Two Approaches Top-Down: smj, pj bottom-Up: lawsuit from beginning to end Drafting the Rules

Why does Clinton win summary judgment on each of Jones’ three claims (quid pro quo, hostile work environment, intentional infliction of emotional distress)?

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  Quid Pro Quo
  
  • 
    Clinton: no tangible job detriment (detailed citation to employment records, to testimony of her superiors, to Jones’ own deposition)
    
  • 
    Jones: tangible detriment (effectively put into a position that had a very low ceiling for advancement)
    
  • 
    Court: no tangible job detriment (and did not even look at Clinton’s other argument: no causation)
    
  • 
    Clinton pretty much conclusively and affirmatively proved that Jones did not suffer a tangible job detriment (may not even need Celotex)
    
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  Hostile Work Environment
  
  • 
    12(c) ruling: “Although the President’s argument regarding the inadequacy of plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim is not without some force, the question of whether alleged harassment is sufficiently severe or persuasive for purposes of establishing hostile work environment is ‘quintessentially a question of fact,’ and one the Court simply cannot resolve on this record. Plaintiff’s allegations as they now stand state a hostile work environment claim.”
    
  • 
    Standard: totality of the circumstances
    
  • 
    Court: no
    
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  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  
  • 
    12(c) ruling: “Suffice it to say that such conduct [as is alleged in the complaint], if true, could well be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable for purposes of establishing a claim for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.”
    
  • 
    Summary Judgment: “[P]laintiff’s allegations fall far short of the rigorous standards for establishing a claim of outrage under Arkansas law.”
    
    • 
      Never went to a doctor
      
  • 
    Court probably should have granted Rule 12 motions
    

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  Often boilerplate orders because judges don’t have time to narrowly tailor them
  
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  Nevertheless, they need to be followed; otherwise, you can face sanctions
  

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  Court wanted all these things done within a certain time according to the scheduling order
  
  • 
    Plaintiff’s attorney did not turn anything in on time nor did he ask for a continuance
    
  • 
    Purpose of scheduling order: to get ready for trial and to narrow the issues
    
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  As a sanction for failing to follow the scheduling order, the court dismissed the case with prejudice
  
  • 
    Dismissing the case is a possible sanction, but it is extreme
    
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  En banc 9^th Circuit: dismissal can be proper but only under extenuating circumstances
  

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  What events led to this opinion?
  
  • 
    Landlord tenant case. Tenant is suing landlord because of injuries sustained from a leaky roof
    
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  What was the purpose of the pretrial conference?
  
  • 
    Court asked if plaintiff’s lawyer was only going to rely on a negligence theory--he said that he would
    
  • 
    At trial, he tried to introduce in the DC Housing Code. Court rejected it because he did not include it in his theories at the pretrial conference
    
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  What did the court do and why?
  
  • 
    Rule 16(e): “The court may modify the order issued after a final pretrial conference only to prevent manifest injustice.”
    
    • 
      What is the purpose of Rule 16(e)?
      
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  Should judge have helped plaintiff’s lawyer?
  
  • 
    Lawyer’s job to push the case forward--judge relies on the adversary system
    

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  Factfinder
  
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  Apply law to facts/make law(?) – was conduct “reasonable?”
  
  • 
    Juries sometimes get cases even where the facts are undisputed. See Pages 608-9, note 4(a), i.e. what is reasonable?
    
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  Voice of community
  
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  Political role
  
  • 
    Tension between trying to make jury decisions rational/predictable and giving juries leeway to exercise their important political role
    

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  Summary Judgment
  
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  Excluding Improper Influence
  
  • 
    Jury selection (voir dire)
    
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    The laws of evidence (e.g. no hearsay)
    
  • 
    Juries may not talk to non-jurors about case or do own research
    
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  Judge instructs jury on law.
  
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  Judges also control the use juries make of the information they receive via Rules 50 (JML) and 59 (New Trial)…
  

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  Terminology: directed verdict = judgment as a matter of law
  
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  Standard: “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.” 50(a)(1)
  
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    Jury could not rationally decide that way.
    
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    Party has not met burden of persuasion
    
  • 
    Connection to 56(c): “no genuine dispute as to any material fact”
    
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  Timing of motion: “any time before the case is submitted to the jury.” 50(a)(2);
  
  • 
    Motion can be renewed after trial (50(b)) but only if made before the case was submitted to the jury.
    
