U. s-japan Alliance is strong, but fragile
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- The alliance is resilient – incentives to cooperate outweigh bubbling tensions
- US-Japan Alliance Bad
- US-Japan alliance collapse good—withdrawal of US presence in Asia prevents Sino-American war
Alliance ResilientJapan alliance resilientPilling 15 — David Pilling, Asia editor of the Financial Times. 2015 ("An unsinkable Pacific alliance," Financial Times, April 22nd, Availabale Online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e32282d8-e8cf-11e4-87fe-00144feab7de.html#axzz3cPkFBAkt, Accessed 06/26/2016, SP) The closeness between America and Japan, forged in the ashes of war, goes beyond the ideological¶ If the Americans and Japanese went in for that kind of thing they might describe themselves as being as close as lips and teeth. In actual fact, that it is how China and North Korea have traditionally categorised their relationship. Washington and Tokyo prefer to talk soberly about their “shared values” as fellow democracies and market economies. Yet, despite the lack of colourful language, theirs has been one of the closest and most enduring of postwar relationships. They stand shoulder to shoulder on most issues from terrorism to intellectual property.¶ That closeness, forged in the ashes of the second world war, goes beyond the ideological. In tangible ways, the two lean on each other heavily. The US regards Japan as its representative in Asia. It depends on Japan to help fund its debt: Tokyo not Beijing is the biggest holder of US Treasuries, if only just. Japan has supported Washington’s military interventions, with cash and, increasingly, with logistical support. Tokyo relies on the US nuclear umbrella and on the protection afforded by 35,000 US troops stationed on its territory. In a candid description of the relationship, Yasuhiro Nakasone, prime minister in the mid-1980s, referred to Japan as Washington’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in the Pacific.¶ Next week Shinzo Abe, perhaps Japan’s strongest leader since Mr Nakasone, will celebrate 70 years of that relationship with a rare speech to a joint session of Congress. He will stress Japan’s concerted effort to revive its economy. He will urge Congress to give Barack Obama, the US president, the fast-track authority he needs to conclude the Trans Pacific Partnership. He will express some contrition for the war, though perhaps not enough for the taste of some in congress. He will paint a future in which Japan, released from postwar constitutional handcuffs, can play a more active role in helping the US to keep the world a safe and lawful place. He is unlikely to mention China. But everyone will know what he means.¶ Mr Abe will mostly be warmly received. Washington hopes Abenomics will work and is prepared to tolerate a little “Abenesia” — the downplaying of Japan’s war record — if that is the price of a strong leader. Indeed, many in Washington regard Mr Abe as the best Japanese prime minister in a generation. The alliance is resilient – incentives to cooperate outweigh bubbling tensionsXu 14 (Beina, Editor/Writer Council on Foreign Relations 7/1/14, Citing Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College & Sheila Smith, CFR Senior Fellow, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance”, http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437) "It's been very corrosive for the alliance," Smith says of the Okinawa issue. "It has focused our attention on this one particular base, when the real challenge for the alliance has been to come up with a broader framework for the sustainability of U.S. forces in Japan." The Future of the Alliance The coordination between U.S. and Japanese military forces after the devastating March 2011 earthquake and consequent tsunami that struck Tohoku demonstrated the resilience of the alliance. The SDF conducted rescue operations in tandem with thousands of U.S. forces under Operation Tomodachi, the largest bilateral mission in the history of the alliance. U.S. forces aided the SDF in clearing Sendai's airport, assisted in search-and-rescue teams, and prepared Japan's defense readiness. This high level of support echoed Japan's own cooperation during the Gulf and Iraq wars. In November 2001, the government of Junichiro Koizumi dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, marking Japan's first overseas military action during a combat operation. A year later, Japan drafted a bill that would allow the SDF to be dispatched to postwar Iraq, and in 2003 it sent forces to aid in postwar reconstruction efforts. At a 2 + 2 meeting in early October 2013, the United States agreed to deploy reconnaissance drones to Japan, which also pledged up to $3.1 billion to relocate five thousand U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Ministers also agreed to rewrite the guidelines for U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation for the first time since 1997 in revisions that would expand cooperation on counterterrorism and bolster the allies' ability to respond to an attack on Japan. In July 2014, Japan took a step toward a more active role in regional security when Abe announced that his cabinet had approved a reinterpretation of the antiwar Constitution that would allow Japanese forces to aid friendly nations under attack. The decision marks a significant shift from a position that had strictly limited Japan to act solely in its own defense. "Japan, for half a century, has expanded its military capability in ways that raise questions about the interpretation of Article Nine in its constitution," says Smith. "And the question has become, 'How much can Japan do in the alliance?'" Some experts have defined the modern-day alliance to be more inclusive, advocating initiatives such as trade and energy cooperation as the road to a future framework. "This is bigger than just the military. These are instruments we use to improve our own national prosperity and security, and that's fundamentally what this alliance should be about," Smith says. