Working Paper By
Download 129.46 Kb.
|
The Air Campaign BeginsHaving been in Afghanistan for more than a week, the JAWBREAKER team was anxious for the US bombing campaign to begin. The team had already completed a series of GPS surveys of Northern Alliance frontline positions as well as those of the opposing Taliban. This had been done in an effort to prevent possible collateral damage to NA forces. Gary Schroen, JAWBREAKER’s team leader, was convinced that: Taliban frontline positions offered a clearly defined, target-rich environment made to order for US airpower to strike, and that a concentrated bombing campaign on the Taliban lines would be devastating to their morale and effectiveness. Taliban troops had never suffered the kind of bombardment and punishment they would face from American airpower in the coming fight. Heavy casualties, continuing for days on end, would break the Taliban.”34 Northern Alliance General Ismail Kahn concurred, stating, “If their [Taliban] front lines are heavily damaged, my forces can complete their destruction.”35 He too, along with all of the NA leadership, was anxiously awaiting the promised US air strikes. At 9:10 PM on 7 October 2001, cheers and celebration erupted at the CIA camp in the Panjshir Valley. Explosions could be seen off in the direction of Kabul; the long-awaited bombing campaign had begun. Delays resulted from a number of issues involving primarily combat search and rescue capabilities, proper target designation, a shortage of approved targets, and a heavy emphasis on collateral damage avoidance. All potential targets were scrutinized in painstaking detail. In fact, military attorneys in the Pentagon, at the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), at CENTCOM, and onboard Navy aircraft carriers routinely assessed potential target lists and approved raids and air strikes.36 Frustrated with the situation, General Franks stepped in and put a stop to at least some of the micromanagement from the Pentagon by declaring to JCS Chairman, General Richard B. Myers “that I am not going along with Washington giving tactics and targets to our kids in the cockpits and on the ground in Afghanistan.”37 The campaign was directed by US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) Commander and Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) for OEF, Lieutenant General Charles Wald, from the newly established Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Wald’s mission statement was clear: “On order, Combined Forces Air Component Command provides air support for friendly forces working with the Northern Alliance and other opposition forces in order to defeat hostile Taliban and al-Qaeda forces and to set the conditions for regime removal and long-term regional stability.”38 In a televised address to the nation on 8 October, President Bush announced that “On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes.”39 Although effective, the first night of bombing was far from overwhelming. Only 31 preplanned strategic targets in the vicinities of Kabul, Kandahar, Shindand, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Shibarghan were hit. No frontline Taliban positions were struck. The opening-round attacks were conducted by Air Force B-2 stealth bombers from Whiteman AFB, Missouri; B-1B and B-52 bombers from Diego Garcia; and by Navy F-14 and F/A-18 fighters from aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea. Also, US Navy cruisers, destroyers, and submarines (along with two British submarines) launched Tomahawk missiles in support of the initial offensive. Later that first night, C-17 Globemasters from Ramstein Air Base in Germany began dropping food and medical supplies to Afghan refugees who were fleeing the cities. A US Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) had been working (since the previous summer) with refugees who were forced to leave their homes due to devastating drought conditions. An official humanitarian crisis already existed in Afghanistan prior to the beginning of OEF. Years of war, unproductive agriculture, and failure of the government to provide basic services had left a majority of Afghanistan’s 26 million citizens impoverished.40 During the first four nights of the air campaign, C-17s airdropped nearly 150,000 humanitarian daily rations (HDRs) to these needy Afghans.41 Two and one-half million HDRs would be dropped in Afghanistan before the end of the year, and by April 2002, the World Food Program and the USAID had distributed 343,000 metric tons of food throughout the country.42 Surprisingly, the propaganda war had started two days before the initial OEF air strikes. On 5 October, EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft, from the 193rd Special Operations Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, began broadcasting radio transmissions over Afghanistan. A Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF), activated on 4 October at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, developed a variety (different themes, objectives, and target audiences) of Commando Solo radio scripts such as this one aimed at the Afghan people: “On September 11, 2001, thousands of people were killed en masse in the United States…policemen, firefighters, teachers, doctors, mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers all killed. Why?”43 The overall messages were designed to encourage the Taliban to cease support of al-Qaeda, to undermine Taliban/al-Qaeda morale, to promote the legitimacy of US operations, and to convince Afghan citizens that they were not the target of US attacks.44 Eventually, Commando Solo aircrews would accumulate nearly 4,000 flight hours in support of OEF. JPOTF also developed and printed