U. s-japan Alliance is strong, but fragile
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Accidents ImpactAccidents are likely and go global – outweighs intentional warsHayes 15 (Peter, Executive Director for the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, “Ending Nuclear Threat via a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone,” http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/ending-a-nuclear-threat-via-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapons-free-zone/) Deterrence, compellence, and reassurance are credible depending on the resolve and capability of the state projecting nuclear threat, and the ability of the threatened state to respond in kind or asymmetrically, to offset these threats. All three types of effects are almost always present in a nuclear threat made by one party to another; sometimes all three effects may be in play at the same time, either in the intention of the state projecting nuclear threat, or in the perception of the state that is the target of the threat, or in the perceptions of third parties. It is rare for the intentions and perceptions of these two or more affected states to be the same. Therein lies much of the risk of misperception, misunderstanding, and inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. This risk arising from miscalculation is compounded by the accidental risks of nuclear war because of technical or computer malfunctions, misinterpreted signals of an impending attack, problems in communication systems, problems in fail-safe and control systems, and cybernetic organizational feedbacks that could lead to loss-of-control of conventional and nuclear forces. 3. Nuclear Threat in Northeast Asia All states in the Northeast Asia region fall under the shadow of the threat of nuclear war. Sometimes, this threat is intended, manipulated, and calibrated, by a variety of signals—nuclear testing, delivery system testing, visible transiting deployments, forward deployment in host countries, declaratory doctrines, operational doctrines, political statements, propaganda statements, sharing via deliberate open line communications, or even what is not done or said at a particularly tense moment. Nuclear threat is one of the bases of interstate relations between the long-standing NWSs in this region, the United States, China, and Russia, forming a triangle of strategic nuclear deterrence, compellence, and reassurance that operates continuously and generally; and sometimes becomes part of an immediate confrontation. Accordingly, these types of threat are termed general and immediate in western literature.[3] Thus, general and strategic nuclear deterrence may be said to operate to ensure that NWSs avoid actions that might suggest that they could involve nuclear weapons and intentions to use them—thereby creating a cautionary behavior that operates all the time. China-Japan War ImpactSino-Japan conflict draws in the US and triggers nuclear escalation.Ayson & Bell 14 (Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria University of Wellington, and Adjunct Professor at the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre & Desmond Ball Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University, where he was head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre from 1984 to 1991., “Can a Sino-Japanese War Be Controlled?”, Survival | vol. 56 no. 6 | December 2014–January 2015 | pp. 135–166) Nuclear options and incentives The role of nuclear weapons is one of the most important aspects of the escalation question in North Asia, as China has a nuclear arsenal and Japan relies on US extended deterrence. If Beijing and Tokyo engage in conventional military conflict, the prospects of direct Sino-American nuclear escalation come into play more clearly. One of the main concerns about the possibility of such escalation revolves around America’s superiority to China in terms of conventional fighting power.41 While China is closing that gap, some American conventional systems allow Washington to threaten China with accurate, destructive strikes that Beijing cannot hope to replicate. Should Sino-American hostilities seem likely to intensify, China could be tempted to utilise its nuclear forces. In such a conflict, however, Beijing should be aware that any attempted nuclear attack on the US would be almost guaranteed to generate a swift and probably disproportionate nuclear response. Mutual fear of surprise attacks and inadvertent nuclear war could not be ruled out, but nuclear deterrence might well operate effectively.42 In the early stages of a conflict involving only China and Japan, the nuclear question takes on a different perspective. Beijing would still face the prospect of relative conventional-military weakness, especially when it considered the possibility of American support to Tokyo. But if China decided to escalate by threatening Japan with nuclear bombardment, it would have to weigh the credibility of American extended deterrence, some portion of which would almost certainly swing into action. At the very least, China would have to deal with the costs of a strong conventional response by the US. One might expect that nuclear threats, implicit or otherwise, would remain in the background. Washington could regard the threat of a nuclear response as effective leverage, discouraging China from escalating a conventional conflict with Japan without the need for heavy US involvement in a conventional military contest. Similarly, China might remind Japan about the existence of its nuclear forces, so as to highlight the potential costs of conventional escalation. Testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during early hostilities – rather like the 2014 Russian test, apparently longscheduled, during the Ukraine crisis – could be such a signalling mechanism. If China suffers, or merely fears, a significant attack on its command and control systems, there are other material reasons why nuclear escalation could become more likely. Unlike the US or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China lacks separate, redundant theatre and strategic networks for C4ISR. This increases the likelihood that what Japan and especially the US view as an escalating conflict in the conventional domain could have quite a different appearance to Chinese decision-makers. Conventional escalation could easily cause the US to take measures that imperilled China’s control of its nuclear systems. Aware of its general C4ISR vulnerability, Beijing would already have experienced considerable pressure to use its antisatellite systems, anti-ship ballistic missiles (including the DF21-D) and other anti-carrier weapons, and to accelerate its cyber attacks.43 The US would likely respond to the use of these capabilities by destroying all remaining Chinese force elements in any way connected to them, which would have further C4ISR implications for China. America could be expected to forgo attacks on Chinese urban–industrial centres and many other force elements. Washington would seek to convey restraint and selectivity in its response, but would already have provided Beijing with a perverse incentive to use nuclear weapons pre-emptively, out of fear that its capacity to maintain command and control of these systems was being destroyed in the conventional conflict. 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