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership has been a highly promising economic development that observers hope will tighten the alliance. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster forced Japan to reconsider its energy policies, Washington agreed to a long-term liquefied natural gas export deal with Japan that could see the United States become a supplier for the island country. "This is the most relevant the alliance has been in a long time," says Lind. "With the ebb and flow of what's going on in the region, these are two countries that are highly incentivized to make this work." US-Japan Alliance BadA stronger US-Japan Alliance risks a “new Cold War”Chen 15 —Dingding Chen, assistant professor of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute, Founding Director of 海国图智研究院（Intellisia Institute), a newly established independent think tank focusing on international affairs in China, 2015. (“A Deepening US-Japan Alliance: Be Careful What You Wish For,” The Diplomat, May 1st, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/a-deepening-us-japan-alliance-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/, Accessed 05-02-2016, aqp) A more serious problem is Japan’s intended target in Asia. Although unstated, everyone knows that the real target of the U.S.-Japan security alliance is China. A new disturbing development is that Japan and the U.S. may start joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea, with an aim to counterbalance China’s growing presence there. This is a puzzling move on Japan’s part. There is already a high chance of an accidental clash of plans and vessels between China and Japan in the East China Sea—why risk another clash with China in the South China Sea? Plus, Japan is not part of any South China Sea disputes, so why does Japan want to be dragged into the already very complex situation? Perhaps the pressures come from the United States, and perhaps Japan sees a good opportunity in mobilizing smaller Southeast Asian states to balance against China. Whatever the motivation, Japan’s move is a highly risky one and it would only lead to higher levels of tensions between Japan and China. In the realm of international politics, action begets reaction and a new alliance invites a counter-alliance. So we now have a stronger and firmer U.S.-Japan alliance, what will China do? The most likely case is that China will counteract the U.S.-Japan alliance with its own alliance with Russia (most likely). Already, because of America’s strategic mistakes in Europe, Russia is quickly moving closer to China, both economically and politically. It is no longer unthinkable that we might see a China-Russia alliance in the near future, particularly if the U.S. and Japan increase their pressures on China. If indeed someday that happens, we might enter a ‘new cold war’ in Asia—real bad news for everyone. US-Japan alliance collapse good—withdrawal of US presence in Asia prevents Sino-American warGlaser 15—John Glaser, Media Relations Manager for the Cato Institute, master's degree in International Relations and National Security Studies from George Mason University, BA, Political Science from University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2015. ("The US and China Can Avoid a Collision Course – If the US Gives Up Its Empire,” The Guardian, May 28th, Available Online at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/28/conflict-us-china-not-inevitable-empire, Accessed 06-05-2016, aqp) To avoid a violent militaristic clash with China, or another cold war rivalry, the United States should pursue a simple solution: give up its empire. Americans fear that China’s rapid economic growth will slowly translate into a more expansive and assertive foreign policy that will inevitably result in a war with the US. Harvard Professor Graham Allison has found: “in 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years when a rising power challenged a ruling power, the outcome was war.” Chicago University scholar John Mearsheimer has bluntly argued: “China cannot rise peacefully.” But the apparently looming conflict between the US and China is not because of China’s rise per se, but rather because the US insists on maintaining military and economic dominance among China’s neighbors. Although Americans like to think of their massive overseas military presence as a benign force that’s inherently stabilizing, Beijing certainly doesn’t see it that way. According to political scientists Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Beijing sees America as “the most intrusive outside actor in China’s internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China’s neighbors.” (All of which is true.) They think that the US “seeks to curtail China’s political influence and harm China’s interests” with a “militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish” foreign policy. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.99 Mb. Share with your friends:
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