U. s-japan Alliance is strong, but fragile
Download 0.99 Mb.
|
- Navigate this page:
- Okinawa is a place of tension between us japan relations
- Tensions over Okinawa threaten to derail the US-Japan Alliance
- Okinawa and the Futenma airbase are perpetual issues
Okinawa Alt CauseOkinawa crushes relationsAvery et al 14— Emma Chanlett-Avery Is a Specialist in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, William H. Cooper is a Specialist in International Trade and Finance for the Congressional Research Service, Mark E. Manyin is a Specialist in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, Ian E. Rinehart is an Analyst in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, 2014 (Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, February 20, 2014, Accessed 6/27/16, Available online at http://mansfieldfdn.org/mfdn2011/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/USJ.Feb14.RL33436.pdf JRR) Henoko area of Nago City, would replace the functions of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma, located in the center of a crowded town in southern Okinawa. Although the recently reelected mayor of Nago City has displayed firm opposition to the new facility, most experts agree that his powers to obstruct and delay its construction are limited. The governor’s approval of the landfill permit in theory should allow Washington and Tokyo to consummate their agreement to return the land occupied by MCAS Futenma to local authorities, while retaining a similar level of military capability on Okinawa. A U.S.-Japan joint planning document in April 2013 indicated that the new base at Henoko would be completed no earlier than 2022. Despite the decision by Governor Nakaima, most Okinawans oppose the construction of a new U.S. base for a mix of political, environmental, and quality-of-life reasons. U.S. and Japanese officials on Okinawa asserted in 2013 that law enforcement authorities are prepared to manage disruptive protests, but Okinawan anti-base civic groups may take extreme measures to prevent construction of the facility at Henoko. The Abe Administration, having invested significant time and money in meeting Nakaima’s conditions for approval, will likely need to invest additional political capital to ensure that the base construction proceeds without significant delays and without further alienating the Okinawan public. Failure to implement the Futenma relocation could solidify an impression among some American observers that the Japanese political system struggles to follow through with difficult tasks. On the other hand, the risk remains that heavyhanded actions by Tokyo or Washington could lead to stridently anti-base politicians making gains in Okinawa, particularly in the gubernatorial election in late 2014. Due to the legacy of the U.S. occupation and the island’s key strategic location, Okinawa hosts a disproportionate share of the U.S. military presence in Japan. About 25% of all facilities used by U.S. Forces Japan and over half of the U.S. military personnel are located in the prefecture, which comprises less than 1% of Japan’s total land area. The attitudes of native Okinawans toward U.S. military bases are generally characterized as negative, reflecting a tumultuous history and complex relationships with “mainland” Japan and with the United States. The anti-base movement remains strong and vocal in Okinawa. Opposition to U.S. military bases derives from two main areas: one, quality-of-life issues such as personal safety, noise, crime, and environmental degradation; and two, pacifism and anti-militarism. These two strands are often interwoven in the rhetoric of the anti-base movement, but not all residents oppose the U.S. military presence on principle. There are those who support the U.S.-Japan security alliance while objecting to the significant and disproportionate “burden” imposed on Okinawa. Because of these widespread concerns among Okinawans, the sustainability of the U.S. military presence in Japan remains a critical challenge for the alliance. Okinawa is a place of tension between us japan relationsYoshikawa 15 — (Yukie, 4/28/15, “The Okinawa Threat to U.S.-Japan Defense Ties”, http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-okinawa-threat-to-u-s-japan-defense-ties-1430240988, The Wall Street Journal, Accessed 6/26/16, MW) U.S.-Japanese security ties are a major theme of this week’s U.S. tour by Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, during which he and President Barack Obama have announced updated defense-alliance guidelines for the first time in two decades. Amid strong bilateral cooperation concerning joint military training, missile defense and other issues, however, the matter of U.S. military bases on the Japanese island of Okinawa remains unsettled and potentially explosive. Especially controversial is whether the U.S. Marine Air Station at Futenma, in the densely populated city of Ginowan, will be relocated to a rural part of the island—as Washington and Tokyo agreed in 1996—or moved out of Okinawa, as the local governor and many voters demand. During my tenure as a fellow of the Okinawa prefectural government from 2012 to 2014, I visited most of the U.S. military bases and their local city halls in Okinawa. This is the island where nearly 75% of U.S. military facilities (for exclusive use) in Japan are concentrated. I met with many local residents and members of the U.S. military and learned a great deal about U.S.-Japan relations on the ground. To my dismay, and despite much high-level rhetoric from Washington and Tokyo about the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, most Okinawans had very low opinions of the U.S. military. Some local government officials told me it had been several years since a U.S. military officer last visited their offices. Few Okinawan officials had a clear understanding of the chains of command within the military institutions based on the island. Local U.S. Marine commanders may provide the prefectural government with an organization chart, I was told, but there would be no accompanying explanation of how each department within the organization functions. Part of this stems from wariness on the part of the Americans. When one U.S. Marine commander suggested that more information be shared with the prefectural government in order to minimize the chances of miscommunication, his advisors rejected the proposal, believing that Okinawan officials would leak the information to local interest groups opposed to the presence of U.S. bases there. This lack of communication helps create a climate of animosity, as local officials seeking clarity on military procedures are routinely stonewalled and frustrated, lending credence to their belief that the U.S. military doesn’t care about them. They, in turn, become more uncooperative toward U.S. military personnel. The onus, however, is on the Americans. The Americans need to maintain good relations with the locals, especially given that many locals question the very existence of the bases. The base issue has always been a touchy one, driving risk-averse local bureaucrats to avoid military contact. The language barrier stands tall, while the fence surrounding the U.S. bases creates a physical divide that allows little space for