Vojenské rozhledy 1/2000, Czech Military Review [vr no 1/2000] English Annotation The Alliance Dimension of Conceptual Frame of Security And Defence Policy of the Czech Republic



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MILITARY ART



Revolution in Military Affairs by Ing. Karel Kozák, Ph.D. The notion ”Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) is a literal translation of English term. In Czech we could better say ”revolution in military science and practice”. The author underlines that we mustn’t confuse the RMA with the ”Military Technological Revolution”. Those two terms are interconnected, but the notion ”military affairs” covers larger scope of problems. The RMA is a nearly magical notion that became a keynote of all progressive military thinking. This article is not composed to praise the U.S. for making use of advanced technologies in weapons systems. The author rather looks upon this revolution from many points of view, and always has in mind the ACR and consequences resulting from our membership in various international organisations, above all in NATO alliance. The key change in our military thinking—is in specifying numbers of servicemen and military tasks. In the past we laid down the numbers of soldiers, tasks were assigned afterwards. This fact could be documented in many papers and confused concepts of weapons modernisation drowned up in the last ten years. Its two-sided process: every modernisation of offensive weapons has its adequate response in the development of defensive ones. The RMA is also closely tied with attitudes of ordinary citizens towards the military. Especially today, when people are still more and more unwilling to be involved in defence matters, including the defence of their own state. We must admit that such position is typical for the whole Czech history. It is patronised by various mass media, films, or even legislature (status of conscious objector). Refusing to serve in the army, bullying, vandalism, drunkenness and indiscipline of servicemen are typical examples of this. It is evident that in our country there is a tendency to hand the responsibility for defence over professional soldiers (volunteers) who will be paid for it. But personal responsibility for defence is also a constituent of overall state defence and security potential. [VR No 4/2001]
Military Technology and Military Strategy in the 21st Century by Doc. Ing. Jiří Strnádek, CSc. In the last two centuries, technology has become the prime source of not only humane civilisation, but also that of military strategy. Its progress is still speeded up. It was also the main means of solving crises at the end of 20th century. The origins of those conflicts varied: national, territorial disputes, ethnical, religious, political, and economic. New weapon systems were testified; new methods of forces deployment and strategical influence were applied. Those changes were reflected in Alliance strategy concept, adopted in 1991. After the collapse of the Soviet Union history has been quickly rolling. The threats have multiplied. The parallel process with the globalisation and integration is ”decentralisation”. The new NATO concept of 1999 took into account risks resulting from two analogous trends that are only two sides of one coin. They were accompanied by global proliferation of modern technologies increasing military depots of potential adversaries that might eventually outbalance NATO classical weaponry. The Combatant of the 21st century is said to be quite different from soldiers we used to be accustomed. He would be a sort of integrated weapon system, integrated into digital battlefield, consisting of armoured vehicles, artillery, reconnaissance systems, aircraft, all interconnected on the screen. Armoured vehicles will use new light materials and stealth technology, employing both passive and active protection. All will be easily projected by transport planes (rapid projection). Non-lethal weaponry will be widely employed, as well as electromagnetic pulse and microwaves and ultrasound. Means of electronic warfare will disorganise command and control systems, not to speak about high-precise smart ammunition. [VR No 4/2001]
What Sort of Army Will Be Necessary in the Year 2020? (Discussion about Joint Vision 2020, U.S. Armed Forces) by Col. Ing. František Valach, CSc. The following paper lays stress on the interpretation of some new spheres of military art and ideas that soon influence the foundations of military science. This essay exploits various articles from foreign press and is accompanied by some thoughts by Col. Valach and therefore--Col. Valach underlines--it can’t be labelled as a mere ”translation”. The Joint Vision 2020 is a conceptual document that covers all armed forces of the United States: Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Those forces are substantial for fulfilling national security strategy and the implementation government’s policy. They also represent basic tool for upkeeping the balance of international environment. Main bias of the Joint Vision 2020 is its concentration on the future, with the aim to regulate the transformation of the forces. The next two years will be influenced by two factors: firstly, warfare will be deeply influenced by information