian governments were long seen by the US as the most effective guarantors of stability in the Middle East. Graham Fuller, a former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, underscores this when he argues that: “democratization ‘is not on the American agenda’ in the Middle East ….[because] Washington finds it more efficient to support a range of dictators across the Arab world as long as they conform to US foreign policy needs.” Clearly the US has maintained strong, intimate relationships with authoritarian governments throughout its tenure in the region, and this continued under the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations. But it is a common fallacy that holds that the US has had little to no interest in promoting democracy in the contemporary Middle East.

Diplomatic Pressure Effective at Democracy Promotion

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 428

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 429-30

Yet when the US is motivated to exert diplomatic pressure on authoritarian allies, it can make a difference, either in helping to generate space for political opposition and dissent, or in tipping the balance at a critical transition moment. By publicly documenting and denouncing human rights abuses in Latin America, and then coupling these denunciations with reductions in military and economic aid, the Carter Administration contained repression, narrowed the options for military autocrats, and contained repression, narrowed the options for military autocrats, and accelerated momentum for democratic change in the region. When the Dominican military stopped the presidential election vote count in 1978 in the face of an apparent opposition victor, swift and vigorous warnings from President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, American embassy officials, and the commander in chief of the US Southern Command succeeded in pressuring the Dominican military to allow the opposition candidate to take office, thus effecting a transition to democracy. Vigorous explicit diplomatic messages from the Reagan administration, which artfully coordinated public actions and private appeals, dissuaded Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines in 1986 and Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea in 1987 from forcibly suppression pro-democracy protests and helped induce them to allow a democratic transition to unfold. And a more extended strategy succeeded in encouraging a process of democratic change in Chile and discouraging military dictator August Pinochet from thwarting the electoral process. Although President George W. Bush in his final two years backed away from pressuring Arab authoritarian regimes after Islamist parties and movements made alarming gains in Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine, his public appeals for democracy in the Middle East encouraged opposition movements and helped persuade President Mubarak to open up political space and allow a contested presidential election in 2005. The resulting political liberalization was partial and short-lived, but it stimulated political aspirations and the growth of opposition networks and skills in ways that would ultimately contribute to the downfall of Mubarak in the February 2011 revolution.