*Topicality/Definitions Democracy Promotion Includes Military Intervention


Democracy Promotion Successes Snowball



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Democracy Promotion Successes Snowball


EACH NEW DEMOCRACY MAKES DEMOCRACY PROMOTION MORE EFFECTIVE –BUILDS NORMS

Daniela Huber, Senior Fellow Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 2015, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU, and Non-Western Democracies, p. 39

To turn to the external part of a democratic role identity, internationally growing norms of democracy might also boost a democratic role identity. International norms hardly appear as driving factors of democracy promotion in the literature which is puzzling since this foreign policy phenomenon seems very much embedded in the growth of democracy as an international norm. International norms are defined as “collective expectations about proper behavior or a given identity”. In this study, indicators for a growing international norm of democracy are not only a growing right of democracy in international law, but also the rise of democracy to a global standard form of governance. If this norm grows, democracy promotion does not only become more legitimate, but also more feasible in the first place. Democracy promotion is dependent on some degree of cooperation from the other side. Furthermore, such a growing norm can also push for democracy promotion more concretely. Constructivist theory tends to focus on the effect that norms have on states who are not complying with norms. This study, instead, observes if and how they affect the identity and foreign policy behavior of states and actors such as the EU who are by and large considered compliers, that is—in the case of an advancing norm of democracy—democracies.
NORMS INCREASE COMPLIANCE WITH DEMANDS OF DEMOCRACY

Daniela Huber, Senior Fellow Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 2015, Democracy Promotion and Foreign Policy: Identity and Interests in US, EU, and Non-Western Democracies, p. 39-40



I suggest three pulls on compliers: first, there might be a confidence pull. When democracy-related norms grow internationally, a democracy will be increasingly confident that its system of government is desired also by other societies. In other words, the democracy receives a boost for its democratic identity. This confidence pull persuades a democracy to act in an appropriate way by promoting democracy abroad; it has a constitute effect on the democratic identity of a norm-complying state. Second, there is a moral pull on norm-compliers. Norms might give them a greater responsibility to speak up for suppressed people and to demand compliance with international norms. Democracy promotion is not only appropriate but actually becomes a moral duty. In this case the norm has a regulatory effect on norm-compliers. Third, there might be a strategic pull of norms. If, for example, human rights grow as international norms, it increases one’s soft power to take the lead of such a wave. In this case norms are neither regulatory nor constitutive, but provide a concrete strategic incentive for democracies to get involved. As in the case of a contested democratic type identity above, the actor here is also self-reflexive and is not following norms automatically, but as part of a rationalization process. Her/his rationality, however, is bounded and embedded in the context of norms and identity.


Should Increase Democracy Assistance


DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE EFFECTIVE – SHOULD BE INCREASED

Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow Hoover Institute, In Search of Democracy, 2016, p. 436

Even when these forms of political assistance crucially contribute to democratic breakthroughs or tangibly help fledgling democratic institutions to gain strength and credibility, they always do so in a supporting role. There is general consensus among scholars and practitioners that democracy assistance cannot substitute for the “courage, energy skills, and legitimacy” of a country’s own pro-democracy groups and leaders. The most careful and dispassionate scholar of US democracy assistance efforts, Thomas Carothers, concludes (not surprisingly) that these forms of aid have the most visibly positive effects where there are already present at least moderately favorable conditions for democratic change, such as sincere and effective democrats, divided autocrats, and higher levels of economic and education development. Nevertheless, where democracy assistance is “properly designed and implemented,” by proceeding from sensitive knowledge of the local political terrain and then endeavoring to monitor grants carefully over time, it can “help broaden and deepen democratic reforms” in new democracies and sustain civic awareness, democratic hope, and independent information and organization in authoritarian regimes.

Thus, if democracy assistance does not in and of itself work miracles, it does occasionally help miraculous democratic breakthroughs to occur, and over time it helps to build the civic and political foundations of enduringly free societies. Given the relatively modest total amounts the US government spends on these forms of assistance annually, this is no small achievement. In fact, when these political aid flows were assessed (for the years 1999-2003) by an independent team of social scientists, they found the effects were clearly and consistently positive, but only modest because individual country level of assistance were modest (about two to four million dollars on average.) Larger levels of democracy assistance appear to yield larger impacts; each additional million dollars of democracy assistance increase the “normal” rate of expected improvement in democracy scores by 50 percent. The findings –unprecedented for their empirical depth and statistical precision and sophistication—justify the authors’ conclusions that overall levels of democracy assistance should be increased, and that democracy assistance should be sustained in countries even after they have reached what has heretofore been considered a “satisfactory” stage of democratic development.






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