hundreds of thousands of leaflets that were shipped to Diego Garcia and initially disseminated by B-52 bombers over Afghanistan beginning 15 October. Up to 80,000 leaflets could be packaged in a single MK-129 or modified Rockeye leaflet bomb.45 In due course, F-16, F-18, A-6, and MC-130 aircraft would also perform high altitude leaflet drops in the AOR. One such leaflet, written in both Pashto and Dari, described US intentions in Afghanistan as honorable, and pictured an Afghan man and an American Soldier shaking hands. Another portrayed radio towers and gave the frequencies for receiving Commando Solo broadcasts. Thousand of transistor radios (many tuned to the now destroyed former Taliban station frequency) were also airdropped, allowing more Afghans to listen to Commando Solo messages. Other leaflets explained how to properly use the daily rations and warned Afghans to stay clear of unexploded ordnance.46 Meanwhile, the goal of the initial wave of attacks was to gain uncontested control of Afghan airspace and to destroy Taliban air defense capabilities. To this end, US planners placed Scud missile launchers; surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites; early warning radars; and Taliban command-control-communications facilities, airfields, and aircraft on the primary target list. Also hit were Taliban tanks and artillery, the headquarters of two divisions, and the former bin Laden training camp south of Jalalabad. Thirty-five additional targets were attacked on the second day, and by the third day, strikes were conducted during daylight hours. On the fifth day, Air Force aircraft dropped 5,000 pound GBU-28 laser-guided bunker buster bombs on Taliban mountain cave sanctuaries for the first time. AC-130 gunships with their own combat controllers (special operations forces had as yet been unable to enter Afghanistan) and F-15E Strike Eagles from Jaber Air Base in Kuwait (the first use of land base fighters) entered the fray during the second week and began attacking Taliban troop concentrations and vehicles. During the second week of OEF, the target list expanded, signifying a shift in emphasis from preplanned to pop-up (emerging) targets, also called “targets of opportunity.”47 Special Operations Forces Infiltrate Extensive inclement weather, treacherous terrain, and Taliban anti-aircraft fire had delayed the helicopter insertion of Special Forces A-Teams. Since the beginning of the air campaign, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been pushing for a SOF presence in Afghanistan. “When are the Special Forces people going to get in?” he asked every day.48 Rumsfeld had championed using SOF, and at a news conference, he commented on the limitations of aircraft (and the bombing), stating “there are certain things they (aircraft) can’t do – they can’t crawl around on the ground and find people.”49 On the evening of 19-20 October, however, the first of several SF elements infiltrated Afghanistan. The 11-member ODA-555 arrived late in the evening from K2 at the Astaneh JAWBREAKER camp in the Panjshir Valley on board MH-53 Pave Low helicopters. Within a few days, ODA-555 would link up with NA General Bismullah near Baghram. That same night, ODA-595 (12 men) infiltrated the Darya-e Suf Valley on MH-47 Chinooks to join General Dostum’s forces some 70 miles south of Mazar-e Sharif. Not long after, two additional SF members joined 595 and the detachment split into four three-man teams. On the 24 October, ODA 585 landed near Dasht-e-Qaleh then moved south to join General Bariullah Khan’s NA forces near Konduz. October 31st saw the insertion of ODA 553 into Bamian to support Hazara Commander Khalili. Next an eight-man command-and-control element, Operational Detachment Charlie (ODC-53), was inserted to assist General Dostum and his staff on 3 November. On 4 November, ODA-534 landed 24 miles west of Darya-e Suf at Darya-e Balkh to support Northern Alliance General Mohammed Atta. This detachment soon split into two six-man teams; one remained with Atta’s command group, while the other moved ahead to accompany forward NA elements. Finally, ODAs 586 and 594 were flown to a remote landing zone near the Tajikistan border on 8 November. From there, 586 flew south onboard an NA Russian-built helicopter to link up with General Daoud near Farkhar. Detachment 594 moved farther south to the Panjshir Valley.50 The 5th Special Forces Group A-Teams had been kept in isolation facilities (ISOFAC—no family, no phones, guarded location) at Fort Campbell prior to leaving for K2. Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, Commanding General of the United States Army Special Forces, met with the teams at the ISOFAC to explain their mission:51
This complex mission would soon be consolidated into a single, straightforward, statement for all TF Dagger Soldiers once they reached K2: “Advise and assist the Northern Alliance in conducting combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”52 This overly broad statement provided TF Dagger with freedom to command, no operational constraints, and the appropriate amount of leeway necessary to get the job done. ODA 534 team leader, Captain Mark Newman, recalled that “his entire mandate consisted of a handful of PowerPoint slides that told him to conduct unconventional warfare, render Afghanistan no longer a safe haven for terrorists, defeat al-Qaeda, and coup the Taliban.”53 How he accomplished those goals was up to him. “We were given an extraordinarily wonderful amount of authority to make decisions.”54 Directory: wzukusers -> user-16994435 -> documents documents -> Working Paper high, hot and heavy: the ch-47 chinook in combat assault operations in afghanistan Download 129.46 Kb. Share with your friends:
|