  • 
    Form: oral motion following plaintiff/defense case in chief
    
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  BE CAREFUL!!! Don’t forget to make your motion before the case goes to the jury!
  

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  Comes—by definition—at trial
  
  • 
    –So case has likely survived summary judgment
    
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    Else it wouldn’t be a trial.
    
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  Comes after full evidentiary presentation by party opposing the motion.
  

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  Comes—by definition—before trial.
  
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    Question is whether the case should go to trial.
    
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  Comes—by definition—before full evidentiary presentation
  
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    Purpose is to decide whether such a presentation is necessary
    

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  Safer not to grant SJ…let the case proceed to trial and see what happens
  
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  Too busy/lazy to decide cases on SJ
  
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  Evidence has changed
  

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  Burden of Production:
  
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    P must produce evidence from which a rational trier of fact could rule in P’s favor.
    
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    D has burden of production on affirmative defense.
    
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  Burden of Persuasion: “preponderance of the evidence”
  
  • 
    Jury issue!
    

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  What happened to the poor cow?
  
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    Cow got onto the tracks and was hit by a train and died. So the owner of the cow sued the railroad company
    
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    Fence is the railroad’s company responsibility & gate is the owner’s
    
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    Owner says that cow got out through the broken fence (which was a mile away)
    
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  What happened in the trial court?
  
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    Verdict for the plaintiff, and defendant appealed from the judgment entered on the verdict
    
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  Why doesn’t the appellate court let the jury verdict stand?
  
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    Says that the plaintiff has not met burden by preponderance of the evidence
    
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    Evidence is insufficient to support the verdict
    
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    Where are we on the chart? Before the “x” because court does not let the verdict stand
    
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    “Evidence of the plaintiff points with equal force to two things, one of which renders the defendant liable and the other not, the plaintiff must fail”
    
    • 
      Plaintiff’s evidence is really between “x” and “z”
      
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      And court will not let jury have verdict on that basis
      
    • 
      We demand jury inferences to be rational
      

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  What happened to Chamberlain?
  
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    What was plaintiff’s evidence?
    
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      Railroad was negligent
      
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      One employee testified
      
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        Far away
        
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        Didn’t see an actual collision
        
    • 
      Bainbridge:
      
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        2nd string moving faster than 1st.
        
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        Loud crash
        
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        Then two strings moving together.
        
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    What was defendant’s evidence?
    
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      Several employees who saw that the trains didn’t crash
      
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      Co-Workers: “There was no collision.”
      
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        Inference: Chamberlain must have fallen; therefore no negligence.
        
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  What motion did defendant make? Directed verdict
  
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  What does Supreme Court decide and why?
  
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    “It, of course, is true, generally, that where there is a direct conflict of testimony upon a matter of fact, the question must be left to the jury to determine, without regard to the number of witnesses upon either side.”
    
  • 
    Supreme Court agrees with district court--should have granted DV
    
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    Why, then, shouldn’t the case have gone to the jury?
    
    • 
      WASN’T THERE A CONFLICT IN TESTIMONY???
      
    • 
      Court talks about how unreasonable Bainbridge’s testimony is
      
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      Where are we on the chart? Between “x” and “z”? Past “z”?
      
      • 
        Doesn’t have to be past 50% for court to deny JML
        
      • 
        Defendant’s evidence bumps us back to before the “x”…so JML was appropriate
        
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  Kind of like Bias case…general testimony vs. very specific testimony (where motion for SJ was granted)
  

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  One of a variety of limits on juries
  
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  Timing: “any time before the case is submitted to the jury.” 50(a)(2)
  
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    BE CAREFUL!!!
    
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  Standard: “reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue….”
  
  • 
    JML = SJ
    
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    Reid: No irrational jury inferences
    
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    Chamberlain: Plaintiff has not crossed X
    
    • 
      What evidence should court consider?
      

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  Terminology: JML = jnov
  
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  Timing: within 28 days of entry of judgment
  
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    Must be a RENEWED Motion
    
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  Standard: Same as before the verdict
  
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    Why would judge grant it now?
    
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      Judge may have had an instinct before case goes to jury…but he’d rather have the jury decide and do the right thing
      

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  Timing: within 28 days of entry of judgment
  

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  Standard: “any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted….”
  