interaction. Americans have tried to build good relations with the locals and contribute to Okinawa’s quality of life—for instance, by cleaning up beaches, teaching English or organizing sporting events. But such actions don’t always succeed. Often they are viewed by locals with suspicion or cynicism. These acts of goodwill should not be a goal but merely a starting point. I found during my interviews, with very few exceptions, that the most successful U.S. base commanders and liaison officers were those who had developed deep local relations. These officers and commanders are frequently visiting city halls and befriending ward chiefs. They also clean beaches and teach English, but they focus first on establishing friendships with the locals, sometimes going for coffee together after beach events or having dinner after language lessons. Such relationships make it easier to establish the necessary lines of communications when potential controversies arise, such as car accidents or crimes committed by U.S. service members. The locals would inform the liaison officers and base commanders of incidents soon after they occur, helping them understand how and when to apologize, and to whom—all of which would be vital for effective damage control. Meeting in person with local leaders and residents, therefore, is the essential first step to reducing mistrust between the U.S. military and the people of Okinawa. As one successful U.S. commander said he learned from his Okinawan interlocutors: “If I see you in person, it is difficult to hate you.” Tensions over Okinawa threaten to derail the US-Japan AllianceLind 15—Jennifer Lind, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Political Science and Government from MIT, Master of Pacific International Affairs from University of California San Diego, 2015. (“Could Okinawa Derail U.S.-Japan Relations?” National Interest, April 2nd, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-okinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=3, Accessed 06-26-2016, p. 2-3) Peculiar, for two reasons. First, although the eventual return of Okinawa to Japan was legislated in 1971, it was actually an important accomplishment of the Kennedy administration. Reischauer believed that a crisis over Okinawa could happen at any time, and would damage or even destroy the alliance. So as ambassador he devoted tremendous energy to negotiating the reversion of Okinawa with both the U.S. military and the Japanese. This effort floundered for a while after the president’s assassination, and was not realized until the Nixon years. But Reischauer’s contribution was an important Kennedy-era legacy, and thus a strange omission from a panel on that topic. But that’s the problem with non-events; though always eager to assign blame for a crisis that did happen, we forget to confer praise for one that didn’t. Okinawa also belonged on that stage because it still remains a vexing challenge in the U.S.-Japan alliance. In the past few years, as Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands grows more heated, with aircraft and ships from each side circling around the disputed islands, Shinzo Abe’s government has emphasized the dangers that Chinese military modernization and territorial claims pose to Japan. In this environment, the U.S.-Japan alliance and Okinawa’s bases acquire even more significance than in the past. But also in the past few years, Okinawa’s anti-base movement has accelerated, and in general alliance managers face a more complex political environment. In fact, just a few days after the symposium, Okinawa’s governor, Takeshi Onaga, brought the issue back into the headlines. Japan’s Defense Ministry had begun preliminary exploration and drilling on a facility that would replace the U.S. Marine base at Futenma. Tokyo and Washington view the move as essential to create a sustainable U.S. presence, because it moves the Marines out of a potentially dangerous urban location.
To be fair, the problem associated with the relocation of Futenma Air Station is not of Abe’s making. In 2009, Yukio Hatoyama, then the prime minister and head of the Democratic Party of Japan, promised that his government would look for an alternative to the current relocation plan that is “at minimum outside Okinawa.” With that promise, a sense of hope quickly emerged and spread in Okinawa that the Futenma relocation issue could be resolved under the new political leadership. When Hatoyama admitted nine months into his premiership that he had come to realize that the existing plan was indeed the best option available for Okinawa, disenchanted political leaders in Okinawa (who lost whatever little confidence they may have had in Japan’s central government) came together behind the banner of “no new construction in Henoko.” In other words, five years after Hatoyama left office, the Abe government still struggles to recover from the situation aggravated during the Hatoyama administration. Still, the reality remains that the relocation of Futenma Air Station has not been achieved almost 20 years after the U.S. and Japanese governments first agreed on it in 1996. The local government holds a great deal of authority in issuing various permits required for the construction of the replacement facility to proceed. Therefore, even if Onaga cannot stop the construction in Henoko, he can still make the process as difficult as possible for the Japanese government. Theoretically, Abe can counter these moves by trying to enact a Special Measures Law that would allow the central government in Tokyo to proceed with the relocation without having to subject the process to the approval by the governor and/or mayor, essentially overriding their authority. There is precedent for this — in 1996, the Japanese government revised the Special Measures Law to practically allow the Japanese government to continue to rent the land for U.S. military bases and other facilities from private landowners regardless of the owners’ request for the land to be returned. However, doing so prematurely would damage the Abe government as it has the risk of triggering anti-U.S. base sentiment across Japan. The approval rating for Abe’s cabinet is on the decline since the government hit a major speed bump in its deliberation of national security legislation after three constitutional scholars unanimously argued that the proposed legislation is “unconstitutional.” Under the circumstances, Abe will not want to force the issue. The current situation, where Futenma Air Station’s ultimate fate remains in limbo, is unsustainable. As Tokyo’s relationship with Okinawa remains deadlocked with no real prospect of a breakthrough, Futenma remains, as it was 20 years ago, one of the most tangible vulnerabilities for the political sustainability of a U.S. military presence in Japan, and the U.S.-Japan alliance writ large. Directory: file -> view view -> Western Europe after wwii view -> Author study: paul fleischman view -> Qpa1 7ela study Guide view -> Arctic Oil/Gas Neg view -> November 1970 Approximately 150,000-500,000 deaths Bhola Cyclone Bangladesh view -> Grade Level: 6 Unit of Study: Caribbean glce view -> Citation: Duffield, Katy view -> Table of Contents Lesson # view -> Chinese Wind Energy Disad Download 0.99 Mb. Share with your friends:
|