Vojenské rozhledy 1/2000, Czech Military Review [vr no 1/2000] English Annotation The Alliance Dimension of Conceptual Frame of Security And Defence Policy of the Czech Republic



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The French Concept of Forces Deployment by PhDr. Jan Eichler. All member states of the Alliance re-examine international situation and its effects on the development of armed forces. The summary of French ideas is explained in newly published document ”Armed Forces Deployment”. The theme is divided into four chapters. The first chapter makes short review of military situation in the last ten years, the second chapter characterizes main features of French military strategy, third chapter concentrates on capacities of French armed forces and finally, the last chapter pursues the main theme: the concept of prospective engagement of the forces. French concept goes back towards the White Book of Defence (published in 1994). It depicted six scenarios of possible deployment. New document brings those scenarios up to date and with the background of the late 90s they analyse related situations. The French concept puts decisive importance to international dimension of security, especially to co-ordination with the frame of the EU. It is always all-European position that is underlined. French top-leaders push ahead forming the so-called Eurocorps (with the total of 60,000 men), which could be co-ordinated with the NATO alliance, but independent from it. European defence identity can’t be build against the United States, but only with their close support. [VR No 3/2001]
Risks Connected with the Acquisition and the Performance of Military Vehicles and Materiel by Prof. Ing. Milan Štěpánek, Dr.Sc., Doc. Ing. Milan Šebesta, CSc. During the life cycle of vehicles and material we come upon risk situations. Those might be described as circumstances or factors having adverse influence on certain process. To solve this problem, we must set such methodology that could eliminate risks or dispose them into more acceptable scope. Identification is a first phase of the so-called risk management. The next step is quantitative analysis and risk assessment. Its level depends on a degree necessary for planning effective moderate strategies. There are also various combinations of risks. Risk manager summarizes results and evaluates them, then he sets priorities. Risk abatement lies in (1) avoidance—we change technological parameters; (2) prevention—frequent inspections; (3) assumption—we can accept small risks; (4) redeployment—we transfer responsibilities on a supplier of army materiel. The paper drew on QAR Training Handbook on Risk Management, AQAP 170, NATO 1997, and FC/AFLC Pamphlet 800-45 Software Risk Abatement, 1988. [VR No 3/2001]
Information Operations and the IBCT by Col Leonard G. Nowak, US Army (ret.). The US Army’s new and lighter brigade, the interim brigade combat team (IBCT) is being designed to improve strategic mobility and quick response to potential trouble spots in any operational theatre. As with any force structure change, the tradeoffs among combat effectiveness, sustainability and deployability are manifold and complex. To fight smart, the medium light force needs to take fresh look at military operations. Today’s emerging information operations concepts invite land forces to get a nearly bloodless victory. Information operations can reduce the probability of a close and prolonged engagement where even the winner loses. Brigade-level IO is especially appealing because it is simple and straightforward, placing few demands on the commander and staff. The challenge is to explore the less-traditional avenues available to influence the enemy, especially the enemy decision-maker. At the lower tactical levels, the task is very direct: either shut down or alter the enemy’s information flow, cause him to doubt his ability to win, then destroy him and his staff. Fully integrating IO with fire and manoeuvre (or with the threat of fire and manoeuvre) significantly increases the probability of success on terms favouring the friendly force. Information operations are divided between offensive IO (direct fire, jammers, air support, psychological operations) and defensive IO (air defence, counterintelligence, camouflage, deception, counter-reconnaissance). The article appeared in American professional journal Military Review, September-October 2000. [VR No 3/2001]
Modelling and Simulations in Military Science by Prof. Ing. František Miklošík, Dr.Sc. Armed forces always used a sort of modelling and simulation, even in their prehistory. But at present, when prices of arms complexes are extremely high, their combat deployment is ultimately complicated, combat simulation gains importance that never had in the past. It has developed into autonomous discipline. Last year, Publishing and Information Agency of MoD of the Slovak Republic published wide-ranging monograph Modelling and Simulation in Military (Bratislava 2000, 400 pages). The authors presents various models and paradigms used abroad, where many institutions and centres have been using modelling for many years. Modelling can reduce outlays for tactical exercises and methods of constructive and virtual modelling increase capabilities of command and control process. The so-called live simulation imitates methods of classical armed engagement, with involvement of commanders, staffs, troops and combat vehicles). Constructive simulation of armed engagement covers staff models and calculations, theory of marksmanship, mathematical models of air fights. Virtual simulations works with trainers in virtual reality. Principles of artificial intelligence make use of advance information technology. Beyond lower expenses for gaining practical experience, methods of modelling, especially constructive and virtual modelling, reduce endangerment of all soldiers who take part in military exercises. [VR No 3/2001]
Comments to Fire Control Systems—Tank Cannons by Prof. Ing. Pavel Fischer. Some published information on the control of fire systems from tank cannons introduce a notion that it is very easy task and that fire and effects depend only on the technology integrated into desk apparatus. It is far from true. The author argues that mentioned system is not automatic system, but only automated system of targeting. The skill of its operating personnel has a priority. Destroying or neutralizing target is in the responsibility of man. Even though this system has 40 percent of probability of precise hit, man has to discriminate targets and set priorities. System must know tactical data of a target. Laser rangefinder is a necessary element of every fire control. It is very effective under ideal conditions, but rough weather, lower visibility reduce its effectivity, especially turbulence of air layers cut down its trustworthiness. Identified lengths are also influenced by various factors, by direct sunlight, or light reflections. Noctovisors (sniperscopes) use infrared waves, the picture is vague, colours are suppressed. Again it is personnel who must have sufficient skill to aim the target and correct entries. Instrument manuals state data that are valid only for ideal conditions, they do not take into account meteorological preconditions. So, we can draw conclusion that readings in various instruction manuals are to be taken with certain distrust to stated data. [VR No 3/2001]


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