1. 
   Flawed Procedures
   
2. 
   Flawed Verdict
   

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  Judge gives wrong instruction.
  
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  Judge allowed impermissible closing argument
  
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  Judge erroneously admits (or excludes) evidence. See failed argument (3) in Lind.
  
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  This is a chance for Judge to fix a legal error and permit a “do-over”
  

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  Illogical Verdict
  
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  “Soft form” of JML
  
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    Verdict is “against the great weight of the evidence.”
    
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    Contrast JML: “a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue”
    

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  JML:
  
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    Focuses on adequacy of evidence
    
    • 
      Assumes process o.k.
      
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    Replaces jury’s verdict with judge’s judgment
    
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    Results in final judgment
    
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      And therefore immediately appealable
      
  • 
    Party must make a motion
    
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  New Trial:
  
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    Looks either at evidentiary adequacy or process
    
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    Sends case to new jury
    
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    Does not result in final judgment if granted
    
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      And therefore unappealable (unless conditional as part of a j.n.o.v order)
      
  • 
    Can be done sua sponte
    

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  Oral testimony between Lind, his secretary, and Schenley’s agents (defendant liquor store): difference in testimony
  
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    Jury found that a contract existed & awarded damagesSchenley moved for JNOV and a new a trial…Judge granted this motion
    
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  Why did the trial court grant a new trial?
  
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    Because he thought the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence
    
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  Why did the appellate court reverse?
  
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    A prime example of subject matter lying well within the comprehension of jurors is presented by the circumstances at bar (wasn’t complicated--just a “he said/she said”
    
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  Is this a case about a flawed procedure or a flawed verdict? Flawed verdict
  
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  What is the proper standard for deciding a motion for a new trial and how should that standard be applied here?
  
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    Actual standard: abuse of discretionrarely find that the trial court abused its discretion
    
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      Trial court’s job is to avoid a miscarriage of justice
      
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      Trial judge is not supposed to be the 13^th juror…not supposed to substitute his own judgment for that of the jury
      
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      Trial court did not believe plaintiff’s testimony (“substituted his judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury”)
      

1. 
   New trial limited to damages
   
2. 
   Remittitur
   
3. 
   Additur
   

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  Claim:
  
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    aka res judicata
    
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    Basic scenario:
    
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      1. P v. D for negligence. D wins.
      
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      2. Can P sue D again for negligence from same accident? No.
      
  • 
    WHY NOT?
    
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    Source of Law? Common law
    
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  Issue:
  
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    aka collateral estoppel
    
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    Basic scenario:
    
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      1. P v. D re: first accident.
      
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      2. P and D have second accident; can parties avoid re-litigation of any issues?
      

1. 
   Final judgment
   
2. 
   Judgment must be “on the merits.”
   
3. 
   Same claims
   
4. 
   Same parties
   

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  Deceptively simple
  
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  How far afield does the doctrine go from our basic scenario?
  

#1 Frier v. City (State court)substantive (on the merits)

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  Replevin
  

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  Judgment for City
  

#2 Frier v. City (Federal Ct.)procedural

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  42 U.S.C.§1983
  
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  Judgment for City
  

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  What was trial court’s decision in Frier #2? Judgment for city
  
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  What was appellate court’s decision in Frier #2? Claim preclusion on #2
  
  • 
    How did it reach that conclusion?
    
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      Majority?
      
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        Arose from the same operative facts in replevin & § 1983 actions are therefore the same
        
      • 
        Divergence does not mean that the two legal theories require a different core of operative facts (even though he didn’t bring the § 1983 action originally in #1)
        
      • 
        Elements of claims are different but would apply the same facts to both
        
    • 
      Concurrence? Claim preclusion doesn’t apply here…I would have granted SJ on the merits
      
  • 
    Different tests:
    
    • 
      Majority “Transactional” approach: All claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence precluded from re-litigation.
      
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      Minority (Illinois?): “same cause of action” i.e. “evidence necessary to sustain a second verdict would sustain the first”
      
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  Result of claim preclusion:
  
  • 
    Plaintiffs will bring every possible claim
    

1. 
   First action brought under expedited replevin statute; only question that could be litigated is who has superior right to possession.
   