technology; secondly, armed forces will bank on intellectual and technological innovations. Dominant aspects will be as follows: rapid and deep manoeuvre, precise strikes, versatile protection from all directions, concentrated logistics. The full dominance spectrum puts on the first place deterrence, both active and passive, indefinite position between war and peace, peacekeeping and assistance operations. Information supremacy will accompany all military and non-military operations. Join operations will be interconnected. They will be characterised among others by force projection, i.e. the capabilities of the forces to be transported very quickly from one place to another. This quality with highly precise ammunition will maintain forces supremacy and makes retaliation measures believable. Such deterrence will be credible. The Common Vision 2020 is also going to reconstruct American forces on successfully mastered optimal integration of all joint forces, while preserving their independence. [VR No 4/2001]
Who is an Enemy? (Rules of Engagement.) Those rules (RoE) have a great importance namely today, during planning foreign operations. They lay down in conflicts certain limitations. Such limitations are new phenomena that serve as a tool to prevent early use of weapons. They upset classical pattern of employing forces. Now we do not use the term ”enemy”. The final goal of a conflict is not a ”victory”, but the ”final state”. The combat employment of forces is regarded as something extraordinary that should be avoided. The notion ”enemy” has several levels. It is someone who threats peace and international security. Territorial claims or threatening national life requirements are not the characteristics of the ”enemy”. The evil is not in his demands, but in the usage of violence. The international community does not pass final judgements, it does not qualify motives, but tries to reconcile all opposing parties, to return the conflict back to a political level. Such attitudes are manifested by neutrality stance. Opposing blocs are multidimensional, multiethnic, religious. Motives that elicited unrests are not clear. The position of a combatant--under the international laws and the Geneva Conventions--is indefinite, vague. The enemy became an opponent that is difficult to define. The symmetric relation ceased to exist. All participants in a conflict are prospective allies. The enemy is determined only by his hostile behaviour. Legislative norms are near to civilian norms in peace. In fact, the core legislative norms are of political nature. Ever military intervention must be justified under the UN Charter, chapters VI and VII. Both chapters deeply influence the rules of engagement. If it is an action under the article 51, criteria of decency and propriety must be observed. Military-political frame changes according to current situation. NATO alliance has three types of engagements: RoE Request; RoE authorisation; RoE implementation. They are based on deliberate strategical decision. And all officers considering prospective military operation ought to be familiar with them. [VR No 4/2001]
Automated Support of Logistics in Field Conditions (An Introduction to Modelling Logistical Processes) by Lt.Col. Ing. Miroslav Pecina, CSc. In every sphere of the military you may come upon something similar to modelling. It is a simplified representation or description of a system or complex entity, esp. one designed to facilitate calculations and predictions. It could be defined as an interpretation of a formal system under which the theorems derivable in that system are mapped. The capacities of modern computers used for modelling are innumerable higher than those of man. Nevertheless it is the man who sits behind the computer, prepares and controls its operations. The basic asset of using computers is the maximalisation of probabilities and selecting optimal variants. Methods of operational research are of mathematical character. They are namely: mathematical expectation, statistics, and theory of mass handling, theory of games, mathematical programming, network theory, and so on. Automated logistical support has a long tradition in our Army. It dates back to the early 60s. At present, at the Department of Military Logistics (Military Academy Brno), they solve automated support for the calculation of losses, repairs of arms, weapons, and vehicles, at a tactical level. The project is intended for the commander at a brigade (battalion, division) level, who is in charge of maintenance and repairs. The calculations of losses and repairs are done in individual units, subject to a particular military situation, capacities of maintenance depots, and the means at a brigade level (division level). Sorry to say, current situation in the implementation and using of progressive information technologies could be characterised by individual effort in particular branches of military logistics, without mutual links and connections. The informatisation of field logistics systems is not taken as a systematic task. As we have no applicable information sources and corresponding organisational structures, we even do not expect any effective upshots in the near future. [VR No 4/2001]



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