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  Is the due process claim precluded under these facts? No, because he did not get to have his day in court. Didn’t have opportunity to bring the claims together
  
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  Rule 18: plaintiff may join together any claims it has against one party (claim preclusion makes it so that it MUST bring together all claims it has arising out of same facts)
  

2. 
   First action brought in a municipal court with a jurisdictional limit of $15K.
   
3. 
   Frier brings third suit alleging that city overcharged him on a recent tax bill.
   
4. 
   Frier brings third suit alleging officer vandalized his car.
   
5. 
   What if Frier were married and one of the towed cars belonged to his wife?
   

4/20: Respesct for Judgment II

1. 
   Final judgment
   
2. 
   Judgment must be “on the merits.”
   
3. 
   Same claims
   
4. 
   Same parties
   

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  Appellate Court affirms dismissal.
  
  • 
    Majority: Precluded under “same transaction or occurrence” test
    
  • 
    Concurrence: No preclusion under “same cause of action” test (but would grant SJ on merits)
    
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  How is Frier different from the simple claim preclusion situation?
  
  • 
    “Same Claims” includes any claims that could have been raised in first case (not just those that were)
    
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  Why do we allow this?
  
  • 
    Finality--defendants should have some piece of mind
    
  • 
    At that first chance, plaintiff gets a really good one
    

“Compulsory Claims”

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  Compulsory Counterclaims
  
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    Must be brought if they arise out of the “same transaction or occurrence.” Rule 13(a).
    
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  “Compulsory Claims”
  
  • 
    No rule BUT claim preclusion flows from common law
    
  • 
    Rule 18 says “may” but common law says “must”
    
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  Same t/o for claim preclusion (majority test) = Same t/o for supplemental jurisdiction***
  
  • 
    Suit 1: P brings federal claim for wrongful termination that goes to judgment. Can P bring second lawsuit asserting a state law claim arising out of the wrongful termination?
    

1. 
   First action brought in a municipal court with a jurisdictional limit of $15K.
   

• 
  Was asking for $100K in due process damages
  
• 
  Restatement says that there is preclusion so long as the plaintiff had a real choice as to where to bring the action
  

2. 
   Frier brings third suit alleging that city overcharged him on a recent tax bill
   

• 
  Not precluded because this is completely different (doesn’t arise out of same transaction)
  

3. 
   Frier brings third suit alleging officer vandalized his car.
   

• 
  Probably precluded
  
• 
  Argument will be whether it is “same transaction or occurrence”
  

4. 
   What if Frier were married and one of the towed cars belonged to his wife?
   

• 
  Wife is not the same party, and she is not precluded from bringing her own claims
  

#1 Vandalia v. Frier

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  For Public Nuisance
  
  • 
    (Cars in alley)
    
• 
  Frier answers, denying nuisance
  
• 
  Settlement with Frier agreeing that he won’t park cars in the alley (or judgment for City)
  

• 
  Seeking DJ that public nuisance statute is unconstitutional.
  

Precluded? Yes, this is essentially Martino v. McDonalds. Rule 13(a) said he must have brought it as a compulsory counterclaim.

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  Martino wants to sue for anti-trust.
  
• 
  Court says that this is precluded because he already agreed in the consent agreement. He cannot attack the very provision that he consented to in the first lawsuit
  
• 
  Another policy consideration--consistency in judgments
  

• 
  Edlean & Woody get a divorce. Edlean gets awarded the house (in Woody’s name but MP)
  
• 
  Partnership brings suit against her for the house, claiming that they have a ½ interest
  
• 
  Definition of privity: a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right
  
  • 
    Includes a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property
    
  • 
    Easement owner takes subject to former owner--why? KNOWLEDGE.
    
• 
  Searle is a divorce proceeding--partnership couldn’t have been a party to the suit
  
• 
  Dissent: partnership (sons) knew about litigation & were actively involved, even testifying at trial
  

Opportunity Hypothesis and a Corollary:

• 
  Transactional preclusion permissible because plaintiff has an opportunity to bring all claims in first suit.
  
  • 
    Maybe even desirable to require plaintiffs to package related claims efficiently.
    
• 
  So it’s fair to preclude only if the precluded party has had a fair opportunity to litigate the claim.
  
  • 
    On rare occasions non-party so closely controls first action we treat her as a party.